_
THE ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY
this estimate is issued BY the director of central intelligence.
the national foreign intelligence boardexcept as noted in the text.
The loSowing intelligence organizatlont participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
Tho Cent-ol Intelgence Age-icy. theol Slolo. thenlelligsnce Agency, end the Nalionol Security Agency.
Abo Participating;
The Aiiiilont Clref of Stall lor Intelligence,lrmy The Olroelof o! Novol Intelligence. Depo-tn-enl ol the Navy The Aitiilonf Chief of Stall, Intelligence. Department of the Aii forcecto< ofoodquoiteri, Morino Co'pi
CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL
DISCUSSION
A. Key Uum*
nalyticami Approach
LIKELY Ti) IMPACT ON THE MILITARY
BALANCR OVKIl THEPIVK
A. Hostilities inIal Ihe Future
R. Turmoil inlor Syrian Mililary CapaMiliw
C. Tin- I'uleUiiiiansililary
ran's IntroasiiiB Military Ca pah ili lie*
E Iranonlrilniinrhe Arabs' Military Force*
K. Mililary Assistanceap! and the. Aral) SiatOi
Syria
Llbyu
Saudi Arjlria
OF Till- MILITARY IU LANCE THROUGH ISMS TrowU
Operational Ef
Weapons
Inventories ol Kcv
II. Impact ol Kciinomic
Principal Aral) States
C Overall Assessment o| the Military Ralancc.
A. Autonomy Nmnlialiom Implications ol Success or
R Superpower Military Presence in lhc Ration
in
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
ustained effort, and not without difficulty. Israel will maintain its wide margin ol military superiority over ihe Arab states during the next five years and remain capable of defeating any combination of Arabif Egypt were to participate. Nonetheless, improvements in Arab military capabilities, even without Egypl. coulduture conflict make Israeli military operations more complex and costly.
Although Arab military capabilities also will improve, the Arab stales face serious problems, which will continue to hinder their efforts lo improve their capabilities relative to those of Israel.
Syria probably will continue toubstantial part of its Army to Lebanon, and its military capabilities will be further impaired if the Army becomes more extensively embroiled in the suppression of domestic antirepimc opposition.
Although Inici has substantially expanded its armed forces and has the capability toarger force than3onflict willi Israel, it has military requirements at home heightened by trouble with Iran. Moreover, il the war were limited to one front, Israel could assign more forces to interdiction of Iraqi forces en route to the Golan Heights.
"swim.
Any assistance lhal the debilitated Iranian nrinct! forces could provide is likely lo he loss conseqiionii.il to (lie Arabs and (heir military capabilities relative to Israel than the yet uncertain resolution of llie Isislc differences between tract and Iran, which could keep large numbers of Iraqi troops from participatinc In an Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Arabs si ill have military options, even though Egypl is unlikely to rejoin Arab rants and more particularly pariicipatc in Arab hostilities aRiiinst Israel. Tbc remaining Arab states could iniliatn hoslilitics with Israel, not wilh tbe goal of defeating Israel but with (lie hope of achieving limited political objectives, such as gaining negotiating leverage on inch issues as the occupied territories or Palestinian rights.
1-ebanon will remain an arena of Arab-Israeli confrontation and in let factional tensions with the risk that skirmishes, crises, and limited military confrontation will lead to expanded conflict, possibly even beyond Lebanon's borders.
Although several Arab states ciirrrnllyhemical and perhaps biological weapons capability, none have nuclear weapons nor are thev likely lo obtain them over the next five years /
TLlLIMrt.
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
This volume nfrovidesnli-lli-KrtH'i* Oiinmuuily's assessment i'f ihi' likely Arab-Israeli inih'liiry balanceSS. ll is Intended lit Kin- t'S policy maroad npprecialion of those dcvclopim-nli which probably will in'looncc lhal U'l-aiitr out the next fin*ccur during the lime frame of this Estimate. The following iivsmnplioii* are made:
No abrogation bit either porta of the Euuih tinn-lsracli peace trvalu. As mentioned above. Ihe implications of possible Egyplianuture hostilities are discussed even though our especialIhcreforc our basic assumption for most of thelhal Egypl wouldeutral parlyali-Israeli war.
Wo major hraeli wilMraieali from ihe Co/on lleiehtt or theHank. Thr withdrawal of Israeli forces from signifieanl portions of these occupied IrrrilOrrcs. presinnahly in conjunction witb another peace agreement, wouldajor unmet on the overall mililary silualion in
1, nt.
.Vo major thiflA in the relatianihiu between Mid/lie Ensl eoirnfrfe* anil their principal aron xupulicn or economic wppartcrx.hift cmld significantly affect militaryas demonstrated by the Soviei and more recent Arab cutoff of aid to Egypt. The cutoff of Arab funding ton (he wake of the peace treatyondition lhal wc assume will continue for the foreseeable future. The renewal nf laruc-scale Arab funding wniddeversal of current Arab altitudes loward Egypt and thelikelihood of which wc cannotcslimalc during the ncsl five years.
No adoption liu Iirael or the Arab rtntcx ol unclear, biological, or chemical irxrnpOn.iprimari/ element* of combatecision by key Middle East stall's to rely on suchwould radically alter the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
No maior direct involvementS or Hariri combat nnift on the tide of cither luacl or tbe Arab itatci. The Intervention of suchhe Middle Easl could upsel the balance of power in the rcflion anrl significantly affcrt lhc course and seope of any future hostilities.
