CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEAS SANITIZED.
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through
NiIImiI Inirillifiicc Euimatc
APPROVED FOR RElWist CIA HlSTORICAL-REViEW PROGRAM
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH
Volume
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organization- participated in lhc preparation of the Estimate/
CanlrolAgency, rha Dvporfmeoi ol S'oU. ihr Ocfemaond Ih* Nollanol Security Aatncy.
Also Participating.-
the Attntontl Stolf It* InuKotnce,f the Army Tht Oirtxior of Novo! IWEgtuCT. Depcrlmcnl ol ihr Novy Th* AMhMM CKwl of StoH.Departf ihe Air Fore* Ih.olow Co.pi
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
A. SOVIET STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
n MAIN CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET
C. FUTURE SOVIET FORCES FOR STRATECIC ATTACK
Possible Soviet Reactions to MX/MPS
Soviet Inlercontineitul Striking Fotom
Sutic Comparisons of US and Soviet Intercontinental Strikin* Forces
Soviet Sfiatestic Foices fee Peripheral Attack
D COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES AND PRELAUNCHOF SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRIKING FORCES
Coonieiforce Capabilities
Prelaunch Survivability
E QUASI-DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AND USSTRIKING
Soviet and US Residual
F. CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET STRATECIC DEFENSES
Air
ABM
Antisubmarine
Dlrected-Enerav
Civil Defense
ii.
-Top Swrrt
APPROVED FOR REtasf
SCOPE NOTE
This National Intelligence Estimate assesses present and futorc Soviet capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict. It examines the policies underlying Soviet strategic nuclear programs. It estimates the numbers, types, and characteristics of Soviet strategic forces over thc nextears, assuming, alternatively, that SALT II limitations are in effect through the period, lhat they lapser that SALT is abandoned (his year. It examines tha USSR's capabilities to integrate and operate ils strategic forces during peace and war. Finally, il assesses key capabilities and vulnerabilities of Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict, now and in the future. For this purpose, the Estimate includes, among other things, comparative analysis of US and Soviet forces, the validity, propriety, and inclusion of which are not fully agreed upon in the Intelligence Communily.1
The Estimate treats the following elements of Soviet military forces:
Intercontinental attack: intercontinental ballistic missilesubmarine-launched ballistic missilesntercontinental bombers, and long-range cruise missiles.
Peripheral attack: intermediate-range bombers, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs andnd certain older SLBMs.
Strategic defense: ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) systems, antiballistic missile (ABM) and antisatellite (ASAT) systems; surface-to-air missilesighter interceptors, and supporting systems for defending Soviet territory against aircrafl and cruise missiles; systems with antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities for use against nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinesnd the Soviet civil defense program.
Operational considerations: activities, organizations, andfactors which support and integrate Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Notable among these are the Soviet command, control, and communications system; the readiness procedures and alert status of forces; and intelligence and warning systems.
- See ihe oliemaiive mem of ike Director. Defenie inlelligencend ihe Senior Inlelligence
qlltterioj lhe mil-ram leruieeI Inn iheflm oogtoltk* Summerg. innd on
Research indrograms and methods of developing and procuring strategic forces.
The Estimate is published in three volumes. The first "of these (Summary) provides an overview uf important judgments and analyses drawn from the more comprehensive second volume. The" second volume (The Estimate) contains our broad estimates of: policies underlying Soviet strategic nuclear programs: the main developments in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces; the control and employment of these forcesnd the current and future capabilities of these forces. The length of Ibis volume has been reduced from last year, bul the number of chapters has been expanded from five to six. The new chapterore comprehensive discussion of tbe rationale underlying our projections of offensive and defensive forces. The third volume (Annexes) provides detailed tabular data on Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces. The cutoff date for information and analysis In this Estimate
SUMMARY '
(he next lew years, Soviel strategicwill continue lo grow relalive lo those of (he Uniled Stales and NATO. The Soviets have puisued steady, persistent strategic programs for many years, while new Weslern programs remain largely inand development phases. We believe thaiaims underlying Ihese Soviet programs are to strengthen (be USSfl's deterrent, Io support its foreign policy, and to foster strategic stability through Soviel advantage. In ihese efforts, however, (he Soviets would face less favorable strategic trends over Ihe longer term if additional and more formidable weapons now in prosped are deployed by (hc United States and NATO in lhe middle and.
Throughout, wiih or without SALT limitations, thc retaliatory capabilities of US and Soviel forces survivingurprise atiack would be very large, in the, when Soviet forces would have greater capabilities than today to reduce US surviving weaponsurprise attack, the Soviets would still have to expect thc United States to retain lhe potential loarge percentage of the USSR's economic and military assets. Similarly, despite the improvements planned fo: US forces in (he, the Soviets could expect lo retain the potential for massive retaliation against US economic andfacilities, even under circumstancesS suiprise attack. This Soviet potential, however, would be less lhan in the early and, androspective decline is cause for Soviet concern.
In seeking lo meet thc challenges posed by prospective US and NATO force improvements, we believe that Ihe Soviets would hope lo avoid substan-
tial further incenses In the costs ol Iheir strategic programs. We believe lhal principal Soviet aims will be lo slow or hall the Western programsombination of threats, inducements, and armsand. at the same tima. to continue to develop force deployment options thai could counter ihese programs The Soviets would have more latitude lo develop and deploy such counters if they were not bound by lhe limits of SALT II or if those limits were lo lapse5 If Western stralegic programsas planned and SALT II limits are not chanced, the Soviets could find il increasingly difficult to reconcile their stralegic force objectives with their desire to continue the SALT process.
A. We do not expect immediate, irreversibleby the USSR lu US deferral of the SALT Treaty.believe the Soviets will wish, at least initially, to avoid visible changes in stralegic programs lhat could seriously leopardirc the chances of eventual US ratification. They could, however, take measures designed to pressure (he United States, with lhe idea of reversing ihem bier if the Trealy were eventuallyS rejection of the Trealy. particularly in light of prospective US and NATO forcewould probably resultombination of actions by (he Soviets (ha( would increase (heir forces and capabilities beyond (hose (hey could have under Ihe SALT II agreement
A. Soviet Slrotepic Plonning for lhe
hc Soviet leaders view (heir strategicin the context of persistent long-term struggle bclween social svslentl. continuing rivalry wiih Ihe
The Diretlar. Defeair Inlrlhgrnte Armey, ihr AnUltal Chirl of Stall /or Inlillifeaee. Oeparlmtal ol Ihr Army, iht Dittttot of f'aoal Intelligence. Department ol ihr Navy, thr AtlUlanI Chirl olntrlheenee. Oepotinient ol ihr AW Force, aad lhe Olieclor ol InleOigente. Ilradouarirrx. Marine Conn, diaitoelalr Ihrmirluei from thii volume and III cktratttrllOlionummary of ihe Ultimate.
In general, ihey helm* ihe Summary ti net ree'rtenlallie of the inirKigencc anal/tii deixhraed In lhe Eiitmaie. In iheir judgment. II conceairatei on Quantitative information al ihe ereenie of mirlUgence concerning Soutet doctrine, policy. capahlliUei. future ptogiami. end neiriMr utinnnun lahe eiieaUve lit of eomparalioe feece aaalyilt ia ihr Hiimair dnori and dutortt the tjlimate'i ji"tt"icais. niKciatly in ihu Summa'y colume.
