Created: 7/31/1980

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Prospects for Soviet Military Technology



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This Nalional Intelligence Estimate was prepared in responseequest from tlie Under Secretary of Defense, Research andfor an assessment of Soviet prospects for military technologynd of the relative US and Soviet standings in key military lech' nologies. The Estimate addresses:

The status and prospects of key Soviet technologies for.

The ability of Soviet military research and development to meet future military requirements.

Thc resources allocatedor. 1

Projected new military systems in significant mission areas for

The Estimate docs not describe systems that will reach operational status innd form part of the total Soviet military capabilities for. Soviet requirements and programs for the deployment of military forces, as well as projected Soviet military capabilities for, are described in other NIEs. Thc findings of those NIEs have been taken into account in our protections of Soviet systems for. The proiections do not deal with the effectiveness of lhe lrjdsvid-ual systems or with the contributions they will make to overall Soviet rnjlitary capabilities

Sixteen lechnology areas have been identified as key to Sovietweapons development and are addressed in this Estimate. Some important areas, such as electronic warfare and command and control, are not addressed, although communications for command and control systems arc discussed. When we have not been able toirect connection between basic research and developmenteywe have not related that research to projected future systems-Comparisons with US technology are used to provide benchmarks for the description of Soviet capabilities in key technologies and lo show relative technological standings. Technology is only one input toeffectiveness, and no conclusion should be drawn from the'

comparisons of technology in this Estimate as to comparative miliiary capabilities. The relative status of US-Soviet technology is consistent with that used in tbe fiscal1 posture statement of the Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering.






Soviet Organialion (or Military

Design Philosophy and Plan and Program

C Critical Aspects ofrganization and

D. Prospects foe Change in the


for the


Soviet Technology Balance

Acquisition of Western Technology

C Key Military Technologies Status and Prospects





Communication for Command and


Culdance and





Nuclear Weapons and Chemical Explosives






The level of technology achievedounliy is important, but is not the sole determinant of its military capability. The philosophy of weapons design, the balance achieved between performance and quantity, and the availability of technology in the field at the time needed are often more important than the level ofystem.omparison of the status of militaryin the USSR and the United States should not be presumed to indicate relative military capabilities, either present or future. The development and appropriate use of technology will, however, affect performance, producibility, cost, reliability, and maintainability ofsystems. Also, in some instances the incorporation of newmay be essential to meeting military requirements.

Theey technology categories chosen for treatment in thisare broad, and many of the categories are interdependent. Microelectronic advances, for example, will have direct impact on computers, signal processing, and dectrc-optic sensors; advances in all key technology areas involve production technology to some degree.

One approach used to describe the progress of Soviet technology is to relate progress in technology to new systems requirements and projectedecond approach used is to provide analogous US achievementsenchmark for comparison. Future prospects for relative US-Soviet standings in technology are based on simpleof past trends, modified by rxoiected Soviet advances. There are inherent uncertainties in both approaches which may prove to be

Projections of Soviet weapon systems ofre basedvidence of early RAD programs and on known or estimated Soviet system performance trends and also the availability of relevant key technologies, along with judgments of where inycle the Soviets freeze the incorporation of available technology into systems design. We often do not have direct evidence, however, of Soviet plans for the incorporation of available technology that new performance may require. Further, the eventual outcomerogram inay not be clear even to the Soviets.


he fundamental motivation for Soviet miliiary research and development is lo support the achievementilitary capability that competes with and surpasses thai of the United States and its allies.

The Soviets haveD program thai is large, growing, and of high priority.t probably accounted for almost one-fourth of Sovietercent of gross nationalone-half of Soviet expenditures for. Other key inputs lo military RAD asas the level of scientific and technical manpower and capacity at dedicatedsteady long-term growth. Although economic growth is slowing, trends in the level of activity in weaponrograms indicate that the resources devotedill continue to expand5 at least as fast as total defense spending, which is projected lo growear.

There is an alternativehatannot be isolated from Soviet work In pure science ando the extent that it is in this Estimate. According to this view, work in these fields is relevant to motivation and goals, as well as to the resources that can be brought to bear on scientific and technological problems the Soviets would like to solve. The resources that are described In thc Estimate should be described In more precise terms in spile of the problems involved with Soviet figures.

The Soviets have made and are cipected to continue to make good progress in developing the technologies that wc believe are key to their "future military capabilities. The prospectsew potentialof these key military technologies are summarized in tabiche Soviets' progressesult of extensive development efforts as well as continued success in acquiring technology from abroad. The Soviets have traditionally given high priority and devoted large amounts of resources to the acquisition and exploitation of information andfrom the West.

Acquisitions of foreign technology by legal, illegal, and clandestine means have had significant impact on the Soviets' capability in the key technologies, especially in microelectronics and computers. Wethem to continue toajor effort to this process in.

hflIhUhe Otrattor,of Iniellieence aad Hetearch. Oqttrfmal of Slate.

. Io? Urn**

Table I

Key Soviet Military Technologies: Prospects and Projected Applications


Comicttesectronic* Sietat prooesnna; Production (ecbnoligv Cornmurucattons Directed enemygallon Power sources Structural material* Propulsion

Nuclear weapoM 'Chemical eiploavei

Ic ihr taw.

Increasing speed, bobw liw. software peoblrsm

tjiSMcele integration by thc early production difficult

Strength In theory and optical prceetlfaK hud-ware limitations

Shortages In ixedtion machinery, automated manufacturing, gradual moderniritton

Increased freownev tint? and bandwidln. een-plvaiu on reliability and security

M ultimata watt hash-energy birr. improved pointing and inetoog accuracy

Improved correttricri tcchruciuci and conventional

aceelcrometerl and gyro

Connnned, Including nocteu and ruanclociydrDdtTuinLC sources

Coed In bnpt sUvetere fabricallor, Inercuedel.

Strength ill rocket end nuclearccilties in litre rocket engines; advance* In nkd propellants

Good ta pi biU'y. empbasii on enhanced radlattoct

and Himptoioniis

Eicellcnl capabilily, advanced wotti In hydrogen-

lice inorganic

Soviet Application* Projcvrrd,he

Advanced command, control. IlvJ coeimunfcaHoea (or theater and itiatcglc all deter**

Towed arrays for anUsaboiirinc warfare; Improved avionics (or air superiority akcraft

Enhanced neutron warheads. Improved air lupcdor-iiy aircraft

Advanced strategic and theater systems for command, control, and ceenrneelcaaioiu

Improved ground based sir defense bser; ipace-bisrd lasersystem

New weapon system lor Typhoon baEWIc imnile lub marine; sellcVpiopellaM IC8M

Ground- and space-based latent global oava ccenaBuoseatiena

tdn; Large space rhutrJe

Large icoce ihaile; newof attack lubn-.iHne

Enhanced neutron -uSead aitillwy round.


lenson (antinb-oiaiine warfare)

Nonacouttle -rainlubmir-rre)


F.lcctro-optlcsl sensors

in towed arrays; neweel onvcr Ae?ne. faw-frequency sonar; long-rang* lowed arrays

Corflinuev! BAD oo optical. Infrared, andand mace-based mbmanne wake

Continuing ciength famissile. Improved Moscow ABM

aperture, andc

Cood progress In line and matru arrays,multipurpose space station; improvedcontrol

Feasibility uncertain

Thc current US-Soviet relative status and trends in the keyare shown inignificant Soviet advances are expected in most technologies and the Soviets probably will improve their overall relative standing throughe do not expect these changes in relative standings to be dramatic, however. In tbe four technologies thjtf we consider to have especially broadcomputers, microclcxtronics, and signaldo not expect tbe Soviets to reduce their lag. Fundamental changes would have to take place in their centrally directed management techniques and their technological base for rapid advances to be made in these four technologies. Such fundamental changes are unlikely.

There is an alternative view1 that, in addition to significantby the Soviets and improvement in their overall relative standing in key technologies, they arc likely to improve their relative position in the four broad impact technologies as well. This view is based on the fact that, in these four technology areas, the Soviets have achieved steady progress relative to the United States over the pastears, on an assessment that present trends are toward nanowing the gap, and on' projections of future Soviet military policy that is expected to call for an increase in high technology systems. It further holds that, in areas which the Soviets consider important to their military goals. Sovietabsolute andlikely to occur.

The Sovietanagement system is characterized by continuity in funding and personnel, strong centralized authority, and the direct involvement of top leaden to assure responsiveness of the defense bureaucracy. It is most effective for conducting high-priority programs such as major aerospace and armor.anagement approach is not well suited, however, for administering programs of secondarythose involving manyand cutting across many bureaucraticforrequiring successful coordination of diverse and interactivedisciplines, such as those involved in microelectronics. Despite impending leadership changes in the USSR, we foresee no fundamental change inanagement system over the next decade.

