Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Space
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGiW-:
RELEASE AS SANITIZED '"
SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN SPACE
Infcamaiiun ivjiliblc 0
uwd in Ihr precaution of thn Ealmate
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The fothwing inteVigcncc cgoruzationi participated in Ihe preparation of Ihe Estimate-.
wol ImBgance Agency, lhe Dfpoil^ni at Stole. Hm Daltm*Agency, ond HW Notional Security Agency
Alto Participating:
Jh4 Auiilant Chief o( Stall tor lnt.*genee.l MW Army
Iht Director ol Novo! Intelligence.ol 'Sc Navy
The Aiilitant Chief ol Staff.Deportnwnt ol ih* Air
SCOPE NOTE
This National Intelligence Estimate assesses present and future Soviet military capabilities and intentions in space. Soviet civil space systems are addressed only insofar as they clarify the scope and magnitude of the military program. Comparisons wilh US space systems are made where they can serve as useful benchmarks for understanding Soviet capabilities or philosophy. The comparisons should not be interpreted as technical assessments showing superiority or inferiority of Soviet systems relative to US systems.
The Estimate treats the following elements of the Soviet military space program:
Scope, magnitude, organization, and management.
Technical capabilities and limitations of current Soviet space systems and prospects for new systems, as evidenced by current research, development, and testing activities, by trends in the Soviet program, and by our perceptions of Soviet requirements.
Operational capabilities of current and prospective Soviet space systems to serve known and potential military support functions, and the USSR's dependence on its space systems.
Current and prospective Soviel spaceborne anlisatellite systems and prospects for their use.
The assessments and projections in this Estimate have been limited, for the most part,eriod covering lhe nextears. The culoff date for information used in lhe report was
6 SO
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DISCUSSION
I. Overview of Soviel Space Program
Evolution of tbe Soviet
Scope and Magnitude of Soviet Program
Space Uuneh Veil
Soviet Space Hardware
Management and Organization of Soviet Space
II. Current and Prospective Military Support Space
Unmanned Phcrtweconnaissance/Jmagine: Satellite Systems
ELINT
Radar
Missile Launch Detection
Manned Military Spacecraft
Communications Satellites
Navigation
Radar Support
Ceodetic
Meteorological Satellite*
III. Current and Prospective Uses of Space Systems for Intelligence and Military
Assessing Technical Characteristics/Performance of
Calibration of ABM Radars
Monitoring Compliance With Treaties and
Mapping. Charting.
Observing and Forecasting Weather
Maintaining Order of Battle and Targeting
Providing Iridicatlons and
Targeting of Antiship
Navigation Support to Naval Combatants .
Military Command and Control Cornro unseat
Summary of Crisis and Conflict Management
IV. Current and Prcapectlve Use of Space Systems To Negate Those of Other
Soviet Attitudes Toward Space
Current and ProspectiveASAT
Soviet Knowledge of Foreign Space
Soviel Dependence on Space Systems and Their Vulnerabilities
Prospects for Soviet Spaceborne ASAT Operational
Annex A: Soviet Information Denial Techniques
Annex B: Major Caps in Our Knowlcdirrlse Soviet Space Program
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over Ihe pastars, the Soviet space program has evolved from one emphasizing civil space accomplishments for prestige purposes to. one emphasizing the use of space systems for military support. Todayercent of Soviet space systems serveilitary support mission, and anotherercent serve both military and civil purposes. The Soviets conductpace launches annually and at any one time haveperational satellites in orbit. In support of their space program, tbe Soviets are developing new space launch vehiclesuilding new launch siles and modifying some older ones, upgrading their land-based command, control, and tracking sites, and upgrading ships dedicated to supporting space activities.
Developments in the Soviet military space program tend to be evolutionary in nature. As with many other military programs, the Soviets continue to operate older satellite systems long after the introduction of improved systems. Improved payloads are often incorporated inlo proven spacecraft. Some completely new. technically complex systems (launch detection satellites, for example, and radar and ELINT ocean reconnaissance satellites) have suffered many problems during the flight test phase.
The Soviets have placed more emphasis than the United Stales on development of space systems directly responsive lo military requirements. Both countries have developed satellite systems for photoreconnaissance, ELINT reconnaissance, communications,of ballistic missile launches, navigation, geodesy, and meteorology. In addition, the Soviets have developed military space systems for which there are no comparable US systems. They have radar and ELINT ocean reconnaissance systems thai can provide targeting data in real lime lo selected naval combatants carrying antiship weapons. They have developed manned space stations for the purposes ofand military-related research They also have an operational orbital interceptor for destruction of satellites in near-Earth orbits.
Although several Soviet and US systems are functionally similar, they were not necessarily designed to satisfy identical recmu-ements. Soviet photographic and ELINT reconnaissance salcllites(_
^Jappear designed to satisfy requirements such as maintaining orders of battle of foreign military, forces.
1
ll of Ihe Soviets' current satellite systems, with the exception of those for communications and missile launch detection, use near-Earth orbits. Having to maintain several networks of near-Earth ELINT and navigation satellites, which have relatively short lifetimes, requires frequent launches of replenishment satelliles. In comparison, the annual satellite launch rate of the United States isourth that of the Soviet Union. The difference in launch rate is due primarily to three factors:
US satellites have much longer lifetimes.
-C
One-thirdf the total annual Soviet launches are photoreconnaissance satellites, all of which return exposed film. The USlectro-optical imaging system is continually in orbit, returning images in near-real timefj
3
n, the Sovietsonsiderable, expanding effort to develop and use techniques that deny us information useful for jessing the missions and performance of their space systems.
3
1
c
3
Current and Prospective Soviet Space Systems for Military Support
S. We believe tlie Soviets will continue to use and improve virtually all of their current types of military satellite systems through, and will introduce many new systems as well. Table IE summarizes current and prospective Soviet military satellite systems.
Soviets areew military space station,continue publicly to discuss plans for docking multipletoontinuously manned space complex. LikeSalyut space stations, we expect new ones will carry bothhigh-resolution cameras to serve multipleWe also expect them to carry additional sensors, suchand infrared sensors. Data collected by all these sensorspreliminary processing on board and then be passed viato Moscow in supportumber of military functions, suchindications and warning and maintaining orders of battle,timely data for crisis management and the conductoperations. In addition, the Soviets may choose to usestations to conduct subsystem testing of future laser
Soviets are alsomall reusable "spacewill be launched vertically and land horizontally. Theserveerry vehicle for space stations oreconnaissanceinspection role It could also piovide valuable engineeringa large reusable Space transportation system (RSTS) comparableUS Shuttle in size and weightarge Soviet RSTSnot be operational before the. Tbe Soviets' new
Tahle IE
Current and Prospective Satellite Syslem Functions
ol Soviet System or
est
System Function
*
Operation
ipw pose military space notion*
ipJI*
development
miceintern
development'
ntcalioro
orbit
tonary
development
(Global Positioning System type)
ISSCt .
erooiuiu nee:
lyWemi
lean systemmp)
devebpoicnt
(real-lime)
rtcoanaluance:
oear-Eartb orbit* ,
data to naval combalanU
Kude orbiti
ocean reMnuiuiQce;
Imaging (lor tnleliferice)
chance
i waming-
ICBM hunches
devetoDoiefli
SLBM bunches
r infelticence)
Intercept
scale. Ulricas loercent:oercent. Evenercent.oercent, tbe scale indicate* lilelihoodll eleci lo develop0 yean.
liave notinlary spice station7 but could launch one at any Ume.
Director. Dr/erue InldHgtntt Ak*kv. bdUoa thai anV SeWei prof am lo deuuVe ipeer Iranrportoilon . ^ no mow 'ta ihe otmeepiuai design sfoane.
liavc wpwienced problems, eiact rtatui unclear 'See leit ol Ihe Disciuskm lor an eimnuor. nr. ih(>aimmroi
space stalion and "space plane" could serve operalional purposes in the.
uring, lhe Soviets apparently intend to make considerably more use of satellites in high-altitude orbits for communications, meteorology, and navigation. This intention is indicaled by the large increase in lhe production and launch facilities for the USSR's largest operational space booster. Also:
The Soviets have announced plans to establish five networksotential total ofeostationary cornmunicalions
satellites. By thehese satellites will provide the Soviets with global communications lo aircraft, ships, and ground forces. L
1
In livehe Sovwill also place weather satellites into geosynchronous orbit These satellites, coupled with observations from low-altitude manned space stations and medium-altitude weather satellites, will complete lhe Soviel "throc-liercdhis network will decrease the Soviets' dependence on meteorological information supplied by the West and will provide them valuable data for planning and executing force movemenls, exercises, and pholoreconnaissance targeting.
By lhehe Soviets could have an advanced satellite navigation system similar to the US Global Positioning Systemhey could elect to incorporate the necessary GPS-type subsystems on an existing high-altitude space system such as their Molniya or Statsionar communications satellites Unlike iheir current navigationigh-altitude GPS-type system would be continuously available and could be used by mobilend sea-based platforms for precision navigation and accurate weapon and target positioning
3
here is little intelligence on which to project Soviel development of advanced photographic, electronic, and radarsatelliles. Judging on the basis of our views of the Soviets' perceived needs, their technological slate of the art, and our knowledge of their development cycle, our projections of future Soviel space syslems include the following:
A high likelihood the Soviets will have an advancedsystem equipped to develop filmboard automati cally and transmit imagery dataround station
A high likelihood the Soviets will elect totype, electro-optical imaging system, which could be operational in Ihe later
A moderate likelihood ihey willigh-altitude ELINT reconnaissance system in the, which will provide
nearly continuous coverage of large areas and significantly increase tasking flexibility
high likelihood they will have an advanced radar ocean reconnaissance satellite by the, with much improved capabiht.es to supiJy target.ng data in real time to selected Soviet naval combatants.
elm nee they willadar imaging satellite ino provide all-weather, day and night coverage of important targets.
All of these systems will significantly enhance the Soviet capability lo obtain more timely data for purposes of indications and warning maintaining orders of battle on mobile forces, and management of crises' and limited conflicts.
he Soviets stillully operational network of satellites or early warning of missile launches to supplement their ground-based bailee missile early warning radars. The US launch detection satellite (LLO) program, which has been in operation for more thanears
SSTSLSorldwide coverage of ICBM and SLBM launches The Soviets have beenroblcms ^
n their efforts to establish an operational network. We believe
however that developmentaunch detection programigh
Priori* for them because of the significant gain in warning time and
reliabihty provided by such systems. We believe that it may be as late as
ITlXur3tinuous coverage of
US ICBM fields Deployment of an LDS network with coverage of all current and planned US SLBM and ICBM launch areas probably could not be accomplished before.
he Soviets have both overt and covert access to significant amounts of information on US systems and their operating and performance characteristics C
Contribution of Soviet Space Systems to Military Support
n developing their vast array of space systems during the hut
U years the Sov.ets have bevn slr.vmg to acquire means to providenal support and to augment their total military capability Most present Sov.et space systems perform military support functions thai can also be performed by nompace systems During recent years however, more Soviet space systems perform functions that cannot be*
easily duplicated by nonspace systems, thus increasing Sovieton space (or military support during peacetime, crisis, and conflict.
o measure the military contribution of Soviet space systems, we have grouped space system capabilities inunctional areas. Tableummary of our assessments of the capabilities of current and projected Soviet satellite systems during peacetime and crisis and limited conflict situations. For most functions shown in the table there are several Soviet space systems that contribute to the net capability. At present, the capabilities of Soviel space systems are weakest in the functions of providing detailed scientific and technological intelligence, indications and warning, and treaty verification. This weakness is due principally to lhe shortcomings of Soviel ELINT and photoreconnais-sance systems. Soviel capabilities arc strongest in those functions related to geodesy, navigation, and radar calibration. Improvements during lhe
Table IB
Capabilities of Soviet Space System* and So*iel Dependence on Them
t -wppa-fed tn Spare Sm<li
IBM
Uaaix
IcrillUCll .filrlllli-IM'
ll-ll.iit
radii*
llltb
enmoium*
I .
lo- Uodcialt
tmlmy
IVpeidnee
HbbV
and
ion
.
order of bank and
daia
Dependenc*
Haft
IUh
Mr*
.nt. nd -arrant
M^M,
al anlarip veapom
pranTM
.Madcratr
Itap
lapportaval
rumitiand md cnnliul
<f
tilth (no piantcal Jiiibaittaarl
Molr.ii-butml a>i do pal-<U}
hai ire alnUwu!
