Created: 7/1/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Control of the

Armed Forces

i ' -1



' 1 ! |



. "i|

Tbli rniblki.repared for the km of US Ocwnmenlnd the formal, cuveraic. and content are defined lo meetS Gorcmmcrrt ofTioaU may obtain acWiiwoal oorecau document directly or through Halarti channel* from the Central IrrleJliareor. Aecncy.

Roaueaicn oauMc the US Otntmtanal nay obtain aobacfiptkom to CIA wblKBtton* Ufnitir to ihl* one by BeMreeetat [noame* to

'lMafi nnd Gift DMria* 'aa^efCeatcreaa

TTniiaa ii r-

or: Narre-e.m Serrice

ert Royal|-


Reporter. oaulde the US CoreramefiliMereatad In aubeoiptlon icTvicc may pare hat* ipccifc putlicatfoo. either in papa* copymicroform from:.

Ph^feehtpAcarleei Kecrice 1y of Conreaa I 'I i j!t. '

or: Natieeatl Tactical laferaaaOMPerl Royal

SprtivneU.pfTlS Ore- Dartfl

National Foreign Awwmfnt Center

Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces

A Research Paper

Information available as0 has beenthe preparation of this

nd queries on this report are welcome and may be directed to;

Director or Public AfrairsCentral Intelligence Agency

WoshinotOT, DC.

For Information on obtaining additional copies, sec the inside of front cover.


blank page

Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces

Political controls have been an integral part ofvict armed forces since their inception. Presently, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPD) accomplishes this functionierarchy of Communist Party organs. These bodies exerciseontrol down to the company level in the field.

Although the placement of political officers in the miliary hassource of friction between the military officer and hisutual dependence between the two seemshave alleviated this problem. The respective responsibilities of thefor the technical proficiency and political ntiability of aseen by the professional commander and the MI'Dmutually reinforcing.urther incentive, the pirty hasthat it will not accept diminution of the politicaland that professional advancementilitary officer isrecognition of this relationship.

j Indoctrination methods of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) continue to receive official criticism for failing to prevent the growth of disciplinary problems in the armed forces. The MPD seems unable to devise imaginative new ways to inculcate ideology land continues to fall back principally upon massive coses of Marxist-Leninist medicine.esult, many young soldiers are probablyto ideological matters.

|Thcre hasradual decrease in the percentage of CPSU members in the armed forces. This is primarily attributedcries of decrees P'lsseci during the sixties and seventies that effectively tightened party admission policies. The decline in military representation in the party, however, will probably have little actual effect on the military's influence or role in policymaking.



. :' i

and Organization of the Main PoHtical Directorate i

With the Central Committee Apparatus

Administrative Organs Department

Relations at the Troop Level



and the Avoidance of Conflict

Representation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to Higher Party Organs

and Continuity of Ccniral Committee Membership

of Political Indoctrination in the Armed Forces

the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Arm and Navy


Soviet Ministry or Defense Collegium

Structure or the CPSU

ja? ' ' 11

1. ' i

Representation in th-CPSU _

i !


on the CPSU Central Committee andral Auditing Commission

: ! .

4. - . 'I

" "' li.


! j

tl- > 1 '

i '


Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces

mil Organization of the Main Political Directorate

Political control mechanisms have been anof the Soviet armed forces since theirthe controls were intended to verifyParty policies were being carried out inforces and that all personnel were givenCommunist political) idoctrination.1later, the Soviet regime continues (oextensive uniformed politicalPolitical Directorate of the Soviet Armyaccomplish essentially thej;

I " '

This apparatus extends from the Defense Ministry in Moscow where the MPD functions with the "rightsepartment of the Communist Party Centralto the company level in the field. It provides the civilian political leadershipested means of explaining its policies to the troops and of receiving political feedback from all command levels.

j <

j J 1

This system of political control hasourcebetween the political officers and themilitary. In recent years, however, the partyconsistently that it will notof the political officer's role andadvanccment for an officer isrecognition of this

Mission. The MPD is formally charged with:

... I = >t

the activities of its subordinateorgans as well as the parly andLeague (Komsomol) organizationsarmed forces,


the performance of the political control organs and military party organizations to ensure thnt party, state, and Defense Ministry orders arc

. carried out.

