Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General
Report of Investigation
IG)
Frcdaick P. Hitz Inspector Central
A.R. Cinquegtana Deputy Inspector Central far Inoesttgations
flPPROVID
All portions
classified SEflt&T
^EfZReT TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE OF
PROCEDURES AND
The
Graphic: Guatemalan Military Structure and
Graphic: Guatemalan Directorate ofStructure and
Guatemala Cm Station's Roles am?
FACTUAL
Graphic: Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Union
Map: Guatemala Key Individuals, Events
Chronology: KeyEventsPertaimne to
GENERAL
Why was the cia in Guatemala? How did therelate to and support the policies ofStates Government? Was there anbetween the mission and the
Graphic Occupation ot Senior Guatemalan
Dm cia Staff personnel direct, participate in,the killing. citizen michael devlnecapture, torture, subsequent disappearancedeath of guatemalan insurgentBamaca
Dm cia personnel violate ant federal criminal
Does available reporting establish thatalpirez
killed Michael DeVine? Thatalpirez killed
What information did cia report concerningand Bamaca cases? Wasimely and accurate mannerexecutive branch officials? Dmor distort any of this
What was the nature and reliability of thewhom the cia obtained informationBamaca, Alpirez,
Chart Key Assets and ContacteB^portine on
Alpirez, DeVine,
how well dm the agency's guatemala cltyLatin America division handle reportingBamaca,
What actions did cia take after receding
egaiionst ire/.
involved in human rights
Did the Agency appropriately inform Congress about
Alpirez
^alleged involvementa
rights
did cia keep. ambassadors to guatemala app^oprlately_lnformedmkm
ALLEGED involvement in human rights as
did cia personnel send classified documents relattng to guatemala to former agency employees so that those documents would not be available to investigators reviewing agency activities in
Why did the Agency not provide information it collected to the devine family or bamaca's american
dm cia's failure to notify doj of reportsin narcotics trafficking hinder theability to determine whether the DeVinewas politically motivated? shouldhave been provided to doj underreporting
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CONCLUSIONS
61
EXHIBITS:.
C Congressional Notification Requirements
Rights Reporting Requirements
Obligations to the
G. Passage of InteUigence, or Other Information, to Private Citizens
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF
Report of Investigation guatemala
GUATEMALA:IG)
INTRODUCTION
n, basedeview of relevant intelligence reporting from the CIA Station in Guatemala, Acting Director of Central Intelligence Admiral William O. Studeman asked the Inspector General (IG) to investigate the relationship between CIAandXuatemalartArmy officer Julio Robertodmiral Studeman requestednvestigation include CIA's knowledge of Alpirez's alleged involvement in the kiUing. citizen Michael DeVine and the possible death of Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez.
On; Congressman Robert Torricellirote to President Clinton alleging that the CIA had been involved in two murders in Guatemala innd that the US. Government had misled the American public about the two cases. According to Congressman Torricelli, the first case involved Michael DeVine, an American citizen who had lived in Guatemala forears and was abducted by soldiers and killed onnix Guatemalan enlisted men were convicted and sentenced toears in prison in connection with the DeVine killing. Inuatemalan captain who allegedly ordered the killing was sentenced toears in prison, but disappeared the same day.
The second case cited by Congressman Torricelli involved Efrain Bamacauatemalan insurgent leader who was reportedly captured by the Guatemalan Army on. He was allegedly held at several locations, tortured, and reportedly killed. According to Congressman Torricelii's letter, the US. Government's official claim that it did not know who was responsible for these Icillings was untrue. DeVine and Bamaca, said TorricellL were both "murdered under the direction of Colonel Julio Robertouatemalan intelligence officer, who wasontract with the CEA and remained on its payroll at the time of theoth the State Department and the National Security Agency, said the Congressman, were aware that the VS. Government "was compliritous in these murders and continued to mislead the families and the American public."
The Congressman's letter stated that the indication of "direct involvement by the CIA in these murders" leads "to the extraordinary conclusion that the (CIA) is simplyout of controlontains
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what can only beriminal element. The (CIA] dearly has too many resources at its disposal and too littlehe Congressman asked the President to secure all information relating to these cases; determine whether there was any deliberate attempt to mislead the Justice Department (DoJ) or any. agency;horough DoJ investigation; and fire any US. government employees who misled the public about these matters. At the same time. Congressman Torricelli released his letter to The New York Times.
n, the President directed that the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)overnment-wide review of allegations surrounding the death of DeVine and the disappearance of Bamaca, as well as any related matters. The IG investigation initially requested by Admiral Studeman was broadened to include the SSCrs questions, the IOB's questions, and other issues that developed during the public debate that followed Congressman Torricelli's allegations. Foray5 letter from Congressman Torricelli to the IG reported allegationsormer Drug Enforcement Aciministration agent that DeVine was killed because he hadarcotics trafficking operation run by Colonel Alpirez. According to this second letter from the Congressman, the CIA concealed this information from DoJ and prevented DoJ fromolitical motive for the killing, thereby constituting an obstruction of justice.etter from the Chairman of the IOB asked the IG to look into allegations that relevant documents were being sent to former Agency employees to conceal them from investigators.
SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION
he Acting DCI'sequest for an IG investigation, as recorded5 memorandum, referred to "recently obtained information suggesting that I
Ipirez may have murdered the Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamacaccordingly, the IG was requested to address the Agency's
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relationship with Alpirez; its knowledge of any involvement by him in human rights abuses, including the DeVine killing; the Agency response to derogatory information about Alpirez, including that related to the DeVine and Bamaca killings; whether CIA complied with relevant statutes, regulations, and procedures pertaining to human rights and congressional notification; and whether different actions would have resulted had current authorities been in effect.
he FebruarySCI letter added more specific questions regarding when and how the congressional oversight committees were informed that Alpirez may have been involved in the DeVine killinj
lese questions, and the expanded allegations of CIA complicity in the DeVine and Bamaca killings that were made by Congressman Torricelli on, required the IG to expand
inquiryand
what the
the killings, how that information was handled, and to whom and when it was reported.
nhe President's IOB issued Terms of Reference for its inquiry, as directed by the President, into any and all aspects of the DeVine and Bamaca cases, as well as related matters. The Terms of Reference also included any intelligence rdating to the torture, disappearance, or death of any US. citizens in Guatemalancluding Sister Diana Ortizriffith Davisnd Nicholas Blakeurther, detailed questions were raised by the IOB concerning dissernination practices, the US. intelligence relationship with Guatemala, and the process for validating sources of information. The CIA, Department of Defensend State Department IGs were asked to address these matters in their invesbgations insofar as they were applicable to those agencies.
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sh^et
jy, at the request of the IOB, the investigation was expanded further to include allegations that CIA was concealing documents by sending them to former employees.
G Reports of Investigation are usually issued individually and present each case independently. Because of the nature and scope of the issues presented in connection with the Agency's activities inulti-volume approach is desirable to present the individual cases, but an overview is also necessary to present the overall portrait they present of Agency activities in Guatemala.