7
n meteorological and communications satellites will lead to strong capabilities in weather forecasting and military command and control.
Several of the functions indentified in tablerovide the Soviets support in peacetime, crisis, and limited-conflict situations that is either unique or dif'icult to acquire by other means. Most notable are the functions of indications and warning, maintaining order-of-battle and targeting data, weather forecasting, and military command and control communications. The combination of present and likely future Soviel capabilities in these areas between now0 will improve the Soviets* capability for worldwide crisis management and the conduct of military operations.
All Soviet space systems rely on unhardened ground-based facilities for launching additional satellites, tracking and controlling satellites, and receiving data. from satellites. In an unrestrained US-Soviet conflict, strikes on the Soviet Union could destroy these ground facilities, rendering virtually al) of the satellites useless- In recent years, the Soviets havearge number of transportable satellite communicalion terminals which, although unhardened. have some degree of survivability due to their mobility. The satellites associated with these communication terminals would remain viable forew days, however, in the absenceurvivable operational satellite control site.
Tablelso summarizes our assessments of Sovieton space systems. In assessing dependence, primary consideration was given to the availability of nonspace substitutes for the function performed. The three categories ofmoderate, anddefined in terms of such substitutes in table 2E. We assess that inhe Soviets will become increasingly dependent on space systems for military support during peacelime, crisis, and limited-conflict situations with the deployment of additional and more advanced space systems. This increased dependence will be largely in the areas of indications and warning, command and controland navigation support to naval combatants. Space systems will provide them with more timely information, enhance the capabilities of weapons systems, and extend support to forces deployed outside the Soviet landmass. The Soviets' greatest dependence will be on those space systems thatunction for which alternative approaches are either unsatisfactory or have not been developed.
The Soviets' recognition of the military contribution of satellites has been in part responsible for their acceptance of tacit and explicit US-Soviet agreements during the past two decades not to
8
interfere wilh space systems. The Soviets' attitudes towardhave resulted from an amalgam of political and other factors, including their own increasing dependence on space systems for military support functions. Their attitude toward foreign space systems gradually changed over the years from one of general hostility ino one of qualified acceptance. They agreed to2 ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons, which calls for the use of "national technical means of verification" without interference when usedmanner consistent with generally recognized principles of internationaln the other hand, the Soviets agreed to7 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment in space of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets still hold that certain other space activities cannot be accepted as legitimate They recognize, moreover, the importance the West places on satellites for supporting military activities.
Development of an antisatellite orbital interceptor clearlyoviet desire to have the capability to negate foreign satellites, should the decision be made that such action was necessary. Unless the United States and the USSR agree to prohibit testing of antisatellite systems, we believe the Soviets will continue testing their orbital interceptor. They are now workingew sensor for their current nonnuclear orbital interceptor. We exi>ect the Soviets to continue design and engineeringpace-based laser system that would have significant advantages over their orbital interceptor for the antisatellite function. They conceivably couldrototype spaceborne laser weapon for antisatellite testing by the. As part ofevelopment program, the Soviets might choose to use their space stations to conduct subsystem testing of low-power laser weapon prototypes.
Even if they proceed with development of new and improved spaceborne antisatellite systems, wc believe it highly unlikely the Soviets will use them to destroy or otherwise interfere with US satellites in peacetime, crises, or conflicts not involving direct engagements between US and Soviet forces. Three factors upon which this judgment is basedhe Soviel desire to limit conflicthe Soviets' own dependence on space systems, and. lesshe current US efforts to develop an antisatellite system.onflict between US and Soviet forces, lhe likelihood of Soviel attempts to destroy US satellites using spaceborne means would rise as the conflict escalated. The likelihood of such interference would probably be moderate as long as the Soviets' objectivesS-Soviet conflict were limited and they believed they could contain the scope and
9
intensity of the fighting. We believe thereigh likelihood that the Sonets would use spaceborne antisatellite systemsATO-Warsaw Pact armed conflict. The likelihood of such use would be very high if the Soviets perceived that general nuclear war was imminent
DISCUSSION
OVERVIEW OF SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
hii lection we present an overview of lhe Soviet space effort7resent. addressing its evolution, its scope and magnitude, and its organira-lion and management. Subsequent sections discuss lhe specific capabilities of Soviet space hardware and the ways in which these systems serve the Soviet military during peacetime, as well as during periods of crisis andeparate section focuses on the Soviets' ability lo use their own space systems lo negate those of other nations.
n this section conipailsom with US space efforts are included where they can serve as usefulfor understanding Soviet capabilities or philoi-ophy. These comparisons should not be interpreted as technical assessments showing Soviet satellite systems lo be superior or inferior to US satellite systems Tlse space programs of the United Slates and lhe USSR have evolved in response to their perceived national needs, which are, in many eases, quite different For ciample
US intelligence collection requirements resulted in satellite systems lomunications signals The Soviets have no similar systems.
Soviet military requirements resulted in aninterceptor for engaging satellites of other nations, radar support satellites for calibrating ABM radars, and radar and ELINT oceansatellites for transmitting targeting dala in real lime to selected naval cornbatants I
1
some US nnd Soviel satellite systems ore of Ihe same type (photographic and Kl.tNT collection satellites, forhey were not necessarily designed in response to the tame requirements Therefore,pecific Soviet satellite system may appear inferiorimilar US satellite system, it may fully satisfy- Soviet, requirements
Evolution of Ihe Soviet Program
The early years of the Soviet space program were dominated by heavily publicized space flights with limited scientific objectives. The eariy scientific and manned missions in low Earth orbit, as well as the lunar and planetary missions, relied on space boosters derived from ballistic missiles This general approacheries of space "firsts'" that made headlines,air probability of success, and were not overly ci pensive. The dear intent was to enhance the image ol the Soviet Unionechnical, scientific, and military power.
In the, the Soviets began to broaden lhe objectives of their space program by launching newer series of satellites with practical military and economic applications While those directed toward meteorology and civil communications received some publicity, others such as those for photographic and ELINT reconnaissance, radar calibration, covert com-1munications. navigation, geodesy, andr-cepcion were masqueraded as partontinuing program of scientific research
o move beyond their earlier publicizedin space, the Soviets began in theo test larger and more corn piei space boosters and soacecraft. They encountered serious setbacks in ihese programs and did not move forward as they had eipecled. Their failure loarge booster for manned lunar missions, coupled with the US lead in ihe Apollo Project, led tlie Soviets to redirect Ihe emphasis of their man-ln-sparc program to Earth-ocbiting space stations.
6 Since Ihe, lhe Soviets have ouncen tratcd their effort on space systems for militaryThey Improved the capability of their El.INTphotorcconnaissapce salellilcs, developed radar and launch detection satellites, andeo-lyrvlironoui communications satellite network Al the tame time, ihey have sought lo maintain the image of Soviet prowess in Space by heavily publieirlng the missions nf the Salyut spare stations.
wg|-
ummarizes the proliferation oJ Soviel spacecraft types discussed in the precedingThis large array of spacecraft hasuilding block approach which em phasiie* an evolutionary design philosophy In (his approach, the Soviets have developed several basic spacecraft designs and, over time, have Incorporated new missions and imprnved capabilities Into them. Despite mine setbacks during developmental (light tests, their general approach of retaining both old and new systems has resultedarge number ofsatellite types.
8 Dining Ihehe Soviets substantially increased lhe level of effort devoted lo space system design and development.esult tbey Introduced many new space systems in tbe
Since then, they haveairly constant level of spacecraft deslnn and development. Clearly,
they remain commutediverse program to serve
various military and civil programs
Scope ond Mognitude of Soviet Program
the bunching of Sputnikhe number ol successful space launches conduclrdby Ihe Soviet Union steadily increased,aiimum ofhe Soviet launch rate surpassed that of the US program for the lint lime since the initial yearnd for the pastears the Soviet launch rate has baen Ihree lo four times lhat of the United States The annual launch rales for the USSR and the United States are shown in figure 2
In terms of the total payksad weight to orbit. Ihe Soviets currently orbit aboutimes the US total, each yearilograms for the USSR0 kg tot the United States) While the Soviets annuallyonsiderably larger number of payload* and more total weight in orbit, the United Statesreater proportion of its payloads into higher orbil Thus, if all launches for both countries are converted into an equivalent weight deliveredilomeiei circular otbil, the ratio wouldn favor of the Soviets.
While the annual number of launches and amount of payload weight to orbit give *ome measure of the gross magnitude of the Soviet program,ore uselul parameter is Ihe number ol active satellites, us shown in lablc I. The nuinbci generally operational is about euual lo the annual launch rate.
Table I
Uniillr Orvrjiioiuf
i-a
OS
911
1-3
M
0-1
i 10
Categories and Numbers of Soviel Satellites Usually Operalional
SalrUiU CatnpMv
Vursa. ELIOTEI4NT mean ictonml nance lUdir nmn ircnmuluinreii
kUnnrd/nuuwd-fvlilrd
(iiitvmmk Jllore
"
IIWI"
Total
Sublittilt Military
Mi limy/Civil
Civil/Snenlllk
Thl* Is because many launchot are for shorl-lived photoreconnaissanee missions, and few Soviet satellites have lifetimes eicccdingonths. The United Slates makes much more use of geostationary orbits, athat requires fewer satellites for continuousof large areas liven wilh fewer annual launches than the Soviets, the United States usually hasatellites in operation. Il maintains about the same number of satellite* in operation a* the Soviets because the US satellite* have much longer operalionalrequiring fewer "replenishment" launches
IS Clear distinctions between Soviet military and civil space progiams are not always possible because some lystems perfoim both military and nonrniliiary functions, as shown by the spacecraft categories inor example, although tho scientific Salyut space itation program is primarily civil, Ihe Soviets have conducted some esr^erunent* on board the Salyut that have important military, a* well a* civilian, applications.llustrates Soviel space launches7 for each uf thesehow* dial the space programs serving or.lv the military are bv far the rnosl active, usually accounlinc for aboutercent of the bunches each year II aho shows lhat Ihe dual military/mil program* have grownsince thend account for around 13
HHHMSO*
percent of the annual total. The purely scientific systems account for less thanercent. Bytheperational US systems are aboutercent civil andercent military or military support. The Utter category includescollection Systems, which account forercent of the US total.
o support their large number of operational satellites, the Soviets have deployed an extensiveof ground stations, all within the USSR The growth of this network has corresponded with the growth in numbers and types of spacecraft, and continues even today. The expanse of the Soviet Union permits ground stations within theinarge amount of access lime lo Soviet satellites. However, the Soviets have still found il necessary to supplement this networkleet of space support ships for supporting space events (such as deorbit or orbitalnd six smallerships for support of space launches.^
rc3fr
United States has nearly an equalfacilities, for telemetry, tracking, and command.not regularly uie ships In support missions,placed ground stations on foreign lerrilnryThe US stations are independent andspace missions (those of the Defenseor NASA, or Intelligence, oror the most part, the Sovieta unified network under the guidance of aauthority, providing them considerablein command and control of iheir space systems.
Spoce Lounch Vehicles
The Soviet space program, like its US counter-pait, has relied heavily on the use ol ballistic missiles as space launch vehicleshe Soviet family of SLVs includes vehicles based on thentermediate-range ballistic missile and tlsend SS-9ballistic missiles (seey using these proven missile systems alongeries ol upper stages, the Soviets have greatly simplified SLV development.
Inhe Soviets beganarge new two-stage space booster comparable to the US Saturn IB In sire and to the US Titan IIIC in function.hey had successfully developed three-stagend four-stageersions of this booster, which ihey lefer to as thehe Proton-based SLVs represent the only launch vehicles successfully developed by the Soviets strictly for use as SLVs
Nearly concurrent with development of the Proton, the Soviets were busy trying to develop an even bigger booster. This vehicle, which wasto the USn size (but not In
lhad ancapability on the orderg toand0 kg for lunar returnSoviets made three attempts during Iheto test-fly this booster, which was intendedlunar missions. All three attempts endedand the program was apparently canceledWe believe the Soviets are currentlyfamily of new large space boosters that willof the launch and support facilitiesforf_ JThc new vehiclesbe about the samesome
variants couldreater lift capability due to
Figure 3.