' The ipecisl ocpsnmenii m' the Commtiiee efSuie Security (KOB) wntch perform the raunierinielUsenet function in the armed rorcesatw monitof iho political rcllibillty of military penonnel amiecnmltct Tor thli type of reporting.

Participating in the selection, assignment, andevaluation of military and political officers:

a Supervising the content and ideological direction of the military press, including the central military newspapers, journals, and publishing houses.

Supervising military-political trrlning Institutions and controlling training, research, and curriculums in the social sciences sections at milhary academies, schools, and military training institutions.

Supplying the troops with political, educational, and propaganda materials and equipment, j

Reviewing the needs, attitudes, and well-being of Defense Ministry personnel, including its civilian employees.

Recording and maintaining statistics on the numbers of Communist Party and Komsomol members in the armed forces (currently overercent of the Soviet military).

In wartime, the MPD, probably heavily reinforced from the ranks of the civilian party apparatus, would be expected to intensify its indoctrination and verificationfficers of the MPD simulate their combat role in Soviet exercises during peacetime.

j *

Organization. The headquarters of the MPD isinto five directorates: one each forwork, agitation and propaganda, mass cultural work, personnel, and the military press (seehe directorate heads comprise the core of the MPDs decisionmaking buroeaded by MPD Chief Army General A. A. Yepishev, The buro also includes Yepishcv's first deputy and deputy, (he chiefs of the political directorates of the five forces (ground, strategic rocket, naval, air. and airnd the editor of the newspaper

1 rhinni World Wir II the icnior political crficer at each echelon wm required to countenlin all written combat orders before they entered intoctTect.

rinure I

Onunliallon of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPD)

" "1 |

Main Political



o<anaax Army and Navy

to* Org anna ttonal -Part. Wort

(o< Agrfafrcn and Propaganda

C reciO'ata tor Maaa Cultural Work


Directorate for

Military Praaa


. ' military diatncL

and groupa of foicoa haartquartara

1 Dapaimam

army. Ilot.lla. andcademy headquarter*


: for Pclit.cn Attain

at rag


1 I


Poiilical Allaire

ai battalion mrl io-ar 'loadauannra I

Krasnuyu Zveztta (Redn elected parlywhose membership is approved by th;Committee considers appeals to decisions on party membership and disciplinary matters made by lower level party commissions. ;'.

At the next lower militnty echelon, politicaloperate in the headquarters of the military districts, fleets, and groups of forces abroad.ower echelon headquarters and institutions such as military academics, the MPD is representedolitical department.

' !

The political officer at the legimcnUd levelmall staff, while the deputy commander for political affairs (the zemnotit) at the battalion and lower levels has no itaff but receives ad hoc off-duty assistance from Komsomol Or party members.

Leadership, Gen. A. A. Yeiishcv. who has headed the MPD sinceZ. is the senior political officer in the Soviet armed forces and is the principal link between the Communist Party apparatus and the Soviet military establishment. He ranks fourth in (he military protocol order, after Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov and First Deputy Ministers Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and Marshal V. G. Kulikov. but before First Deputy Minister Marshal S. L. Sokolov (even though Sokolov's militaryof the Sovietsenior to Ycpishev's).*

Ycpishcv does not appear to be one of thein Soviet decisionmaking on defenseinstance, he is not thought to be athe Defense Council, nor has he or theany apparent role in such matters as j.l

General Ycpishcv is,ember andin the Defense Ministry's Collegium, nbody which considers Important defense problems, including the structure of the armed forces, their mobilization readiness, und combat and political training. The Defense Minister reportedly chairs (his

1 Kwnaya Zvtsda. although ll la kscniiflccl on Its masthead iw "the organ of the Ministry ofas been an element of political control by the Communist Party of tU Soviet Unionince It was founded

* F. I.epiVtev's predecessor, ma protroted to Marihal of the Soviet Union while head of the MPD

organization even though party leader General Secretary Brezhnev appears toember (see

It is the responsibility of Ycpishcv and his political officers to monitor the execution of. and to develop support for. the top leadership's military policyAlthough General Yepishev may not beinvolved in making these decisions, his activities at home and abroad illustrate the scope andof his mission. His9 trip to Afghanistan, for instance, suggests that Ycpishcv was thereurpose other than commemoration of the first anniversary of the Afghanperhaps to provide assessments and recommendations for the further formulation of Soviet military policy in that country.

