SCC MEETING OF 7 MARCH - "SECURITY FRAMEWORK"

Created: 3/10/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessice.it-

Assistant National Intelligence Officerar East and South Asia

MeetingSecurity Framework"

Requested: None; for your information. (Uj

This was the fourtheries of SCCSecurity Framework. Next in the series willarch and tbe fifth SCC meeting on Thursday, T3 March.

Christopher reported briefly on what the Pakthe US military aid package meant. that although the aideffectively dead, some Pak purchases of US military equiprent Much discussion ensued on the approach we should now take

with the Paks. Brzezinskl wants to get clarification of the Pak positionwhat It meansand to be firm with them to ensure they understand the effects of their (damaging) statements. Stateoon paper enveloping the approach to the Paks. The DCI proposed as an alternative ^PP^'C^BMBBBW Idea of US development of self-sufficiency for the arms Industry. Secretary Brown said we had already offered this to the Paks but that they had rejected it. Significantly increasing the size of the aid package is viewedon-starter (on thelthough everyone acknowledgedarge enough aid offer probably would interest the Paks in at least reopening negotiations.^HftSplflPvt

Exgrcisg. An incremental or "stair-step" approachthe JCS was approved: No exercises this first timetartvisits and eventually increase activities and presence {visits of

small units of the MAU ashore, some helicopters ashore,ntil exercises were reached. OoD apparently feels that it is at least arguableAU exercise in Egypt could help Sadat rather than hurt him. They are hoping, however, to at some pointequest from the Egyptian militaryoint exercise (instead of such an exercise being seen as Egyptian acquiescenceS politicalorts in Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt will probably be visited by the current MAU (only one or two ships per port). There was agreement with the DCI's point that Oman is one of the least preferred states for port visits because of the Sultan's already exposed position in supporting theaii

too;

Afghanistan neutralization Proposal. Optionas adopted. Brzezinskl suggested we talk to our allies to more substantively define non-alignment (or neutralization or whatever the term) and to determine how to get there (timing/stages). The DCI suggestedew option, which was missing from the list: that we discourage our allies from pursuing these various neutralization sche-es since they are having the effect of encouraging the Sovietsfghanistan. the appearance of the divided allies falling all over themselves rushing to Moscow to negotiate). Secretary Brown agreed but felt.It was already too late to adopt this approach. Brzezinski, too, agreed with the DCI's point but socnehow believed that Optionwas not incompatibleI.e. that the same end would be accomplished when the allies realized that neutralization Isn't possible after they answerhe objective and modality questions we put them in

8. the agenda items for thearcfi scc are:

Original document.

---

---