The liolden ol ihu it in alio tonildtr ihe judgment! outlined in the Summary ai unduly ihaped hy ISS perception! tad iltaieglc
thinking and nor prOpeily ttfttitiv ol Soviet HietrgU obietlloei. The Summary ilioutd rmpltauzr that Ihe Sooitli are panning iirutsrit mulesr eavabditiei for Mini aultr different from thou of ihr Uniled Statu Uriauir of llm imiplsted rtnoheiu. lhe Summary fail! 10
c rploiii totislacloiily Iht romp irot nervir of SotAtt ilitltgic ptenmig innolwieloil off taut* aad defraiiue lyiltmi. The very peat poliiical and conventional military tonieouencei of lhe aiymmetrlei in iiioiegic lo-ctt and docinnr arr not adrauairtv addttued.
United Stales lor glotal power and influence, and concern lor the policies and forces of countries on the Eurasian periphery, especially NATO and China Within this framework, the Soviets seek Hioncow inc. strategic capabilities lo piovtdc:
A powerful deterrenl against nuclear attack by any adversary.
Along with other military forces, the prospect ol greater freedom ol* action in the world arena while minimizing the risk of nuclear war
An improvement in the chances that, if nuclear war should occur, the USSR could survive and emergeetter position than its advcjiarici
G. The Soviets have made substantial progressthese goals over the pailears. Their strategic forces are generally acknowledged to be equal to Ihose of the United Stales, and arc superior to those of all their other adversaries combined- Despite Soviethowever, powerful US retaliatory capabilities would suivive even successful Soviet initial strikes, and active and passive Soviet defense* could not prevent the devasialion of the USSR From iheir statements and writings, it is clear that the Soviet leaders perceive the present US-Soviet strategic relationship as one in which each side could inflict massive damage on lhe other Side under any circumstances The Soviets wouldelationship in which deterrence and strategic stability were assured by Soviel possession ol superior capabilities to light anduclear war with the Uniled States.
7 The Soviets probably view iheir improvedposition asote favorable backdrop than before lo (he conduct of an assertive foreign policy and lo lhe protection of Soviet power abroad They probably do not see the present situation of appioiimatc strategic nuclear parity as providing ihem with the latitude to safely confront thc United States directly in areas where they perceive US vital interests lo be involved However, in areas lhat they believe thr Uniled States regards as leu central lo its interests, particularly in regions where the USSRa preponderance ol conventional forces and the advantage of prQatmlly, aiwh as Afghanistan. Ihe current strategic relalionship probably enhances Soviel confidence that the riskS local or escalator* mikiary response would be negligible
B There it an alternative view which holds lhal it* increasing aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy will eipand as lhe Soviel Union's advantages in strategic
nuclear forces become more pronounced The Soviets may now perceive that ihey have nuclear superiority. As Ihey see this Superiority
three lo live years, ibey will probably attempt to secure mnimum poliiical advantages Irom theirarsenal In anticipation of US force modernization programs Moreover, lhe holders of this view sense lhal the Soviet leadership remains uncertain aboul lhe hounding of US national interests and Americanlo meet challenges to these interests If such unccitainlies conlinuc. (here Is lhe distinct danger lhal the USSH may grossly miscalculate US reactionsa regional crisis and thus lei thc Stageerious military confrontation between the superpowers'
his year ihe Soviets find themselves at what they may well regardritical juncture in their planning for future strategic forces. Tltey are ncarmg the end of laige ICBM and SLBM deploymentand llie beginningew five-year economic plan Tbey confront growing internal economicwhich could be complicatediansition in leadership some lime soon Paternal problems include deteriorating relations with the Uniled States and China, uncertainty aboul US ratification of lhc SALT II Treaty,rowing Western determination to counter improvements in Soviet military forcesthe Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and lhe international condemnation thai it incurred probably indicate lhat. in ihetr present planning. Ihc Sovieis are not counting on much benefit from delente
bc Soviets must now plan for lhe middle anderiod that (he* almost certainly perceive-as posmg major challenges US Trident submarines and air-launched cruise missiles will make it even harder for ihem lo overcome their insufficiencies Inwarfare and in air defense. Planned new NATO Song-range theater nuclear forces could reduce- Soviet advantage in forces for penphetal attack, long-range cruise missiles jn the Europeanwould be of particulai concern lo the Sovieis Finally, the Soviets would see deployment of an MX/MPS syslem as giving lhe United States thc potential In lhco destroy the bulk of Ihcir ICBM silos and aseasure of survivability for the US ICUM force. The Sovieis inieipret these Western programs as attempts totrategic
lhaInitllttrner
uC*v/ ofauttfrwre.Auuteeirrcr
j iht Aftortt.eerfihr Dl-eflar of iMtXhttrnxt. im. Manitr ton"
advantage ratlier than a* countervailing response*nitiative!
II SALT conudeiationi will figure Kc.nl, indecisions about how lo deal wiih these ehallenges-Ai would be eipected. lhe Soviet* negotiated the SALT II Treaty so as lo protect program options ihcv considered crucial lo Iheir strategic nccdi durine lhe period o( lhe Treaty. The Soviet! do not appear lo have strategic reauiremenl* so praising ai lo cause Ihem lo make major visiblen iheirprograms in lhe cominB monllii, while USol theeferred. They have indicated their willingness, if the Treaty ii ratified, to proceed promptly to negotiate further red net ion* andbut Iheir aims would be complicated by the new wv,tcrn programs. Moreover, the Soviet* might find it difficult to accept continuation5 of the SALT II limitation* on new ICBMi. ICBMand perhaps toul number! of launcher* These provisions would limit iheir option! for Increasing thc connteifoice capabilities and survivability ol their land-based missile forces In iciponsc to the -US MX/MPS and other program* We are. thetefore, uncertain whether the Soviets would be willing to citend such limits5
conomic considerations areactor in Soviet planning for strategic fotces innergy, demographic, and productivity problems are adding lo Soviet economic difficulties To help ease these difficulties, lhe Soviet! mighl consider (educing thc rale ol growlh of military spending. However, the evidence available lo ui on current and planned Soviet program! leads us to conclude that growth in total defense spending and in Spending for itralegicover the neat few years will be at or near thc historic king-term raleear If lhc Soviet leaden should perceive economic pressure so ic.ere that they had tooderation of the rale ol growth in their defense .pending, we believe they would not single out strategic programsajor reduction in growth.
everal major factor! lead ui lo believe that the Soviet! ate not likely lo aller stgnilicanlly their com-milmenl lo long-term strategic force improvements. These factors include the following:
Continued progress toward lhe achievement of Soviet objectives for strategic nuclear lorcesa priority clement in leadership planning.
