Created: 9/2/1980

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cqrssmnt Cwday hetuaar. zhs qcverrrenz end szrikerabk tlili and Poland's vnxediazs labor crijio. The ccreinent, however; oil* ushertrice of political turrailacuta-last several years. ssV

During this post-strikeeakened party Leadership can be expected to engageontest of will and guileefiant and politically conscious working class. Political dissidents, emboldened by the workers' success, will seek tofjive thc new froo trade unions political direction. tsmW

The Soviets, whether or not consulted about the final accord, will be watching events with greatcion, and Polish-Soviet relations will be tense. The other East European leaders, already concerned about possible ripple- effects, will probably heighten security but also be more attentive to popular grievances. ^eemT

The accord allowing free and independent trade', unions will differentiate Poland even more from its Warsaw Pact allies, giving lt an independent workers' lobby to go along with ah independent Church andfarmers. For the time being, therefore, Poland will moveore liberal and open society. eTeass

The TradeV

The regime conceded the issue of free trade 'inions because it realized it was running out of time and It tried, at the same time, to remove thesting from this concession by obligating the new unions to recognize Communism and the party as tlie source of authority. These provisions were necessary.to sell

the agreement to the party leadership and perhaps to Moscow, and to provide a_ lever for influencing theof tho unions.

The regime, clearly startingosition of great weakness, will seek to focus the activity of the dw unions on local economic issues and to prevent the unions fro<^osing as guarantors of political

Keeping the unions out of the political area will, however,ifficult.and conflict-ridden process. The strike leaders and perhaps the workers in general are very conscious of the political power they can exert and for at least some time will be flexing theirey problem is that union pressure on economic issues can lead to politically sensitive discussion of national economicdefense spending and Polish-Sovietareately in Warsaw, Slfe


The regime will have to dedicate more resources to consumption bothonsequence of the economic promises It: has made and in reaction to the mere existence of the

tional Soviet and/or Western aid. Western be reluctant to lend to Polandigorous reform and austority measures.

workers' lobby. But Poland cannot meet the costs of increasing the workers' standard of living andthe country's balance of payments without addi.^

bankersdoption of

The events of the last two months and the terms of the strike settlements do not augur well for economic reform, however. The emphasis in the agreement on higher wages and benefitsrarevork of greater pricewill not promote greater economic efficiency, essentialolution of Poland's economicurthermore, the leadership changes late last month apparently place direction of the economy in the hands of advocates of managerial improvements. Their approach, howeverf rejects introduction of important elements of

2 September

market-type economies. Stefan olszowski, forwas recalled last week to the top leadership andvoice in economic ear that he opposes

wage and price flexibility. This essentiallyapproach to economic reform has not in the past

significantly boosted_ efficiency in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern Europo.

The Leadership

The party leadership has teen weakened and divided by the crisis, and the lengthy process cf implementation of the agreementenerate' even more pressure and conflicts. It is doubtful that Gierek can ever play the leading role he once did, and he probably has already come under.strong pressure to step down. The Soviets, however, mi^ht for now at least want Gierek to remain in placeign that the party leadership has not been undermined by the concessions. Nevertheless, political leadership will probably fail increasingly to the younger generation including Olszowski ana btnnislawarty secretary whoajor i'ole in tho crisis. -


Polish dissidents will probably increase their activities and gain new adherents. They have long argued that society should make demands of its rulers. The dissidents have advised the workers over the oast two months and will try to help thc fledgling unions, butthe regime willetermined effort to prevent the dissidents from giving political direction to union

The Church

The status of the Church will probably not be much affected. The regime undoubtedly needed and appreciated its calming influence, but the Church did notey role in resolving tho crisis, and the regime probably feels under no great compulsion to grant the Church many


of its longstanding demands. Because Polish Catholicism

runs deep, the Church probably did not lose any stand'nq

with the population even though many Poles initially saw

its statements as siding too closely with*the government* position, mm mm


elated acknowledgement of the settlement, its refusal to permit details of the accord to reach

audiences, its attacks over thernent* in Poland, and its indirectGi6rek S weak indicate deep Wlth^cna accords, their implication for Polish

howev<jr' *Ppear to have given grudgingl? accords "nd haveeasure of endorsementhe regime's tactics in rtsolving the

J have apparently decided that howeverthe concessions on Independent trade unions

SSual^-SlSfsmmlZ were mmmfjlk to

de-use the immediate crisi: fBBfaJ

lively, however, that over the next few months the Soviets will be watching for signs yloldin9 any of its authority to the new unions.

bhmaUtai" Pressure on Gierek anS the Polish party to interpret the concessions narrowly

h8Ce The limited SovTet

^gst "arsaw to restrict the scope of the new union's charter to economic and social issues. (

likelyue ^rther sternsituation in Poland. The

s4udonvmMlAwd. under an authorl-

Jn"East European, not.to view: tldlcation^.iet -Uowing or*"




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