Soviet Spacecraft Categories
in design and piopulsion. The most signili-eant advance will be In Ihe use of high-energy (liquid hydrogen) upper stages, which could allow the Soviets log inlo low Earth orbit In addition lo these Urge boosters, the Soviets aremalleriquid hydrogen upper stage1 probablyayload capabsl.ty0 kg tn low Farth orbit.
IH Wc believe the Soviets will continue the use of spendable SLVs for the next decade They arc lelurbishing older bunch sites and building new nrses And they aie increasing lhe production rale of theirLVs. as well as preparing to introduce new.SLVs The new large space boostersflight lott-uralam in ihe mrd-IMOs -Jl
probably be used in theo launch very large spare stalions and heavy lunar and planetaryand could be used fur orbital testseusable space transportation system comparable in size and weight to ihe US space shuttle orbMer.
Soviet Space Hardware Cosls
epicts Soviet investment in space hardware foi both militaiy and civil/scientificfor Ihehe dollar cost estimates shown inepresent what il would cost in the United Stales to duplicate the Soviel programs, using US cost factors and nay rales Costs are expressed9 dollar* This hardware cost estimate excludes
research and development, administration, trucking and data aoquisilion, and the construction ol new facilities. The absolute values shown (or annualcontain large uncertainties and should be regarded as approximations We have moretn the validity of Ihe trends depicted and in the relative costs of military and civil space hardware than we do in the absolute values for annual costs.
n the past six years Soviet investment in space hardware is estimated to have cost the equivalent ofillion per year. Despite the large number nf military spacecraft launched each year, the hardware costs of most of these missions is incrementally much smaller than that of most civil missions. In our derivaof the annual spending for sp,tce hardware, we have allocated the cost ol spacecraft having both military and civil missions according to out judgmenthe proportion of Ihe program devoted lo each inissiun On this basis the annua) cost of civil and mililaiy programs duiing the lasldecades has been about the same. In the* lhe high
expenditures on lunar effortt drove civil costs above military costs In the mid- lOTOs the large expenditures nn new military programs, principally mannedspace stations, caused military costs to exceed civil expenditures The rise In civil/scientific costs in the last few years is attributed to the deployment of more comeosynchronous satellites for civiland the initiation nf thecientific manned space station program
uring the past six yean the Sonet manned space effort, which hat military as well as civil and scientific purpoirv has been the single most coslly program. accounting for IS toercent of total space hardware cats The cumulative costs9 of theissionsi ing of the space Station.oyuz ferry spacecraft, seven Progress icsupply vehicles, one Soyuz T. andaunch vealmostillion During this period, expenditures fnr military program* have accounted for somewhat nsnieercenl nf total Soviet military pfocuiemeul.
res S'tm-m
Figure 7
Soviet Space Hardware Costs Billions9 Dollars
development of prototype space instrumental ion and assists tlie appropriate ministries in determining Ihc best allocation of assets for making the hardware
he Ministry of Defense (MOD) monitors the Quality of materials and components manufactured at all facilities.
Space ila'dwue Costs
ond Orcjoniiotion of Soviet Space Program
road national space policies and goals are established by the Politburo, which also lias thedecisionmaking authority for space issues andey figure in the decisionmaking apparatus is the party secretary for defense affairs. This "super-manager" has responsibility to monitor all matters related to the development of military weapons and space systems. Tbe position carries great authority, including command over resources of all party and government organizations devoted to military and civil space research, development, and production.
he second critical level of the decisionmaking hierarchy consists ol the governmental organisations under the Council o( Ministersepicts the management organisation at this level responsible lor both military ami civil space programs. TheIndustrial Commission (VPK) OvCiSOeS matOiprograms, enforces deadlines, andprogram-related cnnliiiversie^ The Academy of Sciences probably cicrciscs control over the basic research aspects of the Soviet space urogram. The Academy's Institute ol Space Research (IKI) directs
he Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) hn* assigned the responsibility of designing new civil and military space systems and improvuia older systems within five ofaroi design bureaus Each of these design bureaus is functionally equivalentS aerospace corporation Their task is to translate feasibility studies from the scsentiftc community and requirements from (he military into operable space ivstems To complete this task, design bureaus perform conceplual deslam. fabricate mockups and prototypes, and conduct overall systems integration In tablee hive identified Ihe principal euslomert for Soviet space systems and the design bureaus which we believe were responsible for developing the systems
he production of space systems appears to be conducted under ihe supervision of design bureaus, but atot necessarily subordinate lo them Pilot plants, often colocatedesign bureau, mat actually produce all of those spacecraft which ate expended in limited Quantities. In the case ofbunched SI.Vs and spacecralt types, series pioducliun may occur at independent plants In Ihe latlet case, however, we believe that the designhaw rpprrsen la lives at the plants lo ensure that perlormunce standards arc met. conduct qualitymeasures, and suggest ways to improve production efficiency.
uting theears of their space progiam. there has been no significant chance in lhe Soviets' hichlv slandardired development process Thisis similar for missile and Space systems, typically0year time tpjii Once iheade In proceed wilh developmentew lechrvlcally complcs space system, an estimated seven loeats Is required lo complete (he design.
-aoG-oo
Figure 8
Management, and Organization of Sonet Space Program
Politburo
Saareloiy tor Defense Altars
ol Ministers
Induilnal(VPKI
Institute lor Space itlKI)
Ministry ol Oelonsc (MOD)
Rocket
Directorate lo*
(SfiF)
Sarwcea (GUKOS)
CtHWmey Design Bureau
Ulti" Oeisten Bweau
andphase* of devi-lop-mi-illrototype. Many of their mote lecenl sp.iceciafl programs have required excessive lime to coi iecf major problems thai become aptxirenl In ihe flight lest phase, which normally lasts two In four yearsepicts lhe typical time line for developmentoviet space system if no major difficulties are encountered.
lse Soviet method tor developing Space systems has several advantages.ell as disadvantages, when compared wilh the methods used in the United States, liei-ausc Soviel design bureaus are highly'dermanent part of the Inireaticraticfunding and employment levels are more stable arul mil siibjecl t" the liei]iu-nl disruptions
inherentompetitive contracting environment This fairly sialic space management process operate*omplex manner, however, and does not appear toentral coord dialing agency. Central direrhon is apparently attempted through various coordinating devices that in die Uniied Slates have been centralized within NASA or the Department of Defense The system is not adaptive, and it lacks the ability to recognize and solve comples problemshorl lime However, Soviet missile and space syslempractices have losicred the growth of powerful individuals who often operate outside the standard channels of Soviet management to solve problems which arise wilhin iheir urograms This has helped tlie Soviet space effort overcome some ol its shortcomings
flam 9
.Stages in Typical Dcnloamtnt Program for Soviet Space System*
Major DcTcloBiatnt I'rriodt
CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE MILITARY SUPPORT SPACE SYSTEMS
In this section, we address the capabilities and limitations of current Soviet military support ipace systems We make near term protections based on some direct essence, onoviet spacecraft ilevelopment. and on identified deficiencies in current systems We make longer term projections based on our views of the Soviets' perceived needs, their techno-lettical slate o( the ail, and our knowledge of theli developmenl cycle.
While we believe ihal our current knowledge of Ihe technical characteristics, performance, and uses of most current Soviet satellite systems isactors limit our undentinding of ihese systems First, ihe large number ofpace systems operational and under develojwoeni has loiced us to be selective in the allocation ol our collection, processing, andresources. Sccondf^
believe they will continue using such Information-denial techniques and will probably etpand thesr use.
IInmanncd Phot or econnoissanee/1moging Sorellite Systems
'holographic reconnaissance is by far the most active Soviet space program In terms of launchAbout one-thudall Soviet spacecraft launched each year have photcireeonisarssincvFigurehows lhe launch and recoveryover the past four years of those Soviet photorecon naiitance satellitesrimary mission of intelligence colleelion The high launch rate has been dictated by an apparent operational requirement to
-fc*
obtain nearly runlinuous photographic covetjur uling space systems lhatechnically limited. The Soviets' photographic satellites use space vehicles otistlnally designed as manned spacecraft and are loo heavy lo be placed into sun-synchronous orbits by Ihc booster cunenlly used. Also, most of these satellites are battery powered and thus have limited lifetimes.esult the Soviets have opted tor short-duration missions in oibits where lighting conditions icmain favorable for only limited periods of lime Further, their film technology has restricted the total capacity of their satellites We believe these technical limilalions ledhore ofays for the maronly of their missions Over the last sis yean the Sovietshotore-cimnalssance satellite^
3
lenabling them to stretch some missions torbital maneuvers allowed for maintenance ol favorable lighting conditions Tbe Soviets have no system with timeliness comparable to thehich is continually in orbil and transmits imageiyl ^Jin near-teal time.
o gain more timely data, the Soviets have on occasion launched severalhort period of lime. Fin rumple, during3 Middle East war. they launched seven photo-reconnaissance satellites inays and dcorbited most of them about six days after launch Multiple launches within short periods are possibleimitedof launch pads because tbe Soviets have developed systems wilh short on-pad stay limes The Soviets fuel tho spacecraft, mate it lo the boosterorizontal position, and perform all of their subsystems checkout in checkout building* located near their bunch sites (Although the tVmled Stales alsoimited number of launch pails, all of tliesc time-consuming mating and checkout functions are performed while the booster is erected vertically on tin- launchhe mated booster and spacecraft ate then taken to the launch site and erected; the booster is list-ltd and lhe vehicle is launched in asime a* foui hours after leaving the checkout buildinghe Sovietsinimum time of two days between successive bunches from tlie same launch pad
itis the Soviet print wcconnaisiasystem types and their mosl importantThe estimated best resolution ol tlie bestis 12
24
^]The second-generation, high-resolution system is the first to make operational use of film-return capsules and sobr panels lo increase mission duration Alternatively, with this system tbe Soviets can increase the timeliness of the data by deorbiting capsules curly without having loew photo-reconnaissance satellite.
he annual number of bunches of these systems has remained relatively conslanl for several years.owever, the bunchof systems changed signlficanlly {see. Ihis change Iti nof future activity. Two of the tlie Soviets' newest phot oreconnaissa nee systems, the medium-resolution and the second-generation high-resolution, appear lo be fully operational. This has given the Soviets greater flexibility in their phMoreconmissance program
t appears that the Soviets have phased out the use of the low-resolution system for search missions, suppbnling it with the medium-resolution system. By doing this, they have sacrificed tbe brgc amount of area coverage the low-resolution system normallyThe Soviets could counteract this loss by bunching brge numbers (moief medium-resolution ivstems each year, which is unlikely It is more hkeiv that they will supplement the medium-resolution coverage wilh data obtained fromEarth resources missions and space stations (when available)
otting missions, tbe Soviets have begun lo rely rrsore on the second-generation high resolution system, cutting in half the number of first-generation high-resolution systems launched annually
However. Ihe
Soviets lose little If any area coverage with thenew mil and gain in the amount of lug her resolution photography
e expect the Soviets lo continue using some lull of these current satellite systems, with the possible etcrption of lhe low-resolution system, for the neit several years. Evolutionary imptovement in photo-craphie quality is espeeled to continue. Tbey mayfllm-ioturtt capsules on other photo systems
lo further increase mission lifelines However, we eipect ihem to maintain their ability to orbit short dilution missions quickly.
dditionally, we believe ihe Soviets perceive tbe many advantagesear-real-time imaging snlt-llitc svslem like the US KH-llystem in sunorbit would provide them much greater respomivenm to changing collection(such as duringnd could eliminate the need for Ihc costly, frequent launches ol their current film-return systems We believe tliey will have the necessary criticalariavs of eloelm-ocrtic sensors or charge coupleda near-real-time Imaging system, at well as that inquired for data-relay satellites, by the. Although we have no evidence of Soviet intentionsevelopvsiem. we believe that it is highly likely they will elect to proceed with system development. Iftuton has already been tnade, the first orbital Nightcould occur ii) thes.
s un interim measure to acquire Imagery more rapidly, the Soviets mayhotographic satellite system equipped to develop film on board automati-^cally and transmit imagery dataround station
^Jlf such an interim system proves effective, developmenteal-ttme Imaging system may be delayed
adar-imaging system could augment the USSR's phMoreconnaissanee satellite systems byimages in all types of weather and lighting
conditions The critical technology forystem is Spectali/ed signal and data processing, which wethe Soviets could have in the early-to. Solely on the basis of our view of Soviet perceived needs, we believe that there is about an even chance lhe Soviets will decide to developystem. If they do so, an orbital flight test is notbefore.
Pop Staysga.
ELINT gwonnoissancc
he SovleU' program to collecl ELINT began concurrently with their photoreconrvaissanee program. The first ELINT collection was from the second Soviet low-resolution photoreconrialssance satellite, which was launched
Jll appears the "tfggyback- ELINT
Soviets have phased out Use package on the low-resolution photo missions.
he Soviets have two operational satellite-borne ELINT reconnaissance systems that apparently have been designed to collect data of sufficient cjuality to identify land- and sea-based radar types and. in some cases, to locale radar emitters. Another system,for ELINT ocean reconnaissance, has been under flight test4 and may be nearing an operational
t leastoviet naval combatants areconfigured to receive the EOBSAT data, Major limitations of Ihe EOKSAT system include the following:
Ships using emission control could go undetected.
The time between accesses to ocean areas near the enuator is excessive (measured in days).
Demonstrated satellite lifetime is short (one to five months) relative to other ELINT collection satellites
-C
e believe the Soviets will conlinue using their Ihird-generation ELINT satellite and the EOBSAT for the neat several years.
Soviet systems weredesigned to specifications lhat emphasisedof US sea-based radar systems, and to use the data primarily for the purpose of locating ships.
he Soviets have made evolutionarylo their satellite ELINT systems over the years Their third generation system, introducedas Ihe first to have an integral direction-find ing capability. It also has improvements over tlse second-genera lion system |_
nhe Soviets launched their first ELINT ocean leconnaissancc satellitehis system has Ihr capability to provide targeting data in real lime to Soviet naval combatants, as well as to store for later iransniusimi io Moscow.P
Jlmprove-
mcnts in the USSR's EOBSAT program wirf probably include use of multiple satellites to improve access lime, more Soviet naval combatants fitted lo receive the data diiectly,reatly increased lifetime.
dditionally, the Soviets may perceive Ihe ad-vanlaccs ofT-collection satellites designed for Operation in geosynchronous or scm{synchronousAdvantages of high-altitude satellite collectors.
'"dude
continuum access to areas of high interest Q
e believe the Soviets have the necessary lech-nolngy toigh-altitude ELINT collection
system. While we havereel evidence ihal ihey intend to do so. we note that the Soviel military I* sponsoring work on large spaceborne antennasmotci diameter antenna deployed on Salyutor example, wai developed under militaryarge, high-gain antennas are required on collection satellite* at high altitude to provide Ihe necessary sensitivity for the detection of low-power signals radi atcd from emitteis on the Earth's surface On the basis ol the lilted advantages of hrgh-altitudc ELI NTsystems, continued Soviel interest In ELINT collection by satellites, and military-sponsoredof suitable antennas, we believe thereoderate likelihood the Soviets are developingystem Assuming they are, we expect that the first orbital flighi tetf could occur by the. Ifatellite had the necessary receiver sensitivity,coverage and antenna size, il would have lhe capability to intercept telemetry and communications signals llecause Soviet requirements lor Mich systems may not be compelling, we believe that the first orbital flighi testsystem dedicated lo telemetry and communications intercept will not occur before the la
Radar Reconnaisioni:*
lie Soviets initiated llight tests of Iheir radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (ROliSAT) systemhis systemurveillance radar to delect and locate ships of destroyer class ami larger. It can be programed to transmit the data in real time to selected naval combatants The Soviet satellites are launched inlo circular orbtls 2A0 kilometers above Ihe Earth After missionegment of the spacecraftmall nuclear reactor for generating electric power it separated and commanded0 kilometers) orbit, where it will remain for SO0ears, allowing lime lor decay of Ihe radioactive fuel The (ruled Slates has no space-based radar system comparable to the Soviel HOIISAT.
he ROiiSAT is not an Imaging system. Radar return (echo) signals arc piociHsed orilv if ihey are veiy strong, asrge ship
C
ajor advantages and capabilities of thesystem are as
r
L
The RORSAT system also has some major limitations, as follows
3
3'!
lop fart*
he UOllSAT program has opcricnccdonboard system failures.ists all the RORSAT launches lo dale and. where known, lhe cause of failures. The failures have been due lo various causes, making it dlfficull for the Soviets to coirecl ail problems andeliable system
he Soviet RORSAT programajor setback inORSAT, including its nuclear reactor, made an unintentional reentry, scattering radioactive debris in Canada's Norihwest Territory. The resultant adverse world reaction to the use of nuclear power sources in space led to dclibera-lions in tlse UN ouler space subcommitteesajority of nations supported regulations for the use of
nuclear iiawer sources,an on their use in low Earth orbits. Despite these reactions, the Soviets launched Ihe lirtt ROIISAT since the CanadianInnuinlh slanddown The long hiatus was undoubtedly lo allow time fortechnical modifications but the modifications ptobabls do not account (or themonth period, because the lalesi RORSAT appears to have anearly identical In that of previous satellies in lheossible factor influencing lhe Soviet derision lo resume launches ta ihis programhave been lhe need to obtain better coverage of US naval activities in the Arabian Sea
his most recent RORSAT bunch clearlythe Soviets will continue their RORSAT program despite adverse world reactions to the CanadianThe Soviets must continue (he use of the nuclear reactor in tho current RORSAT design since tbe low orbit prohibits the effective use of large solar arrays to satisfy the large ami continuous power requirements of lhe radar system. Soviet goals for this programInclude increasing RORSAT lifetime significantly
beyond theays seen so (at by eliminating system problems causing premature (allures. We estimate that the quantity of onboard propellants for orbitis sufficient for mission durations ofays (The nuclear reactor power supply would be good for ate eipect live RORSAT program will evolve into new generations of space-based radar systems. On the basis of evolutionary trends in most Soviet space systems and of ourof current RORSAT limitations, we believe the Soviets will, by the, develop an advanced version of the RORSAT that will be able lo operate under adverse weather conditions and be able lo detect small ships.
ata collected by both imaging and advanced nonimaging space systems will add to Sovietof the feasibility of detecting surface effects produced by ships and submerged submarines^
"^The feasibility of detecting surface effects ol submerged submarines remains highly questionable.
he Soviets have been plagued with problems2 in their efforts lo establuh an operational network. By the way of contrast, the United States has had an operational network of satellites for early warning of missile launches for more thanears. The US program uses three satellites designated DSP (Defense Support Program) In geostationary orbit to obtain worldwide coverage of ICBM and SLBM bunches Kigurehows the history of bunches in the second phase ol the Soviet LDS program, which began6 Seven of theatellites launched have broken up in
Missile Lounch Detection
The Soviets began flight lestsissile launch detection satellite (LDS) systemhe first phase of the LDS program consisted of fiveinlii semisynchronnus orbits)eostationary position over the Suulh Atlantic ^
^None of these lirsl phase satellites is currently operational
ew phase of this program, which began inoviet effort to establish an operational nctwoik of satellites using the semisyn-chronous orbit, fj^
3
30
bw6 an-
71
he Soviets successfully orbited an LDS in0 and another infterailure to orbil one inhis activity may be an indication that Ihe Soviets believe they have successfully identified and corrected (helhat caused the breakups of earlier LDSThe Soviets couldetwork of five1in less than one year, which couldhoui coverage of US ICBMomplete networi of nine sateUiles providing some redundant coverage could he avaibble aboutear bier. Because we eipect continued problems in thisit may be as late3etworb providiita continuous coverage of US ICBM fields is available Deployment ol an LDS network with cover-age of all current and planned US SLUM and ICBM bunch areas, probably coutd not be accomplished
Figure 12
Lifetimes ol Soviet Launch Detection Satellites Launched in Second Phase of the Program
I Biol* up
| B'Okt lip
"^SioKe up in0 j
Filled In achieve proper obit
8
Military Spacecraft
oviel cosmonauts have periodically occupied two different kinds of Salyut space stations. Salyuts.ere primarily military in nature and funclioned as intelligence collection platforms, although the Soviets used 'scientific research"over for their missionere primarily for scientific purposes, as is their current Salyut G, but all have supported miliIary-related RAD programs. For example, both the military and scientific Salyuts have been used for conducting missile launchexperiments, and these could have somelo development of future military satellites.
Both Salyut programs have gained the Soviets some degree of preslige worldwideheyew man-in-space endurance recordays al>oard SalyutThe United Slatesanned endurance record of S4 days4 aboard the Skylab space station! Long-term operation ofas been achieved through use of unmanned Progress spacecraft, which arc used to resupply the space station with fuel and oilier expendables Cosmonauts are shuttled to and (rum ihe space station in Soyuz ferry vehicles.
he last military Salyut. which was launched in6 and intentionally deorblted inarried both low- and high-resolution camera systems.
^Jl'he space station may also haveystem for transmitting Imageryirectlyround stat ion.
se of data transmission systems would permit more timely rccovcis of photographic dala than is possible with the Soviet photorcconnaissance satellite systems currently in use. The first opportunity to transmit tong the standard Soviet space
nation orbit would bo about eight hourshotographic session over tlie United States. The first Such opportunity afler coverage of NATO countries would be about five toinutes after the pictures were taken It is doubtful, howcvci, that tlie film could be processed for transmission that quickly. The Soviets would probably have to wait for the next pass over Moscow, someinutes later.
role of the cosmonauts in theis not known. Reasonable roles would include:
Changing the film
Making minor repairs or adjustments.
Determining cloud cover conditions over areas lo be photogiaphcd.
Orienting the space station lo center targets to be photographed.
Accomplishing preliminary interpretation of photography
Soviets" writings and statementsthey intend to increase the freauency,scope of their manned space flights Theyto expound on their desire to achieveEarth-orbiting space stations. Wehave demonstrated the necessaryfor such operations. They havestated an intent lo dock multiple Salyuttogether loarger space complex.f"
he Soviets have underumber of developmental activities thai will affect their future manned military space capabilities. Such activities have included Ihene flight test7ew large space station consistingarge uianeuverablcandmaller recoverable segment. The total spacecraft^
aboutercent thealyiil space station ;but appaiertlly equal in massjr
3
Tour flight tests (one failed) of the
Each launch (one each year beginningrbited two of these spacecraft, which were' recovered after only one or two resolutions.
Six flight tests and one manned mission4 of lhe newosmonaut ferryThis new spacecraft is designed to carry a" crew of three, as opposed lo two for the present configuration of the Soyuz.
Developmentilitary "space plane."to be partoviet Air Force program. Itmall, delta-wing vehicle incorporating a. lifting-body design for horizontal landings6 at the Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons and Research Center, and has been seenfj
J under Ihe wingwmber. indicating that drop tests may have taken place. The Soviets piobably intend lo use their largest currently operational space launch vehicleheo orbit this space-craft. If the Soviets use Ihe full capacity of this SLV their "space plane" couldapability to oiblt crews of two to six men.
of two launch sites (estimated completiont Tyuratam whichwere used for the Soviets' largestSLVf"SLV was canceledin4 after several major failures during launch attempts. Nearby, the Soviets areew large launch complex, with pnsstbly two launch pads (estimated com-uleiion inhich will be serviced by the same vehicle assembly building that services the older silesf^
J
WC beheve ihe four launch pads will allamily of new SLVs designed by Ihe Chishkn design bureau. We note that the production facility at Kuybyshev.
now
be responsible for production of the new Clushko bunch vehicles The new SLVs will havemore lift capability than that required for
lhe new small "suae*e believe thai one variant will be capable olpacecrafl comparable in size and weight lo the US Shuttle vehicle to near-Earthunway, which is to be ateters long, is abo being built (estimated completion in) near (he new launch complex. The runway orientation and sire are appropriate for the recovery of manned, reusable spacecrafl.
c
1 I.
"IWe have no direct evidence on what specific military or civilian objectives are lo be served by llwse new manned programs The projections in the following paragraphs aie based largelyogical interpretation gf the available evidence and trends.
new space slalion with fiveis piobably the next generation ofstation, intended to replace the militaryproject lhal:
The space station will be launched with three cosmonauts on board, requiring that the Soviets' largesl current launch vehicle, lhee man rated
The orbit will probablyigher inclination to allow photographic coverage of targets not accessible from the current orbits used by Soviel space stations.
The current resupply vehicle, Progress, will be used for rcsupplymc expendables.
The new thrcc-man ferry vehicle may be used for ciew rotation every five or six months.
