abs-s jamr dAiva mx&j-
ROUTIHC.
.'ii
m
<
I
NO.
w'i rtrnri
4 C
lii ihii ilnril'merit will behose approved for the folJowTfli;lii jjejjyities:
WJ^olnfl Notice Sensitive Inlolligenca Source', and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURiTtnJNFORMATION Unaulhoriicd Disclosure Subject KSgftmlnal Sanctions
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:1
TTJP-Sicag
(Security Classificalion)
.hi
KOFORN-NOCCnfTRrr
CONTENTS
Paklstan
1
tha Soviet
after tha Invasion
Huang Hua'S Trip to
India
Chinas* Hi Litary
cycles of Rapprochc-atnt and Hostility
Tha Vajpayee Talka
Alter th* Vietnam Invasion: Chilled
JLftar the *fghaniitan Invasion ..
Iran .
17
Support for the
Aftrr the-
Poller Since th* Hostage
Afghanistan
Bafor* th* 20
After tha Invasion 20
0
Beijing hii interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanicnlfleant expansionist thrust that poses global dangers,to Western interests and Indirectly to China itself. In the paat Beijing has viewed Southwest Asia as having relatively ressota tap lications for China's own security, but it has now seised on the Afghan Invasion to sound the alara about Soviet intentions and to press its case against detentemokescreen for Soviet aggres-sictt. i
The Chinese view the Soviet move inta Afghsnistan as adisturbing eatension of the Brezhnev Doctrine outside of +hm Soviet bloc. For theie Moscow used its own troopshird Worldith Cubans active In Africa--and in the Horn inthe Vietnamese expanding in Southeast Asia, Beijing belle-res that tbe Soviets are Braving totranglehold on the oil routes fro* the Persian Gulf. This hold will threaten the balance of power between the Soviet Umcn and the vest and will ultimately jeopardize China's own security. pj>JJ
The Chinese have long held that Soviet expansionism is focused on Europe, and thus China is not isssediately threatened. ew wrinkle into its strategic Una, Beijing asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan has "linked" Soviet strategies in the East and tha wait. While still acknowledging that the primary threat is to the West, the tstW argument stain tainsrowing threat to Chinese Interests haa increased Beijing's "Lntat-natiooal responsibilities.- pjfJJ
China realizes itimited ability to project its own power into that region. To date, it has reacted to the threat almost solely through diplossacyj it has yet to offer any comnitment of significant cfconosalc or military assistance. The Chinese reaponai thus far has proceeded along five traeksi fJJJ
Reassurance- to Pakistan. China served promptly to reassure Pakistan of its support. Cut this so far consistsof diplofaatic
form than substantive assistance. The aajor elements of Beijing's policy have been attempts to helpapprochement between Pakistan and Xndis and to encourage maximum assistance frim the United Stataa.
of Efforts at Normalizing Chinese Relations With India and Iran. In the wake of both the Soviet invasion and the election ofdhi, China has renewed its effort to normalize relations with India; the effort wasear ago when the Chinese invaded Vietnam while the Indian Foreign Minister^ was viaitlng China. "
highly critical of the US eld cutoff to Pakistan9 and expressed pleaaura over indications that Washington would reverse this policy in response to tha Soviet invasion. Beijing's main concarn is that the aidof sufficient magnitude to encourage Pakistan to stand fine in its resistance to theoo little. China has argjed, will be worse than useless, Beijing, however, has not indicated the amount it considers sufficient; it has been reported that Chinese leaders are irritated that President Zia has not already accepted the aid Washington baa offered, mma
of Informal Alliance of Southwest Asian States. One then, that has emerged in public rrce"*Mnt lines the Soviet invasion is the prOTOticnotirwn formal anti-Soviet alliance of Southwest Asian nations. Candidates mentioned for this alliance have varied depending on tha individual discussing thebut Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and even India have been nentioned aa possible members, rerequisite to any such allianceapprochement between Pakistan andove China has been promoting assiduously since early January.
inimum,
tng to steer all states in the region as far away from close ties with the Soviet Union as possible and to thwart crention--howevera Moscow-New Delhi-Hanoi axis.
to the Afghan Rebels. Although China publicly denies itthe rebels, it is att-apting to stake Afghanistan a
among opponents of the Soviet-backed regime in Babul. Beijing has sought the cooperation of Pakistan anC other governments in this effort.It is not known for certain, however, if China has succeeded in rendering material assistance.
