Iraq-USSR:
A Downturn in Relations
Iraq-USSR:
A Downfall] in Relations (u)
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan has reinforced Iraq's mistrust of
Moscow and further strained an already cool relationship. It hasigh-level Iraqi revirw of relations wiih the Soviets, posing prickly questions for Baathist leaders as ihey try touitable response to the Soviet aggression. The increasingly hostile behavior of the Iraqi Communisi Parly, which the Baathisti regardool for Soviet subversion, will help shape Baghdad's response.!-
Iraq's public denunciation of the Soviet invasion is in contrast lo Iheto Moscow's initial meddling in Kabul inhisaltitude has sparked rumors thai Baghdad might canceltreaty wilh the USSR. Soove, however, wouldbe weighed carefully because of the Iraqi military's heavy relianceequipment. Moscow already manipulates militarydeliveriesraq in an attempt to advance political ends.theere fore, would have serious consequences for Iraqi
Baghdad fears that ihe Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US-Iran confrontation will introduce superpower compeiition into the Persian Gulf and spoil Iraq's opportunity to replace Iran as the dominant power in the region.
Whether Baghdad decides on gradual or precipitous change in its relations with Moscow, any such change would be unlikely to lead to closer tics wiih the United States, wjih which the Baathisti still have substantia' differences, especially over Arab-Israeli issues.inimum, however. Iraq is likely to strengthen the existing trend toward closer ties wiih Third World and Western nations.
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Iraq-USSR:
A Downturn in Relations
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hasajor predicament for Iraq. The sudden appearance of0 Soviet troopsearby country combined with ;hc potential for Soviet ruin from rampant instability in Iran hasgreat alarm in (op Baathist circles. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has publicly denounced the Soviets on two separate occasions, describing the occupation of Afghanistanaked power play. The shock of the Soviet invasion has begun to wear off. and the baathists are probablyhorough review of their relations wilh the USSRies* to seeking adjustments to protect Iraqi sovereignty.
As Saddam Husayn surveys developments in the region, heicture that must inspire deep concern and apprehension for the future of his radical, but anti-Communiit. regime. South Yemen. Ethiopia, andarc. to varying degrees, ruled by Soviet clients. North Yemen is vulnerable to pressure from the USSR and in client in South Yemen. Moscow has improved its ability to influence developments In Iran and Pakistan. Unity plans wilh Iraq's archrival. Syria, have been scrapped, and Damascus has moved closer to the USSR. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has grown over the decade. Closer lo home, ihe Iraqi Communist Party, which is tied to Moscow, has recently declared that an end lo Baathist rule in Baghdad is its top priority. These developments no doubt strengthen Iraq's conviction thai the Soviets arc intent on gaining control of the Persian Gulfs energy resources, including Iraq's vast oil reserves.
Signs of Baghdad's cooling relations wiih Moscow have been visible for several years, especially after iheaki regime took over in Afghanistan in the springontacts with the USSR arc weakening, and the Soviets view with concern growing Western economic activity in Iraq. There have been reports of Sovici workers in Iraq subjected to abuse by the local population. Political tics also have been soured by Soviet interference in the region and the Baathists' harsh repression of ihc Iraqi Communist Parly. Only in the military sphere docs Baghdad place high value on its tics wiih Moscow, and even in ihis area the Iraqis have been trying lo reduce their dc|>cndence.p
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Lackluster Economic Economic relation* wiih lhc USSR have stagnated. Most recent increasesimports have conic from non-Soviclrend thai seems
likely to continue^
The Soviets have run into difficulties in0 oilwith Baghdad. The Baathist regime not onlyovietincreased deliveries, but cut the USSR's authorizationillion tons less thanther Warsaw Pactalso were disappointed by the Iraqi refusal to allowNone apparently were cut back drastically, but the Iraqitheir efforts to secure adequate oil supplies. Iraq has the oilto the Soviets and East Europeans, but has decided instead to boostsales io Western and Third Worldwhere Baghdadincrease its political and economic
Indications that Iraq may reconsider iis decision0 oil supplies to the Soviets have given rise to speculation that Baghdad iscl- in hones of pressuring Moscow to be more generous in providing arms supplies. Iraq is interested in obtaining new equipment and in speeding up the delivery of military spare parlaJ
Military Dependence The USSR is Iraq's chief arms supplier, providing the bulk of the Iraqi
armed forces' major combat equipment, including tanks, aircraft, ships, and missile systems. Burgeoning oil revenues, however, have given ihc Baalhjsts the opportunity to diversify iheir arms suppliers and ample funds to purchase those items most suitable for Iraqi military needs regardless of the country of origin.aghdad has ordered aboutillion in Western military equipment, nwily from Prance. Despite these purchases. Ihc number and range of Sovici arms in Iraqi hands and on order mean thatramatic policy shift. Baghdad will be dependent on Sovici weapons well inio
Moscow's tight control or mililary spare parts for Iraq's Sovict-jupplicd military equipment has probably strengihcncd the Baathist regime's wariness of its continued dependence on one arms supplier]
In an attempt to lessen their dependence on Soviet spare ports, the Iraqis have recently sought to eipand their domestic arms industry and arrange for alternative sources for maintenance of Soviet-supplied equipment. As part of this effort, the Iraqi* haveililary relationship wiih Yugoslavia lhat includes arms purchases, military training support, and maintenance and construction assistance.