A cutback in Soviet strategic forces would haveimited elfect on theost serious economic problems
The momentum of Soviet strategic programs would be hard to arrest, particularlyeriod of leadership transition
New ilgm of Western delerminalion and lhe deterioration of detente probably will contribute lo continued Soviet determination to seek to shift the correlation of forces in Ihe USSR's favor
The possibility, however remote, of largescale nuclear war will continue lo support efforts to improve Soviet war-fighting capabililtei
Thus we believe lhat. while seeking to slow or hall US and NATO weapon programs, lhe Soviels will al the same lime initiate and coniinue ptogram* designed lo overcome current weaknesses, especially in theitdefenses, and IO give themselves options lo counter lhe prospective Western programs
ain Curront Trends in Soviet Programs
M. Much evidence on pasl and present Soviel strategic progmmi leads us to believe that the Soviets have been striving lo acquire and maintain strategic forces and supporting elements lhat. in the event of nucleii war. could;
Launch crippling counterforce strikes
Survive large-scale nuclear attack
Be employed flexiblyide lange of target!
Substantially limit damage lo the USSR
IS. The number of Soviet weapons with good court-Irrlorer taoabtUlles is increasing rapidly:
lder silos lo make ihem capable ol launching ICBMs with multiple inde-pendeMly targctabte reentry vehicles (MIRVs) will be completed
-The blest MIRVed versions of Ihendow being deployed, are considerably more accurate than earlier versions of these missiles and have substantial hard-target
evidence still points to Soviel programs fot five new or modified ICBMs The character-Mia of ai least some of them will probably
include improved reliability and even belter accuracies
of follow-ons to thendowever, is not likely to occurew yean The Soviets have already incorporated into their current systems major f"
at ions lhat we hadeipecled lo appear on the follow-on systems, and ihey ere stii! working oo Other modifications
Soviets are steadily improving theoi their strategic forces and supportingdevelopments include-
The much greater hardening ol silos as they are converted lo accommodate MIRVed ICDMs, and research and tciting lo make Ihc silos even harder
The continued deployment of MIRVed. mobile
IRBMllwo
solid-propellant ICDMs. at least one of which
could be deployed on mobile launchers.
The further deployment of MIRVed Sl.DMs and an increase in the number of SSDNs on patrol or in transit Additional increases are likely In, especially witb deployment of the new. large Typhoon submanne and missile
The continued expansion and protection offor command, control,ombination of hardening,and mobility.
Soviets are adding lo their capabilitiesemployment of strategic nuclear forcesvariety of circumstances:
Tho deployment of MIRVcd missiles and the Impiovemenl ol command and conlrol systems are adding lo Soviel targeting fleiibility.
Aerodynamic syslems arc being relained as part of boih intercontinental and peripheral allacl forces Backfires conlinuc to beew bomber and cruise missile carrier are under development, bui we now doubt lhat they could be operational until5 The developmentong-range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) continues.
TheRBMdding lo Soviet Unking power and fleiibility for attacking targets in Europe, the Middle Fast, andariant of the SSeing fltghtlesied Some older
MRBM and IRBM sites have been deactivated, but some of lhc launch-related equipment and missiles arc apparently being transferred toactive sites.
The Soviets are increasing, tbc proficiency of their command and control systetnf""
Soviets are improving their ability to launch Iheir mimics on receipt of tactical warning. Thay are completing large new radars that willballistic missile early warning Their launch deieetton satellite program is still inhowever.
hc capability of Soviet strategic defenses to contribute to limiting damage to tbe USSR remalnt low despite large, continuing Soviet investment! Weapon syslems now being tesled should bring some improvemenl, notably in strategic air defenses.
In sirutegic air defense, lhe Soviets-are Stirling to deploy new versions of existing interceptors, but their low-altitude capabilities will be limited Modified and new interceptors with lookdown/ shootdown capabilities are being flight-tested, and lieployrnen!ew low-altilude surface-lo air missile system is irnminenf. An airborne warning and control system (AWACS) that is being tesled probably will have capabilities over land as well as over water. These systems will have better capabilities against low-altitude bombers, bui Ihey probably will bave onlyapabilities against cruise missiles. There is as yet no evidence of active development of systems designed specifically to intercept cruise missiles at low altitudes.
In ballistic missile defense, the Soviet' arcto develop an ABM system thai could be deployed more rapidly than the Moscow system.rogram for antiballistic missiles could give ihem Options inor upgrading Iheir present ABM system al Moscow or for deploying ABM defenses more widely
In antisubmarine warfarentensive cl-lom are under way io improve both acoustic and rvjnacousiiC sensors. However. Soviet towed, array sonar development is not as far along as we had thought. l7
In directed-energy technology, lhe Soviets ateroadly based research program lo invesligale applicalions for slrategic defense. They are continuing lo develop laser weapon prototype* fot lesting against aerodynamicsatelliles. and ballistic miuile reentry vehicles
fn civil defense, new evidence and analysis show lhal Ihc proportion of urban residents that could be accommodated in blast shelter! il toward the low side of our previous estimate ofoercent This reinforces our belief lhat thcwould have lo rely on dlv evacuation as their principal means of protccUng tlie urban population. The Soviets, howcvei, couldatge proportion of theit political leadership and mam key Industrial workers.
The Soviets have operational systems capable of attacking or degrading some US satellites and arc probably working lo improve their capabilities.
C. Future Soviel Forces for Sirotogic Attack
Possible Sovicl Reaclions lo MX/MPS
nder SALT II. While the Soviels will ay to halt or severely limil the MX/MPS system, they can also be expected to use lhe lime between now and lheo develop counters to both the hard-target capabilities and lhe survivability features of the US system. One of the first indicators of lhe Sovicis' response is likely to be the missile ihey choose to flight-test as the one new type of ICBM permitted Ihem under SALT II restrictions They could select eilher of two new solid-propellanl
"Ja imilisystem thai could be deployed on off toad-mobile launchen but could carry no moteewedium system Ihot could be filledarge single reentry vehicle or wllh up toIRV* bul, if deployedobile configuration, probably would be restricted to improved roads or speceploymenl areas. Alternatively, the Soviets couldedium-sire liquid propellanl ICBM lo carryVs, butystem could not easily be deployedobile mode and we hare no evidences under developmenl
t present, Ihc Soviels ate keeping Iheir options apeit. We assume lhal. under SALT II itmilalions, ihey
would choose as llseir newlngle-RV medium solid system lo replace thend would deploy il in silos and perhaps on mobilee think Ihey would alsonotMIRV veisiou of tht* systemore highly fractionated version of they these actions Ihey could minimire disruptions to their present ICBM programs and be ready lo flight-test and deploy ICBMs with greater number* of RV* if the SALT II limitations expired at lhe ende do noi have high confidence lhal the Soviels will follow this course ofRV leplacemcnt forr. or both, seemsittle less likelyingle-RV replacement fors. especially If lhc SovietsSALT II limitations to be extendedS and wanted lo maalmiie iheir counterforce RVs within these limitations.