Yepishev is ultimately accountable to (he Politburo for the military's political reliability. He also informs tlic Minister of Defense on (he status of troop morale, discipline, and political work. His political officers are also accountable to their immediate superior political officers. In addition, they must inform their unit commanders about their activities.

Relations With the Central Committee Apparatus. According to the official Soviet description, the Main Political Directorate operates "with the rightsentral Committee department, serving theof the CPSU and the Politburo. As head of thisepishev would operatearty functionary coordinating the implementation of the top leadership's policy and government activity in his substantive area.

The Administrative Organs Department. Of the other Central Committee departments, the Administrative Organs Department (AOD) maintains thelink with the armedhis department

' The Soviet armed force* Include personnel of the Ministry of Defense, the MPD, the Border Guards of the Committee foe Stale Securitynd the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internnl Affairs, rjefenae Minister D. F. Ustinov issue* Ordcra of th: Day to all of those organ) rations, and they all contribute "military delegates"Party congresses. Chief political officers from the political directorates of the Border Guards and the Internal Troops frequently attend MPD meetings.


thef Ihe armedt servesocal point in the Central Committee apparatus for coordinating; and ad atnislcring party personnel policies for the armed forces with those of the KGB. the Ministry of Internal Affairsnd the paramilitary Ail-Union Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army. Aviution. and ihe Navy(lX)SAAF).

The relationship between the Administrative Organs Department and the Main Political Directorate is not clear. Bureaucrnlically, ihcy are ostensibly equal, but Yepishevigher military rank than Maj. Gen. N. I. Savinkin. the head of theOrgans Department. Yepishev alsohigher on protocol listingj than docs Savinkin.

Theuting of poaiitoas whicharty approval. At the Moacow level,at the Miniiter of Defeiuc and the Chief of Staff,military diitrict. fleet, and force commander!,I'nlubwrna! before ihcy can be fitted.

The pattern of alternating assignments between the staff of the AOD and senior positions with troop units would suggest that the AOD is subordinate toD. Two examples bint at this subordination:

u. I. Padorinaltic Fleet party conferenceorker in the Adminisirntivc Organs Departmcnt.0 he attended party meetings of the Baltic Fleet andasa Rear Admiral and Chief of the Political Directorate or the Northern Fleet. i

. V. Fedoroveningrad Military District Party Conferenceresponsible worker" in the Administrative Organs Department. He continued to attend rear services activities and6 wise major general and deputy chief of the political office of the Rear Services Central Military Medical Directorate.

AOD Chief Savinkin apparently has no politicalhis own. Another man in his positionore active rolekingmaker" withinforces. In any event, the fact that the partyfit to separate the political indoctrinationfunction from maintenance ofis further evidence of the ith maintaining multiple controls overi i '

Military-Political Relations at the Troop Level

in the past, some Western analysts have concluded that the political officer competes with the professional soldict in the Soviet armed forces, demanding precious training time to conduct political indoctrination. The professional soldier felt that time spent on political indoctrination detracted from the development of military skills and therefore decreased combat effectiveness.

The present interaction of Soviet political and military institutions, however, suggests that interdependence is now accepted by both political and military officers. Current military leaders have been subject topolitical indoctrination throughout their careers. This indoctrination nas stressed the positive aspects of the entire politicalajor example is unrelenting emphasis of the role of the party and its political officers in the Soviet victory in World

Military officers are taught, and many probably believe, that the success of their own units and careers will be possible only with the support of the political apparatus. Moreover, both civilian authorities and military officers have long recognized the dangers of institutional conflicts, both to the party and to the country.