The station couldifetime of several years
The recos'crablc segment could be used in case of an CtneiCenCy Or for final crew recovery.the Soviets could send an unmanned ferry vehicle (or final Crew recovery, with the recoverable segment solely fnr emergency use.
used In lhe above manner, the spacereduce the Soviet need lor frequent launchesphotoieconu distance satellites. And ifStation has the automatic (ilm-processingdata transmission system suspected ofon Salyuthe imagery would be much(houit rather (liaiidavS) than that providedunmanitcd Systems/"
jjit probably will cany low and high-resolution cameras, and may carry othercollect, for example, FLINT and infrared data.
The Soviets have conducted three successful tests in which they orbited two of Ihe recoverable segments on each flight. In each case they recovered the spacecraft after one or two orbits, indicating that their primary interest was in testing its reentryWe have evidence that they may conduct one more such lest. We believe that, after they are satisfied with the performance of the recoverable segment, they will orbit andrototype of tlie new space station. This could occur as earlyhe mission will be to check out the space station, cameras and olher sensors, and the recoverable segment By thehey could orbit an operational version of the new space station wilh three men on hoard, operating in the scenario outlined above.
In the, the Soviels could use either the old Salyut space station or the new space station tomilIIsegment space Station.tation could be usedariety of missions- for example, one space station segment couldomplex of reconnaissance sensors,econd could serveaboratory, containing numerous military experiments for developing better sensors and oilier hardware for unmanned militaiy satellites. The Soviets could also conceivably useaboratory for developmental and feasibility testing of small, low-power lasers and ol pointing and tracking subsystems Such efforts could lead to space-based defensive and anlisatellite weapon systems Innd beyond Use of manned space stations as platforms for such weapons couldission flexibility not available on unmanned systems Chapter IV discusses this possibility in more detail
he Soviet delta-wing "space plane" isesearch vehicle that could be developed for military missions. Such missions might include reconnaissance or satellite inspection: or lhe vehicle might servepace weapons platform The last potential mission is considered less likely because ol the estimated limited paylnad capability. Il also could lie developedrew ferry vehicle to support space station operations The "space plane" will probablyrewo sit men. It seems roughly comparable to. arid may have been motivated in part by. the US fJyna Soar programil-Iifs
.'ttVttJttt-
. Up
n nilininine the scope anil rnagniludr ol the imn-iii and prolocled Soviet space effort, wc see many reasons for the Soviels lo pursue developmentarge reusable spare Iranspoitalion syslem (ItSTS) Then motivations would probablyesire lo economize on space launches, particularly in lhe area of Large space station construction, manning and re-supply, at well at lhe general desire to compete with the Untied States for prestige The Soviets' efforts on their space plane and Ihe runway at Tyuiaiamlhal Ihey may be in the early stages ol an IISTS development program. The much smaller "space plane" will probably provide litem wilh valuable experience and dala lorevelopmenl effort If flight tests of this vehicle occur in the eaily, ihey could begin development, of their BSTS in this lime liame and conduct orbital test (lights bv the
Communitoiiom
n- So:v lOTOiinnm nr. ivontol ocswivlniUMisr. whichto ov tl nibiiil
ItOSiliOnl To flate, Ilivrien- DOiiliixO have beenKIk.iiil ui,-Pil<-*
he Soviets currently operate five networks of communication satellite leomsal) systems. Three olI. Molniyand Statsionarsatellites in high-altitude (semisynchronous andorbits These satellites use wideband Iran spender systems lor real-time reception, amplifies lion, and retransmit! at of communication signals The other two coins*Iwe designate at multiplc-payioud communication tatellllrind single-payload communications satelliteslow altitude orbits These satellites record Soviet communl-ralitins foi li.mmil'.alater time (store-dump).
I
3
uture Comsat Sustems4_
jThc Soviet! have an activeun lor future geostationary comsat systems. They have stated their intention to establish,eostationary com sal networks, which they rail Gals. Volna. Luch ande do not know what the Soviets will call the individual satcRHes that occupy each network position or how many satellites will occupy each position. The deque noesHzHz downlink) to be used in their Cals network are internationally recognized as the ones to be used for military comsats Satellites in the Call network will have global and regional beams In addition, the Soviets have indicated that two of these will be equipped with spot beam capabilities directed ai legions in the North Atlantic and North Pacific, suggesting nava! roles
ccording lo Soviet announcements, the Volna network ii lo provide communication services to 'Ivil aircraft and ships beginninghe Soviets have indicated thai the Volna network is intendedbeational system andompetitor of the International Maritime Satellite Systemf the geostationary Volna network is also applied to VIP and military aircraft and naval ships. It could piuvide greater versatility and reliability than the Sliilslonar and Molniya networks now being usedimited lole for these purposes
AS Although, according lo the Soviets, both Luchetworks are planned for operationach appears toifferent mission plan. The Luch network ii apparently intended as an international telecommunications system. Theetwork on the other hand appears intended for government services
BU The Soviets are currently five yeais behind their announced schedule with their Statrionar net work, and we see little likelihood of their reaching their planned operational dates for their Gall. Volna. . Luch, andomsat networks. The completed I networks of these systems probably will be available 1 by thes these syitems become available. 1 we etpeel tlseystem and, eventually, some
p Seece*-
of the current satellites In the Statsionar network, to be phased out. The Soviets aie ei peeled to retain theystem because of Ihe large investment In relatedcoenmunkeatioro equipment
y the, the Soviets will have the necessary tcchisologiei lo develop advancedsatelliles. which will be able to achieve data latcs ol* "gigabits" (billions ol" bits of Information) per second Such satellites will require use of wide band-widths and high frequencies, and will allow greater user access, highly directional beams, less congestion of Ihe cuiirntly used frequency spectrum, and more effective use of spread spectrum signals having low probability of intercept andteriion- These advanced systems will not be operationally available before.ummarires tbe current and prospective Soviet comsat systems
NovigolTon Sotefitei
he Soviets began the development of their NAVSAT systems in then order to provide their naval forces with accurate and timely navigation signalsist-genera lion systcmi"
(was recently
phased out of service. The Soviets now appear to be relying on iheir second- and Ihird-generationhich were introduced In4 and
respectively. These two systemsetter earth rncdelC. _^
he second-general ion system, which consists of sia satellites in near-Earth
2
8 the Soviets announcedatellite in in third-generalion system (four satellites in near-Earth orbit) had Ihe purpose of providing navigation support to their maritime and fishing fleet. All of the satellites in this network appear
5
Current and Prospective Soviet Comsat Syst.
of
i
3
circulsr
cirevbr
Vutns
a* indited In Sovler I,
miiiv salrHiies -illlie blituorui network are occupied
HrJ ,
used hT'VMlnj<
c
-
o believe (he Sovieli will continuouslythcif established networks of naval supportwith replacement satellites ai required. Evolu-ii'Mi.iy improvements to the satellite systems ore expected.
e also believe thereoderate chance lhat the Soviets will elect to develop an advancedsystem similar to the US Clobal Posit sorting Systemhich will be continuously available for precision navigation by highly mobile air. ground, and sea-based platforms. The Soviet* could elect tothe necessary CPS-type subsystems on their existing high-alt (rude space systems such as Molniyauture geosynchronous syslem such as Volna. They could probably have an operational system available in the.
Rodor Support
he Soviets have been using radar support satellites (RADSATs) since theo calibrate their ABM engagement radars, which we call Try Adds, al the Sarv Shagan Missile Test Center and at Moscow.4 the Soviets began launching BAD-SATs which had boon designed to support research and developmenl activitic
Geodetic Soielliios
he Soviets began launching geodetic satellites to determine locations on the Earth's surface precisely. The tracking data can also be used to construct gravitational models which Include variances in specific rancxT
^JThe Soviets may have also equipped these satellites with laser corner reflectors (as ihey did onhich could result in errors as small aseter. The Soviets may eventually add laser reflectors to some of their other satellite systems; this could eliminate the needeparate geodetic program.
Meteorological Satellites
oviet "Meteor" satellites arc used to collect,lobal basis, information required by meteorologists to describe and forecast weather. The Soviets keep six0 of these spacecraft active in orbitiven year to serve general national as well as military purposes.aily basis, three to five satellites are normally active
J
e believe the Soviets will continue using RADSATs to calibrate (heir ABM radars.
3
19
3
he Soviets havo inrvouneed that il it their intention tohree-tier meteorologicalsystem consistingow-altitude manned spaceod turn-altitude satellite system (the current Meteorystem of geostationary satellites It is clear the Soviets ate actively pursuing their manned program and developing sensors appropriate (or collecting meteorological data. They are alsodevelopmenteostationary meteorological satellite called the Geostationary OperationalSatellite The launch of this system, originally scheduled8 In support of the ClobalResearch Program, has been delayed because of
technical problems with tlieit reportedly scheduled (oi bunch0
III. CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE USES OF SPACE SYSTEMS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY SUPPORT
n this section we consider the way* In which Soviet space systems contribute to militaryduring peacetime and to rational decisionmaking and to the conduct of military operations during periods of crises and conlllct*
e have not assctsed the contributions ol Soviet space systems during conflicts involving nuclear strikes within the Soviet Union All of the Soviet space systems rely on unhardened ground-based facilities for launching additional satellites, tracking andsatellites, and for ircelvlng data from, orthrough, tatelliles Nudear strikes on the Soviet Union could destroy these ground facilities, rendering virtually all of the satellites useless
It is possible that Ihe Soviets could continue to make use of their communications satelliteshort period allot their ground bated control sites had been destroyed Some of these satellites could probably remain viable for several days or even weeks in the absence of command sites to monitor them and could be used by the brge number of transportable satellite communications terminals the Soviets have deployed in recent years Although unhardened. the terminals have some degree of survivability due to their mobditt
ists the lunctions to which Soviet space syttems would contribute in peacetime, crisis, and conflict. II summarises the overall capability of Soviet space systems and the degree olem for each function We emphasize that the rankirags of capability reflect our aitesamentt of Soviet space systems only and not the total Soviet capability toarticular function Inthe Soviets' "dependonce" on their space systems, primary consideration was given to the availability nf non space substitute* for the function performed. Three categories of dependence -loan, fnodeiale. andused in the assessments. An assessment of high dependence was madeystemunction for which there was no piaclieal ur lalitfac-
lory lubitllule.ubstituteavailable bul was not as convenient or did not perform the function as well, ihe dependence was rated as moderate.of low dependence were used when the availableutes were at least equally practical or adequate.
Assessing Tt-Jinkol Charoetoritlies/ Pevforeitance of Weapons
nalysis of the technical characteristics and performance of weapon systems is primarily afunction since it Isong term effort. In general, the USSR has not emphasized development ol satellite collection systems for the purpose ofdetailed weapon system assessmentsT
jOnly their mllitaiy Salyut space station and scronrhgeneralion high-resolution photo-rcconnaistance satellites have cameras with resolutions adequate lo contribute to detailed analysis of weapon systems. Bul they have notilitary space station since Salyuthich was deorbitcd in August
3
L
ILG
deciding on future space programsoviets will almost certainly hive to
Tablc 0
Capabilities of Soviel Space System* and Soviel Dependence on Them
Funcllom Supported bv Scare Syttcnt
CtHii and Urnlled
technical
CaUbraunr.
Monitortag compliancelie*
Miwilnf. charting,.
ini iihI forccsillng
Maintaininghlltlt and
targeting data
Provldinc indications and warning
Targeting ot anttthlp weapons
Navigation support lo naval
romUalanH
Military command and control
' Capability
Dependence Capability
ideorc
Capability ftesiendecw
Ci paK"*Iisiwi-
Capability
Depeadenee
CapabUny Dependence
CapabiWv Dependence
CaoabUHv
Dewed mc
,
Dependence
Poor Lo-&eellent Hath
Poor Fair Low EiceOtnt High
Earetlent
Lowkiodnuir Low Moderate
EicelJent High
elient Eacelleol law.Modeiate Lu* Modarall
Cood-Fjeellenl Hi**,
Eicellent Low
Moderate Utr. peacetime tuisctioni
Eicetlent Moderate
KicelleiU Low
Coed
Low .Moderate
Low
Kteeileni High
Fair
Low-Moderate
Eicellent
lllch
Cocd-Eaeelleni lllgh
Good lllgh
Fair
Low-Moderate
Fair-Cood-Moderate
Excelled Modem e
Good
Low-Moderate
Poor-Fa ii Low
Eicellent Ilia*
Falr-Cood Low-Moderate Excellent Hilli
Excellent High
elle.it High
Good-Excellent Moderate
Good High
ExeUeol High
Eieellent
Modetale
(he payoff between Improvements to current systems and the costly development of new sys-ems against the availability of inforitution from olher sources.
hus, wc rate as poor the overall eanabilily of current Soviet space systems to provide technical data on weapon systems, but we judge current Soviet dependence on satellite systems for such use to be. low0 the resolution of Soviel photoreconnaissanee satellites will giveood-to-oceltcot capability for the weapons assessment function, but for this purpose the expected improvements in the Soviets' ELINT and infrared satellite systems probably will nut significantly increase their current capability And we do not project Soviet satellite systems dedicated
telemetry or communications intercept before the. Throughouthe overall Sovietfor weapon assessments will probably remain relatively poor. We expect Soviet dependence on satellite system* lor this function lo remain low, primarily because of lhe availability of information liom oilier sources.
Calibration of ABM Rodors lOSjT
-*op-5cercl
ause there is no other practical way lot ihrm IrT* accomplish this task, iho Soviets arc highly dcimudcni on these satellites and will remain so Wo rale overall RADSAT capability for this purpose as excellent
MooiloriAO Coerpaoncc With If colicsAgreements
here are many provisions In cuirenl and prospective treaties and am cements that requireto determine compliance Soviet space systems contribute lo monitoring many of the provisions of current and prospective arms limitations agree mm ii For ciample
Inter tin Agreement limiting Strategic Offensive Arms
Prohibits construction of additional ICDM launcherv
Limits the number of SLBM launchers
Limits Ihe number ol modern ballistic missile submarines
SAIT II Agreement
Places aggregrale limits on ICBMs, SLBMi. ami strategic cruise missiles
Places qualitative limits on strategic missiles
ABM Irncrty
Limits ABM deployment areas.
Limits number of ABM launchers.
Limits power-aperture product of certain phased array radars.
Outeroly
placing in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons ol mass desi ruction.
liflsiied testeasy
nuclearin ihe aimnspheie. In outer space, and under water.
42
Seabed Arms Control Treaty
Prohibits deployment of nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction on seabeds and lhe ocean floor beyondmile limit
oreign activities In all the above aicas, as welt as In virtually all the numerous other provisions in treaties and agreements, were important to the Soviets and were the object of Soviet intelligence collection before the establishment of formal limitation* and prohibitions Thehotographic and FLINT satellite reconnaissance systems can provide them with data useful In monitoring compliance wilh provisions that limit fixed weapon and radar systems lo certain numbers or certain areas, or both- These satellites ate in general not adequate for monitoring compliance with qualitative lirmtatiom on strategic weapons The agreements themselves have not likely stimulated any major new Soviet requirements for space systems. To lhe extent that the Soviels rely on space systems for the compliance monitoring function, the monitor ing te-aiarement would exist during crisis and limitedas well as in peacetime Clearly.risis and limited conflict situation lhe priority for monitoring certain nuns limitations agreements would be reduced by the competing demands for indications| and order-of-battle data.
n the basis of the capabilities and bmitatiom discussed in section II and of the wide range of required compliance monitoring tasks, we rate us fair the current Soviet satellite capability for this mission This rating could improve somewhat with the launch of the USSR's neat manned military space station, depending on the number and type of sensors it carries Soviet development ol real-lime imaging and high-altitude FLINT satellite systems in tho, as discussed in section II, could increase the USSR's capability from fair to good for this compliance monitoring task
e rudge Soviet overall dependence onsystems for this monitoring task lo be low to moderate Satellite data are probably of value lo the Soviets primarily for confirming complianceinformation obtained from nonsatelhtemidcring the continued availability lo the Soviets of isonsatrlhte information, we do notignificant change in iheir dependence on satellite systems to monitor the types of aims limitation agreementsIn effect.
nfcsppirig,odesy
ccurate maps, charts, arvd Earth gravitational models are requiredariety of military missions, including (he precise targetinc of ballistic missiles The collection and analysis of necessary data callong-term effort, which iseacetime function
ike the United Slates, the USSR has become highly dependent on satellite systems to support its mapping, charting, and geodetic efforts All of the Soviets" photoreconnaissancc satellites supplyuseful lo mapmakert Their phatograpliic-geo-physical spacecraft. In paitlcular, appear to colled baste mapping and geophysical dnla on worldwide ocean and land surfaces In addition to acamera system, these salclliic*
_jnay be used toaetermine ocean temperature gradients and currents. Thegeodetic satellites are used to collect data in support of their efforts in geodesy and gravimetry The data collected allow the establishment of an accurate geodetic grid of the Earth's surface, and thereby reduce errors In the delivery of some weapons
e rateellent the overall capability of Sovtct saldlile ivstems to collect required daia for mapping, charting, and geodesy. Satellites are the only practical means available to collect such dataThe Soviets have been collecting these data for more than IS years, ami the collection and analytical results are. to some degree, cumulative. However, the fact thev continue to tuunch satellites for collection of such data shows they want to refine what they already have available We erpeel continued use of satellites lor these purposes Ihrough tlie 1'JfiOs and. therefore, continued high dependence
Observing ond Forecasting Weolhor Conditions
nowing and being able to forecast weather conditions is important toariety of military activities, including the scheduling and routing of aircraft and ships, planning and eipruting force move menu, planning emotes, scheduling lests lhal involve use of equipment senMhvr lo weather conditions, such as optical devices and lasers, planning lor spacecrafl recovery Operations, and select tori of ctood Iree target areas for photoreoinnaiisancr satellites In addition, if the Soviets attempt to use then launch detection satellites to collect leclinacal infrared dala on foreign missile laiiiK-hrv mlormalion during
the missile launch could lw an important consideration for proper interpretation of the infrared data
he Soviet mrtroeological satellites dearly arc used in supportide variety of militaryddition lo being used for observing and forecasting weather conditions for civil purposes Additional data on weather over Soviet terntory and peripheral areas are provided by ground sensors, balloons, and aerial reconnaissance During peacetime, moreover,weather data arc exchanged by Ihe developed countries Generally, however, this information is less useful thanata for open ocean and underdeveloped aieas and is not always timely.
rale at good to excellent lhecapability of live Soviets' meteorologicalsystem We believe their capability will beimproved in theilh the advent ofmeteorological satellite systemon satellite systems lordining peacetime is lodged lo be inrange We believe lhal iheirwould increase to high during anythat hailed the -or Id wide weather exchange
Moarnoinahg Order ol Bottle ond Targeting Data
targeting of offensive weaponrequires maintenance of targeting data onforeign fiied military Installationsairfields, ports, bases, nuclearcommand and control bunkers,eapon production plants, oilmills,nd oilier facilities essential tosurviving nuclear warfare These aie allinstallations and facilities, and new onesto build. Maintaining this targeting data itpeacetime function as well as aduring crisis and conflict situations
imilar lunelion it the mainlcnance of orders of battle on Ihe location, number, type, and status of foreign land- and tea-based weapons and forces of all types as pari of the prorru of assessing the capabilities of frareign military lotcet Many of the relevant itrms (such at surface- loan missile systems, aircraft, ships, radar systems, and forces) are raobile. and theirand statuseguenl updating Maintaining orders of battle in peacetime, crises, and ron(licts is tiecessary (or both targeting and contingency battle management planning imrpma's.
isting ol majoi systems on which lhe Soviets almost certainly keep current orders ol battle, and the satellite systems that aid litem in tins effort. Their photoreconnaissancr satellites provide valuable order-of-battle information on land-based Systems and forces. These satellites are particularly useful against those systems that do not use radars, or use radar frequencies outside the coverage of Soviet ELINT satellites, or practice emission cnulrol. The Soviets" low-resolution photorcconnaissance system, which appears to have been phased out. performed tlie search mission, but its resolution was insufficient to identify the types and status of relatively small weap-
ons and military equipment. For such identification, the medium-resolution system, which may beihe search (unction, is probably adequate, and the high-resolution systems certainly are adequate. The Soviet military space station of theUS, which will almost certainly carry both low- and high-resolution cameras, also will add to the Soviet search and identification capability.
he Soviets' ELINT satellites can provide ordcr-of-battle data on land- and sea-based radar systems, even those that have been camouflaged or concealed from the view ol phutoreconnaissance satcl-
Table 7
Summary of Soviet Satellite Uses for Collecting Ordcr-of-Battle Information
"hot oa up'-it- Satellites
Med ium-Resolution
it."n
Second-Geoer*lii?n
Third-
Cenriilkin
missile systems Monitor iJdir enviornmcru Locate new dejilosmenl
identify
Determine status at known locations
Early "'i miound-<oni rolled -Intercept radars
Monitor iadit mvlionmriu
Locale newentil ens
Determine stilus ar known location* Aircraft
Determine number! al air fields Determine type) of airfieldi Idemrmament*
lull litre ml win Locate new deployment
Identify intern
Determine stilus at known location*
Surfaceat ants! Dctermiw numbers in pmi jnd identify Locale al sea
I dentil* iidir lypes
Monitor radii environment Submarines
Delermine itumliBii lad types in port
Cround forces Locale
Dei ermine com unit "in Del ermine ilstui
hies nr are mobile Their second-genc rationsystem provides useful data lotstatus of radai Systems. Theirsystem addsnowledge of tiatu* aodlocation ofradars Themade by tr*-sr uidbea are.
eneral, adequate lo define radar type
n Ihe basu of lhe eapabihiies arid limitationsete satellite systems ai cllwij in section II. -vr rule as flood their current overall capability in peace-lime When the Soviel radar and FLINT oceansatellites become fully ope.ational in lhe early lOSCfea. sve believe the rapalnlity will improveihtf to between gooddlent Ifevefnp mem of realiime imaging systems in the hie two. andliitude FLINT ccJIeetso- systems inould add significantly to the timeniteu ol mformallon and somewhal increase Soviet. We believe tho Soviets are highly dcpendenl on their satellite systems for maintenance of targetingand orders of battle In denied areas such as China and for mobile forces such as ships, there is no oiher way lo acquire the required large amountsrequent basis
Providing Indkatiom ond Wovmog
roviding indication! of foreignattack on the USSR or its allies andthat an attack has been launched arethe functions of highest priority for allof information The indications andfunction is essential during peacetime toan enemy from obtaining the advantageDuring periods of cms and limitedequired to provide strategic
warning of the imminence of hostilities or escalation ofconflict and to provide tactical warning of an attack In progress. Timely, reliable IAW information allows
decisionmakers lo take appropriate action, ranging Irnm increasing the readiness of forces to invoking
contingency plans, such asreemptive
or launching an attack upon receiptactical
warning
123 Information from satellite systems would al-moat certamly be combined wilh information from other sourcesasis fo. action by decisionmaker. We doubt that the Soviets would become completely dependent on satellite systems for IAW information Optimum satellite systemsould he those
that could perform continuous svorldw,dc surveilluncc and pass data in real timeentraluthority None of the Soviet systems qualify on both counts, hut several have the potential lo contribute IAW infr-inalion.
Soviet photoreconnaissanKc satellite* can provide useful information on force status withm iheir coverage.
- The Soviets' ELINT reconnaissance satellites uie capable of rT
Contributing
to the determination of force disposition and composition
operational, probably by the imdlWOs. the Soviets' launch detection satellite (LDS)will provide them with aboutinutes" warning of the launch of US ICBMs.
Soviets* radar and ELINT oceansatellites will, when fully operational in the, provide them the capability toship movements within their coverage in ieal lime to Soviet ships in theand will also be able to store the data for bierto Moscow
Soviets' manned military space station mayhotorraxmriajsuncc system in which Ihe film is automatically processed lor transmission lo Moscow within houis. Cosmonauts couldperform prelim inary analysis of photon raphy and other sensor data for specific purposes of IAW. These observations could be relayed instantarseously to Moscow if relay satellites or ships with comsat relay capabilities are used
If the Soviets develop satellites capable of colleei, ine COMINT by the. such satellites could also be used to provide indications and warning.
Lip ficrre*
The data from these individual Soviet space systems in combination with other information is used by (he Soviet Ceneral Staff inerits.
3
the basis of tlie individual satelliteand limitations discussed in section II.as only fair theii current overall capabilityto theask. Thesatellites, radar and ELINT oceansatellites, and military space stations will addcapabilities, so that by tlie early-to-middlecapability will be fair to good. Developmentreal-time imaging and high-altitude ELINTsystems and expansion of their launchcapabilities, as discussed In section II,significantly to the Soviets' capabilities andin good-to-excellent capability by the. We believe Soviet dependencesystems forunction is currentlymoderate, but may Increase somewhat by the
Targeting of Anliship Weapons
use of satellite-derived data toweapons isombat function,dala,are used in peacetime for test andand to contribute to oceanSoviets have deployed antiship cruise missilesaircraft, suiface ships, andseek lo employ such weapons from beyondvisual/radio horizon so that the launchcan stand off as far as possible to avoidsuiprise. and avoid counter measures.attacks, anliship cruise missilesaccurate, timely, and unambiguousIn supplying data directlyruisesatellites effectively become pari ofsystem In part for this purpose, thedeveloped their two ocean reconnaissanceandsupplyplatfoims wilh such data in real time. We have
no evidence (hat (hey have equipped airborne cruise missile platforms to receive such data from satellites,
ombat engagement. Soviel ships and submarines with long-range anliship cruise missiles (such as tliendould establish approximate enemy force location, disposition, and identification by means such as reconnaissancetatlletalc ships, radio direction finding, orsources. Accurate final position information would then be provided in real time by EORSAT. or RORSAT,onspace syslem. Once launched, the cruise missile would maintain line of sight lo the launch platform until the target had been selected and the lockon/dive initiated
Because of the limited swath widths, lhe small numbers of satellites and limited numbers of ships equipped lo receive their data In real time, and susceptibility to coutitermeasures, the EORSAT and RORSAT do not currently add significantly to the threat posed to naval forces operating in broad ocean areas. These satellites would contribute significantly, however, to the threat posed against large shipsin tlie confined waters of the ocean approaches to the Soviet Union (as in the Northwest Pacific and the Noiweglan and Barentshis is primarily due to satellite orbital geometry, which results in frequent access to these areas The access to other potentially critical areas, such as the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Culf. and Indian Ocean is much less frequent.
r
L_
130
In addition to equipping more combatants to receive targciing data, ihe Soviel* are expected to make lulurc impiovemcnts in the satellites and in the opcralinria! use ul lliese space systems. Both the EOIISAT and HOHSAT initially supported the Sovietts defense of the open-ocean approaches lo the Soviet Union. However, with Soviel naval presence In the Indian Ocean increasing and the general trend
TO. OTfltiW.-
toward global operations, we believe the Soviets will expand the coverage provided by iheir oceansatellites. By launching additional satellites, the Soviets could increase Iheir coverage at the low and middle latitudes and substantially Improve(revisit times) at the higher latitudes The rapid launch capability of Ihc booster (same as orbital interceptor) used to orbit the EORSAT and RORSAT could allow the Soviets to exercise this option during periods o( increased tension.
n Ihe basis of the capabilities and limitations discussed in section II, we assess as fair lo good Ihe capability of the current EOHSAT and RORSAT to assist in targeting antiship cruise missiles duringof crisis or limited conflict. During the period of this Estimate, we expect that improvements In these satellites and the method of system deployment will Improve this capability to good during periods of crisis or limited conflict. Currently, the Soviets can useircraft and Hormone helicopters for ovcr-the-Horiion targeting of antiship cruise missiles. In areas distant from the USSR, however, the Soviets arc more dependent on satellites for these purposes. We Judge that, overall, Soviet dependence on satellites forof cruise missiles is currently low to moderate. In the future, as the areas of Soviel naval operations extend farther from Ihe USSR, we expect Soviet dependence on satellites for this function to increase,igh level in the.
Navigation Support to Naval Combo touts
ccurate navigational data are requiredroad range of naval combatants, particularlyequipped with ballistic missiles. Satellites can supply such data almost anywhere in the world with little or no restrictions due to weather, lighting, or ionospheric conditions. The provision of such dala is required in peacetime, as well asrisis or wartime
1
rViiliicjry Command ond Control Communications
he command and control of strategic and conventional forcesritical function that must be performed under the full range of conditions from through general nuclear war. Like the
I.ci.
United States, tlie USSIt lias recognized the significant contribution* and values ol communication* satellite* Cos this function
and control rorn mimical ionsbegan to be used by (he Sovietin the late IWrfh Since then, thegenerally developed com sal capabilities asmeans to communtcate with iheirThe eipansaon in comsat users haswith priont* given to nigh-levelpanieularly' those associated withforces In recent years we have witnessedgrowth in Ihe number of mobileairborne and train-borne commandtwo targe command and controlhave been equipped to use high-altitude comsats,
"^rhui. Soviet use of comsats: has evolved from inrounlry operations to supporting high-level Soviet leaders, naval combatants, and military advisory groups in areas quiteorn the Soviel landmasv
satellites olfer Iheadvantages ovei land lines and radioSoviet comsats
"jiarxlle the large volumes ^information needed for modern (utile management The large capacity of satellite links and the use of mobile terminals also offer increased cenlralualson and flexibility in Iheand controlariety of forces. While the capacity of their individual satellites is small inwith US comsats, the Soviets could augment their total capability by converting all of theii comsats to military useartime or crisis situation. They have recently demonstrated many advances thatthe security and capacity of their satellite communications^
Soviel comsats sulfer from relatively short life-lit with few exceeding tsvu years
e exped ihal inhe Soviets will begin to deploy geosynchronous comsats using higher Irequeni'ies. with increased capacity and improved lifetimes. However, wc do not expect tin* Soviets will achieve all of lhe large! dales they have announced for their fulure comsat systems {ihe Cals iiGlwoik, for example, was scheduled for operation inut is still nol inhen they have successfully deplnyed the Cals. Llich-I'. and Vulua networks, wc eKneel that they will phase out thend
possibly some of the Statsionar comsais When their announced programs are completed In the, it is likely lhat access lo reliable, high-capacitywill be eitersdedlobal basisreater variety of ground force, airborne, and naval users
demons! rated usage andin theause ui to rale as goodcapability of current Soviet high-altitudeto support forces and personnel deployedin the world We expect (his capability loby theecause of theredundant means of militarywe assess the USSR's current dependenceas low to moderate. By therowth in comsat usage and capacityin increased dependence by lhe military.be the ease especially If automated datafor command and control are put into useanticipate, because the Soviets will be unableredundant ground-based systems wilh(high capacity) expected in futureTherefore, we expect theii dependencecomsats will increaseoderate level
Summeryn and Conflict Morsrasrjawtat GeaptsMM
previous sect ken point out thatmake an important contribution to thecapability lo manage crisis and conflictThe type of information required fordecisionmakingrisis or limitedbe political, economic, military, or allon the situation. Soviet satellite systemscan aid in fulfilling nil of thesecollected by satellites allow militaryprovide information such as the location,composition, and status of land- andor CCS and ol weather conditions Tbe value andIhe information forrisis orareunction of itsIn lhe pace al which the situation is changing
I* Soviets have used phctorerennaissance satellites intensively to aid the crisis and conflict monitoring task, byumber of satellites quickly and moveiing the film in about half the usual time They now have lhe capability todeorbit capsules from their second-generation high-resolution system as requirements dictate The nest manned militaiy space station may provide the capability lo transmit imagery to Moscowatter of hours alter photographic
ictslons Wo believe, however, lhal Ihey will continue to place reliance on unmanned photoreconnaissancc satellites, which can be launched al appropriate limes lo ensure suitable lightinn cunrlitloni in target areas, riojcctcd Soviet developmentcar-real-iime sun-ivnchronous imagery system In theould greatly increase lhe timeliness of photographic
he Soviet second- and third (feneration ELINT satellite systems provide arrets lo worldwide bnd and sea areas, with data delay limes measured in hours. They can pan ike CLINT data lo Soviet ground sites within hours (sometimes minutes) of beingProjected developmentigh-altitude ELINT collector for use in theould add significantly to their capabilitiesystem could be designed lo have continuous access to large areas and pass collected data in real time
oviet radar and ELINT ocean reconnaissance satellites (BORSATs and EORSATs) have thelo report data in real lime lo Soviet ships in the vicinity in addition to recording (he locations of locetgn ships in orisis or conflict areai for bierin hours and soanelirncs minutes) trarrmrsaaon to Moscow. Their current access to areas within their coverage ranges from minutes to days The access to areas at high latitudes (inch as the Norwegian and Barents Seas) is excellent, while access to areas near the equator is poor. The Soviets could improve the access timeliness by launching multiple satellites into orbits having different planes. Analysis of the use of their EORSATs, HORSATs, and ELINT satellites in past crisis,nd exercises simubting conflicts indicates that the Soviets coordinate individual(asking to male the most effidenl use of satellite systems capabilities and ground control sites.
The timeliness of the worldwideinformation provided by Soviet Meteor satellites varies from near-real time to hours depending on the area. The expected bunch and operationeo-synchrorious meteorological satellite in theould provide real-time informationarge area of the world (nearly one-third of the Earth is visible from geosynchronous orbit).
The USSR's naval support satellites cannavigation data lo Its naval forces in lite vicinityrisis or conflict Their access lime it measured in
hours.
tismulocations satellites can be used lo relay all types of information to and from lhe affectedas communications with Soviel agents, advisory groups, and military forces This in lum is affected by whether the crisis or eonlbrt area it within the view of Ihe Soviets high-allitude rumsals. which serve as real-time relays, or only within thai of their low altitude "store/dump" comsats. which havemeasured in houts.
Tlie Soviel bunch detection satellites, when operational in the, will provide the Soviets with continuous coverage of US ICBM fields for real-time warningrisis or conflict has escabted to the pousi lhal ICBMs have been bunched.
On the basis of the capabilities and limitations of the Soviet satellite systems, we rate their current overall capability hit crisis and limited conflict as fair to good. With expected increases In Ihe operational availability of their radar and ELINT reconnaissance satellites and bunch detection satellites in the, the Soviets' capability -ill improve to good. They could further improve Iheir capability lo good-to-excellent In Iheithear real-time imaging systemigh-iillitudc ELINT collection system
We believe Ihe Soviet dependence on satellite systems for ciilis and limited conflict management to be moderate al present. By the, we believe ihey may be highly dependent on satellite systems to monitor crisis and conflict situations Soviet space systems, however, are dependentommand and control infrastructure that is highly vulnerable,ien-fore Soviet capabilitieseneral nuclearcould he much reduced.
IV. CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE USE Of SPACE SYSTEMS TO NEGATE THOSE OF OTHER NATIONS
section addresses the evolution oftoward foreign space activities, currentspace homo antisatellite (ASAT)knowledge of Inreign space systems, theon its own space systems, and theof spaiceborne ASAT use under differingconditions This discussion is limited toantiiatelltte systems, whereas otheraddress lhe full spectrum of Sovietcapabilities (both spaceborno amiprospects for their use.
Top -U
Soviel Altitude* Toward Space
t the beKinning uf the space era. Soviet authorilies viewed space as an arena of East-West competition in peacetime andotential combat arena in wartime. In the, Soviet media expressed concent about the potential US deployment of weapons in space, particularly orbitalhe revised second editioney Soviet publication, "Militaryontainedabout the need for defenseside variety of satellite systems, including satellites used for reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and bombardment.
ver the years the Soviets' altitude toward foieign space operations has gradually changed from one of general hostility lo one of qualified acceptance Their record, however, has left some important areas ol doubt as to the extent of their acceptance o( ceilain uses of space as legitimate, especiallv with respect lo space reconnaissance not related lo treaty verification. Tolerance of space systems used lor purposes such as reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and other military support functions became evident In thes Ihe Soviets themselves began to employ such systems. Theegotiating process92 culminated in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Stralegic Offensive Weapons, both of which aclc now ledge lhat both sides will use "national technical means (NTM) ofhe Soviets stated thai NTM included satellite systems, but the United States and the USSR have not attempted to identify which specific space systems are included Soviet negotiators insisted on Qualifying lhe agreement to use national technical means of verilication with the phraseanner consistent wilh generallyprinciples of internationalhe agreements did not codily. however, nor did the Soviets specify in the negotiations, (he uses of national means oflhal they would regard at consistent wilhof internaliona! law
he Soviets slill hold (hat cettain spacecannot be accepted as legitimate. For example. Ihey havenilateral right to take active counlcrmcssurcs against satellites for directto populations without Ihe agreement ol the target slate's government They hold lhat such broadcasting would bo an illegal, hostile intrusiontale'sn ASAT treaty negotiations Soviet repre sentatives maintained lhat space systems thai violate
res
Soviet air space or territoiy, damage (he environment, ortate's sovereignty in other ways such as direct broadcasting are hostile or Illegal actions and should be excluded from tlie tiealy's protection.
