ntelligence
Soviet Intentions and Options in Southwest Asia: Near-Term Prospects
interagency intelligence memorandum
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SOVIET INTENTIONS AND OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow's willingness lo pay what It anticipated would be an appreciable political and economic price (or its intervention in Afghanistan stemmed from the deteriorating situation in that country and overall Soviet strategic interests in the region.
Regardless of the precise mis of motivations and interests underlying Moscow's decision to intervene, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has placed the USSRosition to exploit the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors.
The Soviets will continue for tactical reasons toertain receptivity to proposals for troop withdrawals. In the next two to three months, however, they will probably continue their buildupotal force of at least eight division equivalents. Following this spring's counterinsurgency offensive, they are likely to conclude that even more forces are needed. Regardless of their success against the insurgents, tho Soviets intend toignificant military presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future lo reinforce their broader regional influence
Moscow sees its current best option in Iran as one of continuing its attempt to curry favor with the Khomeini regime The Soviets are also maintaining relations with the Iranian left and with Iran's ethnic minorities, but they are proceeding cautiously lest they further arouse the anti-Soviet suspicions of Khomeini and bis entourage.
Moscow would clearly prefer to achieve its broader aims in Iran without using military force. However, it could respond to large-scale Afghan rebel activity in Iran with hot-pursuit forays and cross-border raids and might consider more massive intervention in responsehreat of Western intervention, countrywide disintegration, or civil war.
A key element in any Soviet decision to intervene in Iran would be Moscow's perception of the likely US militaryresponse Moscow recognizes would be influenced by Western economic and security interests that are far greater than those that were at stake in Afghanistan.
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The Soviet approach to Pakistan will likely remain one of keeping Pakistan sufficiently uneasy to discourage too much support for the Afghan rebels and too close an alignment with the United States or
China, while keeping alive Ihe option of accommodation to Moscow. Id view of Pakistan's rejection of US aid offers, the Soviets now are probably more confident lhat pressure tactics will continue to work against Islamabad.
Moscow looks upon India as an asset In the effort to limit damage from its Afghan invasion and realizes it must now be more forthcoming to maintain that asset If the survivability of Pakistanuffer state seemed threatened, however, the interests of Moscow and New Delhi would diverge.
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DISCUSSION
mrrinorandum focusesoviel intentions in Southwest An* as ihey bear on likely Soviet behavior during thei toonths
The DeeHion To Intervene
The Soviet deciiion to Intervene In Afghanistan was made with careful consideration of the expected con-mii urn..and potential problems. Although Ihe Soviet leaden certainly dismissed the possibility of direct US military opposition, they probably did anticipate such adverse tnlematkotud consequencesetback to US-Soviet relations, an accelerated buildup of USiiscreased Sino-American seeuniv cooperation, and negative reactions in the Muslim world. v
As for the continuation of the Hmosphcre of detente with the United States. Moscow already saw it as being in Jeopardy. Moreover, the Soviets believed liveconsequences of intervention would be reduced because of the US preoccupation with Iran and the internal disarray In Iran and Pakistan. Although the Soviets may have underestimated the costs, we believe that ihey would have intervened even if they had foreseen what his actually transpired
Moscow's willingness to pay what it anticipated would be an appreciable political and economic price for its Intervention in Afghanistan stemmed from the deterioration situation within that country and from overall Soviet strategic interest* in the region. Moscow saw that Afghan political and military Inslilutions that it had helped lo mold were on the verge of collapse and believed that tins wouldistinct decline in Soviet influenceountry thatongstanding Soviet client, perhaps trios'arming il into another mllitantly Islamic state
Apart from more immediate concerns, th* Soviets wore also motivated by geopolitical cotulderations and strategic calculations. On ihe one hand, they fearedumiliating reversal in Afghanistan wouldlow to their prestige, slow ihe momentum of their advance in the Third World, andeirwilh other client regime* On Ihe other hand, they hoped that consolidation of firm political and military control over Afghanistan would facilitate further expansion of their influence into other parts of Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
Over Ihe longer term, the Soviets hope through their presence In Afghanistan to reduce Western andinfluence and promote accoounodating behavior throughout tbe region. This could facilitate theirefforts to gain increased access to air andcilitie* on tbe Arabian Sea and the Persian Cull Tbe Soviets will attempt lo manipulate and exploitperceptions of their ability to threaten vital oil resources. They will encourage bcliefi that Soviet cooperation is required to ensure stability in oiland that it must be fostered by providing the USSR with improved aceeas to the oil resource* of the reglor.