Xo major internal chaiiiic* in the tltrfenio politic* nj ihe Arab ilatet nr Iirael. Allhonuji llu-rt' have Iieeti cIijiiku in (he iM'lteics of KbyiiI nml Israel lownrd each otlwr in tho wntc of the. peace Iroalv. wi; camml cotifidcnllv rslipiale (Ih; likelihood lhal oilier Aral* Hate* und Israel will radkiillr cbaiiao theiroward rath Oilier during ihr lime Iramc nf this t'.iliniale.
ifi'lflrir conflict between the keg Arab Male* arrnuetf againtlaj-tr confliflley Aral) stales, such a* Svrii and Iran, would reduce Arab cooperation und overallcapabilities .maiiiAl Israel.
he analysis in (lib volume hcuin*ixeus-skm (chapter ll)of llinsc frsncsof entrtiil ennrCrit ihal have direct military implications for the Arab-Israeli milium hnhnee. oiirins ihefive years Thr fociu ii on development* in Aral* 'late* that couldah or militarym*eel
forces.
The central portionie Kslimalc (clinptor Til)omparative anaiyiil of Arab (with und .vithonl Fjrypl) and Israeli military tar "abilitiesiie chanter del nib the elements lhal comprbc the Afnl> ami Uracil military forces and focusestrends likely to affect iheir ea pa IWmphasises those nnplilnlivc factor! critical lo Isr.tel's military snpcriorily and hitzhliRhtSends and chaiiKc* llial cnnld nfh-cl lbc cost and liuialiori. if nnl Iheome, of Arab-Israeli hoslililles during thefive years
he Iiasie tesl conclude* (chnplrr IV}iwswmnhree imimrlnnl issues lli.it could affect not only (Ik- mililnry balance, hille pnlenliallv destabilizing for ihe Middle Easta broad scale.
fi. Ileeaiise of the-importance of Jvuypl lo the United -Stoles, ixirlicularlyajor recipient nf US foreiao mililary sales (FMSJ credit* Il* military llireal In Kbvih is discussed in (nine detail in thes tinted in llic main test. IvKvpl is atarm- scale irtlntCtiiMriie nml moderniy.ition of Us armede lielievi-l Kiivptiaii patliripaljori in fnliuc Aiah-lsrnelj hostilities is unlikely./
Ar.iliHie potential for al lead coi'lplical-ink and mating more costly Israeli military nprraliomuture tmifliclthe Aral*nything lhal could increase lite inlcmily anduration of com hat, (hereby increasing casualties nod cotiip-merit losses, is of Impmlance to assessinenls of llie relative military capabilities of tlie Aral* and lhc
I'M.' li
A. Hostilities inLook ol ihe Fufure
nriwE ibe next live years. Ix-'unoo will remain mi a'l'iia of Arab-Israelion and inter.Arab len'ioiii wilh ihe risk that skirmishes, crises, and limited mililary con frontal ions will lead lo expanded roiiFlicl. (visibly eveno inherent and continuing instability in Leiirn-
Icii.innn. iiie ui.slahuilyhanon is likely Ui cinliniH* dospllc any efforts tonilral iiiilimrity caiubfc of effectrc"ing HK-rrciitnlvaior portion of ibe cum Iry. In Iiirn.for conflict between ibe principal player* will remain and may even expand.
DEVELOPMENTS LIKELY TO IMPACT ON THE MIUTARY BALANCE OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
K During llicive years, the iwnc* addressed in this chapter will lie 'if varying importance t"nililary capabililic* 'if ihe principal actor* in thr Middle Easl amiArab-Israeli military lialancc. They Lire nol discussed here in order o! impnflance. lint rather are arranged to establish Irainili'ti from one In lhc oilier. Allhiniiih all of lln'Se issue* have the IHilciilial I" imittitltin" nillil iry balance, either tiuttlv nr in ciuiiiiiinlinn. tlxi are unlikely t'i alter lhal halaiiee-.is. Israel'* margin nf mililary suiM-ririnlv
II)
rtmu
Rein
iis conlrsl all four of lhc maior participants inTial ohieclives at Slake Syria,ini-sought loocile government in ieventam"cniatlon ol Lebanon alongnd lo seeiireoyed flank along rsc-Syrian border. Israel seeks to preventinto ibe ranks of ibe Arabstali-s. avoid extension of Israel's front wilh Syria almm the Lrhnicsc-Israeli border, and reducetbc cdenl possible ibc ihrrat from Ubanon-hascd Pales-linian terrorists. Tbe Paleslinians view Lebanon as iln-ir last major tbcaler of action asainst Israel, and they are delertiiiied to maintain ib'-lr position and their freedom to conduct operations against Israel. Thr OiMrtiaO* woikl like to perpcluatc their dominant
aolls. iMd-sii Is vary grr.it
Arab military capahilihe* The olhrr fnnroprralimtf, Iraq's gmwing military capabilities. Iranian mililary snpporl (or ihend high levels .if in Hilary assistance lo (be
continue
mini: ibe next five years:
Syria has rearranged iis forces in Leliauon anilew units, but il retains enough fiirees1 tar ion lor effective coolrol of ibe
*BMim.
internal -itualiiui Allhnush llir red rplny incuts still rml enable Syria I" seriously lhreali-11
Uriel fromIliey have resulted in a
consolidation ;i( Syria'" forces and nil in need ill capaliiuly ihcre In (blend auainst an Israeli aU'jck. partienLirlyihroiish lbc Bfcpt Valley
erious deterioration inyrian dreiswm I" encage iiigainst Israel,it iei pate lh.il Syriabase In keep major furrrscIkso'ip during ihr ueit fen years.
Tlse ilrenulh. flosibilils.srael's mililary fortes, in additionprn'iiiiitv of major urnuud force* loborder, sis'eanrlv ofseilh which lo pursue il* Glials. Theseforee poMuring to theinnlli-
SikIi conflict likely will produce another major Uracil
ground force inciirsiniihot
mil necessarily, as tlie resull of mine, serious ail of Palestinian lerrorism.
II Tensions in Lebanon likely also will produce further Israeli'.Syrian air daslieS of iho type lluil incurred Ijst summer. Although Imlli sides nclrdarefully oonlrolled fashion, any lime Israeli and Syrian forces engage each oOior ihe risk nfil i< 1nl.
'Kinon alsoertile area for any of tlx- Arab stale* lo Sponsor limlled mililary operation* against Israel. The central government docstml eontrolel union, and mililary aelion eimdueted through Lebanese tcrrilory is less likely to provoke retaliation against sponsoring slates than actionun Syria or Jordan. Lebanon llnu becomes a
lo conducti-banesc Ixirdcr
niiilary capabilities have expanded considerably since the end of ihe Lebanese civil war in November [fjTficertainly that It could heo Lclianon. Syrian withdrawal* fmin and redeploymentsuunu during early JfWO.amplo. led lo increased Israeli-Syrian tensions nn the Golan Heights and Isra-el's rcinforcemenl of its units thereevelSinceiseiitia cement agreement. Thai sduaiion, stemming largely from suspicions of eaeb otbcrV motives, demons!raledrisis in Lebanon couldo ibe main Israeli-Syrian from. Wit hum prior .seillemontione.se iv)lltical ivMieS. any further siihsiaulial Syrian mililary moves inside or oolanon. especially Ifpioliiilily would cause Israel to acibi increase ils readiness posture ami possibly even contemplalr
Turmoil infoe Syrian Mili-lory Capabilities
iiiuvdi
ill eont inni'hius eieaU'i1 mum ior escalating i'i'ilente and1 rtpntidrd eoiifliri. even lieyond Lebanon.
hr ongoing sln.iglr hrls.cn Israel and ihes mosl likelypmchicr open hostilities.
eonliii'iear>*iiii! levels ol intensity and encompass iii'irc nf Ibe eomiiry.culminating inmvnlff ice ihiriiut ihe time frani" nf litis I'siliiMle Such donii-slie turmoil would have aneffrci on the capabilities o[ the mililary. at Ivsisl
C. The PokjUnionsilitary Force
in- Palestinians continue I" stage tcrmiisl und
guerrilla operations against ixulcil i'lciurnlskiimki, hut has in mount forceful, coordinated iniltl
Israel's prsjsvctttbin nf its war effort, but could not diminish Israels capabilities iiifllttcnllv lo improve mure lli.ui marulnally tbe mililary posiliosi of ibe principal Arab Slates
roq'i Increasing Mililory Capobilities
Vvelepmrnl nf ibe mililary form of tbe priu-eirial Arab slates is uneven. Inite slow and Ironbleilyria's armedran's military Forte* liave born embarked on an expansion awl
'uh-sliniau nmani/atinn that Insiaval capability. Syrian surrogate hirer*Syrian lira neb of liteOC) men. Tbe combinedf ul her Palestinian groups thai make un ihe resiMjuet imivciise n!pproximalely fi.OOO
uluh anil the Syrian I'lre by faralestinian forces. Their inventory ofiiil 3 tanVs,
I illo! future Arab hostilities against Israel lo an ei|ieililionary force no larger than tbc ihree division* they ailempied l" send to Syriaorce probably wouldore capablebetter trained lrm;xs employing larger numlxrs of more advanced weapon* wilh groulcr capabilities. Nooelhc-irss. unlike Syrian fn.-eos, tlseorces saw only limited conihal inhich tltev unformedhave nol bail llie experience
.ke:
r.
veral Itiwc-
n
i-.il lary oil
pons, ike il in al
i-si n-
...
bility to defeat ibeusrael could widenIsrael lo divert forces In mhilhrnihiglu-rIsraelis, andiniiilary capdUiiitics over loose incould,uture Arab-Israeli conflict,and make more costly Israeli mililary operation*.
lhough Iran is at tern pi inn lo diversify its sources of arms, it will conlimic to depend on Ibe USSH for mosl of il* mililary SySlems, al leaxl nvel lhc nest five years. Moreover, Iraq will likelyecipient of new models of Soviet cfliiipmonl.cuilro! nf spare porls and its refusalo'l wiapons wilh all of their sophisticated subsystems, however. liiiS made Uaididad wary of conliiiucd reli-univole .source of arms. Baghdad, therefore, is trying io reduce il> dependence gradually so as nol lo alienale Mixsrmv.
iM. "Flu! Irarii Army will experience iiiltttorilial growlh over lhc nest five years, albeit prolsablyower pace Iban duringeriod, wlwn ihe Army doubled lis5 Irani esinflitioiiaty force ivonldank inventory iIbio: the sameas one lhaleployed today, aboul half of the tanks5 could.2 lank eaporled by the USSR lo Iran offers
substantial advance* (it armor proicclkoi. armament, .iiwl iitnliilily imt "III" Soviet-supplied tanks.)imiinUT nl Alts could 1m: up Inercent larger in willi (ill pircs-nl likely to he
nrulier Iirat enubl lie deployed in
IDSU JtvPCreciH growth il< artillery is
lr system will increase air defense protection l'ir live armoredhese woain>ii systems willhe evolving Irani armoredptalilalisv increase in offensive and defensive caiialnlilies.
in- Ir.Kli Air Force conlribulion to anyild Israel would Ih* ahool the saint* inas now. Imt more significant llianxvauw Iran could dispatch larger iiiiiiiIht* ol newer nimbi air-crafl. These airCra'l can Carry significantly lamer oT.lni.nee loads (or ureterhan (lie variant*adnd coulder-lc from hases iulern Iran. In CrtijiliiClinn with its greater eatiaeily locet airf:ii| has imiiroved ils ai' defense ouvi'iinmcnl Itel in irkadars, surface.In-air missilesntiaircraft a'lil-lory. urouri*MxiSed elect runicml eleelronie supportKSM1 equipment In defend key iiiSlallatious and facilities as svell us lines of ei iiuuon.
svdl lOfitiiine to conslrainlfcct'vc employmentIrani ground nod air forces against Israel.inelnrle: iuadertnaic. logistic supporlparticularly for operations oniside thenfechnical personnel, andiiileg'ale sophisticated weaponry.some improvements have heon made, but noi
tested lit combat, ami others are probable, most ofse deficiencies seill not be liniifirautb- mitigated svilhiu llie Italic frame of tills Estimate Moreover, anysiiediltonary force also would lare eslernalicli could complicate 'Icployuiciil of forces opposite Israel:
delirium by Israelntiyn-
(ii'iseijiii'iil possibilily of Israeli niiblaiy aetiim.
ol Iran's forces lo Israeli inlerdic-lion svblle en ronto to tin-eign Is-Jordan Valley front.
