National
National Identity Among the Soviet Uzbeks
IIS
' Aoj AwtAf preparation of this report.
^
The author of this paperPolitical Analysis. CommcriBand queries arc welcome and should be directed to the Chief.
has been coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research, Geographic and Cartographic Research, and Cent rail Reference, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR-Eastern Europe.
Confi&nlial
pa fallall May
CoiilTllviiliil
National [dentity Anions thc Soviet Uzbeks!
4 million Uzbeks or thc Soviet Union arc by fur thc most numerous of the non-Russian nationalities of Central Asia. Their identity is founded in common racial, historical, linguistic, and religious characteristics, as wellommon core of customs and values. In thc recent past, they identified themselves by place of residence, clan affiliation, or simply asut now they refer lo themselvesation, Thc Uzbeks' ethnic sclf-asscttiveness and national consciousness is in part thc outcome of Soviet policies aimed at establishing separate nationalities among thc Central Asian population and in partistorical process of ethnic consolidation. Q
These Soviet policies (hat have emphasized ethnic national identity arc having some unintended consequences. As Uzbek national self-assertion emerges, so do tendencies toward Russian-Uzbek friction, rivalry, and animosity. There is no widespread political protest or dissent among thc Uzbek people, however, and (he Soviet regime remains firmly in control. In general. Uzbeksuiet optimism and confidence that is bolsteredurgeoning Uzbek population and an emerging native elite. This elite has taken (he lead in many of (he religious, cultural, and (cchnical development occurring among thc non-Russian nationalities of Soviet Central Asia.
!
illion Uzbeks in Afghanistan share many social and spiritual values with the Uzbeks of thc Soviet Union. On thc other hand, important cultural and economic differences between Soviet and Afghan Uzbeks have emerged since the beginning of thc Soviet regime. Wc know little about thc current status and nature of tics between the (wo groups. On thc surfucc. Soviet Uzbeks are relatively indifferent to the Islamic revolution in Iran and to the Muslim resistance in Soviet occupied Afghanistan. Wc cannot, however, predict how the Uzbeks may eventually respond to these events.) ^]
Note: Thb paper Is portarger itudy on the Soviet Muillm minorities, tt has been Usucd separately became or the Intereit generated by recent development! In the Muilim border areas of the USSR. Component paper* on the other Muillm minorities of Sovielnd the Cbmcmus are forthcoming, to be follov*edaper addrcsiing the broader Impltcat-ons of Muslim minorities in the Soviet Unfon.^
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Contents.
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Emergence of National Identity
Element! of Identity s
Racial and Physical Unity
Historical Heritage
bMibib Ill iiAiH
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Language
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Religion'] !
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Problems and Prospects
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Issues
Relations
Issues
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Tables '
Family and Fertility [
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oi lasnkent
Minorities of the Uzbek Republic Who Speak Uzbek as Their First Language
Newspapers Outside the Uzbek)
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Ml. r
People in the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and China
Population by99
Population ofthc Uzbek99
o
zbek ana Kussian urowm in tncovnui umun. vj inr Gross Reproduction Rate Id USSR. RSFSR, Uzbek SSR
Rate Dynamics in Uzbek SSR. RSFSR. USSR
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ConVdcntial
I The Uzbek SSR, home to overillion Uzbeks,and of van deserts and fertile oases. It has an area0 square kllomeiers, about the size af Sweden.region's major rivers, the Amu Darya in the southwest and the Syi aarya lh the northyest.form natural boundaries. Afghanistan lies on the southern border of the republic. The Uzbek SSRnusually diversified economy. It ranks third among the worlds cotton producers, has extensive reserves of natural gas, and has one of the world's largest gold mines. Most Uzbeks, however, work as cotton growers.
