nited states: Approaching Break in Nuclear Relations
Within the next few weeks it is possible that nuclear cooperation between India and the United States will comealt. As an isolated event in overall Indo-US affairs, this development would normally resulchort-term dislocation to our bilateralthat would ease over time. Current developments on the Indian scene, however, appear to militatealm reaction to the break in nuclear relations. The domestic political momentum generated by Prime Minister Candhi's election in January has not been sustained at the pace she anticipated when she came to power. In addition, the apparent inability of her party to solvo the problems facing the Indian economy could further aggravate the break in nuclear ties and makemore acrimonious.
Background to the Impasse
The principal indo-US nuclear tie in recent years hasthe supply of US-enriched uranium for two US-built rawer reactors at Tarapur,ilometers north of Bomboj. The agreement providing for the supply of US fuel tor Tarapur was signed3 and was tofor theyear lifespan of the reactors. In return for the fuel, India agreed not to purchase fuel from another source, not to reprocess the spent fuel without US consent, and to place Tarapur-related facilities under safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in "ienna. Numerous Indiantobuilt entirely with indigenous technology or with limited foreign participation are not under IAEA YpYfAj
The present dispute between New Delhi and Washington stems from US legislation passedS to furtiier overall nuclear nonproliferation goals. The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)8 provided that, after two
years, shipments of enriched uranium to foreign nations would be possible only i- Che recipients had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty <NPT>, or i. they had accepted "fullscope" safeguards over all their nuclearions. New Delhi has consis^ently refused to accept the expanded inspection requirements of the NNPA which go well beyond the scope of the earlier bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. Legalargue that India is not bound by "retroactive Koreover. India maintains lonjstardingto the NPT. which it considers discriminatory toward nonnuclear weapon states.
Supplies of Taraour fuel were provided to India on a regular basis throughtwo years after the Indian explosionuclear device. Requests for fuel7 were delayed but eventually delivered. Approval of two fuel requests from India8eceived within the two-year "grace period" provided by the NNPA--has been gi/en by the Executive branch but not by the Nuclear Regulatory Cowaission, which is seeking assurances from India that plutoniua from spen^Tarapur fuel will never be used in nuclear weapons.
Bilateral negotiations over the past two years with three successive Indian eovernments have thus far been fruitless. The Indians claim that if the United States fails to provide enriched fuel as provided for in3 agreement. Washington will have unilaterally violated the terms of the contract and India will be free to purchase enriched uranium elsewhere, reprocess the spent fuel, and utilise .the extracted plutoniumsafeguard inspections.
In anticipation of an eventual cutoff of US fuel, India allotted funds in the soring9 toixed oxide fuel fabrication facility. Plutoniumfrom Tarapur's spent fuel could be mixed with natural uraniumubstitute fuel for Tarapur and therebv end reliance on foreign suppliers for enriched uranium. Irdian nuclear experts acknowledge that India does not have the appropriate technology to utilize this process but could reasonably expect to obtain it before the enriched fuel already on hand runs out
tons of enriched fuel, and the resolved by0 at the want to begin the reprocessing sufficient plutonium available mixed oxic'e fuel well ahead of
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hope is that this will be latest. Indian scientists of the spent fuel to have for the
India toocal substitute, such as mixed oxide, for US-supplied fuel and achievefundamental objective of all Indian nuclearis not clear whether India would choose to operate outside of safeguards or decide on some sort of continuedby the IAEA that would cover only the Tjrapur fuel cycle. The latter approach might be considered in order to deflect criticism, particularly from Third Worldthat could arisedia rejected all forms of inspections.* An added incentive to resolve the safeguards dilemma is the need for continued access to sophisticated nuclear technology and equipment from other nuclearthat probably would be denied if India eliminated existing gu-irjs. "jjfc^
Domestic Political Ramifications
The government's refusal to ?gree to US demands has long had broad political support. Oncebreak in nuclear relations with Washington occurs, there is likely to be considerable criticism of the United States in both Parliament and the press. The effect of the cessation of nuclear cooperation could be further aggravated, however, by developments on the indian political and econortic scent. jhkt]
Within the next two months, the Congress(I) government of Prime Minister Gandhi will face elections in nine states where opposition-led legislatures were recently dissolved. Success in these states, vihere two* thirds of India's population resides, is crucial toimplementation of party programs. These elections willhotly contested and acrimonious, ajid results favorable to Gandhi are not certain.
*Tarapur would beirst instance where an IAEA safeguarded facility would havereuo.ed. India could be expected co cake stem eg. escape ihe opprobriu* of establishingrecedent. ilj
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If it became apparent that her government might fare poorly at the polls because of Ccngrcsf(I) failures to turn the sagging economy around. Gandhi could choose to make the Tarapurajor campaigndisproportionate to the actual eCfect it has on the Indian economy. Tarapur wculd give the Congress(I) an Ideal issue to distract the electorate frou domestic problems and focus attention or. the disruptive policies of the United States. Criticism of Washington has longopuljr--tactic of Indian politicians, particularly CAndhi .
The prospect that Tarapur might have to reduce its electrical output becauseuelreal orhave considerable effect in the western Indian states tied to the Tarapur power grid. Severe electrical shortages already exist in the region because of the monsoon fiilure last year and the ensuing drastic reduction of hydroelectric power available to this heavily industrialized area. Moreover, several conventional power generating stations in the region have had to shut down or reduce their outputbecause of eguipenant malfunctions. These power shortages have resulted in the reduction of power supplied to manufacturers by almostercent. The claim that more rtiuctions are likely because of the unavailability of US fuel is one example^of an issue that could te used by the Congress(I)
The extent of th^ political and economic difficulties in which Gandhi finds herself as the state elections approach will determine the degree to which she may choose to make an issue out of the Tarapur problem. If she were to find herself facedevere threat at the polls and not able to consolidate her domestic political she could make the break in nuclearar more acrimonious event in_indo-US relations than sight otherwise be expected.
Ihe Indian* are confident that their legalin the contractual agreement with the United States is well founded. As aa election plov to gain pointshauvinistic electorate. Gandhi nay choose to take India's case to the Internationa: Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Whether she wins or loses, the assertion of India's position in the face of pressureuperpower ecu Idramatic political effect in India.
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