Theeneral acceptance over the years of most space activities has in large measure been due to their recognition lhat space Is an increasingly attractive medium for them to accomplish crucial military-support functions, including reconnaissance, command and control communications, andassistance They appear to see substantialin maintaining the benign environment in which space activities have been conducted for nearly two decades and from which they have reaped political, military, scientific,nd ectanomic
It is also clear, however, that they recognize the importance lhe West places on satellite systems foi supporting military activities The Soviets'of an antisatelllle orbital interceptor system and their more rccenl efforts to modify it and to develop more advanced systems clearlyesire to have the capability lo negate foreign satellites, should the decisions be made that such action was necessary.
verall, our assessment of the Soviets' attitudes and policies toward space activity suggests that some of their decisions on Interference in space would not -necessarily depend upon prior diplomaticAt leasr at higher levels of international stress, decisions on whether to Interfere wilh US satellites would depend on Soviet political and militarySoviet capabilities, and the expectedof given actions.
Current ond ProspectiveASAT
System t
rbital Inirr, rnior The Soviets have had an operational, nonnucleai orbital interceptor system since the. This system can be used to intercept ami destroy foreign satellites having orbital inclinations between aboutegreesTIht have demonstrated successfulal altitudes ranging fromilometers The syslem It probably capable nfsatellites at allilup tom. depending upon lhe character 1sttcs ascribed theand the orbital inclination of the target. The systemround hated target tracking radars torotected intercept point, two launch pads
at ihe Tyuratam Missile Test Bange.round control facility near Moscow. None of these ground facilities are hardened against nuclear detonations, indicating an intention to use Ihe system beforestrikes on the Soviet Union
he orbital interceptor system presents athreat to satellites using the near-Earth orbils characteristic of most US intelligence and many other military support systems.^"
The operational orbital interceptor uses an onboard radar sensor during the terminal portion of the
The Soviets have successfully demonstrated both one-and two-revolution intercepts. The two-revolutionprofile requiresinutes to complete the
one-revolution Intercept profile
1
the lime required for engagement is reduced to aboutinutes, thereby reducing lhe amount of time available to the enemy to deduce that an attack is under way and to employ evasive maneuveis or other countermeasurea to prevent satellite rlest ructionthe Soviet interceptor itself Is destroyed when the warhead is exploded to create the fragments lhat destroy theeparate interceptor must be launched against each target.
o not know whether the Soviets routinely maintain orbital interceptorseady status within live Tyuralam support facilities We believe they would do so in periods of crisis or limited conflict that they perceived might escalate lo ma|or confrontations Wc believe that two orbital interceptors, if maintainedeady status, could be moved from the support areas and launched wllhtu one or two hoursecision to do so And the minimum time between launches from the same launch pad may be as little as two toours The support facilitiesoaunch vehicles with iWerrerjtorsew building, under construction sinceould double Ihe site's storage capacity for ASATnd boosters. However, all of these support facilities and the two launch pads are also used for Soviet radar and El.INT ocean reconnaissance satellites, making it unlikely ihal they would tie devoted entirely to u'hllal interceptor*
We believe that the Soviets consider those satellites that provide Intelligence or direct support (such as navigation) as the targets of highest priority
he orbital interceptor has no capability against satellite systems In semisynchiooc-js ororbil. Geosynchronous satellites are too high, and satellites in highly elliptical sem [Synchronous orbits pass through the interceptor's engagementat velocities too high lor the interceptor to
fully r
he operational version of the orbitalhas been testedimes against targetslthough live of these tests were failures, we believe that subsequent tests achieved the desired oblectives. Between6 andhe Soviets conducted three testsevelopmental orbitalf"*^
Norse of the taigels were damaged in any of theourlh lest of tlie developmental Orbttal interceptor occur red in0landdown of neatly two year* The test was ano-revolution attempt using theversion of tlse interceptor The Soviel deci-wnn to resume testingtaisddown of nearly two years probablyressing technical need to lenew testing of lhe troubled developmental(ASAT) system II lhe Soviets were refraining from
6tu>>
for political atto technical reasons, it now appears thai they no kxniei fed coratiained.
the United Stale* and the tISSR agreeletting of antisatellite systems, we believewill continue their testing activities andtlse successful completion of theninterceptor system using tbe newhoming sensor We alto believe that there iseven chance that Ihe Soviets would, aftermodifications, mate their orbital interceptor tobooster and lest it against sem(synchronoustarget satellites. Duringththe Soviets hketv will supplement iheinterceptor and any other antisatellitenew antisatelliteas ainterceptor or space-based lasers
Later. There is evidence ofprotect topace-based laserwe beheve may have an anltsatellilea system would have significant advantagesorbital inlcrceplor in that It would havelong-1aiige capabilities, perhaps on liut orderkm between weapon und target It isreater capacity to overcomesuch as maneusenng and decoyDevelopment ofomplicated satellitedifficult, and we are uncertain as lotho Soviets will take. They couldmaller system andWthis would be technically risky. Theya prototype system for antisatelltte testing They might firstaser systemlowerhundrednot before thenother possibleprogram would initially call for andemcmstration using an even lowerthe approximate range olobed Ifest bed could fit into anil might be launched in the
pace-Bared fatlide Reamhere are serious yuestiom concerning the feasibility of space.-hasad panicle-beam weapons (PBWi) Ciittcal technologic* lot the developmentpace-based I'UW are space-qualified neutral-beam particlepieeist- iKHnting and tracking subsystems with mb-in roradian precision, and high-poser,suppliei Tlie Soviets have broadly based research. thai are related to partulc beam
weapons development These technologies, however, are in an early development stage and it would probably be theefore ihey could test tbe practicalitypace-batedweapon
adiofrcoueneu-Damati*liehave been working on novel, high-power sources of radio!requeues radiation or electromagnetic pube that could damage by destroying electronic) or oilier spacecralt parts By lhehey could have this technology available for subsequent usepacecraft However, we believe thereowthe Soviels will elect, within the next decade, topace-based radio!requencydamage anli-satetlilc weapon, in partround-bated weapon would be less complex and piobably more effective and in pjrl because their current efforts appear to emphasise laser weapon systems.
Space Sus'cmr We believe,earlier, that lhe Soviets aie pursuing theof manned idisable space systems thotASAT applications. The Soviets havein the rvrsfutUtions lo limit ASATthe potential use of the US Shuttle in ansuch as altering spacecraft orbits. Thesehe based on their knowledge ol Ihethe US Shuttle or on iheir own future mission plant
n conceivable that the Soviets mightmanned Spare nations to conductof low-power laser systems andin the. Havingfor minor repairs and adjustmentsay of ensuring steady progressthe many problems ihey have hadunmanned, complex spacecraft likeF.ORSATs. and launchoal of having continuously mannedmay include such testing activities amongand might even include having suchsystem* as operational element* of future(or both defensive and offensivehigh-powerW) versions oftyilems pfubably would not- However, we have no directthat the Soviels aie developing anfor then manned spacecraft
Soviet Knovdedo* of Fcsreign Space Systems
171 rerequisite of intelligent usepace borne antisalirllile system is. ol course, identification of
ihoscsatellite lytlems lo be engaged Al any one time, there are wellon-Soviet satellites iCtlve, We believe the Soviets' knowledge 'Jnear-Earth and most high-ahttudeufficient for identification and targeling purposes. Iheiris based on
rgc number of authoritative, unclassified documcnls such as Congressional records ami reports,ide variety ol technical journals
- Human sources.
Information gatheredophisticatedof bnd- and sea-based SICINT collectors, both conventional and coverl.
Orbit determination by their space surveilbnce network.
Space Systems ond Their
e do not know the full ertcnl of Soviet knowledge of foreign space systems Uncbssifiedliteraturerood and. on occasion,understanding Q
Soviet Dependence Vulnerabilities
m decision bi the Soviets lo interfere with ororeign satellite system would almostbe based in part on an evaluation of their own dependence on space systems and the vulnerability of the space systems tu foreign antisolellile means. Their dependence on satellite systems lor military support fuitctiot *at discussed in section III and summanied Infollowingur estimates of their dependence lange (rum low to high for specific functions, depending mainly on the avaibbilitv of nousatcllttc means lo fulfill those functions In getieial their dependence wilt probably increase in the ItWOs withii.f additional and more advanced
space systems for svhich adequate noiispace alterna-
tivrs will not be available
he Sovieli are undoubtedh await of the US commitment loonnuclrar orbitaland thes are prouaMs cevtcernrd oilli potrnlia
"TCf 7li?fi fifl.
loreign development of giound-bated systems lordestruction (tueh as bteri) and eleelronicInformation It tpaiio on lhe vulnerability nf Soviel space tytlems to various forms ol foreignWe have no Information that indicates the Sovietsrogram to harden or ntlwrwisethe survivability ol their spacecraft However, certain features of Sovietystem* lend to offer them some inherent degree of protection
For various technological reasons, the Soviet Union has produced spacecraft that have thick skins and are pressuriredontrolledenvironment This is in contrast to USwhich are generally thin skinned ami designed to work in the vacuum of lhe space envirnnment The Soviet practice nf using thick skins resultsegree of protection that US space systems do not have, particularly against laser and nuclear radiation and electrnmagncltc pulse effects.
Soviets, having somective mili-tarvrebled support satclli'et in orbit at any one time, plus lhe demonstrated ability to launch replacement satellite* quickly, make effective foreign ASAT rffortt difficult The Soviets' greatly increasing use of the geoslalionarv orbil also compound> the problems in designing ASAT systems against them.
Soviets' high-resolution phot or econna usance satellites. ELINT and radar ocean mnnnaissancc satellites. Salyut spaceons. Molniyatalelilies bunch detection utcHilrs. and all Ihelr spacecraft In groslalinnary orbitaneuvering capability. Thts capability can be used to make corrections for drag effects of the atmosphere, to change the orbit lor oper-otional reasons, to dcorblt the satellite, or to attempt to evade an ASAT weapon.
1
J
Prospects lor Soviel Spotvborne ASAT Opciylioool Use
p know of no instance where the USSR has intentionally intetlercdS space system Sovid attitudes toward noninterference with US space *srS-(ems result from an amalgam of political and other (actors Most important among them has been the impact that interference would have on Soviet US relations The USSR has cipUcitly recognized that physical interference with US national technical me.mi beine used lo monitor the SALT agreements would be inconsistent with Its obligation under these agreements It has notommilmentt end this protection tn all US satellites or satellite missions. Nevertheless, the Soviets undoubtedly perceive (hat an attack on any US satellite would contributenaior wayeterioration in Uf Soviet relations
erhaps tlie most important ol the otheris the USSR's own dependence on space systemsariety of military support (unctions, and its probable concern about potential US retaliation against Soviet satellites or retahalion in some other form The Soviets presumably would eipect anyUS response lo include something otherhysical attackonnuclear interceptor since Ihey know the United States does not now have that capability. They would also have to consider the level of US dependence on space systems for military support functions, the US ability to respondoviet ASAT altack, and the likelihood ofesponse Each of these considerations is dynamic and will acquire different significance over lime
e know very little of the Soviets" operational doclrim for use ol spaccborno ASAT svslems. We dc know that Iheir current orbital interceptor use: ground-basedradars, launcl pads, and controlarc not hardened against nuclear detonations, indicating an intention to employ the system before nuclear strikes on the USSR.f_
onsidering all of the above (actors, weit highly unlikely that the Soviets will use spaeebornc means to interlere wilh US satellites In peacetime, crises, or conflicts not involving direct engagements between US and Soviet forces. Wethe likelihood ol Soviet interference wouldbut would remain low even if US and Soviet lorces wet* involved but not directly rngagrdimited conflict outside of EuropeonflictUS-Soviet forces, ibe likeliliood of Sovietof US satellites using spaceborne mean* would rise as lhe conflict escalated. The likelihood of such interference would probably be moderate as long as the Soviets' objectivesS-Soviet conflict werr limited and they believed they could limit the scope and Intensity of the fighting We believe thereigh likehhood that the Soviets would use spacebrn-rw ASAT systemsATO-Warsaw Pact armed con flict The likelihood of such use would Im very high i) the Soviets perceived that general nuclear war war Imminent.
54
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