One-Man Command. Soviet emphasis on one-man command, individual accountability, and controlahorrence of diffused group leadership and its effect on lower level military decisionmaking. For units at what the Soviets consider the tactical level (corps andne-manis the most important operating principle. This principle, apparently unanimously supportedboth the party and the military, implies that the commander is responsible for all aspects of his

the morale, discipline,combat activity of his

The duties of the unit commander and his deputy fur political affairs, the zampolit, arc described in Soviet disciplinary regulations and field manuals for tactical units in similar terms and are directed toward one mainan effective military unit. The commander has ultimate responsibility for theof his unit measured against this goal, while the zampolitonitoring, supportive, and inspirational role. Both men arc expected to root out complacency, carelessness, andto be inimical to combat readiness and efficiency.

The Internal Service Regulations cover theseand interdependent roles of the regimentaland zampolit. The commander is specifically charged with, among other things, the political-moral status of personnel, military discipline,political vigilance, and the serviceman's personal concerns and needs.

The zampolit is responsible for the organizationof political work, but the scope of hisshort of the commander's responsibilities.the zampolit is responsible fortraining for servicemen and fordiscipline, bet the commander is responsibleeffectiveness of this political training/ Thus, atlevel political matters are not solely thethe zampolit. Commanders and political officersresponsible for the unit's political activity

; :.


Military Councils. At the higher levels ofin the service, military district, fleet,army, and flotillapolicies are considered and formulated in militaryay-to-day command decisions based on these policies are made by the unit commander. Membership in the councils is based on the recommendations of the Ministry of Defense and

*oteworthy that at the regimental level, daily ordm for political training are aigncd by the commander but not by the zampolti.

' The Soviet! deny any contradiction between the crJIegial military council and the one-man command principle. The late Detente Minister Orechio claimed, for Instance, that one-man command does not negate but complements collegia) forms of military leadership such as military councils.


(!ic Main Political Directorateubjectpproval by the CPSU Central Committee. Each council includes the commander (who is also the chairman of thehe chief of (he poiilical directorate or department, the first deputy commander (or first deputy commander inhe chief of staff, and the civilian party secretary for the corresponding republic, krey. or oblastommittee.

The military councils, whose orders are signed and issued by the unit commander, "discuss atrd sometimes decide the most important matters and activities of the Soviet armed forces and are fully responsible to the Central Committee and the government forparty decision- and orders of the Ministry ofn the event any member of 'he council disagreesecision of the council, he isto report that disagreement to the next higher echelon within his chain of command. The issue would then be raised at the military council at that level.

The presence of the local civilian party secretaryilitary council serves the party in several ways:

H ennblcs local party officials to be aware of and have some voice in military plans affecting local interests (maneuvers, exercises, new construction, and military participation in holiday parades).

It helps to prevent among theense of isolation from the local community (given the rigid security controlsie Soviet armed forces).

It provides the leadership with another channel for reporting, through the local party secretary, on the performance of the mili'ory commander.

It facilitates military co-option of local assets for particular project*.

Interdependence and the Afoide.net of Conflict. The one-man command principle and the role and functions of military councils illustrate the institutionalof the professional officer corps and the noliticul nppnrilUK

The political officer's role in evaluating professional militaryundamental to his influence in the military. The requirement for political conformity and participation, which must be evaluated by the political officer on fitness reports, is one additional device the

parlyto exact compliance from the military.ndrratcd as politicalhe commander not only needs the political officer's support to achieve unit success, he must also have thatorvn career advancement. He must be assessed by the zampolit in be politically active ande political officer, on the other hand, is the con.'nander's subordinate, and he needs theooperation to be effective and to advance.

The relationship, then, is the dialectic in practice. The party, through the MPD political officer, indoctrinates the troops to work for the regime's military goals. The political officer is expe-ted tot weaken.uthority and effectiveness of thetrengthened, more effective, command is the common mission of the military commanders, political organs, and party organizations. These institutions arc all responsible for carrying out the leadership's policy in the armed forces and for supporting ihe authority of the commanders.