Volume One, withhrough G, presents such an overview. It describes the context within which the events occurred, provides the basic facts of the individual cases, discusses the general allegations that have been made regarding the Agency and the activities it has conducted in Guatemala and presents conclusions and recommendations. The Exhibits outline the legal and policy framework within which the Agency operated.
Volume Twoeport of Investigation concerning the alleged dispersal and concealment of CIA records related to Guatemala. Volumes Three through Six present findings regarding questions raised by the ADCI, Congress, the IOB, and the OIG itself. Each volume focuses on one subjectamaca; andThese individual cases feature common elements and relate to similar themes. The individual volumes are presentedanner that allows consideration o! their
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separate findings, but the overview promotes consideration of the interrelationships between them. Volume VII includes an Index and Glossaries.
he scope and nature of CIA'she remainder of the intelligence reladonship referred to in the IOB's Terms of Reference, will be the subjecteparate investigation and will be describedeparate IG report. Also remaining to be investigated are the questions of (a) what information was available to CIA regarding other human rights abuses. citizens in Guatemaland (b) the Agency's relationshipinvolved in human rights abuses in Guatemala.
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
he investigation initially involved two investigatorsInvestigations Staff of CIA's Office of Inspector General,in January by
employeesBy
early April, the IG hac^xpanaedtneTffort^^ an investigative team ofnvestigators. An5 tasking memorandum from the IG to the Deputy Director for Administration, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Deputy Director for Operationseputy Director forechnology, General Counsel, Director of Congressional Affairsirector of Public Affairs, and the Executive Secretariat requested that all information _thepossessionoHhose components that related to I
(Alpirez, DeVine andvailable to the OIG. The components were also instructed to provide any additional relevant information as it was acquired or identified
esult of these requests and additional searches,0 pages of materials were reviewed andnterviews were conducted. Interviewees included present and former DCIs and DDCIs. DDOs, Division Chiefs, Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of
SJttjRET
Guatemala City Station, and Station officers. Regulations and guidance for the collection and handling of information relating to human rights abuses, reporting to Congress and Ambassadors,
_ 'ere
reviewed. Relevant records of the intelligence oversight committees were requested and reviewed insofar as they were available. Present and former members of the committee staffs were interviewed. National Security Council, DoJ, State Department and DoD personnel in the US. and at the Embassy in Guatemala were also interviewed, asormer Ambassador, Mrs. DeVine and the private investigator who investigated the DeVine killing. Efforts to interview Alpirez in Guatemala proved to be unsuccessful. Throughout the investigation, substantial efforts have been made to cooperate with other related investigative activity by the IOB and the Inspectors General of the National Security Agency and the State, Justice and Defense Departments, as wellpecial inquiry by the Justice Department.
BACKGROUND
The Setting
entral America. From thes through thes, the CIA's activities in Central America took place within the context of wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador which spilled over intoeal, though dimmishing, threat of Cuban subversion;ong civil war in Guatemala. The.
roughout the region. By, the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador had ended and peace negotiations were underway to end the diminishing civil war in Guatemala.
SgeftET
uatemala. Within Guatemala, politically inspired violence wasilitary-civilian relations were tense.
This YkAtvce fprs backFor example, (he insurgentsthought tobten responsible foruiiiiurion of US Ambassador Gordon Meln.
rr
During this period, all factions of Guatemala's political spectrum used violence to further their political and economic interests. Far-right groups, in league with rogue elements of government security forces, were responsible for bomb attacks in Guatemala City and used assassinations to destabilize the Guatemalan Government. The leftist insurgency also engaged in economic sabotage, extortion and murder of military commissioners to bolster its political fortunes. Moreover, prior to0 presidential election, political parties engaged in kidnapping, assault and robbery to raise campaign funds and settle political feuds;
Guatemala's emergencearcotics transshipment and production center contributed to the deteriorating security situation;
Military perceptions of government paralysis in the face of escalating violence and labor strife, as well as the weak civilian response to the insurgency, triggered two abortive coups during President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo's; and
nstability took the form of an effort by then President Serrano to expand his power by suspending the Guatemalan constitution. This effort collapsed when the miliury divided, which led to the appointment in3 of Ramiro De Leon Carpio to replace Serrano.
he Guatemalan Military Underf the Guatemalan Constitution, the Guatemalan military is the guarantor of the nation. By long-standing practice, the officer corps serves as guarantor of its own status and position. The overwhelming majority of thefficers in the Guatemalan military enter through the military academy and usually progress in rank by their class.orps, they support their classmates and friends and they support the military institution against external challenge. The senior officers in the Guatemalan military today were often field officers during the period of heaviest fighting and worst human rights abuses priorhose senior officers are particularly sensitive to human rights charges against their colleagues, in parts because many of the senior officers engaged in questionable conduct as field officers. (See graphic,xplaining the structure and key personalities of the Guatemalan military during the relevant period.)
The Directorate of Intelligencef the Guatemalan National Defense Staff is the national intelligence organization of the Guatemalan Government. Through (a) its headquarters in Guatemala City, (b) staff officersn regional military Commands, and (c) intelligence officerst the base or local level,ollects and analyzes information on armed insurgency groups, narcotics traffickers, opposition political parties, potential regional adversaries, and otherfficers are under the command of their respective military zone or base commanders but also report directly ton Guatemalaollection capabilities include an informant network, interrogation of captured insurgents, as well as technical collection and investigative and surveillance teams. (See graphic,ollowing, indicating the structure and key personalities ofuring the relevant period.)
fficers are generally selected from the best military academy graduates or particularly capable field officers. The core ofs composed of officers who spend their careers in intelligence and consider themselves the elite of the Guatemalan military. They identify themselves as members of then Indian term meaning "village elders."
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nother important intelligence organization with links to the military andas the Department of Presidential Securityommonly referred to as ther Presidential Security Service. This organization, made up largelypersonnd, reported directly to the President and the Presidential General Staff.he DSP was disbanded and replacedmaller Center for Analysis. This organization was to be an interim intelligence organizationvilian-led national intelligence organization could be established. The DSP and its successor are significant because US. policy was toemocratically-oriented intelligence seryiceandtheC required to be in close touch with themM
Alpirez associated with it.
Guatemalan Directorate of Intelligencetructure and Leadership
/ tow MjBurtRIVASRicn
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Division
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Administrative-Division
Intelligence SehooF'Trjinir.fj Division
eVine/Bamaca/Alpirez. MichaelS. citizen who had lived for some years with his wife near Poptun, Guatemala, was killed onariety of motives for the killing have been proposed since that time. Six Guatemalan soldiers and one officer were subsequendy convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their involvement. However, the officer, Hugo Contreras,
escaped from custody the day of his sentencing andugitive.