[Yugoslavia has been selling Military goodsservices to Scar Eastern states that are uneasy about their dependence on the USSR or thai have had their arms supplies cul off.
Tim Iraqi-Soviet political relations, strained by Moscow's meddling in South Yemen and Ethiopia, have grown even more taut in ihe wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Iraq's public disapproval of the USSR has gone far beyond the Baalhisi reaction lo the Marxist coup in Kabul inraq has publicly condemned the Soviets, voted for the UN resolution calling for the immediate wilhdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, and was the first radical Arab state to agree to attend the Islamic Conference meeting in Pakisian that was highly critical of the USSR and its Afghan clients. Although Iraq supported conference resolutions critical of Ihe United States, we have no information that Baghdad tried to soften criticism of the Soviets.
Iraq has also made directly known to the USSR its opposition to Ihe occupation of Afghanisian. Despite close political, economic, and military ties over the years, Moscow has been unable to convert its leverage into effective political influence in Baghdad. Growing Iraqi oil wealth has further restricted Moscow's ability to sway Iraq. The USSR's use of mililary force to secure its political position in Afghanistan has probably shaken Iraq's belief that the USSRafe ally with whom differences could be overlooked or contained because overall bilateral relations were beneficial to Iraq.
The Baalists' most immediate fear rcgnrding Scvict intentions towardcenters on (he possibility for Soviet gains in Iran. Theost-Khomeini government will be controlled by aregime in whieh ihe Soviet-backed Communist party. Ihe Tudeh.central role. In Baghdad's view,evelopment would lessenin maintaining good lies wiih Iraq as Moscow's only political allyregion. The Iraqis also believe this would give the USSR leverageand once again link Baghdad's Gulf rival
Conclusion
lo be worthcnly. Sovic: rhctoncul rcMr.iint. turnover,lilllc loallcviiile Uaalhisl
Rcccni Communist activiiirs arc sure to furl her undermine lhc Soviet Union's standing withulms
In bte December the leader of ihc Iraqi Ccmmunitt Parly declared thai the parly's most urgent task wasut an end io the Baathiste'aid thereright future forroad anii-Baaihist alliance of Arabs. Kurds, and religious groups, an ominous reference to ihc Communists' willingness io exploit rcsiivcncss among Iraq's majority Shia Muslim population.
Continuing efforts to increase Iraqi prestige in the nonaligncd movement: Baghdad will succeed Cuba as leader of the movement2 and probably hopes that this will inhibit the Soviets from engaging in blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.
Developing closer tics with Western Europe and Japan. Iraq probably would not believe its independence was compromised byove since the Baathists could use their economic leverage to assure equal treatment.
Giving greater consideration to relations with China. Warmer Sinu-lraqi relations would provide Baghdadolitical boost and underscore Iraq's independent approach to international affairs. It would also add to the strnin wiih
Baghdad has already laid the groundwork for reducing its reliance on the USSR. The Iraqis arc likely to accelerate iheir purchases of Western arms, despite havingajor arms agreement inith the Soviet Unton. Several West European firms, for example, ace strong candidates lo supply an array of equipment lo expand the small Iraqi Navyorce capable of supporting the Baathist goal of making Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf.|
JI he Iraqis will also try to secure
spare parts and maintenance services for their Soviet-supplied equipment from alternative sources such as Yugoslavia, Romania. India, and Vietnam, which all import significant quantities of Iraqi oil.P
Iraq's public denunciation of the USSR has fueled speculation that Baghdad might abrogate iis friendship treaty with Moscow. Baghdad hps done nothing lo quell theseharp contrast lo official Iraqi denials inollowing similar reports that the friendship treaty was endangered by (he Soviets' interference in Afghanistan.
The Iraqis, who are almost certainlyigh-level review of relations with the USSR, are well aware lhattep would have far-reaching consequences for Iraqi military strength. Nevertheless, Saddamlrong nationalist, has demonstrated an ability to make sudden policy changes lo preserve or advance essential Iraqi interests. He may even be willing toisruption in Soviet arms deliveries because the military threat from Iran and Syria is not great: the Iranian military is in disarray, and Syria must focus on Israel andoviet move into Iran could be the final straw inducing Saddam to break with the USSR.I-
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has crystallized Baghdad's fears of superpower competition in thehreat not only to Iraqi sovereignty but also to Baghdad's plans lo project its influence throughout the Gulf. Official commentary on Afghanistan, as well as on the Iran hostage situation, has consistently followed this linc.r
A chill in Iraqi-Soviet relations would now automatically lead to an improvement in relations wiih Washington. The importance of the Palestine issue to Iraq's foreign policy precludes Baghdad's drawing closer to the United States. Even if this obstacle were overcome, major differences wilh the United States would conhrue in areas such as north-south relations, oil policy, nuclear proliferation, and human rights. For ihe moment,irect Soviet threat to the st.rvival of the Baathist regime couldundamental change in Iraqi views of the United Stales.
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS
The sentence dealing with Iraq's purchasesmilitary equipment, pagef the Intelligence Memorandum entitledDownturn in Relations" ,
hould read:
Since'Baghdad has ordered about S3 billion in Western military equipment, mostly from France.
Original document.
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