Dilficulty iu planning and coordinatingperations with the Syrian arid Jordanian armed forces.
Mi. The Iranian revolution hasajorinfbe area and also will have an impact on Iran's txrtcntial cnmmilment of forces lo ihe Golan ffrights. Tlie lack of an effective military force in the Kurdish region of Iran has allowed theo guerrilla operations, sebjeh have rekindled Kurdish aclivily in Iran.
urther complicating factor Is the unreal encouraged by the Iranian revolution among the Shia Muslim maiorily in Iran Although the sllltntion is not serious now. il remain* potentially explosive, ami the spillover of Shia aclivity from Iran into Iran lias posed problems for the Surmi minority lhat controls the IWhdnd government.
the Kurdish or Shia situations, eitheror at the same time, deterioratedwould likely have fewer militaryo lbc Golan Heights iu the eventchapter III lor detailedIran's expeditionary forties).
E. Ironontributor to the Arabs' Military Forces
Iran continues to cnonnragein Iraq and both countries arcof each nlhcr. some of the newhave made noises about providing armsassistance In the Arab slates in theirIsrael Any Iranian assistance, however,to prove less frmSCqucnlial In (lie Arabs andcapabilitiesis Israel thanclnf ihe basic differences lhal haveIran and Iraq. If Iran's actions pose onlythreat to Iraq, isnghdnd would be ablelarger expeditionary forte* against Israelfuiurc conflict lhan il Iran's aclionsbclii-Ceri itself and the Iraqis.
ranian milltarv parlieipalion in an Arah-lsraeli cooflicl would he minimal through iheerision In send Iroops would depend on the desire* of ibe iniliiical leadership rather than on the condition of Ihe nrmeil forces, hut the poor readiness of their csiuipinciit as well as logistic constraitill wouldoiitrihiiiion torigade-size force of light infantry troops
"5RML
k- Arab slates.llii-m- countries is Capable
'<iiii|MiiiiK ils nun ml!it,ifv lorci-s. although Israelere tilltonlribulimi toward ihul end than ilri uiir u( tin- Arab -lull's.
Syria
SJ. Tin- USSH is likely to remain lite source ol nearly all nl Syria's primary weapon* through theMnV.nw and Damascus apparently hawiayn nfsv arms contract thai promise! deliveries of addilional combat aircraft, armoredair defense weaponry, and other item* of mililary hardware durinn ihe term ol this Fstimalc. Some JOOinks;dvanced aircraft,. and; Several hundred AI'Ca.ir missiles, und possibly ti-lf-oriiiirllrd arlillerv Piece! arc likclv lo lie delivered
Ihe increase sn the nnmiier ami quality ot seeaiHuts delivered, however, will not lie as dramatic during ihe oe.il five years as it was during ihe preceding five. Tin:.around and air force espansioniis thai followed3 war arclateau. Moreover, ihe only newcombal aircraftirorhieed inln Syria in ihefive years is theo other new weapon systems are knownf discussion between MoScOivyria may eventually Seek other weapons such as theyria probably will beginew generation of anliiank guided missiles, nir-to-air missiles, electronic warfare subsystems, and communi-calioia rriuipmcnt Historically, the Soviets have not esporlesl theirst versions of such equipment, and new Syrian system* are likely lo remain rpiahialivoly no Ix'ller lhan Ihe sumo types ofielded by Israel.
uring ihe lime frame of this Estimate. Jordan probably will move further away from its close arms-supply relalionmip with ihe United Stales and receive major new weapon system* from France. Creal llrilaiu. aiul ihe USSH. King Husseins interest in establishing new political relationships wilh Western Kuropc. strains iu US-Jordanian relations caused by Amman's Friistrali'm over USsl policies, ami ibe (iuain ial fle.iibilily afforrled by subsidies ri-sullinu from the llaghdad summit conference in8 have combined toarked change in the siiiirte ol Jordan's arms purchase*.
3ft.his year, the Jnnlamans decided In mate iheir first purchase of Soviet weaponry. Details have not been workesl oul, bill lbc purcliasewill eonsistelf-propelled anllaireraft artillery systems and pnssibly Jurfacc-lo-air missiles.