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, also known as Comandante Everardo, was one of the leaders of the Organization of People in ArmsRPA is one of four Guatemalan leftist groups fighting against the Guatemalan Government under the umbrella of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary UnionSee following URNG Structuralamaca was reported missing in2irefight with Guatemalan Army forces near Muevo San Carlos in Western Guatemala. Contradictory reports about his fate have circulated ever since. Agency sources have indicated2 that he was captured and cooperated with the Army. Recent reports indicate that senior Guatemalan officials believe he is dead, but his body has never been found.
While the death of DeVine and the disappearance of Bamaca were separate events occurring two years apart, they have recently become linked by reports that
Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was mvoTved in both cases. At the time of the Agency's first contact with Alpirezeajor and Chief of the Presidential Security Department. Because his responsibilities placed himosition where Agency interaction with him would be required for official purpose
Guatemala National Revolutionary Union (URNG)
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG)
Armed Forcra (FAR)
. Revolutionary Oration of People In Arms (ORPA)
Guerrilla Arm/ ol the Poor IECP)
.Parly (PGT)
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wm
AKA Ttbko Umuiu
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nhe Stationifany information relating :
DeVine killing. In response!
|report that the GuateLiaian munary naa Been mvoivea in 'ine killing and was also covering up its involvement. The resulting Agency intelligence report servedasis for US. Government demarches and the partial suspension of US. military assistance to Guatemala.
hadH
present at the interrogation oJ^Bvme^inis report contradicted earlier information regarding the specific circumstances ofilling and who was report also contained
itAJpuezhad been acting erratically, had killed guerrilla captives and had been transferred for refusing to retract statements about military involvement in the DeVine killing. Neither source alleged that Alpirez actually killed DeVine or that Alpirez orderedilling.
mission of a
he1 report that Alpirez had been present at the interrogation of DeVine led to Station and Agency actions to
officers ini
crimes report to DoJ.
were advised of the allegations about
ritten crimes reportinformation was submitted in the formetter fromGeneral Counsel on. Neither
informedqqj referral
at this time.'
lore man two
eport, inhat
Alpirezhad personally interviewed
Bamaca aner rus capture and that oiricers fromookOnreportedtold by third parties that Bamaca had been captured aliveby Alpirez and others, but was now dead.that he had been told
military officers had said thai
was known within the senior ranks of the Army that Alpirez was the individual who killed Bamaca.
Guatemala: Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca, Key Events and Locations
nMiii bound*"
M hi
Baa* '
0 91
i.
0
Astu of Guethll* Activityf
GwrrtUi Arm. o( iM Pow (ECP)
RoohiuoufT OrfinUof ihe PcopUAmi(ORFA*
R<bdAmdFonM(FAX)
se^et
Chronology: Key Events Pertaining to Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca
events
DO guidance on handling human rights cues issued.
Augustl
killed
trovidrtmplicating the military in DeVine kiUingover-up
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CHRONOLOGY (Continued)
Oct;
EVENTS
Headquarters disseminates Octoberf^eport that AlpUex was present it interrogation of DeVine
DoJ officials are briefed and provided formal cru October/Ball tuitions.
Bamaca is reported captured
June 16
Staff requests information on Agency's human rights policy and
reporting
CHRONOLOGY (Continued)
EVENTS
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GENERAL FINDINGS"
was the cia in Guatemala? How did the cia mission relate
to am) support the policies of the united states government? WAS there an inherent tension between the mission and the policies?
he CIA was in Guatemala to collect foreign intelligence, the requirements for which were established by the Executive branch in response to National Security Council directives and Presidential findings. The Agency was also engaged in supporteries of Administrations.'
owever, this resultedilemma for the Agency and Guatemala City Station. In order to fulfill its responsibility for collecting information concerning the human rights policies and practices of the Guatemalan military and intelligence services, the Station was required to establish and maintain very close contactsilitary organization thatong history of human rights abuses and military personnel who had engaged in such abuses.
misled the congressional oversight committees or deliberately decided to withhold information from them.
does available reporting establish that alpirez killed michael DeVine? That Alpirez killed Bamaca?
PeVin.e. No evidence has been found of any information available to the Agency indicating that Alpirez actually killed or ordered the killing of DeVine. Only the1 report alleges that Alpirez was present during the interrogation of DeVine. The implication of that report is that the interrogation led to DeVine's death in Alpirez's presence. In reaction to this implication, the Agency promptly initiated action toF and report the allegations to DoJ.
However, there are substantial grounds to question the credibility of this report. For one thing, it is at variance with most other available evidence regarding the DeVine killing, mduding that gatheredrivate investigator hired by DeVine's wife. In fact, one officer and six enlisted men were convicted in Guatemalan courts for the killing. Alpirez has never been charged with any crime although it seems dear that Alpirez partidpated in the Guatemalan military's cover-up of the DeVii '
econdly, the Station officer who acquired the information from an Agency source in1 states that the disseminated report differs in several respects from the irifbrmation the source provided him and that the source's meaning was nowhere near as precise as has been imt
open the question of whether source meant Alpirez had actually been "present" at the DeVine interrogation itself; or only "present" at the base on or near which the interrogation took place; or, if present at the interrogation itself, was present at the specific point when DeVine died or at some earlier
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time. This uncertain meaning and the questions that have been raised by the Station officer regarding the origin of several portions of the report cast doubt on its credibility and value.
Bamaca. There is one Agency report that Alpirez killedtation source reportedly stated in5 that hehe had been told byit was known within the senior ranks'" ot the Guatemalan Army that Alpirez had killed Bamaca.
ubstantial body of Agency and non-Agency reporting contradicts the5 report. This body of reporting indicatesilitary unit withinommand captured Bamaca in2 and that Alpirez was involved in his initial interrogation: Several reports indicate Bamaca was subsequently taken away for further interrogation by Guatemalan military intelligence. There is much contradictory reporting about Bamaca's eventual fate, but senior Guatemalan officials apparently believe he is now dead. Prior to the5 report, the Agency had no information indicating Alpirez had killed Bamaca. (Agency human rights reporting requirements are explained ino this Volume.)
What information did CIA report concerning the DeVine and Bamaca cases? Was the information disseminatedimely and accurate manner to appropriate executive branch officials?
did CIA suppress or distort any of this information?
ouman rights issueswere of major concern to the Statioi
| During this period, the DO at Headquarters, issue
related to the DeVine and Bamaca cases.f these specifically discussed the circumstances surrounding the DeVine killing and nine specifically related to the capture and subsequent treatment of Bamaca.
J
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reporting provided much unique
the first credible, direct indication of Guatemalan military involvement in the DeVine killing and its cover-up;
the initial information concerning the capture of Bamaca; and
the first indication that Bamaca may have been alive immediately after his capture.
reporting on the DeVine and Bamaca cases wasfactor. diplomatic demarches to theThe reporting detailed the involvement ofmilitary in human rights abuses generally andefforts to evade and conceal its responsibility forit provided insights into the interaction of |
civilian authorities and the military on humanduding internal Guatemalan political dynamics that resulted from the pressure being applied to the Guatemalan Government by. regarding human rights policies.
without exception, the reporting on the DeVinecases was deliveredimely manner to thein the Executive branch. There were severalwhere information was delayed or disseminated inmanner due to concerns about source protection.key customers suchot made aware of
hile there were delaysew days in certain instances, most infonnation relating to Alpirez, Bamaca and DeVine that was collected by the Agency was provided to
appropriate Executive branch consumersimely manner. Some of these delays were due to the process necessary to convert sensitive Station reportsore appropriate format for dissemination. Other delays, for example]
here wasack of systematic analysis at the Station and Headquarters regarding the chain of accjuisition of information provided by sources. Both the Station and Headquarters frequently failed to verify facts or pursue
eview of the relevant reports fromumber of cases where, either at the time orkey reports regarding Alpirez,open to criticism. Some examples
include:
Onhe Station reported to Headquarters information obtainedource alleging that Alpirez had J (been present at the interrogation of DeVuTartdanother source alleging that Alpirez was acting bizarrely, was violent and had killed guerrilla prisoners.
Alpirez was in the area at the time, not that Alpirez was actually present at DeVine's interrogation as is stated in the report to Headquarters and the disseminated version.
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Inhe same] ^reported to the source that Bamaca was alive, just as former guerrillas were saying publicly at that time; and
- Onheld another Guatemalan officer who reported to an Agency ource that Bamaca had committed suicide.
Neither the Station nor the Division made any effortthe conflicts in
regardingate before disserrunating the report, nor did the Station note the differences in earlier reports from the same officer in the disseminated report. In addition, the information was at least fourth-hand when acquired by the Agency.
Alpirez
eports were received between8 and2 that fiernay have somehow been involved in narcotics trafficking. These reports were vague, uncorroborated and not to have been sufficiently credible
until the1 allegations that he was present at the
WHATACTIONSD^^CLA^KE AFTER RECEIVING ALLEGATIONSWERE INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS
he Agency received the report that AlpirezTuOTeen present at the interrogation of DeVine. The Station and Agency reacted to this information as follows:
The report was submitted to HeadquartersDeputy Chief ofthe matter to
the attention of the Chief of LA Division;
The report was disseminated to officials at the White House, State Department, DIA, Federal Bureau of Investigations, DoJ, and to the Ambassador in Guatemala on
Justice Department representatives were briefed onnd wereormal crimes report, based on the October report, on.
le same senior tiaals, specifically including the then-DDO, also accept responsibility for not doing so. (Agency obligations to notify the committees are explained inf this Volume.)
lpirez-PeVine. No evidence has been found to indicate that the Agency formally notified the congressional intelligence oversight committees of the1 report that Alpirez was allegedly present at the interrogation of DeVine
| There is evidence that some Du omcers wno were awaieoFthatreport itKOgnized that it should be reported to the oversight committees and made preparations to do so at that time. Virtually all of the key officers were familiar with the most contentious aspects of Central American programs throughnd were well aware of the need for congressional notification and the consequences of not doing so. However, those preparations did not result in such notification.
o evidence has been found that any Agency personnel
advocated not notifying the committees of the1 report
nor that any Agency personnel decided not to inform the committees.
Such notification was especially pertinent since the
report was treated so seriously by the Station and Headc
ledormal crimes report to Doll
| No satisfactory explanation has beenaipotif,f 1
report accomplished, but
those who were involved state that it was forgotten in the course of business when no one took clear charge of ensuring that notification was made.
n at least two specific occasions in the year after the Agency received the1 report, congressional interest in Guatemalan human rights issues came to the attention of senior LA Division and Agency managers J-
| Further, in the summerompilation of ten numan rights reports on Guatemala was prepared to be shown to SSCI staff members after DO representations that it was receiving good reporting from Guatemala regarding human rights. The1 report alleging Alpirez presence at the DeVine interTOgabon was included and that compilation was reviewed by senior LA Division and DO managers prior to being shown
Bamaca. In that re told by
had said that "it was known within the senior ranks" of the Guatemalan military that Bamaca was killed by Alpirezl On, CIA officers met with representatives of the National Security Council, State, the Vice President's office, and DoJ to discuss the reportemarche to Guatemala. The Agency officers raised their responsibilities regarding notification of Congress at that meeting. The CIA personnel were asked to defer
congressional notification pending development of an Adrrurustration strategy and the forwardingemarche to the Guatemalan Government. On Februaryhe Agency was permitted to notify the coinrnittees and notified HPSCI Chairman Combest and Ranking Democrat Dicks. An SSCI staff member was also briefed on Februarydditional information was provided to the committees in the form of documents and briefings through February and March
to theThe framework forbetween the COS and Ambassador containsconflicting principles:
the Chief of Missioncting under the direction of the President, is responsible for coordinating and supervising. personnel in his country; and
the DO is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods. (This framework is explained ino this Volume.)
guidance interpreting this frameworkits flexibility and has placed considerablethe COS to apply the requirements based on the local situation
The guidance advised that, if misunderstandings arise and local efforts faU, the issue could be raised with Headquarters but that "this should be rarelyhe DO considers COS's to be experienced officers who should be able to resolve conflicts between the written guidance and the needs of the Ambassador.
Inmbassador McAfee becamethat she had not been shown key intelligence and thatwas engagedattern of protection of programs anddenied her mformation relevant to the policy judgments shemake. This perception that CIA was suppressing informationin part, by the conduct of the then-COS.
nuestion was raisedresidential press conference alleging that classified documents were being sent by mail to retired Agency employees in order to conceal them from investigators. The Chairman of the IOB, on, related this allegation to the Guatemala investigation and requested that the CIA IG look into the matter.
10S. No evidence has been found to indicate any effort by CIA personnel to remove, dispose of, or destroy classified. Agency documents to avoid any investigation. The allegation may be attributable to the Agency's provision in5 of copies of classified documents concerning Guatemala to former Directors of Central Intelligence for background purposes in order to assist them in responding accurately to inquiries from the media.
Why Dm the agency not provide information it collected to the DeVine family or Bamaca's American wife?
he DeVine family andmerican wife acquired substantial information about their respective concerns from private sources, the Guatemalan Government and the US. Government. The Agency's mission is to collect information pertaining. foreign policy and other interests abroad for analysis and provision to official consumers. While the Agency collects information regarding terrorism generally, it is under no general requirement to collect information regarding threats or harm to US. citizens abroad or to disclose clandestinely collected information to families. citizens who may have been murdered, captured, imprisoned, or are missing abroad.
SBOawT
information about assassination threats or harmcitizens can be mdirectly conveyed through Stateand Agency-derived and reported information mayas background and to verify facts conveyed inAmbassadors Stroock and McAfee and Mrs. DeVineAmerican wife, Jennifer Harbury. Freedom offrom Mrs. DeVine and Harbury are currentlyby the Agency according to standard procedures.
DID CM'S FAILURE TO NOTIFY DOl OF REPORTS IMPLICATING ALPIREZ IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING HINDER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ABILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEVINE MURDER WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED? SHOULD THE REPORTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO DOf UNDER EXISTING CRIMES REPORTING PROCEDURES?
5 letter to the CIA Inspector GeneralRobert Torricelli statedformerAdministration employee" alleged that thewas politically motivated, and that DeVine washe hadrug operation being run byRoberto Alpirez. The letter also suggested that CIAbe guilty of "obstruction of justice" if they concealedwhen the1 allegations that Alpirezat the interrogation of DeVine were referred toof Justice.
t appears that2 of Titlef the US. Code is the statute referred to in this letter as granting the United States the ability to prosecute foreign nationals for crimes against American citizens abroad when such crimespolitical" element. That provision, appearing inB ofs part of the codification of the Antiterrorism Act2 provides criminal penalties forS. national who is outside the United States. However; the murder. national overseas only
iolation of that statute and confers criminal jurisdiction. District Courts in cases where the Attorney General certifies that the murder was intended to coerce, mtimidate, or retaliateovernmentivilian population.
f CIA officials had iriformation relating to the DeVine case that would have assisted the Attorney General inetermination that DeVine's murder was intended to coerce, mtimidate, or retaliateovernment or civilian population, such information should have been provided to DoJ with or following the referral. However, there is no indication that Agency officials either had or withheld any such information from DoJ and therefore there could be no obstruction of justice on that basis.
Six reports have been identified that contain information alleging that Alpirez might have had knowledge of, or have been involved in, narcotics trafficking. None of the reports constitutes direct evidence of such involvement. (These reports are summarized in2 of Volumet the time of the referral to DoJ of the1 allegation that Alpirez was present at DeVine's interrogation, the Agency had two and possibly three of these reports in its possession. One was from DEA, one from the DAO, and one was acquired by the Station8 but was not disseminated outside the Agency, apparently becauseack of corroborating information.
None of the six reports suggests that the DeVine murder was linked in any way to drug trafficking, or/more importantly, had as its purpose coercion, mtimidation, or retaliationovernment or civilian population- No evidence has been found to
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indicate that any CLA official intentionally withheld these reports from DoJ in order to prevent or hinder the Attorney General from certifying that the DeVine murder was politically motivated or for any other reason. Finally, DEA reports that it has located no additional information in its files to indicate that Alpirez was involved in narcotics ttafficking.
urthermore, it does not appear that CIA hadto advise DoJ of the information contained in any of theProcedures established by the Attorney General and thethe Agency to report to DoJ certain information CIArelates to possible violations. law. Theindid notiolation.
law. Nevertheless, two of CIA's three reports were disseminated in intelligence channels. law enforcement agencies. The other CIA report did not implicate Alpirez in illegal activity at all. The remaining three reports originated in other agencies, which had the responsibility to act on the information the reports contained. One was from the DAO. Two were from DEA, an element of DoJ, and it is one of these that clearlyiolation. law.
CONCLUSIONS
IIS. The conclusions set forth below are repeated in the volumes relating to Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca, |
Agency Purposes in Guatemala
gency programs in Guatemala during the pei luestion wereconducted in furtherance of duly approve<
_|that were duly authorizedTbythePresidentTrevi^ oy the National Security Council and reviewed and funded bv the Congress.
Complicity in Deaths of DeVine and Bamaca
o evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employee had prior knowledge of, directed, participated in, or condoned the interrogation or killing of DeVine. No evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employee had prior knowledge of, directed, participated in, or condoned the reported interrogation, torture, or killing of Bamaca.
wed ant
he1 report alleging thatresent at DeVine's interrogation washould have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and disseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor Headquarterserious effort to verify the allegations contained in the1 report and Headquarters did not follow-up sufficiently on its initial efforts to have the Station do so.
imilarly, the5 report alleging that Alpirez had killed Bamaca was also based on questionable information and should have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and disseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor
Headquarters made serious efforts to verify that report and Headquarters did not encourage the Station to do so.
Congressional Notification
he Agency should have notified the congressional intelligence oversight committees in1 about the allegations that Alpirez had been present at anogation that resulted in the deathS
reporMrtreporiing TunirffaToiuoTnecc
committees should
the prompt and serious actions the Agency took on the basis of that sort, in reporting to DoJ and I
A Division orncers intended to provideommittees, but neither those officers nor senior Agency managers ensured that this was done.
nhe oversight committees were expeditiously notified of the only report alleging that Alpirez had been responsible for the death of Bamaca. While notification was laudable, it should have been made clear that there were competing versions of what happened to Bamaca, and that the5 report was sketchy, third-hand hearsay, and unconfirmed. Furthermore, when it had become clear in4 that there was congressional interest in Bamacas fate, formal notification of the reporj that Alpirez had interviewed Bamara^^J
should have occurred.
he Agency provided! the oversight committees and participated during vano hearings and briefings of committee staff I
Ambassadorial Notification
he Station did not keep the Ambassadors appropriately informed in certain instances. Concerns about source protection and possible threats to Agency equities in its liaison relationships appear to have been the causes of some of these failures.
assadorStroody properly notified inthe Ambassador was
provjaecnruormation about the military's involvement and cover-up in the DeVine killing and was preparing toemarche.
mbassador Stroock was not properly notified inallegations
A
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recerTe^POTlr^Hpire^wa^prelerTiatin^ interrogation of DeVine.
l^^rtformaticmprov^ by Agency assets was responsiveincluded significantnuman rights issues in Guatemala, including the DeVines fate, and the reactions of
political and inilitary officialslic^nitiatives in this regard.
owever, in certain instances, concerns about source protection or possible threats to Agency equities in its liaison relationships appear to have been the cau; iniorma tion fully and
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tation reporting regarding human rights issuesunsubstantiate^eports from possibly biasedhp DeVme and Bamaca cases.
Station, LA Division and the DO should have made stronger efforts to validate the information and place it in the context of other reporting, analyze the biases and motivations of the sources, and ensure that consumers of the information were advised that there were significant questions about its validity and hearsay nature. It also appears that LA Division and the Station gave insufficient attention and consideration to the possibility that Station asset reporting on Bamaca's fate was based upon deliberately false informatiot
The Augusti<si:nr.i
a substantial part of what. Goverrurieritlcnewafaom^ficial Guatemalan involvement in DeVine's killing. It also served as part of the basis for at least. Government demarche to the Guatemalans and the partial suspension of US. military assistance to Guatemala.
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Referral to Department of Justice
A Division and OGC acted prudently inrompt referral of the1 allegations about Alpirez to DoJ. However, OGC should have probed more thoroughly to determinereliminary inquiry whether or not there was any basis to the allegations. In addition, having made the referral, OGC did not properly record or monitor the matter, or adequately respond to DoJ requests for further information.
Analytical Responsibilities
o factual basis has been identified for
^conclusion in an analysis presented to then5 that Alpirez was at least "the intellectual author" ofeath. That analysis was also flawed because
heprimary responsibility
was not made aware by DO officers of the4 report
interviewed Bamaca or that Alpirez I
was reportedly present at the mterrofaTTonT? uevme.onsequence, he was not able to include that information in briefings to senior State officials and HPSCI and SSCI staff members in4 or in thelHuialytic reports that were disseminated to the Ambassador and NSC and State customers prior to
ix reports have been found that allege that Alpirez had knowledge of or was involved in narcotics trafficking or other potentially unlawful activities. None of these reports establishes any connection between narcotics trafficking and the DeVine murder, nor does any of them indicate that the murder had as its purpose coercion or mtiznidation of, or retaliationovernment or civil population. Neither has other evidence been found to indicate that Agency employees, were aware ofonnection or purpose.
Thus, there is no support for the contention that Agency employees engaged in an obstruction of justice in connection with the1 referral to the Department of Justice.
Dispersal or Destruction of Records
evidence has been found to indicate that anydispersed or destroyed records to prevent them fromby investigators. It appears that this allegation mayits source in an Agency effort to provide copies ofto former DCls in order that they might be ableknowledgeably to public inquiries relating to Guatemala.
DO Records System
in the DO records system ledailure to
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recommendations
eneral. The following areas have been identified in the course of this investigation as requiring the attention of Agency management and are addressed in this section:
Congressional notification;
Ambassadorial notification;
Selection of Chiefs of Static
collection and reporting responsibilities;
Human rights reportinj
icai runcnons;O records system.
The paragraphs that follow constitute the IG's best judgment as to what should be done in each area, but we recognizeanagement review of the issues involved may develop different and better approaches to improving current practices and policies in each area. The most important message we are conveying is that the identified areas require management's attention and remedial action. Thus, these recommendations should be viewedramework for further deliberation and development of responsive reactions in each area, notrescriptive list of actions that should be taken as stated. However, we strongly believe that the Overview Volume, with Conclusions and all Recommendations except the individual accountability section, should be made available to Agency employees in order that they may be fully informed and apply the lessons of this investigation to their own situations.
Congressional Notification. This investigation has shown that in the DO thereredisposition against sharing information with Congress despite repeated statements by the Agency's leadership that Congress needs information to perform its oversight role and has the right to such information. The DDO should work to replace this biasredisposition that favors sharing information.
The DO should reaffirm that the Agency has an obligation to ensure that the Congress is kept fully and currently informed about Agency activities. The Director should make it clear that each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office is responsible for determining,ontinumg basis, which matters within their areas of responsibility should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. Clear procedures should be established to ensure that such matters are reported.
Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office, in conjunction with the General Counsel and the Director of Congressional Affairs, should recommend criteria for the DO's approval that are applicable to their areas of responsibility to govern which matters will be reported to the intelligence oversight committees.
ach Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office should require their managers to reviewontinuing basis which matters within their areas of responsibility meet the established criteria for reporting to the intelligence oversight committees. In addition, each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office shouldormal quarterly review of their activities to determine which matters, within or in addition to the established criteria, should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees. As part of this process all employees should be given the opportunity to identify matters that should be considered for such reporting.
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Functions. DI analysts responsiblefinished intelligence and conducting briefingspolicymakers should be given access to!
HHIthat pertains to their areas of responsibility. Trie DDIestablish standards that ensure that DI analysts consider all relevant information so that inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete statements are not incorporated into DI intelligence products or briefings.
Records System. The DO should intensify its effortsthat' Headquarters and Station personnel are supported byand information management system that willdependable and timely access to aUarticular individual or sue.
ccountability. This investigation has established that there is no basis for several of the most significant allegations that have been made against the Agency and its employees relating to its activities in Guatemala. Unfortunately, the investigative and political furor that was launched with these allegations and that has consumed much of the US. Government's valuable time and energy for the past several months could have been avoided or reduced if gency employees had performed more capably in reporting the events in question.
evie^vofAgencyactivities relating to the Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca^^HflilllHmatterseneral failure to adhere to the professional standards in collecting, reporting and analysis that the Agency expects from its personnel. The causes of this are puzzling. It may be that closer scrutiny or higher standards are now being imposed on the workforce. There are many possible explanations which we will not venture here.
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hatever the reason, from recruitrnent to reporting; from corroboration to processing; from validation to analysis; from congressional notification to crimes referral, the facts demonstrate performance that is not as professional or competent or sound in its judgments as the Agency and. Governmentight to expect. It is not that anyone engaged in intentional wrongdoing, but that so many errors were committed along the way. Agency management also must be faulted for the failures of Agency personnel that are identified in this Report of Investigation.
any officers contributed to the problems and shortcomings described in this Report, but certain officers had special responsibilities and played significant roles that separate them from the rest. Although there is no evidence to indicate that they were involved in the specific events under review here, the level of professionalism that prevailed in the Agency must ultimately be laid at the feet of the most senior Agency managers, DCIs and DDCIs during this period. In addition, the names of individual officers who should be held responsible for specific deficiencies have been provided to the Director for his consideration and action.
CONCUR:
Frederick P,
Inspector General
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I
BLANK PAGE
ONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS*
f the National Security Actsa) requires, "to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection of unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitivehat the Director of Central Intelligence "keep the Intelligence Committees fully and currently informed of all intelligencether than covert actions, that are carried out by CIA. In addition.f the National Security) provides that "the President shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States" and that "the President and the intelligence committees shall each establish such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Title."
The requirement to keep the Intelligence Committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities carried out by CIA (hereinafter "fully and currentlys one aspect of the provisions governing congressional oversight of intelligence activities that originated in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscalhile the provisions were amended and recodified by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscalenate5 accompanying1 Authorization Act provides that the provision requiring that the intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed "maintains obligations imposed by current law."
The meaning of the fully and currently informed requirement was discussed in nearly identical language by Senate Report0 thathe Intelligence Oversight Actnd House,hathe House version of the bill. The Senate and House Reports state that the phrase "fully and currently informed" was adopted from the
'Thiiegulatory and policy (ruidinoi rotating to Agtncy obligation!.and ttport inJornurtonuman ftpMi abuioi ha* boon prepared wf tho ClA Office ot (rapooor Conaral.
Atomic Energy Acttandard that served well the needs of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for overears. The Reports go on to say that "the responsibility of the Executive here is not limited to providing full and complete information upon request from the Committees; it also includes an affirmative duty on the part of the head of each entity to keep the committees fully and currently informed of all major policies, directives, and intelligence activities."
Reportxplains actions taken by the Conference Committee to reconcile and incorporate the oversight provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal1 and provides additional explanatory comment on the meaning of the provisions. With regard to the provision that nothing in the Act was to be construed as authority to withhold information from the intelligence committees on the grounds that providing them with information would constitute an unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources and methods, the Conference Report states:
Tht ranfenra expect that mutual agreement on theto protect vital intelligence sourcei and methods may result in decisions that certain informatton, such as the idem* ties of covrt agents,ot be furnished to the select committees in pellicula/ circumstances. Although differencesoccasionally arisen under the current procedures, and may arise on future occasions after the enactment of this statute, it is the view of the conferees that, as In theust be resolved on the basis of comity and mutual understanding. Moreover, both branches agreed that the select committors continue to have the right to obtain Information they require by subpoena."
he National Security Act was amended to place responsibility on the President, in addition to the DO and the heads of other intelligence entities, to ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States. The role intended for the President appears to be broad, contemplating the establishment of policies that ensure that the statutory requirements in the'bill are implemented.1 amendments left undisturbed the preexisting authority of the President and intelligence committees to establish procedures necessary to carry out the congressional oversight provisions of the Act, including the requirement that the committees be kept fully and currently informed. Since that Act became law, however, no procedures have been established by the President or the intelligence committees that relate to this obligation.
Executive, United Statesrovides inhat the duties and responsibilities of the DCI tothe Congress in the conduct of its responsibilities forof intelligence activities are as provided inRegulation
^mHHRHH repeafc the substancerovisions in, including the requirement to keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities conducted on behal' egulation
guidance with and staffs of the Congress. This regulation states that "decisions on reliability of Agency information are made by the Deputy Director concerned or designee in coordination with OCA based upon the general responsibilityember or committee or the specific subjectommittee inquiry or investigation."
A3 Inspector General Report of Inspection concerning the Office of Congressional Affairs and the Agency's Interaction with Congress examined the subject of providinginformation to Congress. The report, which did not make any formal recommendations, noted that 'although the provision of information to the intelligence oversight committees is one of the Agency's important responsibilities. Agencydid not identify any formal guidelines for decisions to provide or deny information requestedongressionalhe IG Report went on to note that "currently in some parts of the Agency, the process for responding to requests for information from the oversight committees appears to be influenced by persistent cultural bias against sharinghe Report noted that the inspection team "believed that "this bias should be replacedredisposition that favors sharing information unless withholding is approved by the DCI or disclosure would entail an unacceptable risk of irreparable injury to core Agency interests, as may be the case with the disclosure of agent or source identities or equally sensitive
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Vhile the inspection team was told that any decision to deny information to the Congress would require the DCI's approval, the majority of the team believed that Agency regulations were ambiguous as to who has authority to deny information. The majority of the team believed the regulation should state clearly that denial of information to Congress requires the approval or concurrence of the DO.
Other Agency policy pronouncements have addressed the requirement to keep the intelligence committees fully and curr< informed.
reiterates trus statutory obligation, noting that it is to be carried out "consistent with Constitutional prerogatives of the Executiven addition, the Agency has published and circulated widely since at8 an eight-page pamphlet entitled "Briefingection entitled "Guidelines for Congressional Briefings the pamphlet states thatIA officer in contactommittee, an individual Member, or apresent information that reflects the following: "candor, correctness, completeness, andhese elements have come to be known in the Agency as "The Four Cs."
Candor Be sure that the information you provide is, to the best of your knowledge, true and accurate.
-Completeness: Respond to questionsull and forthright manner; avoid conduct that could give rise to criticism that your audience "did not get the right answer because it did not ask the right questions."
Correctness: If you have provided informationriefing that is incorrect, or if you have omitted something significant, see that the right information is provided as soon as possible. OCA will transmit the corrected or updated information to the Member, committee, or staffer.
Consistency: Our responses to Congress are based on established guidelines which are summarized in the pages that follow.
The first guideline that follows the explanation of "consistency" is entitled "analytical vs. operationalhe guideline states that analytical information may be provided to any Member, or committee, or staff member with the requisite clearanceegitimate reason for requesting it. The discussion goes on to state :
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"information about operational activity, excluding specific source identifying data, is provided only to the oversight committees."
In addition, the Office of Congressional Affairsengthy paper in thevs entitled "Guidelines for Contacts witht appears that this OCA paper predated the Four Cs pamphlet and its guidelines concerning the obligation to provide certain information to Congress are more limited in scope. For example, in explaining the termhe statement is made that
It is not enough that testimony be Accurate; it must also be complete. Agency ofBrials should not responduestionarrowest possible answer. Instead keeping In mindprotection of sources and methods and other issues identified in these guidelines. Agency offidals should be forthwnung in respondinguestion and should attempt to answer It with an informative, completeEmphasis added).
In addition,eading of "sources andt is stated that
Sources are readily described to oversight committees in general tenns
Agency officiaU should not discuss the specific sources of
xcept in unusual circumstances and with advance approval. Such exceptions generally involve cases where there is credible evidence of illegal or improper activities.
It does not appear that these guidelines were circulated outside of OCA. However, the qualifications they contain concerning intelligence sources may have served as the basis for the statement in the Four C's Pamphlet that "specific source identifying data" was generally to be excluded from the operational information provided to the oversight committees.
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>rovided guidance for release of DO intelligence information to the congressional oversight committees. It dealt with procedures for releasing information in response to requests, not with any general requirements to notify the committees in the absenceofarequest. This^Bwas replacedevised version
EXHIBIT D: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS"
There is no statute. Executive order, or Agency regulation that, per se. requires CIA to report human rights violations to Congress Executive,, of1 states that intelligence activities are to be conductedresponsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded."
EXHIBIT E: STATION OBLIGATIONS TO THE AMBASSADOR*
Suinmary. The legal framework for the relationship betweenChief of Station (COS) and the Ambassador derives fromSecurity Acthe Foreign Service Actational Security
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No.nd Director of Central. Intelligence Directive. Other key policy documents include Executivef7 State-CIA Agreement,eries of presidential letters to Ambassadors. (See attached copy ofetter from President Clinton to Chiefs of Mission).
In sum, these documents provide that the Ambassador should be kept apprised of station activities and make it clear that the Ambassador may disapprove and delay an activity until the issue is adjudicated in Washington. The documents also make clear, however, that Ambassadors should be concerned with the overall impact of CIA operations in their country of assignment, not specific operational details.
Some general principles byOS may strike an appropriate balance between the Ambassador's need for.information and the COS's obligation to protect sources and methods have emerged from these documents and practical experience. ForOS is expected to keep the Ambassador fully and currently informed about
Chief of Mission Statutory Duties.) establishes the statutory duties of the Chief of Mission:
"Under the direction of the President the chief of mission to
have full responsibility for the direction, coordination,of all Government executive branch employees in that
. country (except for employees under the commandnited States area militarynd
keep fully and currently informed with respect toand operations of the Government within matshall insure that all Government executive branchfor employees under the commandnited Statescommander) comply fully with all applicable directiveschief of mission.
b)orresponding duty on executive branch agencies to keep the chief of inission fully and currently informed:
Any executive branch agency having employeesoreign country shall keep the chief of mission to that country fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of its employees in that country, and shall insure that all of its employees in that country (except for employees under the commandnited States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.
COS Authorities. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCDOS derives authority to conduct intelligence activities from the National Security Acthe DCI is responsible under the National Security Act for establishing requirements and priorities that govern the collection of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence community. The DCI is charged under) with the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclc)sure. It is this statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods that canource of possible tension between the COShief of Mission's statutory duty to remain fully and currently informed of CIA's activitiesoreign country.
Such conflicts were addressed in7 CIA/State Department Agreement, approved by the President, that explains the authorities and responsibilitieshief of MissionOS and
Executive. Executivemphasizes the importance of the effective conduct of VS. intelligence activities to
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ensure the acquisition of timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, persons and their agents. It requires all US. Government departments and agencies to cooperate fully to fulfill the goal of providing the President and NSC with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of VS. national interests from foreign securityhus, the Executive Order implicitly contemplates cooperation between the COS and Chief of Mission.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No.. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad,2 (NSCIDSCIDs an NSC directive concerning the conduct. intelligence activities. Under this directive, the DCI is responsible for ensuring centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all authorized clandestine activities, including the coordination of clandestine activities with overt collection abroad.
Under NSCID No.he CIA has primary responsibilityovernment dandestine activities abroad, mduding the conduct of espionage outside. Other Executive branch agendes are required to assist the CIA in its conduct of espionage by providing collection requirements and assessments of the value of collected
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information. The DCI is responsible for ensuring that the. representativeoreign area is appropriately advisedimely basisspionage activities conducted in or affecting the area.
p^lOENT CLINTON
Dear Mr./Madam Ambassador.
Pleasemy best wishes and appreciation (or voor efforts as my personal representative to (tountry/mterrvational organization).
Wt areoment of unique historic opportunity for the United States and the world. With Lendof .he Cold War. are entering an era soyours ass one. conducive to American prosperity, to Arnencan secunty. and to the valuesJSS To accomplish thiseed your full support for the three goals of my fomgn
Area's security allLces andrebuilding ^
and promoting democracy, human rights, and sustainable development.
Solid understand that shared democrat* values are use
EJSin. narcobcs production and trafficking, refugees, migrate, and hUmaniUnan assistance.
cnXSesnd complex era presents. This letter outhnes yourave informed all department and agency heads of these
instructions,now you will receive their full support
I charge you to exercise your authorityT
%see budgetary .stringency notardship to be endured but as hi incenave to innovation.
nrSnTzabon) except for personnel under the commandS. area miHtary commander, whether direct hire or contract, full- or part-time, permanent or temporary.
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SE^El
All executive bunch personnel under your authority must keep vou fully Wormed at all times of thetr current and planned activities so that you can effectively earrv out vour responsibility for US. Government programs and operations. You have the right to see all communications to or from Mission elements, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or Executive decision.
As Commander inetain authority over US. Armed Forces. On my behalf you have responsibility for the direction, coordination, supervision, and safety, including semritv from terrorism, of all Department of Defense personnel an Official duty (in (country)/at (mtemationalxcept those personnel under the commandS. area military commander. You and such commanders must keep each other currently Wormed and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest Any differences that cannot be resolved in the field should be reported by you to the Secretary of State; area military commanders should report to the Secretary of Defense.
Every executive branch agency under your authority, including the Department of State, must obtain your approval to change the -sire, composition, or mandate of its staff. Use this authority to reshape your Mission in ways that directly serve American interests andsk that you review regularly.programs, personnel, and funding levels, and ensure that all agencies attached to your Mission do likewise. Functions that can be performed by personnel based in the United States or at regional offices overseas should not be performed at post. In your review, seek guidance from the Secretary of state, who has the responsibility for establishing appropriate staffing levels. Given the restrictive resource environment In which werge you to cooperate in every way you can with any downsizing efforts undertaken by other decrements and agencies.n agency head disagrees with you regarding sufflng, he or she may inform the Secretary of State, loave delegated responsibility for resolving such issues. In the event the Secretary is uruble to resolve the dispute, the Secretary and the respective agency head will present their respective views to me. through my Assistant for National Security Affaia for decision In such instances, both the Secretaryill uphold the party arguing for the best use of increasingly scarce resources.
The Secretary of Sttte is my principal foreign policy adviser. Under my direction, he is, to the fullest extent provided by the law, responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of US. Government activities abroad. The only authorized channel for instructions to you is through him or from me. There art only twoersonally instruct you torivate channel. Q) if the Secretary instructs you toon-State channel. The Secretaryfll look tofor yourdarce and frank counsel You should seek the same from your ownrge you tolimate of openness, as debate and dissentitaln policy-making. Ultimately, there can be only one US. policy,xpect you and all members of your mission to follow and articulate. But byrank internal debate, we are better able to speak to others with one voice regarding US. foreign policy.
The Secretary of State and. by extension, chiefs of mission abroad must protectovernment personnel on official duty abroad (other than those personnel under the commandS. area military commander) and their accompanyingxpect you to take direct responsibairy for the security of yourlso expect you to support strongly appropriate counterintelligence and (ounterterrorism activities that enhance security both locally and in the broader international context
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You should cooperate fully with personnel of the US. legislative and judicial bunches in (country)/at (Inwmational organjiabon) so that US. foreign pobcy goals ace advanced, securityrn*intained, and executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities are carried out.
As Chief of Mission you are not only my representative in (country/International organization)ervant of the people of our Nation. This isigh honorreat respons'-bilixpect you to discharge thit trust with professional excellence, the hjgheai standards of ethical conduct, and diplomaticsk you to ensure that your staff similarly adheres to the same strict standards and maintains our shared commitment to equalrge you In particular Id see that discrimination or harassment of any kind find no acceptance at your Mission, just as they have no place in American society.
SEj2$ET EXHIBIT G:
PASSAGE OF INTELLIGENCE, OR OTHER INFORMATION, TO PRIVATE CITIZENS*
The statutes, regulations and procedures pertaining to the passage of information to private ritizens, by CIA, are quite specific and narrow. There is no statute. Executive order or Agency regulation that requires relevant intelligence information be disclosed to families. citizens, or others, who are murdered, captured or imprisoned, or are missingoreign country, mdirectly, under the Freedom of Iniormation Act and the Privacy Act the Agency must provide information to private individuals, upon request, but in each case the DCI's responsibility in the National Security Act7 to protect intelligence sources and methods is recognized as an appropriate basis for withholding information.
A number of Executive orders and Agency regulations deal with disclosure of information generally. For example, ExecutiveU.S. Intelligence Activities) provides guidance for CIA activities and limits the collection, retention and dissemination of information about VS. persons to authorized foreign intelligence purposes. ExecutiveClassified National Security Information)niform system for classifying, declassifying and safeguarding national security information, but does not require the clissemination of classified information to the public. The Executive order does require the declassification of certain information after prescribed intervals.
There areumber of Agency regulations that address various issues related to the disclosure of information by CIA. For example* |l Bmake it clear that the Public Affairs Office is the Agency component responsible for releasing information to the public; for the review of significant historicaliew toward releasing it to the public,
TrU* compilation of utfonnaAon retadnfrhe ihenng of inatllifcm irdonruaon with private citiieni hairepared by the CIA Office of Inspector Central.
Original document.
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