Soviet strategy innvolves two major themes. The principal theme has been thc controlled introduction of evolutionary advances in technology lo fulfill evolving military requirements. This theme has sometimes made innovative use of technology, often ofinferior to that of lhe West. It avoids excessive demands on either the production or technology base and provides weapons that can be maintained and used by troops possessing moderate technical

hotter, of ihuik* iW DeleteAjeiitant Chief of Staff

PVaMpaBlf, Otvarteneniaf ,ke Aemr arm! lha DUaaa- afaaAouarten. Uarlma

Table 2

Relative US-Soviet Current Status and Trends in Key Military Technologies

Arrow indicate* (red> USSH jiIWiis jnwnd eral rata ot

. < USSH IWni frminJ

boScads US


put crc

(uwluds production lodinoJoav)




id* coroniand/eocitro])





n! liubmarinr w* if*


ntimhinarine wiring


Vitin not ticndi


n alUmaUothc DlrecW. Dtftnte lautitstna Atencp. aHlh tarptet to thett Ihu table:emenM c/ Iht tttoHoe leeeli of mutUtilp meaningful teetookev armortnplllled table. Atlhoue*? eotitpped to renderuth <wtjwrlwru are toWrd In iht, HIE, they ihould.inimum, includeeltoikortc leehnototv toeller penoecitoe cm Sodet mHUarplhe retail* oj lhe SooUH oopeoaeh to trmltlorp Itehnology andrrUnr ridolderMl Otero or table IA.SAompdraltorlha Defease aU eoxlaHeutto*

(rodperformed foe the Underearon* and Knrtneertnt (USOKOEh Support lor lhaabUi provided In ihe Eelimele lea.There ti uncertainty caoceraioa trend* In ihll

The Director. Bureau ofi lUeearcK Department of Suit,hat. ti> foes. Sorter oeooallc

ASW leehnoiozv roiO las further end fother behind VS techtvAm lalhUarta.


skills. Thc resulting weapon systems often haveimited range of applications; however, ihc Soviel approach is to field multiplewhich cover the spectrum of desired performance This theme has resulted in the fielding of large quantities of weapons, and the subsequent introduction of incremental modifications to improve theirperformance, benefiting from field experience, evolving technology, or changing threal perceptions.

Thc secondary theme Inasillingnessthe higher risk and costs required to develop new types ofbased on advanced technological concepts. This themethai are critically dependent on lhe development of newor the successful use of unproven technology. Thisapparent in the development of the USSR's first ICBM andin the Soviets' more recent construction of titanium hulland in their recent developments in laser weapons andtheir long-term commitment lopproach,Soviets still have critical requirements, such as in strategicwhich neither thc USSR nor the United Slates has found

Thc features oftrategy are not expected to change radically in the future. Most new Soviet systems will probably be based on evolutionary improvements in the types of systems now in service. Therocess has been largely successful over the last several decades and has acquired considerable momentum. Also, steadyin key military technology inill probably provide for significant new performances, which we project for. Wc expect the Soviets to take full advantage of the opportunities for new evolutionary performance that their maturing technology makes

We expect the Soviets to place increased emphasis on advanced technological solutions iu. They have applied this approach when advanced technology was needed loritical requirement that the evolutionary approach could not meet; when theamily of systems had been exhausted; and when, for either case, technology had matured enough to make new approacliesfeasible. As their technology advances, we believe the Soviets will see increasing promise in and may be able to determine thcof advanced technological solutions for longstandingThere will probably also be increased activity devoted to advancing the technological state of the art and toroader range of technical options. For initial development of new concepts thc Soviets maythey have inan-

agcmcnt structures outside therganizations responsible for.

There is an alternate view that the existingis both more functional at internally developing newand more resistant to reorganization than the above judgment suggests.*

We expect thc numbers of new or modified Soviet systemsoperational status intoo remain near historical levels,n each of thc. past several decades. Some of the new Soviet systems will incorporate the advanced technologicalelection of systems projected in significant mission areas fors shown in table 3.

Thc chances of technologicalunexpected appearance of militarily important advances inprobably increase significantly through the remainder of the century. Soviet technology advances will makeptions available to the USSR, and the guideposts of US experience probably will become even less useful to the Intelligence Community as an aid in understanding future Soviet activity.

The holder ofiew it the IXreetor. Bureau ol Inleltlceive aad RetearxK Devartmeni el Stale.


- fam ttmm.

Table 3

Selected Soviel Systems Ploiecleil lor IOC laoUiMul

New Palonaiitit

hvfectod Uithol Ooourrmot



New dwoi mra for

thaler awunaad. roolrot, commamcaboa mtccni .cplorm*at)

(Oifvable ra ii ii' ol untied lyOrm

etui of attack submarine



tnprovtdraae*intry mobdnr. armor prolectioB

l materials.

Srucm. naitfiali

Advanced cpaor Baboo (pemanmllr

rvokaWLr, WMobtple larcef eaeetatilY

hick -lo rlmlnarl .icapabuirv

tnhanced oootroa warlvrli (lor utfl-Irry round*}

rVotocW law IVofc.Ul.t. ol Oorwnoo* Broad-area uMrUnkflWBSWd

aad rpaor-bued-aia

defectors IfruSUtSr has aet bano* titeat


reach Initial operational capeUItt- la il-X



A. Tho Soviet Organization for

The miliiary hat top priority in the competition for Soviet research and development resources. This priority and the extensive management controlsto, including establishing realistic performance requitements and delivery schedules, have been instrumental in mobilizing resources tothe militaryteady stream of new weapons. During each of the decades of, the Soviets brought moreew or modified weapon systems to operational status.

Over this period tbe Soviets haveizable and growing permanentstablishment concentrated in ihe nine defense industrial ministries. Five of these ministries have large design bureaus that serve as the general contractors for developingaircraft, shins, radar, and armored vehicles. The other four ministries supply such components and subsystems as nuclear weapons, conventionalcommunications equipment, and critical radioclcctronic components and instrumentation. Collectively the defense industrial ministries arewith the best facilities, can attract the most qualified personnel, and are assured of continuing financial and material support

The military consumer and defense industrial producers haverjose relations with the leadership. The party and the Defenseby the party generalmajor weapon development and rely on an extremely powerful managementMilitary-Industrial Commissioncontinuous oversight. The VPK oversees the entire developmentfrom coordination and documentation of weaponsequirements) through assurance that production schedules are being met. Substantive inputs to the Defense Council are provided by officials from the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Soviet military services, and top officials from the defense industry. The militaryweapon requlremenU and directly influences and monitorsy posting highly qualified rep-

resentatives in weapon design andonsequence of Ita priority and high-level oversight, the defense industrial sector has been largely insulated from the difficult affecting the Soviet economy. The network of organizationsand performings depicted in figure L

The military abo icliea on the civilian Academy of Science and educational inearth establishment for advancing basic science and on civilian industrynd the production of certain materials,and subsystems The State Committee forand Technology (CKNT) coordinates overallscience policy, manages largorograms, and manages Soviet foreign lechnologyefforts. The military influences (be direction of basic research by concluding contracts with the Academy of Science* and Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, and by working through tbc leadership to affect the allocation of state budget funds for basic research. Military control of civilian industrial participantseaponof VPK directives and cUtioning of militarythe same as for defense industrial participants

The Soviet system is defense dominated and the militaryr. substantially insulated from most of the organizational and resource constraints of theeconomy, is able to outperform significantly the nonmilitary sector. The Sovietsaptive, continuously operating militarynd production capability, which, though not independent of civilianess lubiect to the economic andimpediments that lumper lhe nondefense sectorentrally planned economy In contrast to that of the United States, the Soviet approach neither must rely onbb to derive substantial supporttrongase which advances the state of the art on hi own Initiative

There is an alternate viewthat the preceding paragraph overstate* the ddfarence between lhe performance of the miliiary and the civilian sectors