nder No SALT Conditions. If theSALTIimi-talions on offensive arms were abandoned this year and lhe Soviets embarkedajor program of force improvement and expansion, they would have more options to respond Io the prospect of MX/MPSThey could take full advantage of their large ICBM throw weight and theirrograms Anticipatory actions could be taken gradually, without disrupting near-term Soviet program* For example, we would expect the Soviets to deployVs onrief flight test program, and to deploy anothei veision with still more RVs inIRVed medium solid ICBM could be deployed without having '0 replace existingnd SS-iOs, which themselves could be upgraded to eairy mote MIRVs, The smaller solid-propellant ICBM could also be flight-tested and deployed. Mobile ICBM launchers as well as additional SLBM launchers could bewithout compensatory dismantling Wc believe lhal. through such means, the Soviets would seek to counler Ihc US MX/MPS and olher ptogiami as they emerged
Soviet Intercontinental Striking Forces
ur projection* of Soviet intercontinentalforces reflect our judgment lhat lhe USSR will continue It* historical heavy reliance on ICBMs. secondary reliance on SLBMs. and maintenanceelatively small force of aerodynamic system* fot inlerconlinental atlack Thc four protections wcillustrate allrrnaitve fuiure Soviet lorce levels under various assumptions about SALT. Theare based on observed receni trends ond our best estimate! of Soviet technological progrcis. and are
l' in llie light of Soviet obtcclivc* (or strategic forces ss. veil as US strategic program options. Thev are rtol confident estimates of what the Soviets will actually doeriod as long asears ahead, especially mi thu period ol transition in Soviet and US programs
pmiecl two moderate SALT-limited (Mod SAL! Soviet (orces. in which we assume that the SALT II Treaty enters Into force thb year and remains unchanged throughn the (irst force we assume that llie Soviets elect as their permitted one new type oledium solid-propellant missilearge uncle RV. and deploy it in upgradedilos and on mobile launchers The second Mod SAL force illustrates Ihe cllectsoviet decision to manmizc the number of ICBM RVs within SALT II limns, by replacing allndedium solid-propellant system havingVa.in silos and an mobile launcheis.
Wehird force (termed SAL/No-SAL) which illustrates lhe So-net potential to develop and deploy additional forces and to respondhc MX/MPs system il SALT II limitations are in Forceut eapirethe end of lhal year This proprrtion assumes thai the USSR prepares in advance lo* rapid, subsequent improvements in lhe counter-force capability and survivability of its offensive forces
fourth force (Mod No-SAL) illustratesand deployment options underin which (he SALTrealy is abandonedthe SALT process breaks down, anddeteriorate still further In thisbelieve the Soviets would be motivated tovigorously with the United Slates byimproved systems Further, withoutconstrainls they probably would retain many olsystems lhal wouldeen deactivatedprovisionslhe Trealy The projectionihe Soviets wouldrce ofICBMs lo increase their strikingand that they would seek still further tosurvivability nf Iheir forces byobile ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs
Sloiic Comparisons ol US ond Soviel Inlo'conlinenlol Striking Forces
?iillustrates prointed trends in ihr mimln'i >if xi-aiMius in Inline Soviel foices and ut |Ih
rsplirtive power, wiih and without SALT II li The lop two charts compare the moderate SALT-limited Sonet lorces. and the SAL/No-SAL force,S SALT-limited force lhal is bowed on Depart me nl of Dclense projections. The charts show thai the projected Soviet SALT-limited forces would improve rrlatnr to the protected US force in lhe early and, but lhal the trends would become less favorable lo lhe Sovicls In Ihe second half nf the decade if SALT II limits remained in effectlhe period. The charts also show thai Soviet forces could maidi or eiceed ihose ol the United Slates in Ibef SALTimitations eipiredhe Soviets eipanded their lorces. and the Uniled Stales, continued lo develop lis forces al cuirently pro-era mrd
In online missile RVs and bomber weapons, the present US lead becomes very small by lhe. The Uniled Stales would regain ibe lead in lhender SALT-limitedunless lhe Sovieis deployedVs on all iheir MIRVed ICBMs However, the Soviets could achieve an advantage in thef Ihe SALT II Treaty cawed5 and the United Sla'es did not change its programed force
In online equivalent megatons, the Soviet forces maintain their current lead in each of iheie assumed eueumRaneea
he bottom two charts inllustrate the prospects for Soviel force improvcmenl andnder conditions in which SALT II Is abandoned arid Ihe Sovietsuildup this year In thesewe project lhat Soviet forces would achieve Qualitative and quantitative characteristics that would substantially eiceed those lhat ihey would be likely lo have under SALT II:
In numbers of online missile ItVs and bomber weapons, the Soviets would be able to deploy more highly fractionated ICBMs and SLBMshan ihey could under SALTwing lo this greater flexibility, the number of Soviel missileand bomber wi-apons grows mute rapidly andhal nf the SALT-limiled lord'siliilanlitil margin
In iHilinr rutiivalcnl megatons, ihr Soviet No SALT four growsevel gieatcr than thai ul lhcirnilitl I'irces The rule nf inor.jse.
J
however,ore gradual Ihan lhal shown for missile HVs and bomber weapons This is because highly fractionated payloads tend lo have less explosive power ihan payloads wirh fewer RVs.
For comparison, the SAL/No-SAL protection is abo reptoduced on the bottom Iwo charts. Il illustrates thai by preparing themselves lo bteak out of SALT limits lions rapidly upon expirationALT II Treaty in
he Soviets could9 acquire forces which, in Ihese indexes, approach Ihe fotces we would expect them lo acquireore gradual No-SALT buildup beginning this year. If thc Soviets were to delay Ihc star!uildup because ol uncertainty over the outcome of SALT II but began itor example, the Soviet curves on these graphs would probably be belween Ihe SAL/No-SAL and lhc No-SAL curves
variety of pussibililiei exist for moreSoviel inlerconluiental oflcmtve forces. EvenSALT II limitations, the performanceof Soviet weapons mighl be belter, or mighlfaster than our bell estimate* indicate.were no SALThe Soviet*even more MIRV* and relativelyihan in our Mod No-SALnlikely, however, that the Soviets couldexceed our best estimate* of deploymenlachievement in all component* ofThis would strain Soviei developmentcapacity and Incur lhc costs and risksfast replacementrojections illustratingbounds of our uncertainties about Sovieiprogress and deploymenl rate* can be foundV in the mainf this Estimate.
Soviet Strategic Forces for Peripheral Atlack
medium' and Inlermediaic-iangcstrategic attack on the Eurasian peripherybeen superior in numbers and capabilitiesWestern and Chinese forces. Theu increasing with the deployment of thellsftM and the llackfire bombei On the basisevidence of Soviel planning in thetrends in production and deployment sincehavea continued. modVtatetvIn nii-li rnire prri|ilictal slrategicforces, Thr main Iralurr* nf lliisare
Deployns.nl oflien fot MIRVed. mobile lltllMs bymi lhe 'Cplace-ment nf tlw SN-fcllnllnw-nn missile
IC
of someackfires lo Long
Range Aviationuummg lhal Backfire
production is limited loer year and lhal
output continues lo be shared about equally
between LRA and Soviet Naval Aviation p
Basing of lhe no- weapon systems lo ensure coverage of all areas on the Eurasian periphery, with mobile IRBMs divided in about equal thirds among lhc western, eastern, and cenlral USSR and Backfires oriented primarily lo penetrate European air defenses. There Is an alternative view lhat lhe Backfire has good intercontinental capabilities, and thai some portion of lheforce would be employed againsi targets in the United States.
