CHINA'S WARY APPROACH TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Created: 1/16/1996

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

6

fntelligence Keport

Office of East Asian Analysis

China's Wary Approachomprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Chinese leaders approach Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations cauuously and with suspicions thai other countries will iry toreaty to gain advantages over China:

Chinese negotiators also proceed with extreme caution because Beijing has rruniirial experience in developing arms control regimesimited number of arms control specialists.

China's prior negotiating behavior suggest to us that the leadexsnjp naT waited to review other countries' proposals before finalizing their negotiating positions

in October that China would not support conclusion of the treatypecific date but added thai China will honor its commitment to work toward completionreaty by the end of the year. China plans to conduct more nuclear tests6 than it has ever completed in one year so thai it can finish testing nuclear warheads for missile systems under development.

Chinese negotiators are trying to prohibit the use of National Technical Means (NTtVf)rigger for on-site inspections (OSI) and to proscribe what Beijing would view as unnecessary, excessive, or overly intrusive inspections. Based on Beijing's approachTBT and other arm control regimes and statementshinese nuclear weapons industry arms control expert. Chinese leaders are concerned about uneven enforcement of arms control regimes, and attempts to collude against China:

Chinese arms control negotiators' statements show that Beijing does not want NTM to be usedrigger for OSIs because it views NTS! as discriminatory. The Chinese are corvcemed that the United States can monitor other countries' tests at lower yields lhan any other nation, as well as evade the monitoring capabilities of other- .

Geneva. Beiiing instead advocates developing the CTBTs International Monitoring System so thai it has rhe capabilities necessary to ensurehina's approach to the CTBT suggests to us ihat Beijing, at most, would accept NTM's use ir Beijing could vetc inspection* that arc triggered by NTM inforrnaiion.

continues to support, the "green light'" approach toBeijing's objective of guarding itself from "excessive"inspections suggests to us that iPmsghtredprocess if China could Mock inspections based on

Based on Chinese Conference onnegotiators positions andcontroleijinr; as determined to

preserve its nuclear deterreni by maintaining the reliability of its nuclear stockpile and to constrain other countries' ability to improve theii nuclear capability relative to China. According to Chinese Conference on Disarrnarnent negotiators'eijing is still evaluating ihe US zero-yield testing proposal. The Chinese nuclear weapons indusiry representative on die Conference on Disarmament delegation, however, noted die similarity of zero-yield to China's position of "no release of nuclear energy' and stated thai Beijing will agree to the proposal:

is concerned because the United States lias more testing experience, and it judges Washington has solved its safety and reliability problems and can take better advantage of

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iivaii' experts.

[China would agree to

1 TheM. tt-.lonftf Sywem will beTBT and willcotta* isiMiworkofimk.iydioacuuilic. and

inrlionitor fTTBT hlheretvre The CD dxltfiani are mil wutline out jn

on whatwill be imkxlcd indIhey will he totaled.

'The "Keen lisM* ipi- '< require* CTBT Executive Councilbefore initiation of OSb. Under Ibe "red hiht" approach, requeued OSb are conducted unko Ihc council npttifrctUv ilixpivtivci

the US zero-yield proposal if Washington shares stockpile maintenance technology to improve warhead safety and reliability.

docs noi expect Washington to share this infomutlon and therefore plans to propose further restricting the

zero-yield formula by also banning all nonnuclear tests of nuclear weapons.

[Beijing isrovision allowing Peaceful Nuclear Explosions tPNfcsj because it wants to retain the option of using such explosions for civilian purposes. Qiinesc officials have suggested io US experts that China wouldan on PNEs if there were provisions for its future renegotiation--indicating that Beijing nughlaxariaUy provide other concessions in exchangeemporary ban.'

international support and will ulti

tiuiow concerned JtXxjl ihe reliability ofnocleai weapons than (heir talcty.

"Beijing realizes its PNE proposal has no ly back away.

Original document.

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