MEMORANDUM
heillion Rwandann Zaire. Tanzania, and Burundi show no signs of returningwanda under present circumstances, accordingide variety ofheir condnucd presence In the camps poses the following risks:
Regional Slab!lity. Elements of Ihe former Rwandan regime. Ami y. and Inienharaweforces that spearheaded the genoclde--control the refugee camps and use Chen as bases to launch raids beck Into Rwanda. These raids provoke the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Army to lash out at the Horu population Inside Rwanda. Kigali has almost certainly sent small recorirulssince patrols into Zaire and has repeatedly told US officials that It does not rule out attacking the camps. Hutu lighters have also fueled growing ethnic violence in the Mails! region of eastern Zaire. Mi; Hindi's Tutsi-dominated Army suspects thaiind in refugee camps In Burundi, Zaire, and Tanzania stipport Burundlan Hutu Insurgent groups; the Burundi Army has atacked refugee camps In Burundi and sent troopt Into Tanzania and possibly Zaire.
Saps Scam Resources. The tntemarJonai eccua unity spends upward* ofillion tday to provide assistance to the refugee camps hi Zaire. Tanzania, and Burundi. The US Government has spent0 million on refugee relief since the outbreak of the crisis In
Hinders Other US Political Goals. Kigali points to the attacks emanating from the camps to deflect criticism of its human rights record.resident Mobutu has used the refugees to break out of hit diplomatic isedition and some ZairUns fear he will use the crisis to postpone nadona) j
Z Efforts by the International Community to cue assistance to the camps andto Rwanda or other areas of the host countries could spark one of the following
Violent Confrontation. Rwandan refugee leaders probably will vlotendy resistto move refugees from (he camps. Hum fighters would attack Western relief officials and any security forces meant to guard them. Zalri an troops would take advantage of camp closures to loot the retugees andn the confusion, refugees might head to other refugee camps. Alternatively, camp leaders night order todr foflowers to piutvely resin efforts to move (hem. calculating thatfarnational relkJeocnmuruty-urider pressure from the tntemillonil media-will resume aid If refugees begin to die.
Marls! Squared. In our judgment. Rwandan refugees wQl probably scatter to urban and rural areas In eastern Zaire and western Tanzania to ertabllih now ethnic strongholds, as they have done In the Maslsl area. They would likely engage In ethnic cleansing of Indigenous Zalriani and Tanxanlans. cause large-scale
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dip!icemeni. tndevere humanitarian need In hard-tc-reach interior Areas of Zaire and Tinzanla
Human Wava Return. There0 percent possibility. In our Judgment, that the Rwandan refugee leadership could successfullyail reaim to Rwanda, using hundreds of thousands of civilian returnees toutu invasion force.eturn would be forcibly resisted by the Rwandan Army and could spark violence on par with4 civil war. j |
n our Judgment, Impairing the ability of (he refugee leadership to organize resistance to rcrecUcmeotey yadable Qui could Increase chances for success. Id the past, swift unexpected actions have successfully disrupted the control of refugee leaden. The Zairlan Army's destructive looting of several refugee camps list August forced leaders to flee the camps and persuaded0 mostiy women and children refugees to return to Rwanda. Similar unexpected, coerdve actions by (he Burundi Army have sparked spikes inudden and total assistanceipecially for the camps north ofhat are totally dependent on aid agencies for water-coupled with inducements to move to Rwanda or new camps In host countries might so disorient camp leadere that they would be malleable to working widi humanitarian workers toward resettlement. Refugee leaders, however, would be certain to swiftly exploit any delays or hesitationsescrtlemem campaign to rally widespread Hum
Prospemuccessful reseitlemem program would also Increasearge. well mined, heavily armed security force could be mobilized to:
Protect Western humaruuuian workers from hostile refugees and ill disciplined Zairfan troops.
Deralne roads mat aid workers take to (he camps and (hat would carry refugees back to Rwanda or to new camps In host oountrles.
Perform crowd control.orce should also be equipped and trained to perform riot control operations.
Perform police functions to detain troublemakers.
Confiscate arms that refugees attempt to smuggle from existing camps to new camps or back into Rwanda.
Block refugees from moving toward other camps or ncnrocslgnsjed resettlement areas.
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Original document.
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