Thr Jordanians have tonsidimj buying Soviet arms off and0 hut hullrn relut-laul to tlnil with Mdyow. Jordanian forces will 'tillheavily dependenl nn US runiismrnt anil support Isrcuusc nf Lruuthy training requirements and deliveryinn-US eiiuipniriil will mil onk.uoe Jnrdu. libit en patppreciably
Iroq
airing mi niu'Miirti-rl ilfiriiur.ition inwe espcel Ihc Soviet I'riiiio tn remainupplier nf military equipment through Ialthough its share nf llie Irani arms maildi-crenic. Iraq has purchased more ihun MWestern arm*. when lVighdadatsoul it* nearly mini rlo|>rmloiicc nnfor advanced weapon sytlcnu.
ordnance, ami 'raininu. Mini rreenlly. il placed anidler fur warshipsilli Italy early this year. Although purchases from Ihe WW have iK-en primarily .snpimrlentoviet ami East Europe-iiieveral iii.i'ii weapon .sy*toms also hai ordered Nevertheless. Soviet 'viiliiigrioss I"v,inceil rquipmenl and male quick ilchiriii-sliolilical string* likely willBaghdad's diver-sifti-alton efforts
Efl/Ot
espite Egypt's loss nf Arah funding, weprcl II lo make progress, ullx-il .slow, in modern!/inn its military forces during thrive years Maior lactitrs affit-liiiK lluit progress willdelay* iulite necessary financing to imrchaseent. the loiiit leudlimcs re'iulrerl loi delivery of new weapons, mil lengths' Iraining require merits.progress is made during the lime frame of this Estimate, hnsvever, will not reverse the deter (oral ion in Egypt's overall military position relative to that of Israel.
pect* llie Will, especially tlx- Untiedoarge part <if ihe liwl Arah binding for equipment purchases and coprodnclion pmurams Tn date, the United States has approved motei hillinn in foreign mililary Sales eo-dl* for use by Egyptut siiliM.uitiully greater fund* are ri-quiml hefrire meaitinufulil' he made In llie moderiiivatiiin of llie armedMajor US weapon systems likely to he ac'iuiieil over thefive years Include alfi fighters, possibly0K*mproved-1IAWK air defense hallrrirs.if current funding problems can lx- worked mil, Frame cmdd |irovi<le additional Mirage fighterarid as manyom Iml-capable Alpha Jet trainers. Oral lirilaiu Still wauls In sell Egyptgypt's mililary relationships wilh Asianalso are likely lo eiimnd, parliddarly wilh China and North Korea.
Ifcyo
he heavy flow of Soviet arms deliveries is emit hilling. and sve anticipate that tin* bulk ofiilslamling orders will arrive this year.(olnnel Quilhafi has porciiasr'd some mililary rquiismenlumple. lighter aircraft] and related services Irom the WcSl, tbc USSfl will remain lhc primary supplier of major weapon systems Itccausc- il isa lo sell and aide In deliver ipiickly large quantities of advanced weaponry. North Korea is an ini|Mirlanl source of rockel launchers, artillery, anil ordnance.
Saudi Arobio
audi Arabia's principal source ofcunt in ueS lothe United Stales, nearlyin If.Ti) Its largest imn-US
arms cm-tract last year was withmillion for ibe Sbahirie surface-to-air missile syslein.
utstanding Saudi eiiuipmenl orders) TOW antitank vehicles.5 fighters, and as many as sisof lhc Iniproveil-HAWK snr-fiici-lo-.'iir niksile system from lhc United Slates, al least V> AMX-1II tanks Irom France;malli-alt from Wcsl Cut mans'. (ihronicsborlaCO.sof Saudiprrlise ami skilled manpower will neccssilalcarue-scale suppnil by Western technicians lo maintain Saudi Arabia's arsenal of advanced weapon system*;
III. PROJECTION Of THE MILITARY BALANCE5
A. Trends
H3,
ntrliaugcs ilunng ores* trends in Israel
improve llie oiieraiionai etiecttvrnest nt iheir lorccs bill Arab gains will not be sufficient to offset overall improvements iu Israels forces, lhal trainable ami skilled iiMiux'wer will remain scarce, lhal weapons technology will hr-enmc more complei and red nice
ccpt Inr Rtiypt. Iran has llic
males nl miliiarvillion between ihr one. ofmillhoovh iu prnernm lo reduce illiteracy I* merlin* with tome Mtfccss. educated ami skilled mmv power will rrmain in short supply Hiifinji theiveran* rclallvrly Urfc pnnulatkiri ami firrlhcr kxIucIkwo in iHflctacy willk ronlmircd ctpaovnn of 'be Irarji mililary form
Ol Fam*'* bf nonublioisprovide lo ifcc Mtrtnlltf-irlial ssrnoly of unskilleddrs|-lr lowof Mcraic and phirtMalv I* rvjl- Shortages of skitVd personnelnr In ti^radir* mililary capabilities The armed form have difficulty rclamine MM' of higher payuM Join i" the Fj.vi.Ium private sector und ixirlknlarly in other Arab stales
Oi Thr extent lo which ihe Aral. Wales can elfec. lively use new. advanced wwtpnru leclmology or even greatly Increased rpianlilic* nf standard wuopon* will In- clniiinnrrflieclcnwliiuml (hnflasic* of trainedand lechnienl inorture 'hrnogh IW
o hxyptran amir.pnnd lW I"
U
TslLKl*
or refurUslilii* older Soviet equipment (seeanyil!rom llie Wert,llie United Stales, and mini- Irom Norlli Korea anil China,
W greatest emphasis will he placed on the air and air defense force* as Egypt acquires new airerafl and SAM systems, suchfi fighters and IdIAWK missile systems. ByEgypt plan*replace iiI.kI of its Sonet sin-rail with Chinese-ell as Wellcrn-Imill aircrafl. The overall number ol fighters In tbc invenlnry will decline. however, as Soviet-builtare phased out Tbe niimhcr of air defense lxLtIall..ris is likely lo decline also, despite ibe planned acquisition of eight Crotalerom Fiance.AWK latteries from tbc United Slates, andattel ks.
be ground forces are not likely to undergo any sigiiifica.nl cspansinn nf their current, si met lire, despite the acipiisillnti of Wrslcru cquipmrnl. In ibc near Icrm. the Army will gradually replace it* older Soviet equipment wilh nesver hardware, especiallynd artillery pieces purchased (mm ibe United Stairs or Asian cmmlriel. (Egypl probably will cutione to use some of its older erpiipment as military aid to certain Africanhe Army also is improving It* mobile anliiank guided missileby using US iecps,n Egypt, as bunching platforms for Ml LANs. Swingfircs. and Sanger*
aval plans call for refilling the Egyptian-huill tfs-Octobcc-clasS patrol boats wilh ihe Olnmal uiiiisbip missile system and acquiring replacement siiri.iee vessels (nrlrcmely old crafl, if funds are available
aior constraint on Egypt's mndcmi*ailon elfods has been the lackependable source for military eiptlpmenl. This mosl likely will change gradually a* the new arms relationship between Egypl and Ihe tinted Stale* develops. Tbe dissolution of Ibe Arab Organixalioo for Itvluslriall?ation. because of Arab reaction lo the Camp David accorrls, hasEgypt's plan for producing modem arms,Wesl European and American financials probably wiil replace some Arab funding.
ther Arab Sin res and Iran.he pre-mnilcrancc of Arab expeditionary forces lo an Arab-Israeli conflici would continue to come, Ounlmt aircrafl svould constitute the moslform of force eommttmenl from (lie other Arabdm it ri billions by some countries wouldni-ed If.e assess as likely, Egypt remained neutral during futurehese more limited contributions are shown in tablelrlaxifist our Isasic assumption of Egyptian mitlrslily. we uho labuble in table '> our eslimales of Arab ci.nl Hbi it innsis-front war
I2li. Inenl nf Egyptian military neulrallly and the ulrtenceinai frontuture
conflict, Algeria. Libya, and Morocco would k- liki'lv to make moreiilribnlious In Syria nr Jordan, and Sudan probably would enntr.hutr
nullnna. Under such conditions. Miescfir* win ltd
Ih- seriously constrained, nr prrveutcd ffmn sending forces. Iiv dislanecs In itie front, limited transport capability, ami military reiimrement*Imme.liva. serious logistic constraints prnhuhly wnuld make il* law sleekground Inter cquip-inenl irrelevant, unless ciiuipiueii! rmilil Ih* prc-positioned in Syria nr JordanInel hostilities. Tratr-imrting siimifiennt (inautiliesi-yan equipmento front wmilil he particularly dilliciill duringhen movement* hy sea nr air would he vulnerable In Israeliid lei lot I
he only other likely Arab expeditionary force* would cune from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Inilh of which ci iiake limiledaudi Arabia'* en liability lo cmlrilnile fnree*flicl could be made more difficult by the deploy meiiloups ami equipment to IK (outhern border U'causo of concern over relation* wilh iheconcernikely In win and waneghnuli>nd of this Kstimalo.
I2H. In addition In theran mighl try Inml any Iranian emiton would he.prnl in lily alrigadeforce of lighl iidnnlrywii llialroblematic, especially through the early IflSttj. (Se- seel ion E. (billiter II. of ibis volume for discussion of theon Iranian lxnilirinalNiii in an Arab-Israeli conflict.)
B. Impost of Economic Trends
u addition lo the con*lraint* on force hit-prnmnenls already diseiissi-d. Iwuel. the Arab con-frnnlalioond Ksyplust operate within imporlanlrorislraifil* These Includeand inlcruai economic limitations, andon Cslcrnnl financial aid lo oipiip. maintain, and operate llwirorte* (See Sectionchaiiter II.iscussion of military assistance lo Israel and the Arab slates)
Israel
n eonlfiiM to its stronglionarl nf ihe MITft. Israel enters Ihr IWfh with serious economic problems.a nee-of-pay men Is situation Is worsening; (be deheil ha* Increased by S2 billionhe rale of iiiflallou eicoedcd I'd percentJ. and Israel is likely lo have the svorld's highest inflation rale ibis year.
heor the Israeli economy inIM* depends in large pari upon implementing an aiislerily program. Aflcr three or four years ofausterity, Israel could ease resl rid ionsnjoy moderate economic grOwlh llirnugh lbc rest of the decade wllhoul serious balance-of-pay meritsf an effective austerity program is not enacted,
" will le.ieh crisis
priiporlionsnless ihe US Cnverrmient comes throughajor bailoul. The political impacl of inflation will hi: moderated by ihe cxlco*ive System of cost-of-living indexation, svbich protects Incomes against inflation.
Wilh US mililary assistance likely lo increase only slightly, if at all. over the rest several yean and prices for mililary equipment rising sharply. Israel would have in Increase significantly ill own funds nsod for mililary import* lo meet planned lorcc expansion and improvement plans. In view of Ibe likely scarcity of such funds. Ihe militaryplan* probably will not lie cornplcled on schedule.
Financial considerations also will continue lo affect military staining For only tbc second lime in Us history, cost consideralions forced the Israeli Air Force lo reduce Iraining missions and (lying limeials iu other training programs, such as live-fire exercises for ground forces, which consume large amounts of expensive ammunition, also have been instituted. Although Iraining cuts generally do not affect military capabilities In the short run. the long-run impacl could he substantial.
he absence of tensions or hostilities and the implementation of the peace agreement wilh Egypt arc nul likely lo ease Israel's near-term defenseDespite US aid and pressure within ihe Israeli Cabinet in reduce government Spending. Israelibudgets are likely lo increase lo cover ihe cos! of
withdrawalhe Sinai and lliecomlrn.tlnn of new facilities '" Israel 1
Principal Arab Slolts
l-lii. Several
il
illi
Arab confrontation Si" improvemrii! niKfiMHt earningsin change reipilrcinonls. "
Sam!
salaries will coiitrihnte loetilion csim'ially relcnllon of trained ami skilled
nt) 's
Ill) Ewmt. la-'VPt wiil lx: dependent on foreign funds, especially IS foreign mililary sale) credits, to finance military purchases through al leasthangeypl's leadershipone ili jlion Iselwccn Sadat and other Arabbe oil-rich Arab stales are unlikelyrovide funds in Kgypt. Altltough its foreign payment* posilnn is esiieclcd lo continue the improvements of recent years.slill will lx- unable to finance by ilscll large ipianliltc* of military import* I'lirlhemuMe. tk diversionrgr amounts of foreign exchange from civilian tn military imports could hr politically risky and contribute to social unrest in Kgypt.