The commander and zamrHtlitingon-sms which wot.td damage their careers. Individual ch personality notwithstanding, the higher the echelon, the less likelihood of open conflict between the political officer and the commander. At the lower echelons, where there is less direct political pressure, the commander and political officer enjoy fewer benefits from the hierarchical system, and they have less to lose as far as career and political acceptability is concerned. Conflicts, not necessarily political-military ones, may ar*se more frequently.

Mutual dependence thus best describes the zampolit-commandcr relationship. This dependence determines the degree of success acquired by each. Conflicts may arise between the two. but their mutual concern for the political reliability and technical proficiency of their unit would appear toarather than an adversary, relationship.

InterchangenHlity. In the pest, intcrchangenbility of the political and command roles was encouragedhen Defense rV.inlsicr Malimmkiy commented favorably on this approach. He described theasilitary specialistolitical educator. At the same lime, he advised the political

worker to be prepared militarily so that he could substitute Tor ihe commander. He noted (hit the experienced commander with political knowledge could be aligned political work when necrssary. and he required that "thisepermanently, systematically, and not from lime to time."

This practice has changed, however, and currently political officers appear to beixed career pattern There is no recent evidence of permanent exchanges In ihe absence of theine officer fills in. and only in unique circumstances in which the commanding officer and the line deputy commanders are ubscnt or diiatkd is the political officer likely to assume command. Perhaps the most publicized case occurred during the second Sirto-Soviet border clash on Damanskiy Island onhe politicalieutenant colonel, assumed command after the commander was killedeputy commander was wounded.

If intcrchangeability exists, it is more likely to beat the lower echelons, in the form of career service transfer. Such career changes usually involve additionalat an appropriate military school

Military Representation In the Communist Party of the Soviet Union One gauge frequently used to measure the climate of military-political relations in the Soviet Union has been the number of mititaiy men elected in ihe Centralt each partytale cfis proposed by the party leadership and, In recent years, has been accepted by the congress unanimously. The electionilitcofficer who has risen both in the military and in the party is evidence that "he haseview of party membership policies, the function and place of the Centralin the decisionmaking process, and Centralmembership policies suggest that while Central Committee membership is an hoiiar, il is not in

"According lo the parly statutes, ihe Central Committee rona thelweenows, which, since Ivol.hava been held every fifth year liiciecntrrc body, the Politburo, however, ha*been ihe real source of power, aurticd by the CPSU Seereiariea and Ibcrrd.-runmenti. which form ihe Central CosnmltieeTSe Central Commit lee anally holdsJukd meet-

rduring whkh party polkic*and personnel

change* are announced andbarometer of mitiutry influence in the ttolicymaking process.

In recent years the extent of Communist Party membershiprmed forces has varied according to the party leadership's perception of the need for military menommunists. After the Zhukov crisishrushchev encouraged the enrollment if large numbers of servicemen in the party at the small-unit level. This move was meant to provide lower rankingoice in party policies at the troop level in ihe armed forces. For example, they could participate in discussions of failures lo meet unit goats.

Lessear afteremovalhe CPSU Central Committee isVjcd two decreet which tightened admissions policies throughout the party. In one decree the Odessa Military District und the Baltic Fleet were cited for their deficiencies in enrolling new party members. The decree wasreadarning to the entire military that parly enrollment procedures within the armed forces as well is in civilian party organizations were to be tightened. In the other decreed Party Congress stiffened the requirements for admission to the party: applicants up to the age ofinsteadad to enter the party via the Komsomol, and affirmation byatherajority,artymembership was required for admission. In addition, the minimum party affiliation period for those sponsoring candidates for membership was Increased from three to five years.

rior to the enactment of7 Draft Law, thr zampolit was reinstated at thelevel aflera hiatus ofears, andd higher military-political schools were created lo train officers for this position. In the higher echelons, parly committees were replaced by MPD political orgons in military training Institutions, research establishments, staffs and directorates of military disiricls. fleets, groups of forces abroad, and 'he Defense Ministry's central apparatus. These changes were (tartly caused by the expected impaCi if the Draft Law. which lowered thr conscription age fromo IV.Parly organizations in lower echelon military units virtually disappeared because so few cnli*icd men were party members.