Com
National Identity Among the Soviet Uzbeten
Shared phytical appearance, history, language, and religionommon core of custom and values contribu'e to contemporary Uzbek identity. These elemenu underlie the Uzbek perception ofelineated fromhc latter, for example, includingkrainians, and fellow Muslims as well. Contemporary Uzbek identity,is notomogenous amalgam of national characteristics. An Uzbek of former years would have identified himself In terms of his place of residence or clan affiliation. He may also have called himself simplysing lhat single word to describe an aggregate of cultural, psychological, and socialions, attiiudes. and customs. While some Uzbeks may still emphasize particular clan or linguistic affiliationsew others may perceive themselves in termsroader Islamic community; most Uzbeks todayidentify themselves exclusively as
TheSovic'. regime's encouragement of the rise of an Uzbek nationality has meant the emergence of an Uzbek national consciousness, national self-assertion, and expression of national pride. Uzbek national .identity is nourished by the fact that Uzbeks are by far 'the most numerous and most developed group among Soviet Central Asians. Furthermore, almost all the important cultural and historical cities of Centralas Bukhara, Khiva. Kokand, Samarkand, andsituated in the Uzbek SSR, or Uzbekistan. Uzbeks claim as their own the heritage of Central Asia's leaders, scholars, poets, and writers, such as Ibn Slna. Ulugbek, Tlmur. and All Shir Navai. The Uzbeksignificant force In tbe Central Asian intelligentsia, aad the most importantand educationalandin the republic. Increasingly, the Uzbeks view themselves as responsible Tor thc culturalof Uzbekistan. Condescending at limes even to Russians, the Uzbeks often assume the role of "elder brother" to other Central Asian
' Each ofMbfraupt, Ihcbc latcm panA-eftJtlsn and ihcn the rati.Kacir at iSe| Uzbek. Each group ha* In own dialect, biuoey (theyy
different Utaai).and mcaaurr of aortal cohnrrenca*.
Uzbek national consciousness is furthered by their rising levels ofttainmentr.bckt now contribute substantially to the leadership cadres of Central Asia. For example. Uzbek engineersnstructors are found inenclaves throughout Ihc area, often with ihcir own Uzbek schooli andithin thc Uzbek republic other rationalities (for esample. Crimean Tatars. Kipchaks. and even some Tadzhiks) sometimes attempt to "pass" as Uzbeks by speaking Uzbek in order to gain the preference Uzbeks enjoy for jobs and educational pUcemeni.'
Accordimoneihcvber ofihcUibrt &SK erewoofer 0rong ihriirpgs. UrocblnoeaMdhaittal0 numbrr o*Mladkaic thai ihc number of
In Utbchlalan wlthtetondary and hither tpccial oducalionime* In atcmrs In Indaury
' Secn appendii for atr Urtxk acwipapcn puMUhed
' Seea appendix Whon-Uitek nairttulille* cUimina Uibek a* finl lanaaaflc. I
J
Ekwaracs of Identity
Contemporary Uzbek identity and self-assertion are the products of both internal ethnic Developments and policies of the Soviet regime. Although Soviet policies on nalionalitici sought to emphasize and utilize salient Uzbek characteristics, scene policies unintentionally increased ethnic friction and animosity toward Russians. ,
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Hoc,at und rkysicmi Unity. Uzbeks tend lo share! similar physical characteristics, suggesting tome racial delineation from other Central Asian people. Stress upon unique "national" dreaa further separates Uzbeks from other groups. I
Thedistincthre physical appears nee of the Uzbeks does not alone serve to legitimize Uzbek claims to ethnic identity, but it has come to be recognized as one of the component elements of tha identity. Uzbeks are leas Mongoloid in appearance than the neighboring Kazakh and Kirgiz people, although they arc similar to the minority Tadzhiks of Ihe plains. They are typically round-headed, of medium stature with dark eyes and hair. In general, ihey show an even mixture of Mongol and Caucasian elements. Those Uzbeks whose recent ancestors were still aeminomadJc show more Mongol-
otd characteristics lhan those whose ancestors have long been settled and have intermarried to some extent with
Educated Uzbeks and those who work or live in cities tend to wear Western-style clothing. In contrast, the rural population frequently wears lhe traditional Uzbek dress. For men. itobe striped with bright colors, tiederchief al lhe waist: for women, it includes bright silk dresseshawl over Ihe head. The traditional black and white patterned skulks p. lhe Juppi. is Mill worn by many Uzbek men even in urban
eritmge. Uzbeks daim as port of ihcir history such figures as Tamerlane fa corruption of the name Ttmur Ihchc self-proclaimedof (ihenghis Khan, who unified Central Asia under his iron rule inh century, and Timur's grandson Ulugbek. who presided over many creative andachievements duringh ceniury. Both men arc honored as national heroes today. Thc Uzbeks, however, had no ethnic cohesion until early in lhe Kith century when Mohammed Shciboni Khan united people or Iranian, Turkic, and Mongol origin. These Shciboni Uzbek tribes are viewed by some as the
ConndAiii-l
invader, of Central Asia before the Russian
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recent Uzbek history includes anti-Russian
1 activity, but references lo ihis are rarely made, in order
lo avoid inflaming Soviet sensitivity. Uzbeks,xample, were predominant among the Centralomponent of iheh century Muslimovement called dthedldlsm (from the Arabicn Russian transliteration, dzhadld, meaninghich sought to modernize education and revitalize Islam. The dzhadids, however, also took part in considerable anti-Russian political activity. After the Russian revolution, Uzbeks participatedlearly anti-Russian movement whose participants were called Basmtsckl (meaning raider orhemovement erupted in ihe Fergana region in reaction to the harsh local repercussions of7 Russianof themy. famine,irect attack on ihe Muslim
religion by the Tashkentdeveloped into areligiously Influenced, protonationalbt revolt thaios quelled uniU.