Followingiscussion of China's relations with the various countries in Southwest and South Asia. MM
PAKISTAN
Before tha Soviat In;*sion
TO
China has longaithful ally to Pakistan, but its support has always been limited by Beijing's inability to furnish high levels
0
j
of sophisticated equipment. Beijing his, however, consistently advised and supported Islamabad diplomatically. After th*8 coup in Kabul, the Chinese counseled Pakistan to use restraint in the quiet support it gave the Afghan rebels lest it give the Afghans or Soviets pretextiplomatic crisis or military action. To this end, Beijing approved of Islamabad's effort to improvt relations with Moscow and Kabul. China also encouraged the Pakistanis, with greater
pjJJJJjnjjasjjessj
, China renewed its military and economicfor the purpose ofnew aid agreement eijingPakistan additional economicounting toillion. Sorae of the assistance in both these yearsbeen in the fora of long-term, low-interest loans. Inapparently gaveillion in concessionaryand low-interest lonns for military assistance. Adelegation visited Beijing inariety of military supplies from Chinaeginning in The Chinese oromised torequest sympathetica!!1
Throughout muchhe Chinese leveled heavy criticism, at the American aid cutoff to Pakistan and said that the United States was making too much of an issue of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In Beijing's view,ime when the USSR menaced South Asia by its actions in Afghanistan, Washington should haveciltani greater support.
0
t
Hua'a Trip to Ialar.ibsd
Huanganuary Islamabad trip demonstrated China's cautious approach toward substantive support to Pakistan. Presidentmmmmmmmmmmm* tressed Co Huang his country's need for large ajacunts
;tancepgHMp^that assistance Afghan guerrillas without strengthenTngaTo to Pakistan woulda Soviat reaction that Pakistan would be unable to withstand.
Judged by its public nanifestacious, the Huang visit wasfor its subdued tone. Huang, unlike Chinese leaders on earlier trips to Islamabad, made no provocative references toChina's new effort to improve relations with India. Chinese media also gave the trip la'-key treatment that appeared to play down Beijing's commitment to Pakistan, again possibly out of regard for Indian sensitivities.
China, nonetheless, sees little alternative at thii time toits support for Pakistan. Since Huang's trip it has continuad toumber of countries about the need to step up assistance to
i
i
I
'If I
: Ii 1
fir I
Cycles of Rapprochement and Hostility ,
Norssal relations between China and India have been blocked2ordar dispute and by the tendency of the two countries to allow the vicissitudes of relations with third partita, especially Pakistan andUSSR, to affect the status of their bilateral Sine* tha, relations between China and India have been marked by cautious, briaf effort* at improvtment, followed by long; periods of renewed bickering. Um
Some progress has been made, however. 6 ehe two countries restortd normal diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level; relations remained strained, however. After Indira Gandhi left officeo the undisguised glee of Beijing--China looked forward to better relations under the less pro-Soviet government of rioraji Desai and in8 invited Indian ForeicnMinietor A. B. Vajpayee to Beijing to discuss outstanding issues. |
Vajpayee's trip, which occurred inent well until China invaded Vietnara--which has close relations withVajpayee was still in China. Following this affront, which was politically embarrassing to the Desai [government, relations between tha two countries remained chilled, but did not revert to earlier levels of animosity. H
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Beijing again attempted to revive the effort at rapprochement, and the Indira Gandhihas expressed interest in moving ahe-d. pejj
Tha Vajpayee Telks
If significant progresso be made in improving Sino-Indian relations, both sides must try to pick up some of the piecesear ago. The main question the then Foreign Minister vent to China to explore was Che borderomplex issue for both parties, as it touchei on key security concerns in China and ttnsi-tive domestic Issues in India. The dispute involves three areasi ^
estern Sector (Aksai Chin). esult of long-term moves into theand military conquesthina0 square kilometers of high barren plaint and mountains through which it hasoad linkingtern Tibet
0
n. i
Autononous Xixang Region) to Xinjiang. Although not vital to Indian interests. New Delhi clai-as the Aksei Chin as part of tha rtate of Ladakh but also knows that China considers the road crucial to its control of Tibet. H
Middle Sector. Between the Aksal Chin and Nepal. China and India dispute control of several tracks that are associated with .pilgrim routes between India and Tibet. ^
ector (Arunachal Pradesh). This region, which is controlled by India alonq the "ttcMahona claimed by Chinaraditional part of rioet. China, however, aay have asserted this cliim irainiyargaining chip to be sacrificed in the greater interest of securing the Aksai Chin area
After the Afghanistan Invasion
The Chines* leadership's initial reaction to the election of Indira Gandhi was to view Indiasuntry that wasstable factor for peace in South Asia.'