h Parly Congress approved Brezhnev's planarly cardrogram actually begun3 and completedhis was Ihc first formal opportunity fur purging thehe exchange was not heraldedurge, bul it was used to strengthen internal party discipline and to stimulate passive members. j

The party card exchange in the military probably prompted the convocation in3 of the Fifth All-Army Conference for Party Secretaries, the first to be held inears. There Brezhnev stressed the "fundamental political importance" of the renewal of membership cards.

j *

inothcr decree again emphasized strict criteria for party admissions and warned against manipulating candidate memberships to embellish bookkeeping and reports to higher echelons. Party organizations and the MPD political organs have been blamed for these practices, and, following6 Partyetailed review was initiated of party admissions policies in the militarv.

esult of these measures, during thehef party members among military scrvkrmcn reportedly declined fromoercent.

Brezhnev's longstanding campaign for an educated and politicallythereforeparly membership, in contrast with the partypolicies encouraged under Khrushchev, has restricted the possibilities of party membership for enlisted men and young officers. The resulting low party membership has been attributed to constant. personnel changes because there was insufficient timewo-year conscript to become more than a andidate for membership.

Election to Higher Party Organs, Militaryin the Central Committee and Centre! Auditing Commission is determinedightly regulated, centrally controlled electiont begins with the election of delegates to the CPSU congress (see

The Central Auditing Commiasloii audit, the ireatury and profit making cnicrprlaea itichihc party pre" of ihoCommittee. While ihelack* any railelection lo ll aomctimn tervc*tep;Mors lo candidate or full membenhiri in the Central Cv-Ttmlllcei. and, therefore, generally l> rcgnrded ihe loweat runs on the cenlra! party hierarchical ladder.

nd their unanimous election it the congressredetermined slate of the Central Committee and its Politburo.

Under party procedure1 the election of military delegates to party congresses parallels that of civilian delegates. Military party organizations, includingand border troops within the Soviet Union, choose represent stives at the same lime that the corresponding civilian party organizations outside the Soviet Union elect their own delegates to the congresses.

Some idea of the number of military personnel who arc members of the CPSU can be dct ived by using data provided on the parly congresses and the election rrocess. At all but one of the recent congresses, the ratio of delegates to party members wasrnnounccd.or example. Party Secretary I. V. Kapitonov reported to the parly congress that. norms of representation laid down b, the Central Committee were one delegate toartyhat year it was announcedilitary delegates were elected to the CPSU congress.

The decrease in the percentage of Communist Party members who arc on active duty in ihe armed forcesercentercent has brought adecline in their representation in the higherorums (see1he military representation at the party congresses also declinedercentercent. Moreover, while the number of military who mayn the Central Committee appears to have declined less,ercentercenthis may be accounted for by the apparently honorary inclusion of two World War II heroes. Marshals I. Kh. Bagramynn and V. I. Chuykov. If they arc not included in the militaryhen the military's voting representation declinedercent.

As might be expected, few new teats have been given to the military voters on the Central Committee (seehis voting body has been enlargedew sealsul the military has received only six of these. Tlx number of military personnel in tha Central Auditing Commission and the Centralcombined (voting and nonvoting) has remained

FIruk 3

Structure of Ihe CPSU

- 1 'a

; cpsu covjui


CaKial Auditing Commit Wirt

Conirol CommmM of th*aolral Commme-e

CPSU Central Commitloa

Secretarial 1

All-Ur^on Party Conterance

ol th* Communist Party

of (ho Union Republic

Cant rat Committee of lha Communist Party of tna Union Republic

Republic Party

Party Conlaranco

Audtlmu Com m> at ion

Krsy, Oblaat Party Commillo*

City. Rayon Party Conference


Okrug, City, Rayon Party Committoo


Party OgannHione


constantxcept6 when therehe holders Of these scats arc continually changing, however, because of reassign-mcnls, retirements, and deathj,j,I y.

