PROSPECTS FOR POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA (NIE 15-79 M/H)

Created: 2/1/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS^SANITIZED

Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF

PROSPECTS FOR POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

i libit tt <ii ISI9R0 iied in (He pupa'at inn ol (hi) mtmiiiindum

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THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organiiationt participated in the preparation ofmorondtjm:

The Cenfrol krteJbgeriee Aoency. lh* Deportment of Stole, tht Dalenie InteOtoertce Aoency. ond Ih* National Security Aoency

A ho Participating:

The Aitnronr Chief of Staff lor iMefcgence. Deportment of the Army The Director of Novd Intelligence.l the Navy The Ann'out Chiel of Staff, Intelligent Deporrmant of ihe Air Force The Direcior of Intelligence. Headquarteri. Marme Cocpi

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In liichl of Tito" illness and olher events ltncr.articularly (he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Intelligence Community representatives have reexamined the major conclusions of, Proipfct* for Post-Titon their view, (he principal judgments of thai Estimate llius far remain valid

iih respect lo possible Soviet miliiary oiactions directed against Yugoslavia.oncluded that Soviet behavior would depend in large measure on the course ol internal YugoslavIf, as we eipect. the transition lo collective leadership occurs smoothly, if thai leadership retains its cohesion, and if lhat cohesion is reflected In broad public support for Ihe new leadership. Sovielfor aggressive military or poliiical actions against Yugoslavia in the short term will be diminished

Indeed, tbe Yugoslavs' heightenedresulting Irom the invasion ofmoves against their own couniry should increase the colics ion of their leadership and lhe Yugoslav public, and could serve at an additional dctertcnt to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in view of lhe USSR's apparent effort to maintain its detente reUtionihip with Western Europe despite tbe invasion. Moscow wouldontinued incentive toestrained posture toward Yugoslavia.

Atoted, Itowever, the longer term (iiognusis for continued political cohesion Is more problematic in the event of regional tensions in Yugo-davn or serious disputes within lhe leadershipfor the Soviets to apply political or military pressures could arise How the invasioo of Afghanistan may influence Soviet calculations on Yugoslavia under such circumstances wil) depend largely on its longer

term effects on the Internal political atmosphere In Europe and on lhe evolution of East-West relations

5 One view in tbc Intelligence Community holds that, for the midterm (one lo fiven the light of (he invasion of Afghanistan, the probability of Soviel miliiary interventionost-Tito Yugoslavia unacceptable to Moscow Is now higher than previously estimated According to this view, the Afghanmay already have persuaded the Soviets that expected Yugoslav military resistance would not itselfeterrent and that the rids of US or other Western counteraction would be lower than they previously believed.1

ost analysts, however, believe lhat. while the Sovieis did consciouslyhreshold inon-Warsaw Pact Marxist-led state, the Afghanhas only limited applicability to Yugoslavia They believe lhal the Soviet perception of expectedmilitary resistance and the danger oi heightened tension and escalation associated with it has noi been substantially altered* The Direclor of Centralsupports Ihis laltor view

7 If Tilo does not recoveruccession occurs, we anticipate reconvening Intelligence Community representatives to issue an updated assessment in lhe light of early evidence beating on the prospects lor thesuccessor regime, and on any indications of change in estimalrd Soviet intentions.

1 Tlieol thisIt tSe Awwant Chief nf Sun* for InteltiinBr. DerortrneM of lhe Aims

' Tlx headed at Ihii vim if* Dirnlix. National Fortran Aunt'mm OA. th* Director. LWau ol Intflliamc* aaal Be

seaarh, IVoarfof Stale. Ik* Dutctor. Drferor liurtWrncai Ihr Dwtrtoa. Sanoaal Senear Afaasty. UWai

Ninl iMclLaoasoe. Druaitmenl ti thr Nair lhc Amlim Chirl ol

ML lmcfLr.ti.cc tSaoartinrnl of llm Ail lo.ee. and the DMtxSkM olaidouaners. Mailisr Coaiii

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Original document.

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