Some continued deactivations of older MR/ IRBM launchers, and retirement* of olderbomber* We arc uncertain, however, aboul whether these aging systems will gradually decline or be retained, in part because lhe Soviets are ptobablv hedging againsi NATO force model ri ration
e have no preseni basis lot estimating how impioveinenls in NATO long-range thealer nuclear forces would affect Soviet peripheral ailack programs, or what specific arms control proposals lhe USSR may put forward The Soviels would have the option of eipanding Iheir peripheral atlack fotce*igher level of effort, and could lake furlhet Men* lo improve tactical nuclear fotces
D. Counlfforce Capabilities and Prelaunch Survivability of Soviet Intercontinental Striking Force*
he Soviets expect lhal intercontinental nuclear conflict would most likely arise out of an intense US-Soviet cisis Or confrontation, probablyonventional theater war lhal had eicalaled Tbe Soviets generally envisage strategic nuclear operation* as complex engagements, ralher ihaningle, all-out
l thc Soviets
Stress employment flexibility and endurance in lheHiei rfm imi'u- aie ikentrlheenee
Agriwy: MirChirj tij hialf loi Iniiillxencr.iir Ar.iiir.hrre/S'o//. UllrlUeen'r.
A-oirreii'iii nl ilir Ai* Torre
development of their strategic weapon*ongstanding aim of the Sovieti is to improve (lie survivabllity of their command andsystem so that il could function even under circumstance* in which il had suffered direct, large-scale nuclear attacks
ecent Soviel [mutism* lor intcrconltnenlalloices and supporting elements include Icajjitc* reflecting the stress on llealbility and endurance
J^Qvcr the years the Soviets have acquired capabillliei to employ theirnuclear forces in initial, preemptive, orstrikes, and In recent yean they have been developing capabilities to launch their forces upon receipt of tactical warning that an enemy atiack had been launched We believe that lhe Soviet command and control system could suppori any of theseoptions. Wc also believe the syslem would have good capabilities for susiained battle management following an initial nuclear strike, but would be severely degraded if national-level command bunkers and communication centers were destroyed.
Counlerforce Capabilities
f the Soviets were lotrike on the United States, (heir obtective ol highest priority would be to reduce the retaltalory capability of opposing offensive forces Thc Soviets would target US bomber and SSBN bases, ol which there areew, as well as US ICBM silos, of which there iro. In addition, lhe Soviets will be facedarge number of MXn (hc
3d. ludging by present trends in Ihc number and capabilities of Soviet ICBM RVs, we believe thai from now on (he Soviet ICBM force will be capable of destroying most US ICBM silos and still have many warheads remaining for other purposes. An MPS system. Ivowever, would tax Soviet count erf orcein (he. The Soviet choice or which new ICBM lo deploy under SALT limitations would influence tlse number of ICBM RVs available to attack MX shelters, but the more important factor affecting the number is whether or not SALT limitations were in effect. Thc table below shows our alternative projections of total online Soviet ICBM RVshose with hard- targel capabilities, and thc number on ready missiles in excess of those requiredtiack silos. While all such excess RVs would theoretically be available to atiack MX shelters, it should be noted that the Soviets would also have requirements to attack olher kinds of targets and lo withhold ICBMs for olher purposes. These requirements would reduce theof ICBM RVs actually available for attacking MX shelters.
hereivergent view that, because of the olher Soviet targeting and withhold requirements for ICBM RVs, the number of Soviet hard-target ICBM RVs available for use against the planned US MX/MPS system would be far fewer than the "excess" shown in the table.esult, the holders of Ihis view believe the table andverstate thc threat to lhe planned US MX/MI'S system.'
llustrates (he number of ICBM RVs. remaining on each side if the ICBMs of the Soviet SALT-limited forces were used to attack all US ICBMs
The holden of ihu cuw .tt ihe Diieelor. Deftrtteu'. end ihr Senior Inirliltnce Offlcen of iht military
Hard-Target ICBM Reentry Vehicles9
Modorce ProirOion*
Toul Online ICBM KVi
Hard-Tana-Capable ICBM HV)
Hard-Tarte! RV. in
Eicess ef Three Reovlred To Attack
limit ai inn*8 New ICBM -Ilh ilntlc 1W
SALT liieliaiianiCBM -ilhVj
hrouch toss
Buildup hcillm6
No SALT limitation*
Buildup hetlnl
0
0
0
TCS-
and MXot litis purpose, we assume thai the Soviels latgcl Iwo ICHM HVs against each US silo and one RV againsi each MX shelter, and lhat US ICBMs ride out lhe altack The figure shows
In the lop two cherts, if thc Soviets elected loew ICBMingleoviet altack on all US Silo* andX shelters currently programed would leave thc US ICBM force wiih few surviving HVs bul.he USSR would alto be left wllh few ICBM RVs fat other missions
In the bollom two charts, if lhe Soviets elected toew MIRVed ICBM withVs. the Soviel atlack would leave the USSR withCBM RVs available lor olher missions9
If Ihc SALT II limits were lo expire5 or if SALT II were abandoned this year, the Soviets would have Ihe flexibility to increase their Inventory of ICBM warheads fat beyond what would be required io attack all US silos andX shelters currently programed. With this US shelter ptogram. the Soviets couldCBM RVs remaining after an altack on US ICBMs in thender ihese No-SALT circumstances. However, the Soviets probably would eapect the United States to increase lhe number of MX shelters substanlsaDy. In Ihis case. Soviet RVi remainingoviet silo/ shelter altack would be significantly reduced.
We believe lhe Soviets are now considering some form of advanced guidance system for their fuiure SLBMs, bul it is unlikely thai MIRVed SLBMs with hard-iargct capabilities could be deployed beloreo acquire such capabilities, the Soviets would have to develop guidance techniques employing global positioning satellites or terminal RV homing. This would involve mote lechnical risk andto counter measures ihan the Soviets have been willing lo accept in their SI.BM systems fo date. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the MX/MPS system might motivate Ihe Soviets tosuch techniques and that,igh level of efiort. ihey might be able to start deploying SLBMs capable of attacking MX shelters in the.
The Soviets have ample capabilities lo destroy all US SSBN bases as well ai Ihe bases of the US bomber force We have no picsent evidence lhal thc Sovicis ate trying lo minimize lhe (light lime gf SLBMs in order Intealer Ihirat lo US aleit
bombets In view of lhe dispersal and other measures the Uniied Slates could exercise, it Is unlikely lhat lhe Soviets would be able to destroy moreew of the bombers the Uniied Stales keeps on alert.
Preloursch Survivability
lie overall survivability of Sovietoffensive forces inill remain heavily dependent on the survivability of their fixed ICBMi Deployment of mote SLBM RVs and mobile ICBMs would increase Ihe relatively survivablcof Soviel forces, but preseni trends do notadical shift away from silo-based ICBMs.epicts the ihreat to Soviet ICBMs posed by current and programed US SALT-liiniledssuming lhat the Uniied Slates targeted two ICBM RVs againsi each Soviet silo and lhal Soviet silo-based ICBMs rode out an attack The figure show*
In the lop two charts, if tbe Soviets elected toew ICBMinglr RV.oviet RVs on silo-based ICBMs couldected lo survive an attack by US ICBMs through thcn the, however, lhe number of silo-bascd RVs expected lo survive would be reduced loof lhe increased counterforce capability of the MX.
In Ihe bottom two charts, if the Soviets elected toRV new ICBM, lhe number of silo based RVi expected to survive in thcould be only slightly higher.
In bothwo-on-ooe attack on all Soviet silos would leave the Uniied Stales wiih virtually no ICBM RVs remaining unlil thc, al which time, il would have unused ICBM RVs available for other purposes.
--Soviet mobile ICBMs would be vulnerableS ICBM attack if deployed at fixed support bases like those used for theRBM Their survivability could be increased if. as wc think hkely. Ihe Soviets dispersed ihemrisis The charts show that with dispersed mobilethe Soviets could have as manydditional lurvivmg ICBM RV* il lhe USSR0 RV missile as lis new ICBM andumber of ihem on mobilelngle-HV new ICBM would noi offer ihis advantage becausearge force nf mobiles would carry relalivelv few RVs.
Capability of Soviet ICBMs To Attack US ICBMs In Silos and Shelters
Soviet ICOMs Attack Mlnideman Two on-One. MX One-on-One; US ICBM* Ride Out Attack
Attack by Soviet Hod SAL Force With New Single-RV ICBM
I0OB0
Attack by Soviel Moo SALhRV ICBM
j Soviet
ICOM RVi/*^
. i i r
1
ai oi aa
and*
13
he foregoing charts indicate that In SALT-limiled circumstances lhe Soviet) couldub. tJsnlial number of their silo-based ICBM RVs lo survive in lhe early ant)ven if they rode out an attack. Under No-SALT circumUarvces. the Sovletl could MIRV virtually all of their ICBMs. ami therefore Couldomewhat (neaterof ICBM RVsS attack in lhe early and. In lhe, however, the. number of expected Soviel ICBM RV survivorswould still decline to relatively low levels, unless thc Soviets were to change iheir force mil mote dramatically than we behove likely even under No-SALT circumslances
ild pull.
II should also be noted lhat the highly accurate US bomber and ALCM weapons would pose anihreat lo Sovicl silo-based ICBMs The Soviets would be concerned aboul ihis additional capabilily bul would belhal the US aerodynamic systems would be subiect lo attrition by Soviel air defenses and that iheir long Ifight timet would give Ihe USSn more time lo decide whether to launch its stlo-batcd ICBMs.
With regard to the survivability of the Olher elements of Soviet intercontinental striking lorces. roughlyercent of the Soviet SSBN force Isin port and no bombers are kept on alert. Therefore, both elements are vulnerable lo surprise attack.
e
Sonets couldmodern
SSBNs lo tea in combat-ready status At full combat readiness, lhe survivability of bombers would bebecause ihey probably would be dispersed and placed on alert.
E. Quati-Dynomic Analysis of Soviel ond US Intercontinental Sinking Forces'
omparisons of the aggregate sue of slrategic forcet provide important insights Inlo significant trends In US and Soviel intercontinental striking power. Because such comparisons are essentially static in nature, however, they cannot fully reflectbetween the two forces and theit capabilities lhat arise from qualitative asymmetries These dilfet-
Tm ifcr weir a/ ikr Oweeioi. Or/nuvmmd
llJKm ofmm ikr
ml ihU aia/(ui<'
enccs can be better illuminated by using an analyticalhas been an integral part ol this Estimate for the past teveral years. This analyst! addresses the potential of one side't ICBMs lo attack the retaliafory forces of the other sideen compares lhe residual destructive potentials. The respective arsenals are icduced by subtracting those ICRMs needed for Ihe altack und those relali-atory forces destroyed in the attack, Iho ICBMs of the side alluded are assumed to ride out the atlack without being launched. Thc residuati are on-pad potentials, calculated without considering such factors as specilic Ur art ing doctrines, command and control degradation, attrition by air defenses, andariables
he calculalions in the analysis do not atlempt to simulate actual conflict outcomes Rathct, thev seek lo display comparative capabilities and limitationsanner most relevanluclear deterrence in its mostssured destruction The analysis illustrates the retaliatory destructive potentialide contemplating an attack would have lo expect lo survive on the side attacked ft also compares Ihis surviving destructive potential with Ihepotential remaining to lhe attacking tide, aimportant to both sides.
The mcasuies employed in thcarea potential and hard-UrgeiIhe remaining and surviving polcntiab of each side torescribed overpressureide area or lo attack representative hardened silos on the otherhe analysis makes no estimate of which of thesether capabilities, or what mix of them, national leaden would elect in retaliatory or second strikes. But thc comparison ol the US and Soviet potentials does eivc tome leel for lhe options lhat would be available lo national leaders, and lhe composition of the tesidual potentials provides insighls about lhe suitability of the forces for rapid or delayed response
Thereiew in Ihe Intelligence Community that the quasi-dynamic residual analysis in this Esti-malc produces misleading nrsuht wllh respect to trends In lhe slrategic balance, sheds little hghi on lhe question of deterrence, andet assessment from the US perspective which ilroper func-
' The Snvicl haioUitcl pcteniitl ilgiiiHt rco'cscouuve US iilo> hsrdcnrd
T[Tht US potential Is timed (gainst
rili(lvt Sovitt SiIhrfnn"St
lion of intelligence According lo ihis view, only analysis of comprehensive iwo sided eachnnges can convey valid and usefulaboul relative US and Soviel strategic nuclear capabilities. In this view, such analysis from the US perspective should be accomplished within the Department of Defense with inlelligenceull paitrver, and should not be includedational Intelligence Estimateihe holders of this view believe lhat lhe analysis of residual forces In this Estimate (as sum ma riied inndhould be removed Further, ihe holders of this view believe that the Intelligence Community should focus ils efforts on undeistanding and. if possible, duplicating Soviel analyticalfor net assessment'
he Director of Central Intelligence believes that it wouldisservice to nationalto produce this Estimate without anyof relative US and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities beyond thai shown by static indicators. In his view, the Inclusion of quasi-dynamic analysis, despiie its limitations, allows the Estimate to reach more comprehensive conclusions about relativecapabilities and deterrent potentials and about perceptions of ihem He believes that the quasi-dynamic analysis is important to ihose who see the key ingredient of deterrence as the capability of one side loirst strike and retain enoughst ro dive potential loroad mii of targets on the other side
Soviot and US Roiidual Potentials
isplays the icsulls of our analysis ol residual potent illsorst cose circumstance for lheurprise attack when forces are on day-today alert. The SALT-limited forces of each side are used In the USX missiseshelters are deployed69 The forked lines on ihese charts indicate our uncertainty about whether lhe Soviets willVRV missile as iheir one new ICBM. and show thai the trends would not be very different in other case
heust rate that, under SALT II limits, the potentials of residual Sovieteither in lerms ol lethal area potential or in terms or Kurd targetimprove over lhefew
' rite hriMeii ol rnU Mr upe Oittrloi. lie/emi laltlhgentriJie Seme- liHeUiiinet Olflctn el lUy
n'uteri
years regardless ol which side struck first. Theluable advantage in ihese potentials in lhe early and. but US force improvements will erode and even reverse Ihe Soviet gains if SALT II limits extendoviet residual potentials would revert lo levels equal to or less than (hose lhe Soviets would have today, while US residuals would grow to levels substantially larger lhan those available to the USSR. The Soviets could alter these adverse trends ll ihey deployed even larger numbers ol mobile ICBMs and SLBMs or established high alert rates for such systems It would be dlfflcull. however, for the Soviets bclween now and thehange their force mii sufficiently lo reverse these trends.
ompares lhe composition by major force element of the residual lethal area potentials and hard-target potentials of US and Soviet SALT-limited forcesurprise attack by the other side:
The composition of the surviving Sovietreinforces the impression lhal it is the continued heavy Soviel reliance on silo-based ICBMs thai causes the adverse effects on Soviet residuals in lhel the United Stales deploys the MX.