The Uzbeks take pride in recalling lhal theyastoral nomads in iheir earlyrom theentury, nomadic Uzbeks were gradually drawn toettle in oases, taking up agriculture and later engag-
in craft manufacturing and in trade. Once settled,most Uzbeks became subject to ihe culture of thend io Persian ideas and mfloenoe, mainly Islam.
' Unlike the Persians, however. Uzbeksurkic language lhat they retained along with the memory of their earlier nomadic life. Thai early,omad ic tribal structure survives today amongzbeks in the kolkhot (collective farm) system andhe generalized practice ot rntsnlehestvo (localism).
Often denounced In the Soviet press,onsists of favoring kinsmen in the selection of Uzbek government, managerial, and even Communist Parly cadres. Clans function today in such activities as
'Afikaa Urbeks anbranch of ths asw-tek UrtekTihj.kua tine*hr. Afghan htfiory. tow, iM rata of ihemd. irrtar-sre-Kfiffprtaeatedt iethan.1 H
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housebuilding and ceremonials, and clan leaders may still be found heading kolkhozes and local sovleis
LMMgHMge. Despite intense russification. Uzbeks are still strongly attached to their language, which belongs to tbe Turkic family of Altaicearly all Uzbeks (overerceni, according lo9 census) claim Uzbek as their mother tongue. Many urban and educated Uzbeks are bilingual, withof Uzbek and Russian. The latest census dataramatic Increase in the number of Uzbeks listing Russian as their second languageillion5 percent0illion3 percent.rue mostly among the young Uzbeks who have studies. Russian in schools and in the military and especially among those who live in urban areas. Russian is required in academic study from an early age and isanguage learned by an Uzbek, mostly male, professional work force. Many rural Uzbeks, however, still have only minimalin Russian.
Uzbeks are often nut numbered by Russians in the major cities, which Russian and Soviel governments have used as controlling outposts. The cily offor example, was less than half Uzbek* 3ecause there have been more Russians than Uzbeks in Tashkent, bookstores in lhat cily containRussian-language books, and the majority of the city's cinemas show mostly Russia n- language films. In addition, for many children and young adults of the Uzbek middle and upper classes of Tashkent, the Russianiewed as necessary for career advancement and for access to scientific and technical knowledge. The Uzbeks are gaining grand among the urban population In the republic, however, and ihe Uzbek language may well displace Russian in many aspeclsof city life.
'orthographical and Icaicalpert menu, tht Uzbek literary Ur_uait hai been baud1 on an Iranicfrrd
'.iI( Mertry Uftgvlgf iicmlyid.Hinl rrlllixof
CMTurkic larjjvife In corn-ton MMMhroa.hoBl Central Aali daring the ISfha ccalurtea Urbrhaa Arabicatla,alphabet. TXrCyrillic aertpt -ai tatrcdnced hiI. but the baiiiof the litmr} language remainedSpoam Uzbekraata groan* of
dialed* Central end Northern. (
' Seea egptndu Tor Tualeat de-_traph< data.
CmOdVllal
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Tn* Rnista* Moiaut
atWHS
women are generally oriented to child rearing and home life, and are thus less likely to have either the ability or inclination to speak Russian at home. In most Uzbekzbek is the language of everyday use.
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The majority of the newspapers in the republic are in Uzbek, ond there are Uzbek-language textbooks in such* higher mathematics and nuclear physics. Advanced education through the university level is available in ihe Uzbek language. The recentof an Uzbek encyclopedia, written by Uzbeks wiih emphasis on native topics, is viewedajor achievement by those Uzbeks seeking to preserve their linguisticj |
'Soviel policy retarding thc Utbckudifferedihc policy followed by ihc gonrnmr.ru of Afihinniart,net rccogniied minority bnguatea The dominantPaihinna feci thai thery la mainlyi ia langaaieiother than DaH otuntil rcceaily.I Afghan radio, afteradio ra-oaram In Uzbek.wlihOM nptiaaUon. Ihc program* were abohihcd byrcgianej".
Religion. The vast majority of Uzbek Muslims ore Sunnis of th; Hanafi school. There are only small colonics ofShia Muslims in the cities of Samarkand. Bukhara, and Tashkent. Official Islamic institutions are belter represented among the Uzbeks lhan among any other Soviet Central Asian people. In Uzbekistan there areO functioning "Friday" Mosquesrobably at least one in every town except In the south (where former nomads are lesshe only Xwomedresnhs (higherschools) in the Soviet Union arc in Uzbekistan:rab of Bukhara and Imam Ismail al-Bukhari of Tashkent. The periodical Muslims of ihe Soviel East. published in Tashkent, may well be consideredbut il docs deal wiih religious subjects and is Ihe only Muslim periodical in the USSR lo do so. The Mufti of Tashkent, Ziyautdin Khan bin Ishan Babakhan. acts as ihc official leader of Soviet Islam. Thc Muslim Spiritual Board of Tashkent, part of the
There are it kailriday mosqaes in Taihkeni and. ocrordmg io ihc officialmalt monua The Soviet preta report*mall mowocs In Samarkand. Andizhan ha* two motouc*.doc* Namanean.7 ihere were JW moaqeca in Namangan.)
Confllentlal
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face**of Islam In the USSR, is responsible for numerous religion ihrlnea throughout Uzbekistan.
iag circumcision, marriage
fThc Islamic religion is practiced openlyUzbekistan.ig tonumber ofattemUncc at Friday services is lespectable withsome young people participating, despite theand Ihc modernizing trends that;tendsuch
Muslim traditions regard-such as early marriage of
youngayment of the Kalym (bride money, now often In the formresent to the bride'snd burialuslim cemetery are all extensively observed by Uzbeks. Not all nvgious regulations are followed by the faithful; many urban Uzbeks may drink alcoholic beverages and some Uzbeks may cat pork- Many Uzbeks, however, do observe the dietary regulations, for example, eating meat only if it has been slaughtered according to Islamic rules.
Another side of Islamicin religious cuTOits of centuriesthe legacy of the ascetic-mystical and secretive movement Inwhich grew out of loose and voluntary associations into an organized popular movement of brotherhoods (larioat orome observersasis for organized resistance to Soviet rale In tbe Sufihile these secret orders still exist, their influence among the Uzbeks seems Intufrirently strong to serveasis for any real oppositional movement.
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Values. Traditionally, Uzbek life has been orientedhe family. Uzbek homes were built behind highf sun-dried bricks with no windowi fadng thc streets, Today, the familyery Important part of the Uzbek value system. For example. In defining thc idea of the "good life" most Uzbeks interviewedoviet surveyhappy family life,"by "interesting work, including in this concept
Oram ofbra vtn, Yaaewtje, Kadiriya. and UUmdariva warshc Uzbeks.rt many "holynHnta ind torn fee" niau.the republic. Many hot* places wen convened toaecalar maseemadariaa Nikita Khrushchev'i [losexrt many tan attract pJrrtma. la addition, tome BSteWi| Maslim
'Ids may be ceaitroUed by Sufi Oram. That Ii thc case, for nuance, of Tashkcnt tailhDaaAfft
prestige of occupation ralhcr thai highoviet Investigators have found traditional family relations (multlgeneratlon extended families)e very strong. These findings have been confirmed by visiting; Western scholars.
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A revealing episode was described9 newspaper article written by an Uzbek regional Communist party official.ew silk combine was opened and employees were beingelegation of old men from the surrounding rural areas came, apparently to sec iflhc plantuitable place for their children and grandchildren to work. When the men were then invited lo discuss their concerns with party officialsearby chalkhona or tea house, their main concern proved lo be that thur children would become subject to bad influences. Mostthey needed reassurance that transportation would be arranged so that their children andcould continue lo live al bwne. { |
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The chalkhona is an importan social institution for the Uzbeks. Since ancient lines it hasoleind oflace to get together ond talk about thc affairs of dally lifeip of tea. Muslim preachers have long used thc chaikhtnas to spread Islam. Soviel officials have also used lhe chalkhanas. assigning agitators lo them as well as installing television sets and movie screens to spread propaganda.
Traditional attitudes toward womenecent article in thc Soviet press commented that even "professional" Uzbek men consider il shameful lo go out visiting with Ihcir wives or to goovie, theater,arty with them. In some Uzbek families, lhe paper lamented, women cannot be present when guests are received, their only role being to prepare food. On thc whole, however. Uzbek society is no longer completely male dominated, Women who weresecluded and not respected for being active (even in dance thc woman was trained to move slowly and deliberately) are now participating In education and the professions. Q
Utbtks iti itxrtthrrkalkkt lirahovnl In Bukhara
The (talus of women ii improving,ai lean accordingfFicial statistics. The SovleU contend thatducation has increased, particularly for youngerhe Soviets repot tSe percentage of Uzbek women Si-edoho0 hu completedears or more of education was almost identical to that of Russianpercent for Uzbeks8 percent for Russians. The Uzbek rate surpassed that of tbe Kirgiz, Tadzhlks, and Turkmen. Preliminary data from the Soviet census9 indka'e9 percent ofthc population of the Uzbek SSR that isears of age and over had either all or partigher and secondary education. According toensus, the Uzbek ratiohe highest of the five Soviet Central Asian republics.
Some Problems and Prospects
The development of Uzbek identity and ethnic self-assertion understandably has led to ethnic friction, rivalry, and some animosity toward Russians, oth Europeans, and even some other Muslim groups
Cultural Istmn. The issue ofey element of the Uzbek identity, has produced much animosity between Russians and Uzbeks andotential cause of further antagonism. Recent census data show that
" The imerethnlc problem! md pretpectf reuillrnf front ibe Oevctoomtnt of "ruttonal- fcSemliy and einnk salf-aaaetlloB can only be highlighted In thia aericaon Individual athnk roup* Adataikd dlietiailoa appear* In ihe final paper of the
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Painilitior. by99
Iihih SSR
;irgiiazakh SSR Tufkmen SSR
nd othora'
4 million Uzbeks are the second large ilpopulation in the Soviet Union (afterMost of the Uzbeks reside Inthe heart of Sovitt Central Asia. Roughlyof ihe total Soviel Uzbek populationUzbekistan, mostly In Tadzhikistan. toextent in Kirgizia and in still smallerKazakhstan and Turkmenislan. There aremanyillion Uzbeks in theof Afghanistan andn
The Afghanistan Uzbeks live in the Provinces af Baghlan. Balkh. Fayab. Jowijan. Qonduz. Samangon. and Takhar.ajor urban area in the north,alorliy Uzbek population. Mou
Afghan Uzbeks live somer more kilometers to the south of the Amu Darya border, rathei lhan along it. They have become Afghanistan's professional and entrepreneurial class, even while the country itby the fasHtuHS^ [
Duringntercensal period the Uzbek population7 perceni. reflecting the high Uzbek fertility rate. Uzbek family size had increased remarkably duringnlrrcental period. According9 Scviei studies. Uzbek women haveghest average number ofmong married women in the Smiet Union. Uzbeks lendve in rural areas andumber of Incentives, are reluctant to move to cities. They rarely migrate from Central
( onfilcnlial
Population of thc Uzbek99
Uzbeks
Russians
Tatars
Kazakhs
Tadzhika
Ksrakatpaks
Koreans
K<rgiz
Turkmen Others
o'al population 0 Tolal9 Total0
Comparison of Uzbek and Russian Growth In the So.iei69 ,
USSR
Gross Reprodnctlon Rite In USSR, RSFSR, Uzbek SSR1
VtUk SSR RSFSR
rsr
Birth Rate Dynamics
In Uzbek SSR. RSFSR. USSR1
UM SSR
II
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0
fnnnirnlinl
t nnriJrniU!
are willingearn Russian,ey are evidently unwilling lo forsake their native tongue In the process. Russians and other Soviet Europeanhowever, sccmirgly e'.pcct Uzbeks and other Central Asians to speak Russian and sometimes are uncomfortableotally Uzbek-speakingTbe regime serms aware of Uzbek sensitivity regarding language and has urged Russians and other European nationalities in Uzbekistan to learn Uzbek.