of ihe Military Balance.
ibc Dump David accords anilr> Km-pi as ibc Arabs" leader, however, nmb has been less erratic.
by
cs are procure-
uria. Despite considerable natural resourcesrowing ccoi-omlcia remains depend-nil iit*in large foreignn fund mililary ami development programs Itrcc-ul increases in aid frmu Arab slate* under llie Baghdad agrcernenlal-Insved Syria In increase Ms military procurement pro-gram Over the nest few years. .Syria probably will lx: able Inm lest arms buildup since aid Flows are likely I" he maintained. Although tbe aid will be mill to rnlarncow Salaries slill will be largely responsible [or personnel retention problems as people continue In leave lhc Syrian armrd Inrce* lor high civilian wages in llie oil-rich Arab stales.
ice
il of IIU
I .IS Ji.-tlan. Jordanmall eomilry withIrsv resources, and its military capuhi
or
Syria
.f
Urcauv: we do not anticipate sulilunlial iuitic.es during the uesl five years in llie current force trend* in Israel and the Arab stales, we estimate thai Israel willide margin of military siipcri-
Inn
anili iasi/c
in
Arab force improvements, still would notffsel overall improvements in Israel's forces.misrnvcmcnts in Arab military capabilities (even withoul Egypt) coulduture eonllicl make Israeli military operations more COinptesstly in lerms of Casualties, equipment losses, and eeonomie rlisruplion.
141
Allhouuh Israel will continue toorces and hr concerned about Arab fo
froml.ighduil uerivim-iil proliahly will
cover Jordan's mililaryils overt fen sears, bul absorbing and niamiing tin- military equipment will lx- moreroblem than financing. Cnriliiiisrd limlled domestic hinds lor higher military
Hank: and ihe continued, or possibly increasing,by I'ale-linlan terrorists. These problems are nol likely lo con*irain Israel militarily, but ihey are likely
_
demand Israel,tali military1
rrsnlllCCS
r.
rowing ntifi" iinilti Ik- pnrlicularlytail Ini- Tin' krai-li mi
fiey
mali
Je.vid
i,,L,
for
u-jMifiMn- Arabs. Such measures ami the use ol large numbers of additional Inwifw in llir occupied (rrrilnrio Incivil imfi-Sl would sixnifieanllv raise
.In ills'
Ironps inimited military i r
Israelis and may eventually have it wife adverseli training and lu-aen-tlflW mnralr nforce*
M.iiiv farlnfs. suchSyiiai iltimovlir turmoil in Syria, anil
'isitiu tin
tiruuuh misc-ik-
is lhat an
iul scilh Oh' hope nl Iwmgmi pressures In bear nn Israel in make ennr usueS a* llir iicclipiod* I'al
Allhiuigh llir Arab* prtiluil.ly cnlci-.
war ivnuld if* If'hUunlial er KKMiiic costs. cas.iaili.-s. and eiiuinmnil
ihrmsrlvrs. lliey couldIsrael. although
militarily victor im is,rjl. rdamageear. The Arah stale*ar would profoundly.il
Mien nest (i
mgiims wouldduring Ihe
gyptunlikely I" rvjtiniV. andarlieillarly inr.il>iihiring Ihr time frame oflimalc.
ansl risky .can il
cdris mililary taiKihilUlrteak with another.supplier, this lime the Unitedlemiviiis il* mililary forces, Isosvevcr.fur Kaypl llir ixgenlial military Optionthe Arah lold. This might occur tx-eausc nfin Egyptian leadership, uiisalisfaetorynu West flank-shim wiUniOrriy. and l'ithpressures to realign Ivgypl with ihe Anil.
ILVbecause of ihe peace Irealy Egypt
h.il il is not hkrlyy Israel. Cain, prohahly lurlmrs some concerns ahont Israel* likely alliluilo ami mililary posture Inward Egypt in the event of Israeli hostilities with the oilier Aral. Males, flrspilr any residual concerns almul Israel's military intentions, Ismvcvcr. Egypl will maintain ils military forces primarily for threats Cairn perceiveshya. inlernal security problems, ami forpolitical and economic reasons; large nnmlx-rs of soldiers demobilized and released inlo Egypt's high-imemploynuiit economy could he polilically
I. ' .
MS. To lake aCCounl nf the possibility thai Egypt could join Ihe nlher Arahs in hoslililies. Israel's Slra-legic planning will not e'naiige during llse. noxl five years despile Hie peace Irealy. Israel will continue lo planwr.-front sear, still regarding Syria as ils riuisl Immediate thrcal while comlucling holdinSon all oilier fronls until ihe Syrian ihreal has lx-en neulrlliwl
ral, eflnrls lo challenge Israel militarily will continue to Ik undermined hy deep politicalwhich divide ihe Arah world Dcspiie calls for unity against ihe ix-acc Irealy and Israel, the steps taken hy ihe three principal Arah confrontationJordan, andcloserties have been cautious and tentative. Suspicions about llaglsdads intentions have caused Damascus and Amman loather than permit any real progressnificl military command or even contingency planning. Moreover, Iran and Syria have been rivals for cenlnrieS. Ixith aspire lo leadership rotes in Ihe Arab world, ami Imlh have sponsored coup plots and assassinations agniiiM ihewhich are noi easilyNow thai Kgvig Is cut off from ihe nlher Arahs. ils will in goes* to come In their assistance in thef hnstililies wilh Israel is problematic .it Ih'SI. Inumber of conflicts furlherfrom ihe dispute between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara lo the conflict
ln-tween NnrlhilliArab differences mid contribute In divisivemss in Arab ranks.