Afghani stan
The Soviets did not invade Afghanistan with any expectation thai they would be able quickly toeffective control over the entire country. To dale they have concentrated on eonsoudating their control In Kabul and some other key cities and over major lines of communica lion. However, the Afghanhave continued tbe fighting even in areas where Soviet focoea have been active. The Afghan Army hu continued to disintegrate In areas of major resistance, and the Soviets cannot count on the loyalty of the few effective units that exist
The most serious Soviet problem over the near term is the failure of Ihe Soviet-installed government of Babrak Karma! to control Ihe cities. Themajority of the populace views the governmentoviel puppet, and nationalist and Islamic fervor Is fueling broad popular opposition to tbe Soviet presence
Even before the urban disturbnneec in litethe Soviets were committing additional forces Several weeks earlier, the Soviets introduced one division that they had been holding in reserve and began forming several rpceiilly configured helibome units for couctcTinsurirncy operations. The Soviets, moreover, are continuing to improve their ksgistjc capabilities along the border for moving men and supplies into Afghanistan Soviet units withinsome of which are being regrouped Into highly flexible brigades, have recently begun more aggressive counterinsurgency operations.
We believe (hat (he Soviets probably plan lo build opotal force ol at leant right division0 or morethe next two to threeorce of (bu size would permit the Soviet) toote extensive counter!nairttoncy campaign this spring while maintaining the security of key uiban areas and major lines of communication. However,orce would not enable the Soviets loull-fledged countrywide coursterlnsgurericy effort without tbe supportore effective Afghan Army.
Whether the Soviets decide lo augment theirwill depend largely on lhe outcome olto reconstitute an effective Afghan Armythe resiliency of the insurgents following theSoviel effective. On balance, we believe thatare likely to conclude that even more forces
Although the Soviets have suggested rival oeasatlon of "eitcrnsl Interference" might lead them loroop withdrawal, they are unlikely to act on such suggestions in the short run. since neither the Babrak government nor any Soviet-Imposed successor could survive without major Soviet military support. Al this stage, Soviel talk about withdrawal appears toactk designed to dampen International pressure and particularly to drivetween lhe United Stales and Its allies-Over ihe longer run, successful curtailment of the insurgency and partial stabilization of lhe Afghan political situation might enable the Soviets losome of their forces, bul they would wish lo maintain sufficient forces lo ensure their control over Ihe country. Moreover, even under Ihe most favorable circumstances there, we believe they intend loignificant military presence. Moscow will seek lo use this presence lo reinforce the USSR's broader regional Influence and possiblyiploit (heand weaknesses of Afghanistan's immediate neiglibors.
Iron
Since the collapse of the Shah's regime inoviet policy toward Iran has been aimed at enoourtglng anti-Western attitudes there, improving economic and political relations witb the new regime, andavorable climate for an eventual pro-Soviet government. The intervention la Afghanistan has greatly complicated ihese conciliatory efforts, and will continueo so (he longer the Soviets stay in
Afghanistan and tho more Involved they becoinc In fighting the insurgency (here
Iranian officials have publicly proclaimed support for their "Muslim brethren" In
Hindlcates
that limited material assistance hasnSince the Invasion. Pakistan nnd Imn have moved closer together, ipurred byoviet threat In (he corning months, Tehran will probably provide (he Afghan rebels with media access for propaganda purposes and support for liberation offices nnd refugee camps ha Iran. It will probably tolerate ernes-border arms (muggJing and rebel movements. The Iranian Government Is unlikely, however, to provide large-scale supportltn Afghan resistance, al least until It sees how much support other Islamic nations provide.