otere by thretrepresentative to the t'N rue-r.tiiry ininvasion of Afghanistan.
while Beijing privately viewed Gandhi'J return to power withit did not abandon its policy of Moderate media co-went on Indian affairs during the transition and sought immediately to establish good relations with the new government. Hua Guofeng sent Candhi warmon her return to power, and when New Delhi appeared to back away slightly from its II January position by making mildly critical statements about the Soviet invasion, Chineseplayed up the Indian calloviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. New Delhi, in turn, beganixture of statements about China that Beijing chose to interpretositive light. Beijing, for example, ignored Gandhi's statementress interview that India hadictim of Chinese aggression and she did "not think that Chin* hasnstead. Beijing highlighted statements by Gandhi and other Indian officialsesire for better relations.
call for the withdrawal of Soviet force* from Afghanistan.
In line with this new asscss-tent. Beijing began offering Hew Delhi new assurances of ncod
! i
nays after returning to Beijinc. Hueng lee theto theh anniversary celebrations inhe gave an especially warm statement calling forfriendship between China and India
on
Indian foreign policy bureaucracy, if not necessarily Prime
Minister Gandhi's, has apparently been impressed by Beijing'sand actions.
SC
One issue that nay hinder progress in future relations is India's qroving concern about Bhut.uVa drift out of :he India orbit. ecent trip to New Delhi, the King of Bhutan lJHH;^ 9 treaty with India that .lilaws New -elhi to guidetan in its foreign policy. The reason for this requestequest by Beijing to demarcate theia-Srmtanese fcorder_
i
for its part,ort-dly pleased with India's handling of the Crcrayko tripelhi
The Chinese, however, continue to harboi doubts about India's intentions and the prospects of better relations any time soon. Thes-doubts were recently fedhrill staterent Gandhi was reported in the press to have madeolitical rally onebruary condemning Chinese occupation of sections of Indian. Bhutanese. Hepalese, and Burmese territory and charging that Chinanger to the .yidian border. Beijing dealt with this charge by expressing "surprise and regret" over Gandhi's remarks which flew "In the face of facts" and "vilified China." Beijing's public co-.ra:iitsry, however,n an 'jpteat note by recalling the Gandhi govcrrjn-nt's expressed desire to seek normal relations with allncluding China. ^
O
Sir- Nepali iflaticm continued Co be close9 andi? to rcreain sj The sost significant biiaccralyearthe signingerrier drnarcation protocol thatin athat did rot raise the ire ef Heu Delhi. its siie aaiccition. IVpii has always tried towith its tve giant neighrors. and India and China have
r tditicially teen sensitive to erchnfluence ana activities Hepa'..
ir'derr*
wide'pread solitisalrupi-pd in civilprin- ':pp?rted Eirgcverr.ra.ent ande'ui to avoidearir.ce inter it-rin-j. in Nepal's internal ffurt. as pirticularly concerneJ thar the disorders would -id tD Indian militaryn.
The King's callolitical referendum in Kay restored publiconcerned that the vote would lead to increased powericTrthe supposedly pro Indian Nepal Congress Party. Shortly after the crisis subsided. China offered Nepal military support in the event that India interven tarily and offered covert military sales for the government to use in coping with civil unrest. Chinese^ ofa. however,eflected in media cor.ments.
not
was careful not to allow the Huang visit or theto offend India. The Indian Gov-rnrc-nt has
co-icerned over Nepal's unilateral action of 3igning trTeTorder protocol vithout first consulting India. The agreement Nepal and China signed, however, left untouched the sensitive trijunction area where the borders of Nepal, China, and India meet. Huang avoided making aati-Indlan statements in public
0
IRAN
Pasthr Shah
Iran and China established diplon.itic rr-laticns1 and began to exchange high-level economic and political delegations. China considered theajor stabilizing force inrion.
