NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Created: 6/28/1980

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I PAN

SITUATION REPORT

Aini-5aar an^ /tyacofrtefc beheshti may haveu:ixzl aacc-nodation to appease ayatollah khomeini,

ewspaper on Thursday published anpurportedly reached between Bani-Sadr and theclerics in the Revolutionary Council. Khomeini recently has criticized the different factions for their failure to work together.

Bani-Sadr I'he President then met

Khomeini's unhappin-)ss with the situationwhen one of Behcshti's aides was accused ofthe President. Beheshti has appeared anxiousover the incident.

'k luvbuay wicn KDORieini.

nuttce of Beneshti's

Republic Party.

e Revolutionary Council and with the central'com-

Military Acti

Although such an agreement serves the purposes of both Bani-Sadr and Beheshti, it does not mean that apeace bcLwoen them has beer, reached. Bani-Sadr, appears to have forced Beheshti to compromise, and Beheshti now is able to show Khomeini that he is willing to obey him and ishreat to his authority. ey test of any accommodation between them will come over the choicerime minister.

Tehran and Baghdad areeach other of

border violations. Iraqon Thursday

iolation of itsan Iranian aircraft,

and Iran countered with claimsattacksoutposts.

n<

OUTH AFRICA: Breaking Diplomatic Ties

inister Mugabe'a decision to sever all diplomatic links

with South Affzca will be uelconrd by hardliners in his government

ukonave adoooaied an end to infernal, low-level ties with South Africa,

Mugabe's statement onwhich hethat economic relations willreported decision by the Central Committee ofAfrican National Union party againstAfrican budgetary support. Reasons for

the decision probably include:

that the present policy would be difficult to defend at home and lead toin the OAU and UN.

that South Africa may be harboring and training Zimbabwean dissidents.

elief that it is necessary to breakwith south Africa to hasten internal political change there.

from the Frontline States and Nigeriaougher stance.

Southhas an embassy ir. only one black African country,have viewed theof low-level relations with Salisburyolitical ana psychological plus and one that might have made it easier to establish similar arrangements elsewhere in the region. Pretcria will now be watching to see what support Zimbabwe gives South African liberation movements before it decides whether to use its economic leverage.

June I'/su

KAMPUCHEA: Curtailment of Belief

Bangkok has rttoindcd its order Kilting airrtlUf shipments to tzvwmohw. zhrsugk ZtefXassi,.h* continuingo/ overlap shtpmmte--result -ngtha vietnamm* incurs ion-uill affectillion Ksnouohiana.

Border refugee camps and relief distribution centers were virtually emptied as a result of the incursion and ace likely to remain unoccupied for some time. relief oiganizations will be alow to permit their employees to return. I

comparison, the regime in Phnom Penh claimedmid-April through May it hadons of food outside the capital. wouldOO calorics per dayoisons.

Unless the cross-border supply program resumeswillepetition of last year's famine, million mora people added toilliontho meager food supplies provided by Phnomaverage Kampuchcan diet could dip well belowcalorie per day level.

Meanwhile, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization reportedly planti to order the indefinite susoension ofshipments to Kampuchea in order to focus worldon the need to speed distribution of mounting stockpiles of relief aid at Kampuchean ports. The FAO headquarters in Rome apparently has been persuaded by its representativa in Phnom ?cnh that rice seed is being used as food and that relief food distribution is being obstructed by uncooperative officials.

U

NIGERIA: Civil-Military Friction

After nine xonthe of civilian rule, inevitable butfriction ha* developed between Frepidat Shagari'eand the military.

The government Is conscious of the need to keep the military content.

|Lasti president sought publiclyass demobilization and purge ofwas in the offing. Delayed legislative the military budget is another irritant.

Key defense and security posts are held by northern Muslims, reflecting the regime's political base and on-gendering some criticism among other groups.

SYRIA: Pressure on Arab Moderates

Recent statements by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam andin thepress suggesting that"qualitatively" ctrcngthtn its ties with Hoscou areprod anti-Soviet Arab moderates to give Syria moreand to suggest ufat Syria might do if the moderatesPresident Sadat.

Syria appears to belea for more aid at tho meeting of foreign and economic ministers of the Arab League scheduled to convene in Jordan in early July. The Syrians may want the Arab moderates to speed upunder the annual subsidies pledged to Syria at the Arab summit in Baghdad in Syrian paygranted to public sector employees last January probably are contributing to the government's growing need for foreign financial aid.

Tht Syrians probably also fear that opposition by moderate Arabs to the US-sponsored peace process is Jordanian King Hussein's visit to the US increased Syrian suspicion that he is lookingay to enter the peace talks. Similarly, the Syrians may believe that the Saudi commitment to the anti-Sadat consensus is weakening.

President Assad remains wary of Soviet Syria and probably still hopes to avoidfriendship treaty that the Soviets have longSyria.

Assaa might taketep to

acrengtnen nis nand against Israel if Arab financial aid to Syria were suspended, or i: the moderate Arabs move to support the autonomy talks.

Sr-rrrl

iveu

INTERNATIONAL: Ncnaligned Meeting on Nuclear Energy

The toncligned Coordinating Group for Sualear Energy begins meeting on Hondai? in Buenos Aires to discuss nuclear issues aiid iiUl probably try to coordinate policy positions for those Hon-aligned members tendingecond S'cvicw Conference of theProliferation treaty scheduled for August in Geneva.

The growing dissatisfaction of Third World countries with the export policies of leading nuclear suppliors and with the Non-proliferation Treaty, which many believe impedes their nuclear development, will be voiced by the Coordinating Group.

Yugoslavia, on-Poliferation- Treaty has beer, urging the NOnaligned Movement to press for unrestricted use of nuclear energy for peaceful It is preparing to take an active role in Buenos Aires and may be designated to represent the interests of nonsignatorv nations at the Review Conference.

Members of the Coordinating Group with ambitious nuclear development programs are among those who will be most active at the coordination meeting. India refused to attend the first coordination meetingut has indicated that it mayelegation to Buenos Aires. Niger is rapidlyignificant exporter of ura-nium.

Although the first Coordinating Group failed to break new groundB, the advance preparations this time have been more extensive. Earlier this month, for example, the head of the Argentine Atomic Energymet with senior nuclear officials in Yugoslavia to plan the agenda and tooint position on the issue of unrestricted access to sophisticated nuclear

SO'JTH AFRICA; Strikes Abate

T;IC automotive industry strikes in the eastern part of Cape Province seem to have lost much of theirat least temporarily, but the situation still remains volatile. The majority of nonwhite workers are back on the job in the fortitenhage area, which is still under heavy police and military guard. Widespread strikes could resume at the end of next week, however, if an industrial council scheduled to meetuly cannot satisfactorily negotiate the rejection last week by workers of an offnrpercent pay increase.)

SOUTHAUDI ARABIA: Hasani's Visit

South Yemeni President Hasani is scheduled toisit today to Saudi Arabia and several Persian Gulf states. Hasani will try to convince his hosts that he intends to bring South Yemen back into the Arab mainstream and to reduce Aden's dependence on the USSR, arguing that he needs his hosts' financial help to rlo so. This tactic has been employed before by South Yemen, and although the Saudis strongly wish to wean Aden from tho Soviets, they are 1'kely toait-and-see approach, p

Tnp Sacror

ZD June ivou

SPAIN-ITALY: Coproduction Agreement

Spain and Italy recently signed an agreementthe first time calls for the coproduction jfelectronics. in the past, Spain and Italyon military contracts, butormal agreement for coproductio-i. to expand military cooperation reflects atrend among arms producers throughout Europe toburden of escalating costs for arms research

While details of the types of weapons to behave not been disclosed, the coproductionwill beginimited scale. Spain is engagedajor effort to increase operational capabilities and modernize material, particularly in the Navy and the Air Force. Spain also has been increasingly active in trying to expand military relations with NATOove preparatory to entry into NATO. Italy has strong tinancial incentives to expand its arms export market.

;

June jvbu

SPECIAL ANALYSTS

AFGHANISTAN: Factional Feuding

Factional infighting is intensifying within iheDemocratic Party of Afghanistan, virtually theof Afgho- support for the Soviet-backed regime inSoviet pressure on the feudingKarmal'e Paroham (Banner) faction and the Khalqof former Presidents Amin andpreventedfrom falling apart, Humors abound that iheBabrak, but no mu leader would be able todtu;pr-iA? factions or broaden the govern-

ment'sss. I

The Communist People's Democratic Party wasunder the leadership of Nur Mohammed Taraki but it split, two years laterroupBabrak broke away and formed the Parcham faction. For the next ears the two Communist groups functioned as separate parties. |

The Parcham faction is somewhat more pro-SovietKhalq faction. [

Inhe two Communist groups unitedurging. The following April, having obtainedof the military, they killed President Daoudbloody coup and established the country's firstwith Taraki as President.

Factional infighting and jockeying for powerimmediately. In June and Julyarakichief lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin, with theGeneral Abdul Qader and key military officers, and most of the Parchamist leaders to

Intervention Deepens Split

The invading -Soviets must have had reservations last December about the new coalition of the two factions even as they were establishing it under Babrak after deposing Amin. Total Communist Party membership probably is no more and the Soviets and Babrak probably have concluded that th.cy must work with all available party members.

Many Khalqis ridicule Babrak for having "ridden into poweroviet tank." They believe that the Soviets' expanding control of internal security, particularly in the citis, has turned most of the population against the regime.

Parchamist-Khalqi rlvalTy in ministries and departments is bringing govern ment operationstandstillf

13

Jtiric vjw

auuu eventi* <uu accelerating the disintegration ot the Army, forcing the Soviets to shoulder more of theof fighting the insurgents, and making "Afghaniza-tion" of the war even more remote.

Alternatives to Babrak

If the Soviets decide that Babrak must qo, they probably would want to avoid the embarrassment of another coup in which their role would again be so obvious. They might cither contrive Babrak'g "resignation" and the "election"uccessor or they could acquiesce in an Afghan-inspired coup that offered some chance of stronger leadership.

The Soviets would look for someone who nightthe loyalty and rebuild the morale of the military and make some headway in securing popular support for the revolution- None of the possible choices are likely to be able to deal successfully with the regime'sinsurmountable problems!-

In the end, the Soviets may muddle through with

ne is one ol tne tew leftists who was ever elected zo parliament during the constitutional period, and he probably continue* to have more backing than the other three among the few Afghans who support the regime.I

The Soviets are unlikely to resolve the conflicttheir objective of dominating Afghanistan and their interestovernment that would not be reviled by the Afghan people as an appendage of Moscow. Any new regime sponsored by Moscow, even one including additional non-Communists, probably will not be more effective than the present one in attracting broader popular support.I

The factional split in the regime appears and, under the best of conditions, it couldto assemble an army capable of makingthe insurgents without substantial Soviet Moscow may be aware ot the open-ended its commitment, and the military and economicthat the Soviets have poured intothat they are preparingong-term

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