NIO/NESA REGIONAL FORECAST REPORT OCTOBER 1995

Created: 10/27/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Addressees

National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

Regional Forecast Report

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1. NTO/NESA convened Intelligence Community analysts onctober to review recent developments in Afghanistan and Egypt. Those discussions are ounvnarized below.

Afghanistan

2. Analysts do not see progress on opposition unification efforts, which are hampered by differences over who would hold key positions that would be installed if Rabbani is ousted by tho opposition. The opposition agrees that tho presidency would go to Taliban, but other key positions are disputed, and other factions do not want to concede too much to Taliban. Dostam is not participating in joint military operations before the oppositioneal on sharing political power; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is staying out of the fray but probably would join if he believes he can win an advantage.

3. Many analysts expect that stalemate will be theat least in the short term. ey factors in the fighting, in addition toof whether the opposition will unite, will be theloyalty of pro-government forces. Taliban has succeededcommanders to change sides (often by buyingbut commanders under Rabbani and Masood, whoethnic backgrounds (Tajik) than the Paohtunbe harder to persuade than other commanders.

4, Kabul. The battle for Kabul has turnedloody offonsive with no clear indication that the government will be more flexible on negotiations with the opposition. Rabbani may hint at more flexibility as winter approaches to stretch out the

SUBJECT: NIO/KESA Regional Forecast ReportS

opposition until it can no longer maintain forces in the field. Taliban tactics, meanwhile, are focused on infantry operations. Afghan commanders typicallyifficult time integrating armor and artillery with infantry, and much of Taliban's equipment in still located in southern Afghanistan.f

S. Western Afghanistan. Although the government has not foreclosed on the option ofounterattack in western Afghanistan, government forces in tha west do not have the personnel, organization, or coordination toerious attack on Taliban. Analysts agreed that Inn, which faces the United States in the Gulf and Iraq to the West, probably sees little to gain from intervening directly in Afghanistan and is not making preparations for offensive moves. Iran does not want to antagonize Pakistan by committing forces to the. fight but is making diplomatic efforts to obtain backing for the Rabbani government from others, such as India and Pakistan. Taliban apparently la not interested in confronting Iran in the West;

Government, already faced with unrest elsewhere in Central Asia, would like to minimize the prospects of more instability flowing out of Afghanistan. The Tajiks, preoccupied with their own conflict, can facilitate the transit of supplies from Russia into Afghanistan but are unlikely to devote their own resources to the conflict. The Turkmen are susceptible to pressure from Iran and have sold food and fuel to commanders allied with the Afghan Government. Turkmen and Uzbek policies are also influenced by longterm economic concerns--in particular, the desire-to create new transport routes for oil and gas; both countries have discussed pipeline routes through the region with Pakistan. The key player to watch is Russia; Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and especially Uzbekistan see the Afghan problemussian prism.

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humanitarian crisis in Kabul, particularly because the-city's population has increased since last winter and the fighting will limit heating fuel and food shipments to the capital. rawdown in UN assistance will sharply limit reserves of such supplies.

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