IV. SPECIAL ISSUES
in* issue* addressed In this chapter have .sulsstaulial potential bif iH-i'iininn major iliscoiuinuiirsw military iinil political npiinme stales in llie Miiblli't lionhe**prolnbly will nol Impact directly "ii Arab and Israeli military rap-dulitics during ihr nextean, ihcy likely will influence mililary pluming ami. indirectly, ibeiimietil of mililary cai rob ili lies in ibe Arab Stall* anil Israel
A, Autonomy Negotiations! Implications of Success or Failure
MO. Whatever ihr-iitconie of ihe Fiil.-slimaii autonomylie key sovcrciui'lyrrlutcdeniral In settling ihr ultirnalr stains idest Hankva Strip will remain unresolved. The final Matiis nf ibe Iwo lerriMiies is unl I" In- drcidi'l until Ihe lasl two yearsin-sear transilinnal uerirul. which would nol bii'iri urilil an uulnnnmy aiEreemenl had Inert mgnliatcil
f Ihe currenl im:"'rations produce an anion-omy agreement lhal I'iili-iliriiaii aod Arab leadennadequate, or if the talk* stalemateof Arab Fast Jerusalem No Israeli government will In? inclined to weaken iis harfiainir.it leverage by making such concessions, in Advance of nesotiatlons on tlsc final status of the West Bonk and Caw. Even so. Kitvplian leaders are unlikely in the end to insist on Israeli concessions in all of these areas as tl-eir price (or an autonomy agree men I. Without substantial Israeli concessions, bosvever. Pole-'tinlonrab leaders will publicly reject whatever autonomy arrangements miahl be agreed to by Kgypt and Israel and continue In prevent credible West Bank and Caw leaders from participating in an autonomy administration. The
I;it 'inn (Pl.O) probably
siould step up terrorist operations in Israel and against Israeli residents working in the occupied lerrilnrieS.
Sasidia Arabia and Jordan as well as the FIX) probably would privately retain potential interest in the autonomy idea,imited agreement werebed containing some immediate and significant gains for the Palestiniansirm commitment by hrael lo continue negotiations over basic, unresolved isvuS affecting tin' nllimale deposition of lhc West Bank. The Saudis. Jordanians, anrl the PLO lo this case innlijlity would not foreclose their option tnruler or liecritne more actively involved in llie negotiating process.
Among the radical Arab slates, any partial autonomye regarded as an Egyp-lian sellout of Palestinian Interests and as an Egyptian attempt to consolidate tlsc separate peace with Israel,
gr
of fr
ill
-.1 ol IsStK
regional i
leaders and their non reject ion ist Arab allies, anagreement would have lo contain (ar-reaebilig hrueliconcerning 'in' political prernga-livesalestinian self-governing authority. West Batik-Oa'a land and >valer resources,Israeli military presence. Jewish Settlement activity, and tbe
grnn ius! tioinrai hadt choice "intransigence.'
c uis III bul
in ibe autonomy ncgoti-i ni-
mp David
fold. President Sadat or
I lo such outside
t'Ctinii by claiming lhal Kgyptlace of continuing Israeli withdraw (rom aciive peace
with tin; suin-rpowcrs. and return In (I* Arah rest^msibiliiics.
onetheless,ft enthusedcollapse n( thr autonomy mWHinlions probably wouldS iulcicst* among thrclionis1 Aral* less, lhan an autonomy agreementrlh.ut of rnlestiiiian lnirfr*ls. In ihe case
ollapse nf negotiations, many Aral.would
iwrffl ihe United Slain In comeow riegotlaling (rarncsenrk nf il* own nr In agree In annlhel forum favored hy ihr Arabs.ata would drinand US endorsement ol newesigned lo generate more rlfeelive US andot nd pre" mre nn Israel to wilt iduin Occupied) Arahn accord theoreolr in ringnlinlious. and to rceognixr the I'jlcsliniam' right lo >clf-deteration.
nespansionof naval activily by nil herwould not generate ihr- same intensity of rearlioo as tlx: inlrodnctiori ol nlher lypes nl forces liecaiise Imth tlx- Uuiled Stales and the Sovici Union (nr years have operated livable naval contingents in Ihe Mediterranean. Mnreover. US andesser extent Soviet naval forces have increased ihe level of llieir activily in Middle Ea'lern waters since the revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan, arid probably will remain al ibis higher level until Icuslons ininn subside.
I HI. Neither superpower al ihe present lime lasses ground comlwt forces or pie-positions weaix.nS and ouuipmenl in ihe region, bul either may (In so, particularly if the survivial of one nf ils clients were atither orlion* may base fighter or reconnaissance aircraft in the area during ihlt period. They already receive overflight and landingfrom some Middle Eastern counlries formilitary aircraft.
Kant ciipim
her cracking do' vrvalivc Israeli gi iK| annesalinirisl
collapsed anyway. Israel range of precaiiliouary polili-rmoves. incbidiug heightened leocssary. the Israeli Govern-Israel's .security position Inncreasing Its mililary lord's up an ti terrorist operationsut Palestinianoulilsiibicelcdsurc hy coalition hardliner*
pprehension*.
FJ. Superpower Military Presence in the Region
The introduction in peacetime nf major US or Soviel comhatarllcutarly ground lores, Inlo lite Middle East could havedestaging effect on ihe rcstinnal militaryrge-scale deploymenls of ground, air. nr air defense forces by one superpower
II
count or ba iggravaling rs'Ki'u
provocative because Hiey wouldn princi-luilly as signals of heightened US or Soviet policy inleresl in ihe area and not as potential combat reinforcements.
andertirwin u/ nw.
DISSIMILATION NO' CE
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Original document.
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