While Ihe Soviets have been large induec*of the US loss of Influence in Iran, their own bilateral relations with Tehran have not prospered
under the erratic Khomeini retime. Even before (he Invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow failed toatisfactory working relationship with Tehran. ,
The Soviets have two basic strategies for enhancing then influence over their Strategic southern neighbor
Thewe believe, theSoviet strategy has been to seek crucial leveragenitary Iranian state in which Ihe Tudeh Communist Party could eventuallyignificant factor. At the same rime, lhe Soviets, imcr the (all of the Shah, have reportedly increased their covert activities among linn's ethnic minority groups nnd their efforts to strengthen the Tudeh Communist Parly. They have proceeded cautiously, however, lent they further arouse tltn anti-Soviet suspicions of Khomeini and his entourage. Moscow has taken care not to derail what will remain Its primary focus of attention so knag as Khomeini retains dominantthe improvement of stale-to-state relations with an Iranian regime whose foreign policy hoimarked anti-Western orientation
Falling In an effort lo achieve primary influenceentralized Iranian stale, the Soviets might ah rmati very seek to encourage centrifugal ethnic lorces in the country, break down centralnnd exploit the ensuing disruption
Moscow clearly would prefer to achieve it* brooder aims In Iran without using military for CO As long as
Iranian support for ihe Afghan rebels remainsairly low level, the Soviet) are unlikely lo retaliate militarily. However, corapicuous bnte-icale Afghan lebel activity in Iran could lead lo hot-pursuit forays and cross-border raids. Furthermore, the Ihreal of Western intervention Khomeini! death and live loss of central control over ihe ethnic areas, or widespread chaos might tempt the Soviets lohreat to their aeeurity and intervene In so doing, they might use1 Soviet-Iranian treaty as the legal Justification, or the claim lhat they were asked ia by the Tudcfa. The USSR has refused to accept the Iranian abrogation of1 treaty provision* that allow for direct Soviet irrtervention in Iran if the internal situation in that country or foreign intrigue threatens the security of Ihe Soviet Union by Afghan rebels, ihe government will find ildifficult lo move conspicuously In this direction because of President Zia's carefully nurtured Islamic image and because of the numerous kinship and ethnic ties between tribesmen on bolh sides of Ihe border.
The issue will become increasingly troublesome If Intensified Soviet military operations force tbe Afghan rebels lo rely more heavily on sanctuaries In Pakistan. For Islamabad the issue will be complicated also by the fact that China and some Arab countries will to pressure Pakistan to increase Hi aid to the ekhough even tbe Chinese reportedly do not want to get too deeply involved in activities that would merely be provocative toward Ihe USSR or
S, the Soviets have increasedsurveillance of the border with Iran and. more recently, have raised their state of military prepared neas. They have no doubt prepared contingency plans for armed intervention
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element in any decision to intervene in Iran, nowever. would be Moscow's percept sonikely US response. Moscow no doubt recognizes lhat Western economic and security interests in Iran are considerably higher than In Afghanistan and lhal lha likelihoodtrong military US response is thus also far greater.
