UPDATED REPORT ON SOVIET GROUND FORCES BRIGADE IN CUBA

Created: 9/18/1979

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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REPORT ON SOVIET GROUND FORCES BRIGADE IN CUBA"

PREFACE

Thli memorandum lifollowup to the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, "Poaeifaia Prasence of Soviet Ground Forcaa inhat waa pub Hi hid on. thli btmoiandun la based on

data, some of which

oean ryaxamlnad orI Will.. It iaefinitive study of tha origins and avolution of tha Soviet ground forcaain Cuba. Furthar collection and analyaaa ara continuing. M

Msorandua to holders of the9 UN. "Possibleof Soviet Ground Forcaa inaa prtparad under thaof tha National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe, National Foralgn Assessment Cantor. It waa coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency; with tha Bureau of Intelli-gencs and Research. Department of State; with the Defense Intelli-gsnce Agency; with tha National Security Agency; and with theorganisations of tha Dapartmanta of tho Aray, tha Navy, and the Air Force, Information available as0 EDT on9 waa used in the preparation of this memorandum.

Xjeiqji,

s^Jmkiry

* Soviet ground forces combatt brigade bytoon in Cuba ilnca it leait tha. It isthat tha unit or Ita precursor! have bean thereeildual of2 soviet troop presence. conaisti of notorized rifle, tank, and artilleryvarious other combat support and strvlca supportbrigade probablytrength ofan, althoughnight have additional support element! that couldr even eamevhet hightr. Ha haveto determine tha brigade's minion. Ha bslisvalikely minion ii toill but concritsto Ciitro,eidlnssi to defend Cubengisa. Another minion, particularly for tha elementi ofstationed it Lourdss, may be to provide security forThere is no evidence indicating that the Sovietparticipated In tnining Cuban pirionnil or unite. Whilehe excluded that the Soviet unit hoi been uied forof Sovietar.dCuhar.there ia

W

discussion

Introduction

This IXH sets forth what vt now know about tht preianca of Soviat combat troopi in Cuba band on recently acquirad information and on older data rtintarpratad in light of currant analytical judgments.

uly IXH, "Possibls Praaanca of SoviatQround Forcaa in

PaMBlMflHai datl gathered

over leveral yeara,oviat grollfi Forces brigade waa possibly stationed in Cuba, but that its sixs,nd mission wart uncertain. Sines thsn, ths Intslligancs Community hssto tha Bovistin Cuba.

CubshavaBeenTuVtnTJn. Various Intalltganct sgsncias have tatsbliahad working groups to assemble and examine data on Soviet actlvitias there.

Ths heightened intslligsncs collection snd analysis affort haa confirmedovietunit,rigade by tha Sovists (and, on one occssion, by tha Cubansia In Cuba. Tha collection affort hss provided data on tha organisation, atrangth. and locationa of ths unit, as vsll as soma information on its history. Thus far, hovtvtr, wa have not batn able to datarmint what its currant mission may ba, or tsactly how long tht brigade or alamanta of it have batn In Cubs. It is possible that tht brigsdt or its prscurtors may date as far back

Recent Evidence

In April andn support of tha production ofassessing tha overall Cuban-Soviat military rslstionship,Security Agency published ssvsral summary rsports onforcss organisation snd sctlvitiss in Cubs. In sdditionrtfartnetsbrigade"

reports- "stances ofhrtt-yttr

ets! to the

rforctsB CUfll, luooFfllnaladoviet brigade command, snd consisting of ons tsnk bsttslion, one, and probably two, notorized riflaultiple rocket launchar battalion, as wall as other combat and serviceaments,

rint company, two hovitier batteries, two tiultiple rocjtet launcher

nd elementsortar

of the Santiago de site to accoeaodate

equ

las Veges, a

battery In addition, there were enough tents in the bivouac toull complement of personnsl for these units.

lab Vfl9"town. Jjgggglllgll.hopping origh: on the

reportedTyw.il aquippsdfc?w"

and other emjip.oent.nd araonnelprevent itb.ss

brig.de received eix ^th. ,gned to the

the beaiieview of erchival materiel, we believe thet the Sovietc siey have maintained ground forcee units in some form in Cubalthough we cannot confirm thia as yet. Soviet

Sounden organized highly mobile armored combatdeployed primarily at four locations in Cuba between August and Ine estimated thet by then most Soviet ground forcee personnel hed been withdrawn from these four main camps. The Sovietswere then judged to be no longer organised ee combet groupe but were believed to be involved in training Cuban unite. ecently initiated, but still incomplete, review of photography suggests, however, that elementsoviet ground forcss unit may haveat ths Santiago garrison since the fall

ril.nl avidence1 jIi. of ably elements of thet

to Soyist ground forces involvtd in exercises and training activity, and sinceariodicallybrigads." Thaaa ware rigardad In tha Ctumaunity at tha time as consiatant with ths known lovist military training and advisory presence in Cuba. (TS U)

Tha Briqade'a Organization and Strsngth

* synthesis of ths

intelligence confirmsovist ground.

Cuba, snd suggests thst its hasdqusrtsrs is locstsd nssr Santiago de lei Vegas. Avsilabls information indiestas th* brigade consists of four maneuver battallona-ona tank and thras motorixedplus combat support slsnants, including ons multipls rocket launcher battalioniald artillary battalion, and aarvica support elements. If ths brlqads wars fully Banned, it would havean. Ths brigade could include mors email combat aupport victunits that could push its strengthen or evan aooewhat highai

bolitvs thst ths Sovist brloads Is at or nssr its full

'i',

ths most likely mission la to

msll but concrstt Soviet commitment to Castro,o defend Cubs ind his rsgime.*

lnothsrfor tha slsnants ofstationed at Lourdts-msv ba to provideSovist facilitiss.

Assistant CMsf of Staff for Intalligtnca, Department of tha Army, bsllavaa tha cost likaly mission to bs security for present snd future Sovist facilities. oviet commitment to defend Cuba were ths principal mission, ths Sovlsts would mora likaly hsvs sdvtrtlssd this unit's pressncs, rsther thsn dallbarataly concssl it.

The Sovist brigade lacks ths sir and ass lift capability required to givsower projsction rols. In any csss, we belisvs it is highly unliksly thst tht Sovistsslon ss militarily snd politically plausible.

: Whils ths brigade or its prscursor slsasnts msy havsrols in training Cubans in, thsrt isthat this hss bstn tht cass in rscsnt ysara. lack of communications bstvssn slsnsnts ofwhils on sxtrcissi and Cuban army elements,thst Sovist snd Cuban slsmsnts makeof ths Sin Ptdro training srts, strongly suggestSoviet im^tor units.

indicstss thst ths unit dots not conduct training oparstions with Cubans. Moreover, known Soviet training unitsis, HMOconsist largaly of offlcsrs, snd it is unliksly that such sn officer-hssvy group would trsin ss an intsgrsl Soviet unit or thst it would, or could, exercise in tht way thst wt have obssrvtd tht Sovists sxsrcist st Ssn Pedro. While it cannot bs sxcludsd that Cuban military personnel have observed Sovist enercisesemonstration of militti* tachnioyss.

K

personnel

lJj Personnel of the Sovietof

which appaar. tQmiilloBf

from the

Original document.

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