Ththt,ht Otreaor. Cemurd iMt&tm* Aernar





the Soviet economy, and the extent to which the rniliUry sector is insulated Irom (he rwoWerru of the economyhole Defense production deticndsata* client on civilian rectors of the economy such as chemicals and metallurgyarteof the wca^Jofs design and production activity is governed by thc same roles and incentives as civilian production- These, in turn, produce economic andimpediment! which are only partlybv the periodic inlervenlion of Ihe Soviel lead-ership in defense mailers and by the deference accorded miliury production by the ope ratineand managers

ovietnd elements of theand educational establishment eapcrience certain deflctenoes in manpower and material resources Moreover, the compter, plan, supply, finance, and incentive regulations that govern civilian RADhave not been effective in orienting thestablishrrvenl to the rseedi of the

iversionesources to the military slows the rate of purely civilian technical advance and. in turn, affects productivity in live civilian sector. Inoviet economic growth will be Increasiiigly dependent on improving productivity, but there is Ill-tic evidenceuture slowing in the growthl. the increasingof Soviet weapons means that the miliury will further pursue basic science androwing variety of materials and components developed in civilian

B. Weapon Design Philosophy and Plan ondnooemont

ver the last three decades the Soviets havetwo basic themes in weapon design- Their first strategy calls for evolutionary upgrading of weapon quality through the gradual introduction of newIn line with this strategy, they have developed weapon design practices that stress commonality of components, reliability in the field, and adequacy In mission performance- This policy has yielded weapons capable of being produced and deployed in large numbers at acceptable cost,imely fashion, and at reduced risk. This policy lias reduced the demands on the lech oology and manufacturing liases, but may contribute to long periods between achievements in the laboratory and availability to the weapon designer. This strategypected to remain dominant.

he secondary theme in Soviet HAD hasiihngrseaa to accept the higher rial and coststo develop new types of weapons based ontechnological concepts The Soviets probably will place increased emphasis on this theme, in the past such designs were pursued when the evolutionary approach was deemed Inadequate to meet changing threats or doctrinal requirements, when the growth potentialamily of systems had been exhausted, orffort created newopportunities. The Soviets haveechnology led where they are expected to be more willing to pursue advanced lechrsoloBical approaches which enuil greater risk ihan the evolutionarybul which hold greater promise of rrsoeting their performance objectives Where entirely new weapon concepts are involved, falling outside existing design bureau capabilities, tlie Sovietsave In lhehoc organizations for proof of feasihihty. but this will be followed by application of more traditional administrativehanismi

II. Soviet five-year plans and the more elaborate annual plans are used tond production activity. The plans are formulated at at least throeministry,nd productionassignments becoming more detailed as they are transmitted to lower levels. The Soviets rtow are concluding the preparation ofh Five-Year Plan, coveringeriod. By now thc Soviet leadership probably has established thefor defense and defensend thus will have begun thc process of formulating specific plan aastgrtmenti for industry. Although there Is an aversion to major changes, plan targets can be and are modifiedafter ihey have been esUbluhod.

ajor weapons development programs normally take six to IS years from initiation to initialcapabililyepending on the complexity of Ihe weaponeries of VPK decisions Is used lo manage the program (see

first specifies asstgmnenb for draft design, technical design, and prototype manufacture, as well as the testlnu. preparation, andof new types of materials andmachinery.

second identifies series rxoduction plants (both system and components) sets production levels, and continues deveJopovont work

through pilot model production (lull-scaledevelopment)

third, made after theub-tnctedengthy series of teat and validation procedures, ipecifia numbers and types of weapons to be depioyed

These we*por?aoquUttion stages reflect the Soviets' preference for incorporating proven technology and incrementa] advances in their weapon systems. The Soviets apparentlyommitment to siraclrand designs early in the process. The initial requirementingle concept and calls foror multiple designs

he firs* VPK decisionational commitment, although the resource* necessary tothe program are not authorized until the complete design Is formalized and received. TheVPK dectsion^ut homing productionand assimilation--reflects the frequent separation In thc USSR between design and experimentaland those performing series production. The

third VPK decision authorizes series production and deployment

C. Critical Aspects ofonizotion ond Management

The assignment of dear prion tics, atrongmanagement, and organizational stability and continuity in military RAD facilitate the prosecution of high-priority weapon programs These sameoften can hinder perfonnance la other areas.ummarizes features ofand presents some of the resulting Implications ofpcroacfi

The Sovietanagement system has been highly successful In managing high-priority military programs such as the development cf major aerospace systems and armored vehicles. Programs can be authorized rapidly and funds committed for ci-tcrtdrd periods of time. Long-term personal contacts Iwtwccn leadership elements such as members of the Politburo and Defense Council and primary weapons


Implications of the Typical Sovietanagement Style

nunuenml mad Oaten Cttmla efl ktnv? In i


unocthodoi ipcvoictA


muaera wflhdraw orilerti

Uif auEOber et praeiuni Outoverallac< tJcquitel, controlled

uml wzttxUM mmHI, ml

rrwuRwito dvtl

developers permit close monitoring olnd rapid program response Theof (oimil plan and program IrchoiqiKi and informal memiures enable* Soviet leaden to mike clear alignments of priority to largo proiecii. Thii allows managers al all levels lo apply simple decision rules ^nfresource allocation questions. In high-priority areas thc Soviets encourage and enforce program fulflllinent by maintaining centrally administered reserves to meet unfbrcsnen developments, and by creatinefinancial and professional incentives and special authorizations for acquiring supplies

hU management system is generally not well adapted, however, for administering programs ol sre ondary priority, those involving many organiaalions, or those which cut across bureaucratic lines. The high priority accorded major programs means thatprojects may be deprived of essential resources. The ability of high-level iriariagemeni to scrutinlieimited number of programs means that projects of secondary import must rely on inefficient bureaucratic distribution mechanisms to acqulteof inferior quality. Sovietinsularity, secrecy, and tendenev to strive for self-sufficiency lead to major difficulties when the cooperation of many organizations is required onprograms In other than major weapons areas. Moreover, the common instiiutional separation ofdeaign/devesoimsctst, and productionfosters redundancy of effort and retards the rapid assimilation of new technology Finally,ough Soviet five-year plans and long-term programs are sources of program continuity and stability, they also restrict flexibility and create aversion to oiajor change.

he management coot rob applied lo highweapon programs overcome many ot the problems endemic to Soviet centralized planning andAreas requiring continuing incremental advanceumber of mutually supportive tr^rsoiogies,suffer lander the Soviet management approach For example, in spile of qualified personnel andInfusion of resources, the Soviets continue to lag the West in design and production of microelectronic* componenti

here i* an alternate view* that tlie discussion In the two previous paragraphs anday be

* The holder, of ihi, Wm are ihe Direcior. Defeat* Inulllgencr Atmcv. and lha Direcior of InlefUtenct.arine tCOtpi.

mislcadiiig in that Ihc management deficiencies identified therein apply primarily lo low-priority civilian HAD programs rather than to miliiaryAll militaryjust those of the very highesta special status in the planning, resource allocation, and management proc-cess. and are accorded favored trealment. whkh helps to insulate these protects from most of theand nsariagement problems that plague thesectoresult, while competition for resources also eaists in the military sector, even militaryof lesser importance arc favored over civilian programs in the competition for scarce resources For example, military projects arc accorded specialby the nalional supply organizations. Military supply requests are filled first and requesters with military contracts are assigned the most reliable and best equipped supply firms. This helpa to insulateprojects, including those of secondary importance, from the chronic supply shortages that trouble thc less favored components of the economy. The high-level commllment to defense also serves to amcliorale much of the organizational insularity and problems Involved in coordinating military programs of all priorities that cross organizational lines. And. finally, the powerful positron of the Ministry of Defense as customer helps to blunt many of the incentive problems thatajor source of inefficiency in the civilian economy. Qualityase in point; the in-place and powerful mih'tary representative learns effectivelythat products, even those of secondaryare delivered on time and meet the military's quality speciftcatlons.

D. Prospects for Change in

lie fundamental character of military RAD organization andot eipected to change over the neat decade. Major weapon rxogram managementighly effective, but,gradual and cautious tinkering with themechanism likely will continue. The party probably will attempt to institute measures that will allow it to exercise greater high-level direct control of the economy

rappling with the critical problem of relatively slow movement of new technology from theInto production will mean continued industrial reorgaearation merging RAD and prodesctioofurther Ureas on direct contracting; tying BAD bonuses and other perquisites to theof new technology In production: and Improved

dissemination of technical Information. Acquisilion of foreign technology to compensate for domesticdeficiencies will continueajor program and yield considerable benefit, but hard currency shortages and other factori may require greater self-reliance on the part of the Soviets.

Althougkl Siffieult toeost-Brezhnev leadership would not Institute adifferent approach to RAD planning andThis view is based on thc apparent absence of sxjrnifieanl RAD policy disagreement in lhe current collective leadership and on lhe entrenched position of the Urge RAD bureaucracy Nevertheless, past leadership transitions have resulted In some abrupt and extreme shifts in the administrative mechanism. The impact on military RAD can be especiallybecause of the extensive Interest andof top leadership elements

We believe that economic problems will not substantially threaten tho position of the military in resource allocation or lead lo major change in the administrative mechanism. The military, the VPK. and thc defense Industrial ministries aretrong position to defend their interests against anychanges wouldhallenge lo iheirpower.

