Nttlonn. Foreignmerit Center
The Soviet [Leadership Balance and Afghanistan
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The So-rfet Leadershipalance aad Afgbanbtaa
Keydecision lo intervene in Afghanistan has raised theall
major Soviet decisions have in thethe degree of consensus that existed among the leadership on this action. It has also promptedthat PresidentKremlin's strongest advocate ofnoeading force in Soviet policymaking. [
On balance we believe that Brezhnev remains the dominant force within the Politburo and was directly involved in and supportive of the decision to invade Afghanistan. Measuring the level of enthusiasm within the Soviet hierarchy for military action is more difficult. We suspect there were some reservations, but we believe these concerns did not extend to fear for the future orolicy with which the leadership was increasingly disenchanted during the closing months
Public statements by Soviet leaders aboul Afghanistan before the invasion occurred revealed little moreommon concern with developments there. Party ideologist Suslov, who has often spoken out favorably about revolutionary processes in the Third World, implied that Afghanistanommunist state worth preserving. This could mean that he was in the vanguard of those favoring intervention.
Premier Kosygin| |
lalmost certainly did not play an active part in the Afghan decision. His counsel probably would have been on the side of caution, and his absence from office probably facilitated the choice for military action.
the temper of the Politburohole shifted away from detente, however, it seems unlikely that Kosygin's presence would have altered the decision. Despite this shift, we have notasic realignment of power within the Politburo. In November, an opportunity to replace Kosygin was allowed to pass; he is still being ranked second in the Soviet pecking order. Instead of retiring Kosygin, the Politburo broughtyear-old Brezhnev loyalist. First Deputy Premier Tikhonov. We have no reason to believe that Tikhonov's promotion, in itself, altered the balance within the Politburo on foreign policy issues. ( I
The L'SSR'i leaden must hive Uken Ihcir positions on the intervention with an eye on their relative standingost-Brezhnev political environment. To the extent that the intervention has undercut detentewhich most Soviet leaders had been signaling their increased discontent-so, too, has it weakened the succession prospects of Brezhnev's protege Chcrnenko, one of detente't most vocal advocates in the Kremlin. The contender who presumably profited the most is Brezhnev's party deputy, Kirilenko, who in the past has voiced some reservations about detente.
If the invasionuccess, those who might hive argued againsl it probably will remain silent. But if the USSR is driwnong, costly military operation that damages Soviet interestslobal baus, the decision will be reexamined. There are already signs of second thoughts surfacing among second-level officials. The outcome ofebate couldignificant impact on the makeup of the leadership, particularly in the post-Brezh ev
era.
A prolonged, costly conflict in Afghanistan might encourage younger elements in thc Soviet establishment to pressejuvenation of the leadership. Unsatisfactory results in Afghanistan might also make KCB Chairman Andropov and Defense Minister Ustinov vulnerable and subject to removal at or before thc next parly congress inoreign Minister Gromyko might also be faulted for miscalculating the adverse worldwide reaction to the use of military force in Afghanistan.^
The Soviet Leadership Balance and Afghanistan
addition of Party Secretary Gorbachev to tie Politburoandidate (nonvoting) member could also be interpretedove designed to preserve the delicate balance of power. Gorbachev's politicalare far from clear, but he and Suslov may be linked through association wiih the Suvrcpolase could be made, therefore, that if pro- and anti-detenteby Brezhnev and Suslovin the leadership, each sideew member in tbe late Novemberappointments.
were under way in tbe soviet: officials have even takon the line that the Soviel action in Afghanistan reflects the growing influence of "younger, more hawkish Politburo members {who] have become more involved In recent policyf there hadhift in the power balance, it presumably would have been reflected in significant personnel changes in' , ]
Thereew changes in thc Soviet leadership at the party's Central Committee plenumut these changes did not alter the balance of power or threaten Brezhnev's leadership. Thc elevationyeai -old First Deputy Premier Tikhonov to full (voting) membership in the Politburo was, to thelus for Brezhnev in at least two respects. It added another Brezhnev loyalist lo lhe top leadership, and it dealtacancy that otherwise might have been filledounger, more ambitious man. Tikhonov ia directly in line for the top governmental post should Koaygm not recover from his heartircumstance that bespeaks near-term continuity and slabilliy within the leadership.
More importantly, in terms of reducing thc threat to Brezhnev's primacy, Gorbachev's appointmenttoe opportunityore seniorexample, Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy or Bcloruinan party bossmove to Moscow to oversee ugricuttuial matters in the Politburo.ove for either man would have strengthened his credentialsossible successor lo Brezhnev and. thus, might have contributedilt against Brezhnev within the top leadership. Neither man increased his relative political importance at the November plenum, howiver, and Brezhnev was thus able to participate in the final phase of decisionmaking onh his political flanks secure.
Nor did Brezhnev's health prevent him from caerMsing his powers. He was activehr. fall esjcpt for two weeks In mid-October.'
main-
ychedule throughout November
Jlheleaderahippresumauiy ,
the Afghan insurgents.
home in earlylikely US reactionsSoviet move against the Amin regime andon other aspects of implementing
' i;
Brezhnev dropped out of public view onecember.
Foreign Minister Gromykoighlyapology for Brezhnev's absence fromonecember for Angolan Presidentexpressing Brezhnev's regrets thft he couldthe affair becauseatarrhalprobably offered this explanation to headnother round of "Brezhnev is dead, or dying"to those that had circulated two monthsBrezhnev failed to show up for any ofwith Syrian President Assad duringvisit to Moscow,.
rhere is no reason to believe that he was out ot touch with the developments on the Afghan front during this period. I
Brezhnev's public ariivitie* during January add toepression that he is very much at the center of things in Moscow. His name remained In tho public media, which havetream of messages on domestic issues from Brezhnev to various segments of the Soviet population. In addition, Brezhnev's role was highlighted when he, together with Suslov and Ponomarev, met in early January with Frenchleader Marchaii In talks resulting in Marchaia* press conference remarks defending the AfghanMoreover, Brezhnev was the only top leader who met with French National Assembly President Chaban-Delmas onanuary before the latter cut
short his visit because ofthc Soviet actions against dissident physicist Andrey Sakharov.
In addition, Brezhnev has taken the leading role among his colleagues on Afghan issues. His message of congratulation, published in Pravda onecember, makes Brezhnev the only Soviet leader who has gone on record, as yet, with an endorsement of Babrak Karmal's "election" as the new 'op man in Kabul. Brezhnev's interview in Pravda onanuary set the standnrd for other Soviet leaders who have publicly defended the Soviet military Intervention. In short, the evidence on hand strongly suggests that Brezhnev was actively involved in the Afghan decision and is prepared to defend it. Thus, while he may not be as vigorous today in directing and shaping the consensus cs he wasoears ago, we believe that on balance Brezhnev remains the dominant force and arbiter of Politburo interests.^
The Decision's Setting
Soviet dissatisfaction with the Khalq regime in Kabul had been growing during the past year. Sovietin Kabul and elsewhere were exploring alternatives to the regime byf not earlier. The collapse of the Moscow-backed intrigues by Afghan President Taraki against Prime Minister Amin in mid-September probably convinced the Soviet leaders that Amin could be toppled only by direct intervention and that planning for such action should commence. Brezhnev may have felt that heersonal unite in all this, if only because he had met withto confer on his move againstdays before Taraki launched his attempted coup. No doubt there was added pressure to do something as tbe subsequent months brought increased casualties among Soviet advisers, tho attackoviet military Installation by Afghan pilots, and the failureoviet-managed drive against Ihe Afghan insurgents.
There were no signs that Afghanistan was aissue within the leadership during this period, but there were Indications of mounting pressure for :nore militancy on other Issues. Onctober, for example, USA Institute Director Arbatov told f * ]in Moscow that Brezhnev's proposals on
European force reductions, made in East Berlin on
2
6 October, were opposed "not only by the military, but by other parts of the Soviet leadership asrackdown on dissidents and human rights activists, which some of them called the most severe Inears, also beganoderate decline in Jewish emigration. One speakerentral Committee cvnference for media propagandist* held in October or November is said to have questioned the ,virtues of the SALT II. treaty, and according to I he word "detente" all but rrom be fund -closed-doors talks byIn the last month1 li ;|
mier Kosygin')1
Jniay have made it
easier ror the Politburo toecision on military Intervention. Kosygin, while as tough-minded as any of th* Politburo members in defending Soviet interests, would have been particularly concerned about the impactilitary intervention on Soviet relations with the West. He has longoice of caution in foreign affairs and probably would have arguedecision that would involve Soviet military forcesonflict beyond the USSR's borders.
Kosygin displayed his displeasure with the USSR's miliiary Intervention in Czechoslovakia, for example, both before and after the fact and has never wholly subscribed to the so-called Brezhnev doctrine Of limited sovereignty. It may be noteworthy that, as mentioned above, the message of congratulations to the new Afghan regime onecember bore only Brezhnev'sdeparture from normalBoth Brezhnev and Kosygin signed greetings to Amin In early December on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty. Both men also signed messages to Cubaanuary, to Kampucheaanuary, and to Prime Minister Oandhl onanuary. Q
Speeches by other Soviet leaders prior to tberevealed little about their attitudes onothereneral concern for events there. Party Secretary Suslov indicatedew occasions during the past year that he considered Afghanistan one of several Third World states that had embarked "on the path of socialistmplying that he consideredommunist slate worth preserving.
Suslov has also been relatively positive in hisofeady development of revolutionary processes" In the world, and he gave the Impression that he was more committed to supportingovements than other Soviet
Party Secretary Chernenko, speaking in SovietAsia last August, complained aboul "imperialist attempts" to Interfere in the internal affairs of "our neighbor, democratic Afghanistan" and to deprive the Afghan people of "their revolutionaryhile this would seem to put him very c'tsc to Suslov on the question of the progressive nature of the Khalq .xgime in Kabul, his professed confidence that such efforts would fail suggests that Cherneako saw no reason at that time for any dramatic change in the level of Soviet involvement. PI
Party Secretary Kirilenko said nothing about the Afghan situationpeech two weeks later, and Shcherbitskiy was equally reticent on the situation in September and October. Both men, however, have repeatedly called for more vigilance against the intrigues of 'hose who "nurture aggressive plans" inimical to Soviet interests. Similarly, DefenseUstinov avoided commenting on the Afghan situation while emphasizing vigilance in his public remarks last fall. Q
The silence of these three last fall on the Afghan situation may haveatter of discretion rather than dissent, but we do know that the leadership was
rerorlt
C
i.ig divergent views from the Soviet staffearlyargued that the USSR should maintainto Afghanistan regardless of the costs inmaterial. 1Is said to have opposed this view, stating thatadvantage gained from assistingnot justify the costs involved. The disagreement
edly was referred to Moscow for resolution.
Kirilenko, speaking for the leadershiphole at the Kremlin ceremonyovember marking the Bolshevik Revolution, noted that Afghanistan was one of several countries that had recently embarkedath of independent develhis formulation.
A
tbe urns that Foreign Ministry Gromyko used In his speech at the United Nations oneptember,iddle groundthe remarks by Suslov and Cbernenko on the one hand, and the "nocomment" from Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and Ustinov in their previous public statements. Both of these "official" statements appeared to avoid directly confronting the issue while tbi top leaders presumably reassessed their policy after Ttraki's failure in his bid to Oust Amin in mid-September, j |
eassessment probably was under wayOctober and plans for the military intervention must have oeen ready by late November. There is no fcign that they were discussed at the Centralplenum onovember which, according to public accounts, was devoted to economic issues '
During these closing monthshe Soviet leadership gave no sign that Afghanistan was the weightiest issue they had under consideration. Soviel leaders were sending mined signals on how Moscow intended to respondATO decision on Theatre Nuclear Forcesaising the possibility that this issue was the major source of contention in the Kremlin at that time.peech onovember in Bonn, Gromyko saidecision would destroy the basis for negotiations. He continued toyielding on this point even after the Warsaw Pact communique In early December stated that "the Implementation of ihcnd not the decision itself, would destroy the basis for negotiations. Meanwhile, ihe deputy chief of Ihe Soviet Central Committee's InternationalVadlm Zagladln, was quoted In the West German and Italian press onndovember respectively as favoring ihe continuance ofnegotiations even if NATO decided in favor of
The "A. Petrov" commentary on the Tehran hostages in Pravdaecember was another sign thai the Soviet leadership was willing to take actions that might damage detente. Thetempled to justify the seizure of the hostages and in so doing signaledajority of the leadership was prepared to risk further deterioration in relations with the Uniied States^'
An article in r'ne/yz^ onecember suggests there might have been some resistance to this toughening trend. The article was noi at all specific with regard to issues bui it pointed out thaiecision is taken allthose with divergentact as one person, ttoint of reminding Central Committee members lhat Ihey are subject lo this discipline and warned that "hardened factionaries" who ignore the will of the party deserve to be banished, j |
Afterrttnior.
Against this background It Is possible that the decision to use military force in Afghanistan was made with relative ease after the leadershipougher, more assertive foreign policy linethe board. As in past crises, Brezhnev, who has always been sensitive lo the prevailing mood of his colleagues, hashimself squarely in the forefront of (his policy shift. He has heard rumors about his declining health and weakened authority, and his behavior since the invasion seems designed, t" least in part, io make it known that he is in charge. He also mayirm position Is necessary to cover his vulnerability from his past advocacy of
In his recent Pravda "interview" Brezhnev said lhat the decision on Afghanistan wasimple one for the Soviet leaders. This could be interpretedint that the Politburo was divided, but we think the more likely intent of that remark was to persuade the Soviet and world public thai the Politburo, fully aware of ihe seriousness of Its decision on Afghanistan, had felt thai Il had no alternative under the existing circumsiances.
The silence of the other top leadersesiregetting too far out In front on this issue whenis so near. The speeches that are beingconnection with theebruary elections forlegislative bodies are providing each of themto comment on the world situation. Whilethe impression of wanting to avoid sayingthat might jeopardize their positions in theera, they have fully supported the decisionAfghanistan and have blamed thefor the disruption of detente, themes set forthi
Implications for IJ* Sacetwale* j
The decision to Intervene militarily In Afghanistan almost certainly will have implications for theIn Moscow. If the invasion sets thingsSovietshort order, those who might have argued against it probably will remain silent, hoping to put as much distance as possiblo between this episode and the succession process.ong, costly military operation that damages Soviet policy interestslobal basis mighteexamination of the decision to move Into Afghanistan^ There already are signs of second thoughts about the wisdom of the invasion among second-level officials.ebate at the Politburo level would almost certainly lead to major chsnges in the top leadership, regardless of whether Brezhnev remained on the scene^
Prolonged conflict in Afghanistan could work to the advantage of Shcherbitskiy, Romanov, and other relatively young leaders still waiting in thestrengthening their caseejuvenation of the leadership. None of these young Turks are currently inclined toharge against Brezhnev and the other Politburout they may press for several changes ath Party Congress inhey almost certainly will argue that the time has come for Party Control Committee Chairman Pclshe, whoo step down. They also may InsUt that Kosygin be replaced If he cannot resume his former responsibilities, and demand that the job be given to one of their number rather lhan Tikhonov.
A protracted campaign in Afghanistan that docs not produce the desired results but does complicate Soviet interests elsewhere in the world will also embarrass the three members of the Politburo who arc charged with safeguarding nationalChairman Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Andrew could be vulnerable on twofailure of Taraki's move against Amin last September, which must have beenand the KGB's failure to gel rid of Amtn and install Babrak Karmai in Kabul before the Soviet troops went into action onecember. Andropov also would bear some responsibility fot intelligence assessments that led the Politburo touick and easy success in Afghanistan. ( |
Ukdnov would also be imperiled if his assessment of the military situation in Afghanistan before the coup onecember differed from the reality the Soviets are now facing. He would also have to accept some responsibility for the less than outstandingof the Soviet troops, and whatever discipline and morale problems develop within the Soviet armed forces in the months to come. Some Soviet leaders, for example, could ask Ustinov how the SovietIn Afghanistan squares with his repeatedthat the Soviet armed forces are always ready to cope with any task they are given. Gromyko also could be faulted for having misjudged the worldwideto the Soviet move againsl the Aminrj^]
In the meantime,matter how much he agreed with lhe decision onfeel some pain over the demise of detente. He also must realize thai the collapse of detente has left him vulnerable lo somesince some of his Politburo colleagues seemove been questioning detente in nrivate over the past few years. These leaders might use the recent events toase against Brezhnev's handling of foreign policy, which was one of his political strengths during.
In any event,lmost certain to ease up on his past efforts to Improve Chernenko's standing within the leadership. Indeed, Chernenko may have suffered somethingetback, if only because be has been the potential successor most supportive of detente and further steps to curb the arms race,imeumber of bis Politburo colleagues have been expressing their doabts more openly during the past year or more. P
By contrast, Kirilenko may be able to use tbe increased international tension to argue the need for anhand at the helm. Moscow party chief Grishin may also benefit, if onlyompromise candidate who would be acceptableajority of the Politburo, including kingmaker Suslov. Suslov reportedly is determined to block Kirilenko's candidacy, and bis influence has probably Increased with the intervention. On the other hand, Suslov probably would put the regime's needs ahead of his own preferences if tbe succession issue had to be resolvedoment of high tension in the world.)-
Original document.
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