The composition of surviving US forces shows that, despite increasing US ICBM siloUS residuals decline only slightly in theecause ICBMs makeelatively small portion of US prestrike potentials Deployment of MXhelters would not signiflcanlly increase the surviving US potentials il. asm this analysis, the Soviets were willing to eipend large numbers of their ICBMs to attack all MX shelters The charts show lhat bombers and ALCM ciniers. which must be launched to survive atiack and are subject to air defense allrilion. would accountarge andfraction of lhe surviving US potentials.
o provide an indication of tlie urban and industrial deslruction thai could be achieved by the. suiviving lethal area potentials of these SALT-limited forces, we have compered (hem wiih US and Soviet urbane find lhal:
, the area over whichUS forces couldreate overpressures sufficient in destroy reinforced concrete buildings would be equivalent to (he
JsQuare *ih>
meters. Even the relatively few surviving US ICHM fl Vi would have the potential loarge share of Soviel economic value.
Ihe early and, ibe Sovietlethal area potential would be equivalent lo
kilotnctcts By the, lhe surviving Soviet potential would have been reducedess than one-half of this amount Even then,Use Soviet potential would eacced lhal required to destroy most of the US economic value
e have also examined lhe sufviving hard-targd potential of each of these fotces In relalionjhip to the mi vi lie silos, shelters, and hardened command and control bunkers of the other We (ind that:
Surviving US ICBM warheads would have the potential lo destroymall number of Soviet ICBM silos,arge proportion of the Soviet national- and inlermedlate-leveland control bunkers. Surviving US bomber weapons would have the poteniial ioubstantial portion of Soviet ICBM silos, although they have relatively long flight limes and would be subject lo air defense attrition.
Surviving Soviet ICBM warheads, on Ihe other hand, couldubstantial number of US silos, as well as US hardened command and conirol facilities in quick-reaction retaliatory strikes. They could destroymall fraction of lha US MX sheltersowever
we have examined the survivingof the SALT-hmiled forces of each side lomilitary targets, which vary widely in areaThroughoutnder SALTeach tide would have thcarge percentage of these targets onside For the United Stales, lhe bulk ofwould reside in either its survivingor its bomber weapons. For ihe USSR,would reside in cither its surviving ICBMwarheads
Implications
regard lo absolute tcstdual capabilitiesanalysis indicates lhal. ihr out boutof ibe Ultimate, lhe SALT-iitniled forces ot
each side could devastate the other side in retaliation afterirst strike
regard to relallve residual capabilities
The analysis shows lhat. If they struck first with SI IT const rained forces, the SovieU couldubstantial advantage in residual potentials through Ihe. The United Stales would begin to mirow the gap thereafter and. In thc, would achieve residual potentials aboul equal to ihose of Ihe USSR. Thus, the Uniied Slates isisadvantage through thend llic situation then improves
From the point of view of Soviet concern about Ihe possibilityS first strike, again with SALT const rained forces, tbe analysis indicates that Soviet residuals would be the greater in the, but would fall well below those ol the United States by the
regaid lo lhe very broad trendsII conditions:
The analysisubstantial Soviet improve ment in the neat few years,lateau in tbe early andr peaking in the. Itlight US decLnehcharp Imptovement in the US poiilion in the.
These trends are caused by lhc combined effects of heavy Soviet reliance on fixed land-based ICBMs. US force diversity and plannedand SALT II limitations if emended through lhe decade.
F. Capabilities of Soviel Strategic Defenses
n light of the improving Soviet intcrcontlnenlal olfcntlve capabilities, the cxlcnt to which Sovietand inlisile defenses, antisub marine warfare forces, and civilthe damage lo the USSR from US retaliatory strikes is becoming even mote important. Currently. Soviet strategic defenses would be unable lo reduce significantly the weightarge-scale US nuclear atlack on the USSR.
Air Defense
t present the massive Soviel air defense forces, if undegraded. would probably perform well againsi airrrall al medium and high altitude, but ihey have
i r
r
L
1 r
J L
hlile capability to intercept targets at low altitudes. Thi grophs inefleci our projectioniew inlerceptori. the majority of ihem equipped
with modern lookdown/shootdown eapabililies.
and a new low-altitude surface-to air missile
i, item will be deployed in substantial numbers
during
Thr percentage of the area of lhe western USSR cowered by air defense warning and control syslcms capable ol vectoring lookdown/shool-down fighters will grow gradually. Significant gaps in coverage will remain, however.
With tbe deployment of AWAC5 aircraft in conjunction with longer range interceptors, thehe middle andould be able, for relatively brlel periodsrisis, foro mount forward defenses along ihe approach routes lo lhe western USSR. Such defenses would be designed to intercept US bombers and lo force ALCM carriers toeir missiles at considerable distances fromI xx decs
e arc unable lo quantify lhc attrition thai Soviet air defenses would be able to inflict on US low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles, in pail he-cause of uncertainties aboul key technicalof future Soviet systems, ind in part because we cannot quantify lhe effects of important operational factors and interact ions ihat would bear heavily on actual air defense performance. Accordingly, thereiew in the Intelligence Community which holds that graphs showing lhe gross area of theoretical coverage of air defense systems,when standing alone, can be misleading as measures of Soviet air defense potential. Because such graphs cannotii' important deployment and operational eonud rratmns. ihis view concludes lhal the graphs arr not uselul
The estimates that Inllow represent our brsl tudginenls about thc eapabililies of Soviet air defenses againsi programed US aerodynamic forces over the noil decade
In the early IfJtsOs. improved Soviet air defense systems will not be available in numbers large enough to markedly improve defense against bombers and muse missiles at low altitudes
' The JioAJc'1 of ihii Men- arr ihe Oiiretor. Otfrnte InirlUtrmr
i/ ihe Sennit Offum of ihf miAln'v
In lhe middle und. Soviet air defenses will probably have reduced the USSR's vulncr-jbility lo US defense avoidance tactics and. if undegraded. will have lV potential to Inlllct considerably higher attrition against US bombers of current types They wiH probably have little or no effective capability against in-flight US short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) earned by bombers
The Soviets will gradually develop the capability lo defend some key areas against currentlyUS ciuisc missiles. Because of technical and numerical deficiencies, however, theirlo defendarge force of US cruise missiles will probably remain low.
In addition, precursor missile attacks, delense saturation arid suppression, and electronicwould degrade the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses.