Pakistan
Pakistan will almost certainly remain under Soviet pressure lo cease all support for Afghan insurgents Pakistan's aid to rebel forces so far has been limited. Even so, Afghan Government forces In the past year have occasionally shelled refugee concentrations across Ihe border. The Soviets have confined themselves to diplomatic and propaganda threats against Islamabadhave been cautious in their own militarynear the Pakistani-Afghan border. They are probably planning, however, lor the contingency of hot pursuit raids across the Pakistan border and in any event will atlempt lo have the border scaled
Islamabad recogniies its vulnerability to SovietIt has publicly staled il will resist any attacks from Afghanistan, but ihere hu been no significant reinforcement of Pakistani armed forces near ihe Afghan border. While Pakistan may eventuallyto restrict Ihe use of its territoryanctuary
Islamabad views the Soviet military presence In Afghanistanong-term military threal that is far snorethan the immediate border security Problem raised by Soviet counterinsuigency eflorts fat Afghanistan Pakistan is concerned thai Ihe Sennets may interuiftheir covert contacts with Rahsehl and other tribal separatists in Pakistan or lhal they may in other ways attempt to take subversive advantage of Ihe country's political instability. Even wilh the new Soviel threal. however, Pakistan still fears India as Its primary enemy, particularly since the return lo power of Indira Candhi Paldstan's feeling of vulnerability has given Moscow important additional political leverage.
In view of Pakistan's rejection of US aid offers, the Soviets now are probably more confident lhal pressure tactics will continue to work against Islamabad Coun tennsurgent activities have brought Soviet forces close to the Pakistani border, but, so long as Islamabad appears to he keeping the United Stales at arm's length, llse Soviets are unlikely to esert heavy military pressure.
Mcacow's objectives in Pakistan, particularly In the short term, are subordinated to Soviel alms relating to Afghanistan and India. The Soviets have recognized the concern In India created by the Afghan invasion; they prefer not to act so peecipitsotisly In Pakistan asound lhat alarm.
On balance, the Soviet approach likely will remain one of keeping Pakistan sufficiently uneaury totoo much support for Ihe Afghan rebels and loo close an alignment with the United Stales or China, while keeping alive in Islamabad the option ofto Moscow as the price for Soviel restrain!.
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Afghan devrJoprr.cnla have undencored Mnecow's basic interest in preserving and enhancing id close ties lo India, which, because of its site,i.in. andee in global politics, is its major Asian counterweight to China. Moacow looks upon India as an asset in Ihe effort to limit damage from its Afghan invasion, and realizes it now must be moremilitary and economicformaintain that asact
India has been alarmed al the implications of this Soviet aggression so close lo home, including the danger lhal Pakistan might cease toiable buffer. The Gandhi government has nominally accepted the position that Soviet objectives in Afghanistan are at this i'nnt limited to securing controlank client border stale, but, beyond thai, Soviet diplomatichave so far not been sufficient to ease Indian concerns Nevertheless, the Gandhi government sees no realistic alternative to good relations with the USSR
Accepting Moscow's refusal to commit Itselfithdrawal from Afghanistan, New Delhi now sees overall stability in South Asia threatened principally by US nnd Chinese efforts lo strengthen Pakistan militant. The Gandhi government may try lo counter this with renewed efforts to ease tensions withMoscow would not object to this, so long as it look placeontest consistent with Sovietthrough threatsj. Stan's identification with China and the United States and its assistance to the Afghan insurgency
Il lighting should erupt on the Afghan-Pakistani border, India would almost certainly presseaceful resolution involving Pakistani restraint in aid to Alajun dissidents.osition would not run counter lo Moscow's presumed interest In limiting military incidents with Pakistan.
Given lite Increased polarization that Afghanistan has brought about. Moscow is probably relatively sanguine that it can forestall the movement begun by Indira Gandhi during her lint administration (and continued by the Janata government) toward greater diplomats" flexibility nnd casing of tension with China. As It was. lhe movement towardwith China was stalled but year by China's invanon of Vietnam.
If major (ushiing erupted between Soviet nndforce* nnd particularly if the survivability of Pakistanuffer seemed threatened, lhe Indian response would be less predictable. It might seek lo pressure the USSR by Improving relation; with the United Slates nnd resuming lhe process ofwith China. India's aim would be to avoid the dismembermenl of Pakistan nnd to enable it to surviveuffer slate.
Original document.
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