To underscore China's interest. Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Tehran inQ, and in late August Premier Hua Guofeng, on his return from an East European trip, stepped off in Tehran,
liia'a visit, however, was marred by an upsurge in anti-Shah demonstrationsarshreaction; the Chinese, concerned about the stability of the regime but believing it would survive, used the Hua visit to demonstrate
the las* days of theand throughsriod just after Khomeini's return, the Chinese leaked to the United State*omething to save the situation.
0
when China realized an Iranian Islamic Republic was inevitable, it moved quickly to recognize the new regime and ittcmpted to limit the damage caused by the memory of3 visit to Tehran. Beijing's media coverage, which had been largely rcportorial in the last days of the Pahlavi monarchy, began to describe the old regime as "autocratic" and noted that the new Bazargan government stsod for opposition to tharelease of political prisoners, and establishmentemocratic republic. The propaganda also noted tliat the Persian Gulf was menaced by both the United States and the Soviet Knicn, with the Soviets posing the greater threat. ro-Soviet fiction ?petit::ig ur.der the guise ofto the monarchy was said tc be at workoviet "drive southward."
Policy Since the Hostage Seizure
China's Initial response to the hostage crisis was to viewconc-rn but restrict oeUJ* coverage to In response to repeated requests
public expressions of disapproval of the Embassy takeover and concern about the fate of the hostagea. Beijingautious atatement onovember, three weeks after the takeover, that balancedffirmation of the principle of noninterference In the internal affairs of other countriesall tc respect the principle of diplomatic immunity.
0
At the United Nations, China Joi-.cd in Che unamcouson Iran to release the hostages andualified voteDecember supporting the resolution calling for possible sanctionscrisis were not resolved; Beijing's decision to cost thisonly afterthe President'secember iecteTToKui^riof:-r. id not vote on the resolution lisp-jsingc.ns, taking thethat sanctions would not be effective in releasing thethey would serve to increase Soviet influence in Tehran, endOunese vote fortheawould reduce Beijing's already marginalIn Tehran.
Beijing's general policy toward Iran since the Soviet Invasionhas been to step up efforts to normalise its ownTehran. China continues to be concernedossiblein Tehranro-Soviet political group, while Beijingcurrent regLae as reactionar- and unpredictable. It contendsare elements that could c< .iescetabl? government anda role in thwarting Soviet designs inrian Culf. enthuastically welcomed the election of Bani-Sadr. sendingwarm messag* expressing . for "tYiencUhin and Iranian pev".-
Onebruary, Vice Premier Jl Pcngftl led an unusually high-level delegation to the Iranian Embassy's receTtiiii marking the firstof .he Iranian revolution. In publicly rsported comments, Ji praisedor its success in opposition to forei<
China has kept up its contacts with Iran in other wayshostage crisis. It maintains an Frtassy in Tehran butnot yet been allowednd an
In earlyegerion of Chinese visited Iran to attend celebrations honoring the revolution.
Beijing is taking care, however, not Co become too closelywith the United States, while its media coverage tends to af/oid negative comments about the United States. Beijing has reported Iranian statements that Tehran willourse Independent of both Washington and llosccw. t must demonstrate that its goals in Iran andlr^miccountries are distinct fromhe US Government and therefore must continue Co express opposition to superpower involvement in the region.
SC
1
AFGHANISTAN
Before the Invasion
Beijing initially expressed little public concern about the8 coup that ins tailed the prc-Soviet Taraki regime in Kabul, and it recognised the new government within two weeks. China assumed that Afghan nationalism would assrrt itselfas it had in the previous Dioud regime. As Sovietin Afghanistan increased.eijingts criticism of the USS3. China wast in its public ccewents about the Kabul government
China maintained correct relations with both Taraki and Amin andiplomatic mission in Kabul. Inhina gaveed hospital in Kindahar. In the same month itrotocol for the constructionextile mill in Bagrami. In October the two countries signed an annual protocol (several months after an earlier protocol had expired) that called for7 million in mutual trade; Afghanistan had earlier agreed toons of cotton to China. Beijing's main imports to Afghanistan were tea and'xtiJe machinery, pnjj
0
oted the establishment of the "Liberation Alliance of Afghan riualims"ossible beginning of unity among the resistance. Chines* media also stress the brutality of the Soviet occupation.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: