IRAQI POLICY TOWARD JORDAN: DRIFTING TO A COLD WAR?

Created: 2/29/1996

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

RELEASE

DATE:6

Intelligence Report

of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis

6

Iraqi Policy Toward Jordan: Driftingold War?

Iraqi-Jordanian relations have declinedost-Gulf war low during the past seven months. Husayn Kamil's defection precipitated the downturn, which led to strengthened Jordanian enforcement of international sanctions againsteduction in Jordanian trade with Iraq, and unprecedented public Jordanian support for the Iraqi opposition. Despite these setbacks for Baghdad, the regime has refrainedelligerent response to keep open Us economic lifeline through Jordan, Iraq's acceptance of UN Security Councilould lessen Baghdad's economic dependence on Amman and probably increase the incentive for Saddam to challenge Jordan,

Iraq's Lifeline to the Outside World

Iraq has reaped substantial political and economic benefits from its ties to Jordan, its single largest financial source, since the Gulf wan

Iraq exported crude oil and refined product to Jordan0 million5 in exchange for goods and services.

extended Iraq additional credits0 million last year.

NBA

Jordan is ihc key lo Iraq's access to ihe outside for diplomatic and commercial ties because UN sanctions prohibit direct air travel to and from Iraq.

These benefits have led Baghdad to slow the decline in relations with Amman despite unilateral Jordanian decisions to cool political and economic ties to Iraq:

Amman harbored defector Husayn Kamil from early5 to

Inordanhipment of Russian-built surfacc-to-surface missile parts destined for Iraq.

Pressure may be building on Iraq to shift policy on Jordan:

Baghdad's Policy Options

Acceptance of UNould reduce Iraq's economic dependence on Jordan and increase its range of options to change Amman's behavior. Iraqi retaliatory moves lo settle accounts with Jordan could range from manipulating Iraqi economic assistance to Jordan, to sponsoring terrorist operations against Iraqi

ot Nur fc'fm and Sooih Ailin Anaiyiit.

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opposition elements inside Jordan, to military posturing in western Iraq.

Saddam probably wouM be more confident of his ability to withstand the economic consequences of reducing or cutting off Iraqi sales of oil to Jordan if UNere implemented Under che resolution. Iraq would gainillion in annual earnings from oil exports via Turkey and Umm Qasr for food and humanitarianigure ihat accounts for deductions for UN operations in Iraq and the compensation fund:

Under these circumstances, Saddam probably would be more confident of his regime's ability to manipulate oil supplies to Jordan, projected to total0 million this year. Saddam might, for instance, stop, and later resume oil deliveries to induce Jordan to back down from its anti-Iraq policy.

Iraq would be better positioned to sever land links to Jordan. Iraq probably could make up most of the lost trade coming through Aqaba, Jordan, by increased trade via Umm Qasr and Turkey, j

A drastic cot in lies to Jordan would involve significant costs for Baghdad- Iraq would stand toaluable economic network in Jordan.

Iraq has more forceful and riskier policy tools it can employ against Jordan. Saddam could, for example, order terrorist operations against Iraqi opposition figures in

[Although less likely, Saddam could target Jordanian officials, particularly in the face of increasing Jordanian suppon to the Iraqi opposition. Saddam's assassination attempt against former President Bush tn Kuwait3 demonstrated Saddam's willingness to strikeout against adversaries.!-

ISiiddam might resort to military moves in wfsjcci Viq Although Sadftair: hai his hands full containing Kurdish and Shia insurgents in Iraq's north and south, respectively, and maintaining comrol in ceniral Iraq, he has military optionsis Jordan:

Iraq couid deploy more sophisticated fighter aircraft such as Fla,

ando airbascs in the west such.hereozen olderircraft are normally based.

Baghdad could mount paramilitary incursions into Jordan, claiming that such operations were mounted in hot pursuit of smugglers to reduce the risk of promoting outside .military intervention while fueling fears in Amman.

Baghdad might move ground forces into western Iraq under cover of an exercise to get Jordan's attention, sending Republican Guard mechanized and armored units to western Iraq ostensibly for maneuvers.!-

In taking such actions, Baghdad would try to gauge US and Israeli reactions, fearing possible military action against Iraqi ground forces.

Outlook

i

undoubtedly wants topreserve his economic and political lifeline toworld. Io the near term, Baghdad is likely to continue its muted approachprovocations by Amman while it attempts to improve ties toin the region to hedge against further strains in the relationshipIf UNere implemented, Saddam probably would belhat the economic consequencesardline policy toward Jordan couldalthough not eliminated. Saddam probably would be more willing locosts in the face of further perceptions of Jordanian provocation sucha more prominent public role for the Iraqi opposition in Jordan, aon Iraqior the deployment of US forces to Jordan for

military exercises. |

Original document.

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