II-ESOURCES A. Past Trends

5 spending for military RADstimated to have accounted for about half of all Soviet nAD expenditures. Military RAD has taken on thc average aboul one-fifth ofspending for defense, andercent of Soviet gross-national productilitary RAD expenditures have grown more rapidly than Soviet spending for civilian RA D. have been the most rapidly growing category cf Soviet defense spending, and have outpaced overall Soviet economic growth. Thus, while defense spending has accountedoughly constantoercent of Soviet CNP*ilitary RAD has consumed an increasing share of Sovietspending9 military RAD expenditures probably accounted foe almost one-fourth of Sovielexpenditures anderceni of CNP.

To compare thc site and growth ol USctivities, we have estimated what

'This Minute re/lecO th* definition ol defetue wending used In the United SUMca. gf>

the Soviet actfvitiea would cost in& dollars if they were carried out in the United States.S outlays forere approximately one-third larger than the estimated dollar costctivities. Thereafter, US outlays declined in real termshen theyoderate Increase. The estimated dollar cost ofmilitary RAD activities, in contrast, Increased steadily.fl the estimated dollar cost of Soviet miliiary HAD was almostercent greater lhan USutlays. These figures, however, do not measure (he comparative effectiveness of USpending and should not by them' selves be interpreted as indicators of relative Soviet and US aecomposhmenls- We are not able toimilar comparison of the dollar cost of Soviet and USctivities, although we recognize lhal some of those activities may affect military RAD, particulariy in the United Stales.

Our estimates of Soviet military RADare based on highly agsjregatcd Soviet statistics andmall number of intelligence reports They are subject to considerable uncertainty but are.consistenl with our physical evidence of Sovietctivities and we believe them lo be indicative cf the magnitude and trend of Sovietspending.

An ciamlnation of the resource Inputsrograms shows that thc Soviets haveIncreased the resource base committed to. Wd believe that this approach, in conjunction with an analysis of Ihe outputs ofrocess, best portrays trersds in the level of weaponctivities, identifies shifts In Sovietriorities, and reveals the strength of the Soviet commitment to.

Total Soviet manpower employed in civil andas been growing at moreear; employment in those onranirations conductingas probably grown even faster. In the mid-lPTOs the Soviets probablyatillion people Inr about half of thc manpower workingn the USSR More thanercent of these worked In facilities subordinate to defense Industrial ministries.

here hasteady increase in floors pace at many of the major SovietIn Soviet. for example, floorspace has Increased at an average annual rale ofercentor the Mlnbtrfc* of Avi-

ation Industry and General Machine Hulldlm most of Ihe major research facilities have been Identified and measured. In these ministries,3oorrpace new at average annual rates ofercent, respectively. In Otherample of major Ministry cf Shipbuilding Industry research 'and development facilities shows an average annual rate of growth ofercent during the same period. Soviet nuclear weaponoors pace grew at an average annual rate ofercent5n general floors pace seems to be growing fastest in facilities developing advanced sys-terns dependent on electronic subsystems, such asand In emerging technologies, such as lasers, where Ihetill being

The Soviets appear to have suppliedstablbhment with adequate facilities and manpower, but their work has been harsdlcanpedeneral shortage of equipment resources, especially In lhe area of high-quality technologically advanced precisionShortages exist despite tbc priorityfacilities engaged in. The scarcity of Soviet-made equipment sterns from production deficiencies, and has led lhe Soviets to rely on Western suppliers for many types of equipment For priority protects the Soviets allocate hard currency for the purchase of Western equipment, butierce competition for such funding and the process is time consuming.

Systemic pressures have affected resourceas well.hilosophy, procedures, and general level of technology haveart in the steady expansion of resources devoted lo. The Soviet evolutionary style of development relicseries of incremental steps to achievemilitaryavors military systems designed for single missions,arge number of product lines to covet tbe mission spectrum.tyle requires that design teams and supporting workers be continuously employed turningteady stream of Improved systems.

of the principal output of thenumber and type of newweapons designed for theas an indicator of level cf effort.time required to develop or modify weaponsthe rate at which new and modifiedhave reached IOC has shown remarkableDuring each five-year periodhe Sovi-

ets have completed development ofystems The increasing complexity and Improved performance of Soviet weapons have requiredallocations of resources to maintain the constant number of systems developed bystablish, moot.

ata on Soviet expenditure*re not availableec^pam-by-progtam basis Someappreciation of lhe relative shares allocated to key weapon system categories can be gained, however, by comparing the complexity, the amount ol Innovation, and lhe development time of each weapon systemAircraft and offensive missile prog rami havefor about half of the total military R&ffort0 Defensiverograms haveaboutercent of the total, although their share was somewhat higher daring therograms and ship programs have each taken aboutercent of the total, but we believe the share devoted to surface shipblng slightly.of space bunch vehicles and spacecraft for military applications has accounted for roughlyoercent of theience on groundparse, but.w by the flow cf newinto the forces, we estimate that these programs have absorbedercent of the overall effort

B. Prospects for

e believe that resource allocations loill continue to grow Inesult of the strong, commitment made by the Sovietsigorousffort Primarily because of demographic trends. Soviet overall scientificwill grow less rapidly lhanercent rate of the past. Difficulties facing the Soviet economy willeview of all major resourcedecisions, including those relating to defense. The resource requirements of defense in general,n particular, however, will almost certainly retain their favored position, although at an IncreaslnEly greater cost to the Soviet systemhole.

tlempU to remedy the military problems which wc believe are cf greatest concern lo tbeInvolved in correcting deficiencies In their low-altitude air defense and submarine detection capabilities, forrequire costly, high-technology approaches. Both continual upgrading of current weapons and the development of new systems will be required Large numbers of new defensealong with subsequent modifications to th*


systems will be live focus of Sovielctivity for lhe rest of the century.

e have identified more thanew oraircraft, missile, ship, tank, and military (pacein lest or sea trials. We (save also identified aboutdditional programs0 pretest or pretrial stage. Beyond these systems, we believe therereat many more planned for. In addition tor so systems already identified, we know that many modifies lions to es 1st ing systems scheduled for completion inre not yet under way. During the lOtiOs, tho Soviets brought moreeapon systems lo operational status In eachThus, we project that the number of weapons developed inrobably will be about the same as In earlier decades


oviet technology Is considered key if it Is basicumber of significant military functions or concepts, or if itacing factorpecificcapability. For example, among the Sovietsystems projected for, computerIs Isuic to now performance In strategic and tactical systems for command, control,ollow cm to the Typhoon ballisticsubmarine (SSBN/SLBM) system; and In an air superiority fighter (including controlhe development of high-bypass-ratio turbofanIn the propulsion leclmology area Is the pacing factor In our projection of new Soviel performance capabilily in large transport aircraft.

ofeysignal processing, andespecially broad Impact. For example,will probablyajor tote Incomputers and signal processingignificant factor in Sovietsignal processing, abidance andsome areas of propulsion development, and, toextent, determines Soviet capability lotechnologynlo military

A. The Soviet Technology BoaVance

present status of the key Sovietto comtstsraMe US achievements, and future

trends based on extrapolation of past trends In relative US-Soviet technology standings are illustrated ininduded with the Keyhe Sovietslag the Westose areas where excellence depends on the interaction of many diverse technical disciplines, fn these lagging key technologies, Soviet centrally directed management techniques have apparently not met wtth much success. There is an alternative view1 that Ihe reasons for the Soviet logertain areas should not be generalized, as in thisMany otber reasons are equally likely. For example, some areas of US lead may be attributable to US civilian consumer sector Impetus for advancementose areas. Many highly complex and successful Soviet programs have required interdisciplinary

Soviets lead or are roughly equal toIn certain areas of technology where largea feasible alternative to complexity. These arewhich iheir single-purpcee. high-priority,techniques are probably well adapted

Theractice of separating thcand design functions has made It difficult for ihem to orient research programs toward meeting their general technology development needs. It has, moreover, inhibited their deveiopcoent of refined product and process designs lhal may become key parts of productton/manufacturing and basiccapability.ractice, however, has not inhibited their ability to do majorhey haveesign bureau as tbe lead, or integrating, contractor with controlnd lest facilities.

Thr development and integrationroad technologyrobably significantly hamperedanagement approach. Examples Include precision machining, baste to weapons guidance component technology, and phctohrjsography,asic Io microelectronics production technology. In an attempt to overcome those deficiencies tlie Soviets have created an organizationalby the Zetenograd Science Center for microelectronicsplaces both research and design as well as production functions inside oneoundary.

The holder, ofem ere lhe Duettor. Defentelhe Director of Sural InlasVlgeaee.f>he AuUtaat Chief of Staff. lateuUgeote. Depart/went ofMarine


Soviets' progress In ley technologiesbe slowed In part by their weapon designwhich emphasizesetirement with existing meansdeveloping and applying new concept!by advancing technology. The Sovietsmeet military requirements through the usetechnology. Hence. Sovietmore requirements "pull" thanthis does not encourage broad lech noi ogbut generally results in timely andfielded technology

Soviet advances are eipeeted hiand thc Soviets probably willoverall relative standing throughnot expect these changes In relative standingsdramatic, however. In the four technoscatlraconsider to have especially broadtechnology, computers, microelectronics, anddo not expect the Soviets lolag Fundamental changes would have toin thetr centrally directed managementand their technological base for rapidbe made in these four technologies. Suchchanges are unlikely.

b an alternative view' that. In additionadvances by the Soviets andtheir overall relative standing In keyare likely to improve their relative position Inbroad impact technologies as well. This viewon the fact lhat. In those four technologySoviets have achieved steady progress relativeUnited States over the pastears, onthat present trend* are toward narrowingand on projections of future Soviet militarya expected to call for an ioaeoaesystems. It further holds thai, inthe Soviets consider Important to theirSovietabsolute andlikely to occur.

oviet capabilily in the key technologies throughrobably will be adequate, however, lothe requirement* for new performanceilitary systems of thc evolutionary type such as ICBrvis, armor, and aimed. Whererequirements call for lhe development of ad-

hoidet, ol thu otne are tht Director. Delete InleBlrence Agency; the Atxttaat Chufofoteport men I

he Armuj; ond the Otrtttoe ol taretKcenee. Heaeeurlrri. Mo-



vanoed technological concepts, certain keywill have special significance Foreseeable advances in Soviet signal processing, along with pro iected developments in microelectronic* andfor example, have high future potential These advances arc expected to further encourage the Soviets' consideration of advanced technologicalto solving longstandingexample, in antisubmarine warfare (ASW1

B. Soviet Acquisition of Western Tcchnoloqy

asic component in the advancement of, the Soviet technical base Is the acquisition and exploitation of both Information and hardware from the West. Through thc selective aoqubilton of Western technol* ogv. the Soviets lujve realized three basic objectives:

First, the reduction of risk by following or copying proven Western design*

Second, reductionime and costs by lhe use of Western designs and technology, including production technology gnd equipment

Third, incorporation of counter measures early in the Soviet weapons development process through the clandestine acquisition of Western military-related technology during


hc fact that tlie Soviets have traditionally given high priority and devoted large amounts of resources to the acqubitton of Western technology using all means at their disposal indicates that suchf great value to them, alt hough we cannot directly measure ib impact The efforts include Urealthrough open trade channels and through student, scientific, and technological exchanges andlUceal irade charrael* that evade exportand ctandeitlne acquisition through recruited agents, industrial espionage, and communications intercepts Legal acquisitions generally have their greatest impact on the broad techrvilngical base, and thus affect military technologyelatively long-term basis Acquisitions through illegal Irade channels frequently have both civilian and military applications and thus arc Important in the near term. Theacqubillons frequently have immediate value to the military.ummarize* the most important known Soviet successes.

mong the many sources of Western technology accessible to thehe moat significant acquisv r


Table S

in lhe West in lhe Key Area* o( Soviel Military Technology

f- aad Bft-trc. and oUndeWa

Dirrctrd anargy

Cuidince and nivuntlon

Indtutrlal proomrind llinul


IBatal mo* acaoHOM ot anaaatraad MwirtiinJ caiwnaad afarnaQeasecirHmMad* acovanUooolr>Mndlmiy

Ltaal and ittnnl KQuuilloru alsnonulpmcnl lotncinU ami pnaably optical and Utn aeapoai romcaaalj. clandestine anauUUJon ol rSocvaicntaliofl on

crorfuflk-oltaHHa. Urmll para, tartan* btadat. tomputrrvalreticalc

ii aad optical cofnronrnti aorreired throwfc leaaJ and lEtcal

Legal and tllafal trade bmuMWoo. olm nartoHon ibbkh Oloral and lUndaaWipof advance! inrriial malam oanpcctraO, Inciadinc mlnlatura and laseroaptacod USmdu* terrain lafc tag radars. aamiinBou BUba. aadateral air-ao-alr aadat-rirs. ASW tn. anor svWyntona. Loral arauaamaoo narkMary lor hJ I



lining tnouv (torn*iwx-ntnrl rryosenlc oaulpiiuni through Iraa) trade.

purchases and inletbfcnc* .ceua-icra ol Wanara Dtu.ii> aimaaaj

i COO* flliBent vfadaaf HOanolno thrash total and iQrczl trade. MB* pooadthreuck lloani and legalU rorUanv and rctarlcaV ajbawtnrp-Uon plac*by eunbatis* means,nd tfirgal purefW.ot advanndanetrw dnlcn tnfontutfain ihrouch rltndntlnt- means, captured Rtrom Vietnun.

d<Wi) and MV-retard dab W

CUndantn* lOjiirMtSaa ol rnWictbrlr* detail! ol advanced hidi rapkalrca (or aoricar

OandadJa* acuW.fl.ton ofaatSon .ad Arectk- tlndiaa aqalaoaeni; vinnlrne-qoral intW. iOcsnl

Eipk*tattoo of eaptured Imaln-loUWln* radar and alrbonw intrrenpt radar. cUndestliHi aoQulsltlon of air de/nur radars and antmna daalcns lor US SAM i


lions that directly impact on Soviet weapons devcl-opment have resulted (torn ebisdestine collection and illegal tradehe Soviets also have profited greatly from the exploitation of captured Westernequipment (such as thai from Vietnam).lions having direct military impact have been inorm of weapon designs, manufacturing pbns anddrawings, components, subsystems, and In some cases complete weapon systems.

be Soviets and their Warsaw Pad allies abo have had measurablevia Illegal Hadeacquiring controlled dual-use and defense-related production technology. The delectedand evasions over the last several years areconcentrated in the field of semiconductorequipment and account forf the identified caws The heavy concentration cf semiconductor equipment acquisitions is believed to indicate Soviet efforts to improve the wholecomponents industrial sector. The coot rolled technologies being acquired by the Soviets and the Warsaw Pactevealing Indication of theirneeds, which Include, among other things, microprocessor designs and production technology, computer systems and (tinside variety of laboratory and recession manufacturing equipment.

purchases of Western equipment playrole in modthe Soviethe Soviets purchasedbillion cf Western equipment andpurchasesumber cf categoriespotential defensemateriafabrication equipment, modern electroniclaboratory and Industrial testautomated production equipment and technology.

-Such purchases, requiring hard currency, are closely controlled by the State Scientific and Technical Committeehose meeting the direct orneeds of Soviet Industry for defense purposes arc given tlie highest priority. The Soviets have alsofrom other legal soufrom open literature and overt collection.

clandestine and illegal collectiondriven, first, by the needs cf the military andindustrial ministries and. second, by thethe civilian sectors cf Soviet industry thatproduction The overall Sovietillegal Intelligence efforts are worldwide,directed, and very selective They are closely

coordinated with overt acquisition, and legitimateparticularly those efforts under the auspices of the CKNT. The USSR's efforts in these acquisitions are extensively supported by the other members of tlie Warsaw Pact.

hc CKNT abo initiates and manages thenetwork of International scientific and technical agreements that the USSR maintains with tbeindustrial nations of thc world.greements are judged to provide valuable scientific information and technology for the USSR. Thebelieve thai under these agreements their sci-enlisls are able to acquire Western technology inanner thatnd military benefit arc greatly enhanced.

cquisition of Western technology does support and broaden the overall Soviet technology base and, in many cases, provides Western technology inform that can be utilized directly in Soviet components and systems. Once the Westernare acquired, however, their full exploitation and utilization become subject to many of the sameand industrial limitations affecting indigenous developments

C. Key Militory Technologies: StCftus and Prospects


oviet computer technology has been limited by fabrication and production technology problems and by difficulties in software development The mostSoviet general-purpose mainframes andare at2 US levels as far as performance and type are concerned. The lag is considerably greater in terms of tbc quantity of these machines In use. The Soviets have produced some large-scale scientific computers that offer high levels of performance even by current Western standards.

J Central processor performance typically isigh level, but memory technology is limited. The Soviets have been slow lo rectify their software problems; improvement In Ibis area will require strength in management andrelations, areas of traditional Soviet weakness.

antiquated telephone system and lhe lack ofconununicalioni software limit Sovietnetworking capabilities.

he Soviet mtlitary will in* ihe same models ol general purpose computersivil users, particularly lor(or command and control applications, and. in some cases, for fire control applications The military sector abo will draw on civil expertise in network ins; computer systems; both (ypes of users will require off-the-shelf availability of hardware, fully developed software, and an infrastructure that can easily support both. While this trend toward the use of available civil models will grow, thc military will continue to have priority and its versions will be subjected to stricter quality control, specialized packaging, and careful componentshort, better made Thewill probably not be able to decrease the overall lag of about seven to eight years, relative to the United States, In computer technology. Indeed, Sovietlimitallons in main and auxiliary memoryand adequate software for operating systems may have an additional slowing effect. The (rend forill be for the same lag oromewhat greater one in computer technology relative to the United States

b an alternative view' that, whilecivilian consumer sector will likely quaranleebasic computer technology will continue tocf thc Soviet Unionubstantial margin,terms of technology availablelikely bo substantiallyhigh-priority areas through continued Sovietcf Western and Japanese computerhardwaic. software, and productionaddition,oviet drive to carry newtoxpected to cause thedeployed computer technology In Sovietto continue to gain relative to that ofStates.

MkrocWc Ironies

be Soviets have placed aon, and theoversees the development and productionintegrated circuits. The first Soviet military

n* hoideet of lha Hr> are Iht Dtrrclc. DtfenM Inletktrnci

.fOTCDY Ihe AtiUlanl Chief of Staff for ItileHltmet. Deoe'lium!

f Ihe Anna: end lhe Dtrttlor of mlrUVeaiv. Ilee-domnen.Mr Cms*.

application of small-scale intecralion (SSI)technology occurred innd wc expect to see military application cf large-scale Integration (LSI) in tbe. Some evidencethai the Soviets have recently stressed microelectronics production process technology at the expense of design/layout studies. Their typicalto date has been to copy US devices. Many of their own devices are designed for cocnpshbuily with Western parts, and they rely on legally or IllegallyWestern parts to supplement ihetr own base. Despite this, the latest Soviet device design capability is about ihree years behind lhal of the United Stales while the production capabilitybout nine yean

Soviel military systems designers are cxpocted to continue to use devices that are pin-for-pin compatible with Western parts, thus decreasing lhe development time for new systems Substitution of indigenously produced parts can then be made when they become available By ibehesewill probably enable Soviet electronic systems developers to design and In some cases producesystems in spite of not having domestically produced basic microelectronics trchnology. Thus, through acquisition of Wastern components, thefuture military applications of microelectronic technology may be more advanced than their general technology level would suggest

Military and civil systems designers will make increasing use cf electronically identical parts. The military devices, however, will receive specialand testing, and In tome cases will need redesign and modified production processing for radiation hardening to meet military rcquuerneots The Soviets' many problems In supporting technology, including shortages of semiconductor-glade silicon, willnot be adequately offset by their aggressivedevelopment and acquisition efforts. In the ease of mlcruelectrentes. Westernow advancing so fast that the production technology gap piobably will continue to widen. The general Soviet microelectronics technology lag. relative to thc Unitedrojected to increase.

There Is an alternativehat the effective Soviet lag in microelectronics relative lo thc United Slates is likely to be substantially leas in high-priority

- The holder, of Ihu teem are iht Dteoctor, Ihtfemee Ir. IeOlrm

Agrncv; lhe AuUttoi Chief of Ueff.

of Ike iasagsike Otrettar of Inletttgenee. Iletdtmmrlen. kit-



because of availability of microelectronicsand production technology from Japan and thc West, Thus, this view holds thai microelectronicsavailable for use will continue to lag that of the United States by an approalmately constant eamount. Tested technology is likely to gain on but not 'pass that of the United States, with deployedan unknown because of apparent Soviet choice to use provenfor survivabilitythe United Stales generally chooses to use advanced solid Hate devices.

Signol Processing

he Soviets* theoretical understanding of most aspects of signal propagation and signal processing techniaucs androbablyar with that of the West. They lag the West by five toears in thc speed of digital signal-processing cquip-ment and Its production. In many respects theirin optical data processing is on par with that in the West, and research In this and related analog equipment such as surface-acoustic-wave (SAW)probably will intensify as an alternative lo their lagging digital signal processing capability. Operating equipenenl for some applications of optical data processing of signals could be produced in three to five years. Clutter suppression techniques also lag the West because of slower implementation of digital technology. In some instances, hybrid signal processors that use both digital and optical technologies could also be expected in. There Ls an alternativehat, while the Soviets are apparently behind the Uniied States in digital processing, they havehybrid processing (potentially al least as fast as digital) over the yean and lead the United States -in that area. Both processing techniques are applicable to clutter suppression.

Ti is. therefore, not dear that the Soviets lag the Weat In clutter suppression.

oviet advances in signal pcot^ssang lechnokary inill probably Include digital processing based on advanced medium-scale integration (MSI) microelectronics technology, digital pulse dopcJertechnology, digital image formation, and pattern

hef ihu <Xeu>irector. DeferueChief of Staff for InleBlteace. Depart

theanti Ihe Direcior. IIreCorps.

recognition. For high data rate applications, optical processing could be available somewhat earlier than digital. The slight lag of lhe USSR relative to the Unitedignal processing will probablyexcept perhaps in optical processing, where the Soviets, driven In part by Iheir deficiencies in digital technology, may make some gains relative lo the United State:,

Production Tethnology

A major weakness In the Soviets' ability tonew technology In military ivsterns'lies in their production technology. In particular they generally are not advanced by Western standards in production processes where large quantities of high-technology products are cooccrned.

The Soviets have demonstrated good capability in the fabrication of heavy structures where innovative welding, forging, and extruding techniques have been employed- Titanium processing and fabrication as inais submarine pressuren example. Their industrial production,enerally marked by def iciendct In quality control automation, and mechanization.esult, Soviet production performance even in high-priority military areas has been uneven. In some cases where advanced processes are crucial to the attainment of militaiy performance objectives, as In the production of opticsactical air defense system, and In millimeter-wavethe Soviets have staeceasfully mrioducedmachine technology comparable to the level of US state of the art Still, in other areas they have been unable to establish and maintain high standards of quality control, as In lhe production of electronic componentry or the manufactureigh-bypass lurbofan engine

Production sector deficiencies result in part from the Soviet Incentive system, which rewards the fulfillment of near-term production largeu more than It encourages innovative solutions, andhortage of high-precision production machinery (such as numerically controlled machine tools) capable of maintaining precbe specifications and tolerances. Such incentives and shortages have contributed to Soviet managers' reluctance to Incorporate new technology in areas where trxdanotogy already io use will satisfy the performance requirement.

Defense hardware production technology will continue to be modern!red gradually with newproduced equipment and continued acquisition

ten Searet


ihc West, ll will continue to bethe (hod run by labor-intensive

ever, some Improvements In productivity andaccuracy will come from Ihe increased use ofmanufacturing centers and Other numerically controlled machine loots Recent large purchases of machining ccntoa from lapan and Western Europe may have already benefited some militarysectors, such as the Soviet aircraft industry. The Soviets could probably abo Increase their production significantly by applying available technology toand mechanization of production along with computer-aided design and manufacturing.

n some technology areas such as electronics, the Soviets have chosen to copy Western machinery and processes. This allows them to progress faster and at lower cost lhan if they relied on their own resources So long as they rely on copying, rather than onInnovation, they will probably remain behind the West in achieving high-yield, high-quality

here is an alternative view" that, while the Soviets will remain behind the United Stales in many areas of production technology over the near term, the increased availability of domestic and foreignproduction processes, will permit them to gain on thc West in improving the efficiency of (heir production processes. Thii view also holds that tholag may not be militarily meaningful since the current Soviet capability Is adequate to support malor military requirements.

Communications for Command and Control

ommand and control communicationsinvolve* thernekiing of technologies forand fat* computers (for the latterurvivability and reliability have been mafor considerations In Soviet communicationsdesign,n landline, high-ficquencynd very-high-frequency (VHF)means, and redundant equipment and routing have been emphasized Tlie Soviets*extending the frequency range used bysystems, applying spread-spectrumand Increasing thc sophistication of their com-

" TV ho/den of ihu are iht Director, OefenetIht AttUlanl Chief of Staff for Intelligent*.Ihtht Director of Naoal Inttttlgmet, Dtvarlmenl ofand lhe Director of InlelUgenee.

munlcatlons satellite systems. Other Soviet devel opmcnloing oo in the application of superconducting technology to circuits and antennas, research in propagation and natural nobe both in underwater acoustics and in lower frequency radio bands, and application of optical communications The Soviets in general lag the United States Inand high-Information-rale systems, high-speed signal processing, and fiber-optics-commtinications technology.

he Soviets' progress in command and control communications inxpected to profit from their efforts io communications theory and propagation and to be moderated by their general problems with computer technology. They willmake more use of synchronous communications satellites for communicating with foices at allThey will probably move higher In the frequency spectrum to tako advantage of the increased band-widths available there, and may make wider use of spread-spectrum techniques because of their greater Immunity to lamming and potential for increased cov-ertness. The Soviets will also probably increase tbe use of Icw-pn^bUity-of-litfercepr, short-duration-signal design techniques. Computers and the associatedwill, of course, continue to be developed for communications purposes. On balance the Soviet lag In communications technology for command andb expected to remain unchanged.

b an alternativen thethat, while the Soviets lag iosatellite communications technology, Ihey arc onwith the United States bt other basic areas ofcommunications technology and that iheyUnited States and are expected to increase thetested and deployedndtechnology- Distinct advantagesby the Soviets at all frequencies in terms ofof deployed equipment and in link andredundancy. Thb view holds that as Sovietand satellite communication technologyassociated signal processing technologyUS lead in basic and availablewill dlmlnbh..-

Dtreeled Energy

Soviets' capability to develop largeroughly equivalent to that of the United States They

holder, ol ihuiv DinOe. Delnure

Agenep. ike AuUieml Chuf of Staff for laaetUtenat. Daren men t

of Ike Army, omd ike Director of Intelhgenet. Haadepearttei.Corw.

have done high-quality work on all types of In

known lo be scalable lo hirth output powers. Tneir highestuevetnenLs probably are wiih carbon nvonoxide and carbon dioxide electric discharge. which have been built both in continuous wavo (CW) and pulsedith outputs probably in the megawatt (MW) range The Soviets probablyecu Id build mcgawatl-eUss CDla if they choseo so. They also have constructed large long-pubeduration) glass lasers for unknown purposes in military prolccls and are pursuing, reportedly for term inal ballistic missile defense, explosively driven iodine lasers; these programs have had no USExes riser lasers are in an early developmental stage in both the USSR and the United States. Wethe Soviets could have an excimer laser of several hundred kilowatts by (he.

e believe that in the teciirsology areas of chemical and excimer lasers, the USSR is corn parable to lhc United States While tbe Soviets may lag in CW chemical lasers, Ihclr work In pulsed chemical devices Is comparable to and fn some cases ahead of US work In ihc excimer area, the Soviets are in thc forefront of the electron beam device technology required lo pump such lasers There it an alternate viewthat Soviel work on chemical lasers for weaponsew years behind that ol tho United Slates.

oviet laser window and mirror fabricationlags that of the United States. The Sovietslo some extent on US metal foils for separating electron guns from the laser cavityeam lasers They probably are roughlyar with the United States in wavefronl correction techniques; theylag in acquisition/tracking/pointing; they appear toead in development of some suitable power sources. They may have now Ihc csuxabiUtv topace-based acq uitition/tjack Ing/pointing subsystem for high-energy UsersinalIncludingfoicroradians. but we have no evidence that they are actually developing subsystems. Wc believe Ihey could build such subsystemsapability oficroradians by lhc. There is go alternative view" that the Soviets maypace-based acquis!lion/tracking/pointing system for higbenergy lasersinal perforrmance on thc orderi.iri by thend thus Soviet weapons couldenfold Increase in energyicroradian beam at lhe same range or.

r holderatientrol Irueaqrcen


"Thf holder of ihuhe Olrtclor. IXfmtt Inftilter-ct Agency

hreefold irscrrxue in range for the same output power. Such increased perforrnance would be quite significant.


_Jthe Soviets

probably have undertaken research designed toPBW feasibility. There is an alternate view thai.


program is probably fnhich will resultemonstration of propagationarticle beam to militarily signifieanl ranges,.

"jicave open the

possibility that Ihe Soviets are further advanced. They may be in at leastulminating indemonstration for some applications ofhey are far from resolving the technical problems (propagation, power conditioning,beam-aiming magnets) that must be solved toan operable weapon, even If tlie PBW covcept Is feasible. In the radtofrcquency (RF) damage (nonnuclear eleetromagraetieeapon area the Soviets are able to build suitable power sources and antennas, and they have developed microwaveof very high peak power.

expect that the Soviet status relative toIn all aspects of laser systems will remainsame inlo. The Soviets could buildweapons by the, but there Isevidence of any activity to do so. Userough equivalence with tbc United Stateslechrrologies that will determine thePBWs is expected to continue

Guidance and Navigation

the last year the Soviets havetheir deployed force some missiles that havemodified for improved guidance

This Indicates that the Soviets have made strides tn^ the use of higher precision machinery and instruments in their production lines. The acquisition and appllea-

" 'holder of ratih*hief of Staff.Deportment of the Alt Fame.

tlon of Western-made equipment may haveto these recent Improvements.

in calibration and in errorwill further reduce guidance measurementthe Soviets' conventional gyroscopes andthe neat decade tbey abo mayselected use of electrostatic gyros andin place of conventional gyros. They haveccrrelalion sensors equivalent lo sceneUS varieties.^

They now have

adequate technology tolobal positioning satellite system Although thoy use navigationmore extensively In their land combat vehicles than does the United States, they are behind In man pack navigation and landavigation tech* notaries

Power Sources

ffortsidepower generation and conditioning technologiesfrom improvement programs on consolar cells,nuclear reactors,programs on advanced areas with highdirectnd magnetneumulative(MCGJ, pulse power conditioning, fusionThe Soviets* work In nuclear power sourcespriority and is advanced. They lead thein some power source and conditioningapplicable to directed energy. They lead Inreactors for space power, but lag infor space power.

SO. Continuous wave (CW) and low-iqlsc-fatepower supplies suitable for airborne applications al average power levels up to tens of megawatts or for space applications to several megawatts will be available to the Soviets by tbe. Higher pulse rates at peak pulse powers muchigawatt will be difficult to achieve,umber of technologies are leading In this direction. They Should be able toS-kilowatt (electric)power supplyhree-year.kilowatt (electric) nuclear power supplyive-year lifetime in. Thc Soviets appear toery wide range of riiilitary/aegosxsace power requlremenU and are

umber of alternative approaches for each type of requirement.

Structurd Motertols

In metallic materials the Sovietsough parity with the United States by the. Their steels, aluminum, magnesium, and titaniumand nickel-based superalloys are comparable^ to those used In theajor effort to exploit the potential of titanium lias given the USSR worldIn the quantity of titanium produced, inon high-temperature titaniutn metallurgy, and In some titanium fabrication techniques, especially extrusion. The Soviets' welding, forging, and casting technologies are outstanding,heir innovative work on electroslag and plasma-are refining methods, electros!ag casting, and thermotnecbanical processing. Soviet researchers are making substantial progress to close the gaps in fracture mechanics and powderTheyarge program to develop metal-matrix composites.

In the area of norunetalUe structural materials. Soviet scientists have achieved comparability with the West in their technical understanding of the behavior of materials, but deficiencies in plant and equipment, especially In the chemical industry, have hampered tbe Soviet Union's ability to apply certain types of high-performance synthetic polymeric materials, glasses, ceramics, and the newer advanced composites The Soviets have bought production facilities from the West to hasten the expanded production of thc mote important high-temperature resins, fibers, ceramics, and composites. Soviet scientists have announced development and limited application of ors^anlc-rna-trix (for example, trrapmte-fieer-remforced epoxy) composites to secondary structures cf military and civil aircraft.rogram that appears to be roughly five years behind the US equivalent

In the area of armor, the Sovieu have broughtalent io materials technoloev to bear on increasing the protection of ground combat vehicles against kinetic energy and chemical energy antiarmor munitions. The use of electroslag refined steel plate is suspected lo be responsible for tlte Improved quality of the armor noted In Soviet combat vehicles fielded in the. Laminated armor concepts have been employed In tbe frontal arc cf both42 medium tanks. The use of antiradlatlonprovides increased protection The Soviets have made concerted efforts to develop laminated materials

and advanced composites, and ihey are probably investigating armoc concents employing spatial arrays.

he USSR'sffort in lhe areas of materials processing and fabrication is eipectcd Io continue andteady commitment of icsouices throughhe Soviets' weapons are expected to benefit from their advances in metallic material, (Tut* (heir metal mains work is unlikely to have any significant impact before thee expect lo see an increased use of composites, especiallystructure* In the, thc already high level of armor protection for Soviet combatis expected to profit from the USSR's large,materials programs The Soviets are expected toonsiderable lead in fabrication technology for thick titaniumexample, in submarine


hc Soviet*ood capability in air-brealh-Ing aerospace propulsion technologies, allliougfa they lag the United States in high-thrust (particularly high bypass-ratio) applications In subsonic aircraft Their currenl work in air-breathing aerospace propulsion is aimed al high-temperature opera lion of turbine-based systems through advances in materials, cooling, and surface coating and manufacturing processes. Thc Soviets also havender way in ram effect (rarroet/scrarnjet) engines, and their fuel Inleclor, [lameholder. Inlet, and nozzle techniques arid combustion studies for these engines are advanced There also is considerable activity In combined cycle concepts, where Ihey have developed advanced ejector designs.

n rocket propulsion technologies lhc Soviets' cjoaed loop engines and some of their thrust chamber manufacturing concepts are superior to those of the United Stales. They have attained very highatio of fuel weight lo total weight) la some of Iheir large military liquid-ptopellant rockets, have investigated all nozzle concepts employed in lhe United Stales, and have done comprehensive propel-lant research- They have major programs covering all aspects of solid-rocket rxopulston, arid future advances in this area are expected to be rapid

hc Sovietsontinuing program devoted to the development of high-powered propulsion syi-lems for their nuclearhey have devel oped uquld-roetal-cooJed reactors and possiblyrect-cycle system as alternatives lo the more com-

mon pressurirrd water reactors for submarines. Thelass submarine hasT

ppeed* in execs* ofnots and has aplantorsepower/ton ratio (nuclearper Ion of propulsion plant) probably significantly greater than those of US nuclear-powered attack submarines

he Soviets' lead in itorable liquid-rocket propulsion for missiles will continue into. Serious combustion instability problem* thai tbcy have encountered in Ihc design of large-thrust closed-loop engines (greaterillion pounds of thrust, for cample, for space booster use) may hinder further development of thb techrsology, evenajor Soviet effort to understand and solve these problems continues The Soviets' solid-propcllant propulsionbout five yean behind that of the United Slates; however, thelosing. They may be catching up in area* of materials technologyrelated to propulsion such as fiber-reinforced materials for motor cases and nozzles Their lead In horsepower/ton ratio demorrstrated inlass bably coniinue through.

Nuclear Weapons ondlosives


here ii extensive Soviet HAD on both acoustic andensors for antisubmarine warfare. Improved active sonars based on new, powerful low-frequency sound sources could be deployed in ASWn-the neit decade or so Allhouah SovielIn'lowed acousticbout eight years behind that of the United States, no sensor technology brcakthioughs are required and Ihis reseaich could lead io improved operational ASW systems in the-

he Soviets are also engaged in extensive RfiD of nonacoustic ASW systems


hc Sovieu lead the United States in someof radar sensoris. ovcr-the-horizon back-scatter radar and real apcrtuie space-based radar. They abo lead in millimeter wave tube technology and are comparable in microwave tubes and componenU.

he Soviets' past high-priority attention to some areas of ASW ond radar sensor technologyxpected to continue. They could develop space-based Tadlrs for detection of largo aircraft, such as those capable of carrying cruise missiles, by the, and smaller aircraft in. Their lead In millimeter-wave technology will probably continue. Active sonars and towed acoustic arrays for detections beyond the first convergence0 nautical miles) will probably become operational in. An alternativehat the Soviets will not haveoperational passive-towed-array sonar systems with consistent or reliable detection ranges in excess ofautical miles (that is. approximately onezone) against either current or future USby the" Operational microwave

holder of ihuhe tXreaor of Neoel Imtetllgettee.he Not*.

udor and infrared ladlomelry systems for ASW mayossibility for tbeproved feasible. The Soviets will reins in roughlyar in ladarwith the United States intond will probably make some gains In acoustic ASW and electro-optical sensors. We expect them to makeIn nonacoustic ASW tensor teehrvology butprotect their standing relative to the United Slates.

n electro-optic sensor technology, lhe Soviets have lhe necessary competence to support production (at least in limited quantities) of high-quality devices, including charge-coupled deviceshey have fabricated such detectors Irom visible through long wavelength infrared in linear scanning arrays andmosaic staring sensor formats Visible spectrum detector arrays consisting of up0 elements have been produced. They probably could develop by then Earth-imaging camera based on CCD technology havingoot resolutionfrom an altitude ofilometers, but an oiierational lyrtem would not be available until

he Sovietsapability to design andquality optical systems. Soviet high-sensitivity and moderate-sensitivity black and white aerial films areequal In image quality to those produced in the United States; however, we have not identified any Soviet film that approaches the best US high-resolutson film. It is estimated that tbe Soviets can achieve an optic minor sire for space upimit ofeters (or single minors In the. They may also be able to achieve, for smallerurface control accuracy, using adaptive optica, of0 wavelength over tbc same period.


akes projectionscries ofrysterns that may reach initial operational(IOC) in. Tbe protections are In areas where new Soviet systems perfc*mance could have signtficanl Impact on what we believe to beSoviet requirements or deficiencies.rograms, known or estimated Soviet systemtrends, and the availability of relevant key technologies serve as the bads forrojection. For each new system protected, significant attributes, performance, or minion capability arc established to the extent possible, and thc key relevant technologies


identified. The proiections do not deal withof individual systems or with systems reaching IOC innd contributing to total Sovietcapability in

systems performance projected forpepends on when reoulred key technologyavailable and when inyclefreeze the incorporation of availableInto systems design. Thc incorporation ofdiffers for the two. Sovietin evolutionarys to incorporatetechnology into systems designs, wiih thefreeze on technology occurring some two tointo theycle forsystems. Thus, forhere Isof roughly five toears between theproven technology and its appearancen advanced concept systems is tiedto thc development of new technology oruse of unprovenimessystems will vary considerably, depending ondevelopment and application of newto meet program goals, Soviet technologyInnd. In some cases,available for use inystems.

ctivity includes asignificantICBMs and aircraft,fit the fundamentalin. We are able to protectthese systems inn the basis ofof typicalctivity alsoumber ofthat are investigating advancedWc are able to protect certain of theseconcept feasibility is notmilitary systems forn the basisadvances In key technologies, as Inof ASW. But wc cannot project thefforts where technologicalunknown lo the United States and probably toas well Wc expect some increasedadvanced concepts in. The USSRable to develop significant new concepts basedsteady advances which we now foresee in

are many uncertainties affectingof systems types and performance char-

acteristics. Whenever poaslblc we base our protectionseapon lOCs on evidence of development thai has already begun Even when this evidence is available, the very early status ofrograms and the major decision points that they mustpass adds to our uncertainty. We are also unsure of the role that Soviet resource expendituresill play inecisions.

The primary basis foroviet systems performance is Soviet capability in the key technologies projected fore are oftenhowever, of Soviet plans to use availablefor specific lystoms or concepts. Improvedperformance is not nrscessarlly dependent on thc availabilitypecific technology. Novel application of less advanced technology can often enhanceperformance and miliiary capability as much as new techricJogy The Soviets have been Innovative In tbe past in tbe use of technology already available to them. Different design approaches or philosophies (stressing quantity over Quality, for example) have compensated for techraologscal shortcomings io some past. Our uncertainty in this area could affect the validity of out judgment* of projected new performance

A large source of uncertainty in our projections lies in the use of past trends. Trends in Soviet systemsecond part of our evidential basis for protection ofeasily change. Further, the relationship between past trends andweapons ins often unclear.

In view of our uncertainty, the new system* and performance protection! summarized In tables6A. 6R. andhould be viewed as representative.are made at three different levels, depending on our judgment of the probability of occurrence of the new system and performance in:

A high probability of occurrence projection Is one we view as having significantly better than an even chance of laking


A medium probability of occurrenceIs one we view asoughly even chance of occurrence. I



A low probability of occurrence protection is one we view as having significanlly less than an even chance of occurrence. C

lOt. We also have evidence of Soviet activityto other advanced concepts!.

I These activities

conceivably could produce significant military results in such areas as:

ADM concepts based on high-energy lasers or even particle beam

Weather and chmatc rncdification.

Biological effects of nonionizingradiation

Communications through ionospheric,ce*>besic, hthosphcric. or even pa fa physical effects.

Laser propulsion.

Hypersonic cruise vehicles.



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