i For Uzbeks themselves, the emergenceated. urban literate class raises another important cultural issue. This group, which dominates Uzbek-held administrative and cultural posts,ange of choices on whether to modernize or to preserve traditional values. If they lose touch with the majority of thc Uzbeks in the rural and smaller urban areas they risk the severance of their "native" roots. If. on thc other band, they become too insistent tn their advocacy of traditional values, they may run afoul of the Soviet
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Social ReUtiom. It is rare for an Uzbek woman toon-Muslim, and the rat. of intermarriage between Russians ond Uzbeks is low. This reflects some1 distance between Russians and Uzbeks. Parental influence on the choicearriage partner remains strongecent Soviet survey indicated thatercent of urban Uzbeks andercent of rural Uzbeks believed it necessary to have parental consent tozbeks take moral pride in the difference between the Uzbek female, who is relatively isolated from social currents, and the Russian female, who has much seiual freedom. Uzbeks generally opposethey are inclined toward large families and few abortions; and they do not consistently useto limit the number ofj^
"ii.tmtk.il dun on ihc U'rbci family ind idles thairerea'iaao*at ihc lona term, inonmodem.ling irendi ai female imraoymcnt. incrcatcd rdacaiton.and
urttoni/Jlraei.
Political Ittati. Until recently the political culture of the Uzbeks was preponderantly inward looking and parochial. Political issues were denned in grass-roots terms; local institutions were the focal points of native political participation; and thc Slav-dominated central policy apparatus in Moscow seemed remote and inaccessible.
Recently, however, more natives have risen to strategic posts in the provincial and republic bureaucracies. Although Uzbeks arc still undcrrcpresenled in the party, they are joining in increasing numbers and thereby becoming eligible for broader incorporation into the ranks of the republic's ruling elite.
Uzbeks also are extending their interests andto the USSRhole. Members of an increasingly cosmopolitan and self-confident native elite no longer believen Moscow is beyond their reach, and some showofan authoritative role in federal decisionmaking and policy formation.ole is likely lo seem not only legitimate, but indispensable, (hanks lo (hr growing importance of local and regional issues These issues include investment, labor policies, and thc allocation and distribution of resources which cannot be resolved at the local level.'
Rising levels of education and increased fo*cign contacts are among the factors that are helping to make Uzbeks less insular. Uzbeks are now more aware of foreign affairs, including such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The political consequences of such awareness are as yet uncertain. Q
Thus, the policies of the Soviet regime that have sought to emphasize Uzbek national identity have also given rise to an assertive, sophisticated native leadership. Like other elhnic elites in thc Soviet Union, the Uzbek elite probably perceives that itsre sei-vcd best by learning to manipulate the system to their own advantage. Should it be frustrated in gaining its ends by workirr within thc system, national protest could result. For thc present, however,o widespread dissent or political protest amongck people, nnd the Soviet regime *cems firmly in
C nnlUrntial
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Family and Fertility Data
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Sinbrh family. I'
ikr BffWc)
1
KarakhiraiiSSR Tadjik SSR Tuilme* SSR
6 1
M
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Sire.(to Prtnaf)
btr of
lemilr Member* .
SSR
J 4
! s
4
7 or more
.
Nodau
Nodaia
163
1
off*of Bank Rate. IV7*Iky RtaajMr)
Bride* Up toear* of Age
O0 People
RSFSR
11*
146
Rare. Drath Rait, and
Natural Pepetaitoa Cro-th. lh* RtaamKel
Vofii
eople
Growth
Uahek SSR RSFSR
-1
1 i 1
II1
M
U/bek SSR RSFSR
.3
ll
1
( naliwialiir famtllea.
Include* families *iih five r* mcec members.
' Theae rain arc docr lira*
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Confiiij
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2
1 1 '
; Population nf Tashkent1
*i
iona lily
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The toial population ofhe ethnic breakdown of ihe pupulaiidn9 it unavailable.
Table 4
Uzbek Lawiuat* Newspapers Outside Ibe Uzbek)
Uirin Yull (Oih)
Kazakh0 Uzbek.
zbek*
Tadzhik0 Uzbek*
kiiknai Bayrovl(Chlmkent) KofmuHlitlk Meknal
Kommuitltm Sariroleiar Toiii (Prolctank)
Ml (Rtf) Barorl KommvAltm (Sovelikiy)miWrni (Ura-Tabc) BorohlUmUt ilrr rnahad) Okifakw' (Shayarur) Sowr TWrfclMra*nnbe)arafthtm (Panihkcni) Skukrail Aihl (Shaydon) Bayratt LriumimZardbo* (Za fa raaaiaoi (Lcninikly)
KMhoimM (Kolkhorabodl
0 Uzbekj
3
Minorities of 'he Urbck Republic Who Speak Uzbek as Their First
Perceni 0 erceni
ofof Total
Tatar* '
J67
(
.
1 "
If
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Original document.
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