Thus, the actual performance ol the defenses against combined attacks Involving largeof US bombers. SBAMi, and cruise missiles will probably remain low during the period of this Estimate
ABM Defense
ovietctivities in ballillfc missile defense conlinuc. In oui view, these eflotts represent hedging againsi an uncertain future and are aimed at deterring the United Stales from abrogating lhe ABM Trealy and developing options lor ABM system deployment inhere continues to be no evidence iq suggeit that the Sovieis have decided to deploy ARM defenses beyond Moscow.
ithin the provisions of the ABM Treaty, lhe Soviets could use lhe systems ihey have under develop ment io improve their limited ABM defenses alSuch improvements could provide bettertoew selected targets in thc Moscow area, such as command and control facilities, but could not provide more lhan minimal defenserge US missile attack
fit The Soviet AIIMprogram could give the USSH options to deploy additional ABM defenses beginning in the early nrf the ARM Treaty is abrogated. Ihese options woukl incfiMie further esnansMsn of the Moscow ABM defenses:rapid deployment of an ARM syslem with ubnvegrnund launcher! In protect olher key area Inr-
luu Swt
gets, and slower paced deploymentystem with silo launchers lot defense ol key area target] ot for hatd point defense of selected militaiy latgeti The ABM system available foi such deploymenl in the middle orould be able lo inlercepl US missile RVs of all current types, including those accompaniedchad. The effectiveness of these dels-uses would depend moil impoilanlly on USsuch as ihe deployment of penetration aids and the adaptation of lactic*
or Ihc past several years, we have "pressed concern thai, in addition to ballistic missile early warninghe four large radars thai are being built along the periphery of the USSR could also have or be given lhe capability to perforin ABM battle management. Withapabilily, these radar* could constitute long-lcadtime preparations for fuiure ABM deploymenl In terms of Size and power, they have thc inherent poteniial lor ABM battle
66 Recent analysis7"
pleads us lo
conclude that they have been designcdand arefor BMEW and space surveillance alone
hereivergent view in the Intelligence Community lhal the available evidence is sublet! lo alternative interpretation as to the capabilities and intended use of the new radars, and is insufficient to conclude that ihey are only for BMEW and space surveillance. According lo this view, lhe fact remains that these long-leadtime Hemsignificant potential for fuiure ABM battle management and could provide data accurate enough fot such employment "
Antisubmarine Worfore
oviet lorces with ASW capabilities are not now an effective counter io UShe criticalconfronting lhe USSR are limitations in tensors and signal dala processing Matorrograms are
older! el,
lheChtej of Still Ic IntrlHgnCt. Drparlainl
ol iht Amur anif rhe AithlMf Chiel ol Si'H. hueftatwoB.
ol thtc
under way lo develop improved sensors for submanne detect-on Tlie number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) -ith improved bul still limited ASW capabilities will piobably increase from aboult present to abouln the, or lo as manyumberlass SSBNs are converted lo SSNs We believe new classes of Soviet SSNs will incorporate more effective noise reduction methods than those in ciisltng submarine classes. New types of surface ships and long-range patrol aircraft wiihimproved capabilities for ASW ate likely.esult
During the period of lhe Estimate, the USSR is likely to acquire somewhat better capabilities to detect, track, and atlack SSBN* that are ope rat ing neai the USSR or in confined waters, are leaving porli. or ate Iraruiting choke point*.
Despite increasing numbers of ASW-capable forces and improved ASW sensors, wc believe the Soviets have little prospect over thc neitears ol being, able lo deled and track US submarine in broad ocean areas.
Moreover, longer range US SLBM* arcincreasing the ocean area within which US SSBN* will be able to operate and remain within missile range of targets in the USSB.
We therefore believe that, throughout the period of ihis Estimate, Ihe Soviels would be unable io prevent US SSBNs on patrol In broad ocean areas from launching iheir missues.
Direcled-Energy Weapons
s pailong-term developmental effort in technologies applicable to air. missile, and spaceibe Soviets are conducting extensive research in Ihe advanced technologies of lasers, pat tide beams, and nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse generation Tlie magnitude, scope, and variety of these programslhat ibe SovieU are actively exploring ways by which they might use dircctcd-enenjy lochnology to overcome oi alleviate major weaknesses In thetrdelenses.
The Soviet* may nowround-based laser capable ol damaging tome satellite sensors and maypace-based antisatellite weapon under development uccessful high-pn
only effort, lhe Soviets might be able lo hive ground-bated laser air defense weapons ready for
operational deployment to stiaieglc air defense
forces in thehe Snvjeli evidently are also investigating the feosihililyaier weapon fot ballistic missile delensc We believe thateapon, if feasible, could not be icadv for operational deployment0
The Soviets probably have thr capability to develop, hy (heround-based rmfintK li-ii electromagnetic pulse weaponto disrupt or destroy the electronicof enemy delivery systems
Soviet research programs applicable to particle beam weapons (PBW) may permit the USSR to determine the (easibility of such weapons several years before the United Slates If feasibility is proved, thr Soviets probably could beginrototype short-rangem) PBW sys tern for aii defense by0 There is an alternative view that Soviel rcseaich in lechnol-ogie* applicable lo 1'BW could be sufficiently advanced lo allow the USSR lo begin prototype testing by thr, if feasibility isll agree that development of long-range PBW weapons would take much longer.
Civil Defense
e have reassessed the ability of Soviel civil defenses to reduce casualtiesS retaliatory atiackoviet first strike. Casualties and fatalities would vary greatly depending on thc extent of civil defense preparations Our findings indicate that, ai present
Prompt Soviet casualties would beillion (including SS million fatalities) in the case of little or no preparation,illion fatalities) if urban shelters were fully occupied, and aboutillionIf boih sheltering and evacuation plans had been fully implemented.
ew hours*arge percentage of Ihe Soviet leadership at all levels of government probably would survive. With several additional hours for preparation, aboul one-fourth of therce in key Soviet industries probably would also survive
" Tht holdit ol ranAr rliiitreer Chlel el Stall.
'nttlllfta/e. WriKi'liiwnl of the Alt Fotci.
Civil defense could not prevent massive damage lo lhe Soviel economy
In the, prompt casualties andamong (he general Soviel population would be somewhat greater than9 At present rales of shelter const ruction, the projected increase in shelter capacity would be more lhan offset by increases in Soviel urban population and by improvement! in US forces. Mass evacuation of cities would still be-toubstantial portion of the urbanAn even larger percentage of lhe leadership and essential personnel will probably have shelterbut the Soviet economy will remain about as vulnerable as al present.
Given their belief lhal. all aspects of society contributeation's military capabilities, the Soviet leaders probably view civil defense as contributing to Iheir strength in the US Soviet strategic balance They almost certainly believe then present civil defenses would improve Iheir abilily to conduct militaryand would enhance (lie USSR's chances ofuclear war. Our latest analyses of the effects of civil defense, however, provide additional support lo our previous Judgment lhat present and projected Soviel civil defense program! would not embolden the Soviet leaders lo lake actionsrisis thai would involve deliberatelyigh risk of nuclear war.
here is an alternative view that the Soviet Union's capability to protect its ratensive leadership infrastructure al all levers, even under condition! of limited warning, enhances its ability to conductoperations, improves Its crisis management, and promotes postwar recovery. The continuing Soviet investment of major resources in lhe civil defense program clearly demonsliates lhe confidence theleaders have in its value. This confidence could contribute lo Soviel resolveuture crisisAccording lo this view, the Soviel civil defenseIls potential for Influencingperceptions, providing leverage for coercionrisis, affecting nucleai exchange outcomes, and contributing lo postwaron both thc reality of lhe strategic balance and on perceptions of Ihe balance in ihe USSR and elsewhere."
The Uo/dtti of ihii irfrui ate iht IMreclot. Dtfeait Inlelhgtntt ^ge"<a. aad the Stntot Intelligence Offlieti of lhe mlhto't
iei act 1
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