With the exception of Marshals Bagramyan and Chuykov. military voting members of the Central Committee -re in key military rations. By virtue of being assigned to certain positions in the Defense Ministry, lending military figures seem assured of this high party status. Few officers below the rank of deputy defense minister become voting members.

Significance and Continuity ofCeatrat Committee Membership. Previou olysesof militaryin the centralrgans have focused on the elections at the congresses with little attentat given to the periods between congresses.or instance, most observers saw the increase fromooting members on the Central Committeeubstantial gain in military influence. Within the next two years, however, four of theilitary officers died or were reassigned or retired and wero not replaced.

Only twice1 has the political leadership elected military personnel to the Central Committee betweenwhen Ycpishcv was assigned to head the Main Political Directorate, andhen S. L. Sokolov was appointed First Deputy Minister ot Defense. In all other instances, key officers were not elected to fill the "military" vacancies on the Central Committee when they were appointed to key positions in the Ministry of Defense. Nor has thereingle instance inewly appointed commanderroup of forces, district, or fleet was elected to the Central Committee between congresses.

The decline in military representation in the party will probably have little actual effect on the military's influence or role in policymaking. This influence continues lo be exerted in other forums such as the Politburo, the Defense Council, and the Military-Industrial Commission. But, paradoxically, high party status for the military continues to be important. Membership on the Central Committee, which seems to have decisionmaking powers only in an acute Internal political crisis such as thatrings with It prestige and probably material perquisites.


thai pony membership policies do not change, we can anticipate ihnl the current number of military members on the Central) will probably not go any lower. There is not likely to be any substantial gain or loss at the neat party congressf Marshals Bagrnmyan and Chuyknv die before then, they probably will not be replaced.

Kftectivetnrss of Political Indoctrination in the Armed Forres

Thendoctrinationn the armed forces avc designed not only to mold an ideal Soviet soldier but also to continue the development of what has been culled the "new Soviet ma.v" Ycpishcv and others have noted that universal military servicepportunities, under controlled conditions, to reinforce ihc ideological training of Soviet youth, which begins In the school system. Conscripts who have completed their service are urged to volunteer for projects in remote areas such as the Baikal-Amurskaya branch of ihe Trans-Siberian railroad. Because of their service and Indocirination, these former servicemen arc considered lo be "hardened" both physically and ideologically and thus valuable additions to the labor force. The Soviets admitthat this idcM is sometimes not achieved.

" According to the Soviet MlltWy C,vol.he anal*ariy-potilical work" in tha armed forcaa art to train icMier* la the aptrll of ComnwaUl corndouincaa; In Sovtet patriot iim, Intimalionallam, political via It* nee. and data hatrcl toward ancmlca of the Soclnliit Fatherland; in loyally to military duly and the mlllta.'y oath; and to be In comtani rearllneu to defend andallat achlmmenu. the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and ihe wvereignty and territorial inltsrMv of the USSR.

Despite the efforts extended in political activity, however, the average serviceman is bored by the poiilical training which is supposed lo inspire and. The reaction of the leadership to dale has been to increase, not decrease, their efforts, mostly in the form of more of thehen ihc decree "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" focused on the military, the Central Committee has issued several decrees which related to MPD activity, calling for better political discussion, unproved lecture propaganda, and most recently, improved Ideological and political education.

" Brezhnev, who could aptly be deacribedupcr tampoiit. hai provided additional, if not new. uitHtancc inrl direction to political education ia the Soviet military a* well ai in the civilian population, lib three recent rnemoin.Ua VnrotKAtrnyt, and Ti'Hia (nubtubed in FeVuary, May. andwhich recount thencludingoiilical officer and leader, received ihe Lenin Pnre9 and have been given full pJay in the civilian and militaryey are ccenpubory reading InD'i political trainingunS conference. Ustinov delivered an encomiam on the fin! two memoir* lo whkh Manhalfn Deputy Minmerof Dcfenw. and Manhalhief of the General Stnfr. added their neatie. The tallerd that the memoind to furtUr military leience, edacalion, anr< training.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: