cia historical review program release as7
TITLE: The CIA'S Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair
AUTHOR: Michael Warner
VOLUME: 40
All opinions expressed in Studies are Ihose of the authors. They do not necessarilythe official views ot the CentralAgency or any other component of the Intelligence Community.
Lessons Unlearned
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair
Michael Warner
A humiliated President Kennedy did not wait for
cither reporthouse at CIA.resignationsDulles andfor Plans
59
Michael Wi/ncr is Deputy Chief of the ClA History Staff
CL^ CI-c) DECUaWTXi DS^ROM Multiple
The Bay of Pig? invasion met iu
nilendIi the jllfI flOOn Ct
hree days after the force of Cuban emigres had hit the beach) the CIA officers who planned the assault gatheredadio in their Washington war room while the Cuban Brigade's commander transmitted his last signal. He had been pleading all day for supplies and air cover, bul nothing could be done for him and his men. Now. he could see Fidel Castro's tanks approaching.ave nothing left io fighte shouted. "Am taking to thean't wait forhen the radio went dead, leaving the diained and horrified CIA men holding backU)
Within days (he post mortems began. President Kennedy assigned Gen. Maxwell Taylor to head the main inquiry into the government's handling of (heirector of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles asked the CIA's Inspector Generalyman B. Kirkpairick.o conduct an internalumiliated President Kennedy did nor wait for either report before cleaning house at CIA. He accepted resignations from both Dulles and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell (although both stayed at their posts until their successors wereew monthsU)
Lyman Kirkpairick subsequently acknowledged (hat his Survey angered the handful of senior Agency officers permitted to read :t, particu-laily in the Directorate for Plans (the Agency's Clandestine service and
irltpanick tU)
covert action arm. referred to here as thehe IG's Surveyormal rejoinder from the DDP. written by one ofides, who was closely associated with all phases of the project Tha* rwo lengthy briefs, written when the memories aad documentation were fresh. -intended to oe seen by only aof officials within the CIA. They shed light on the ways in which (he CIA learned from both success and failureilestone in ihe Cold War. (U)
Did Kirkpairickair case against the Bay of Pigt operation? If he did. what can be inferred aboul the rejection of his Survey by Dulles. Bissell. and other AgencyistorianGlehas noted that theoule and the CLA were like ships passinghe night during the planning (bt the Bay of Pigs, assuming lhal ihey spoke ihe same language with regarduba
Bay ot Pros
but were actually imprisoned by mutually exclusive misconceptions ibojitm.i'i likely outcome. The Kennedy administration believed the assauli brigade woold be able io escape destruction by melting into ihe countrysideage guerrilla warfare. According to Gleijeses, CIA officials, from Dulles on down to the branch chief who ran the operation, profeued (hii same belief, but tacitlyes idem Kennedy would commit US troops rather than let the Brigade belose reading of the IG'. Survey and the DDP's response supports Gleijeses's thesis and hints that an analogous mtsuft-demanding within CIA itself hampered planning foi the invasion and contributed to thebreakdown wiih the White House. (UI
Shooting the Messenger?
The Eisenhower administration and me CIA had decided inhat Fidel Castroool ofand ta ally of che Sonet Union. Bissell explained in) that popular discontent with Castro's regime could be galvanized into active resistance only by an external shock. The springas seen as the last opportunity to administerhock (without actually committing US troops) before Castro's military received more shipments of Eastern BlocIA-trained force of Cuban exiles would scite an isolated area along Cuba's southern coast, allowing tmigti political leaders to return to the island and offer theemocratic alternative to Coiiro. Assuming the emigre force gained control of the air andiis beachhead, the Brigade's aircraft (obsolescent but6
u
Kirkpatrick subsequently called the events surrounding the Bay of Pigs affair one of the most painful episodes of his long service with CIA.
bombers allegedly purchased on die black market) would then negate the Cuban Army's numerical superiority and demo narrate Castro's impotence to (he Cuban people. Over the ncn fewuba's populace and military would finally mount an active rests-ranee to him. setting in motion his eventual downfall. If worst came to worst, however, the 3rigadc could be evacuated by sea. and elements might be able to "go guerrilla* in the nor too-distant Escambray MoutVoth assumptions proved disastrously mistaken. (U)
Alkn Dulles had ordered Kirkpatrick to invrsiigare the failed invasion three days after the Cuban BrigadeKirkpatrick subsequendy tailed the events surrounding the Bay of Pigs affair one of the most painful episodes of liis long service withe had been named IG by Dullesafter being crippled by polio Although Kirkpatrick was rumored tc covet the rob of Director for Plans and to resent his bad luck, there was no doubt about hisand concern for improving the Agency's tUACOorting. Hb judgments coinrnanded responsible(U)
The lG's team of three investigators quickly set to work, reviewing the voluminous documentation and interviewingIA and military officers associated with tne project, codenamed JMATE
irkpatrick himself played an unusually active role in coenpiling and evaluating records and interviews for the study. After sis months of research and drafting the IG Staff completed its thick report and had it ready for submission co DCIS)
At rhii point. Kiikpatiiek made atactical error. He set asidef the Survey for DCI-designatecCone. rather than for Dulles, and gave McCone his copy before he had given copies to Dulses or BisseH.'Boih McCone and Dulles were angered by this breach offtncpairsoYs fan* pas naturally stimulated gossip about his motives. The IG Survey was critical of thr DDP and would not have been enthusiastically received in any event, but the IG's prematute presentation of it to McCone had piled insult on injury. Soon after taking office. McCone allowed Bissell toormal rebuttal to theS)
BisseU'sracy Barnes, drafted the DDP's response,it inarnes was well qualified to present the DDP's case, although hardly an objective observer. One of the Ditectorate's two Assistant Deputys thearries had set aside his usual dutieseasconcentrate on the Cuban operation. Although he rarely imposeddirection rurradf, be often reviewed and approved decisions in BisseU'sarnes thus hadomprehensive view of (and signifi -cant responsibility for) the project, gaining wide knowledge of its details as well as working with many of the policymakers involved. (S)
70 fU^f*
Bay ol Pigs
and Controversy
Tbe most notable feature of the iG's Survey of the Bay of Pigs is that it jays little aboui the Bay of Pigsperse. Kirkpairicklatetinsisted rhai Dulles had ordered him to "say out of national policyhat is. to restrict his probe to the performance of the CIA and not io pass judgment on decisions raken by higherhaiever Dulles's orders had been, ihe Survey stated on its first page lhal its purpose was "to evaluate selected aspects of ihe Agency's performance" in ihe attemptverthrow Castro,hose aspects did noi include ihe operation's "purely militaryhe Taylor report had alreadyihe US Government's conduct of the entire opeiation. Kirkpauick's Survey did not presume to judge the actions of other departments, let alone those of higher authority, and thus concentrated on the phases of the operation that CIA controlled. Nor did ihe Survey examine the toulity of CIA activities within Cuba or directed againsi it from abroad; among othet things. Kirlcparriek did
not examine in depth iheof ihe Havana station or ihe Santiago base, the development of foreign intelligence assets and liaison contacts, Division D's technicalprograms) orwork against ihe Cuban services. (S)
The inspectors concluded that the operation's unorthodox command structure ensured ihat vitalwould not be properly disseminated and ihat decisionmakers would entangle themselves inOperational details fell toCuba) of the DDP'sHemisphere Divisionut Jacob Esicrlinc, chief of Brancheported to DDP Bissell and Tracy Barnes, rather than io the chief ofing (although he wasinformed and ofteno confuse matrers still furihei.ad no direct control over the Brigade's aircraft, which were managedeparate DDP division (which also look some orders directly from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Charles P.S Air Force general who liked to keep his hand in theof airdrops and otherhese odd command relationships were accompanied by similarly ad hoc arrangements in other phases of ihe
Kirkpairick's inspectors alsoBranch 4's mishandling of intelligence on the politicaland growing military capabilities of ihe Castro regime. Although ihe branch already had its own Foreign Intelligence Section, ii nonethelesseparatenit subordinate to itsSection, which planned the acrual invasion. This decision wasraven the IG's opinion.
because it allowed ihe project's most important analysis io become so engrossed in the invasion planning thai their objectivity and judgment suffered. Even worse, ihcre was no one to audit ihe's" analyses: Branch 4's Foreign Intelligencecould nor see all the available sources and was not privy to the invasion planning.cues:
undoubtedlytrongon Ae process by which {Branchrrived at theAat Ae landing of At strike force could and would trigger on uprising among Ae CubanThis conclusion, in turn, became an tueniial element in Ae deciiion toA At operation, as it took Ac place of At original eoneepl. no longer maintainable, that Ae invasion was to be undertaken in support of existing and effective guerrillaS)
The IG Survey also criticized CIA Headquarters' micromanagemcni of the Agency effort to bolster ihe"guenilll forces" operating in Cuba in the months before the Bay of Pigs invasion. The CIA's aireffort accomplished little: the Agency's maritime supply operation looked no belter. CIA efforisain and infiltrate rebel leaders wasted months and produced no appreciable results. 'Ihe air operation insuffered under the personal attentions of DDCI Cabell. In one especially embarrassing fbul-up, agents in Cubarop of not moreounds ofand sabotage equipment; thanks to Obeli, iheyounds ofunrequestcd materiel,ounds ofounds of beans,ounds ofS)
Bay o'Prps
Senior Agency officials often gaveihtifl lo ihe operaiior. in the press of daily business, and more-junior officers working full-lime on ii had too little authority and no view of the full picture. The project staff was shorthanded from the beginning despite iu rapid expansion (che work to be done expanded even moreand iu managers did not insist thai DCI Dulles honor his promise io pui (he CIA's best talent on the effort Finally, ihewere left behind by its assumptions and never caught up. The CIA kept building iu project ever bigger at the likelihood of popular resistance to Casiio faded in the distance. Ir. the autumnhe projecta urike force io assist the (ailing rebellion; by the following spring, it had become clear ihai ihere was no more rebellion. The onlywasebellion by shocking the Cubann ihe end. the shock was too ephemeral to damage the Castro regime,ne ihreaien iu survival. But no one withuthority sawitfall, and no one ai th* lower levels who am it could do much about it. (S)
The IC Survey suggested thai the Agency'sin- had been derelict in their duty to advise the White House of ihe growing possibility of disaster. "When ihe project became known io every newspaper reader, ihe Agency should have informed higherthat ii was no longer operating within iuheivilian without military experience, and the DDO. an Air Force general, did not follow the advice of the project's paramilitarypecialist init that Kennedy revoke hb canccllaiion ofay air-strike. "And the President made this
ii
The IG Survey suggested that ihe Agency'sinbeen derelict in their duty to advise the White House of the growing possibility of disaster.
55
vital, last-minute decision [to cancel] without direci contact with thechiefs of (he invasionacedhoke between "retreat without honoramble between ignominious defeat and dubiousstates the IG Survey, "ihe Agency chose io gamble" andiu plans to whatever restrictions were imposed by the WhireS)
The IG Survey endedrief sci of conclusions andKirk pa trick's team believed the OA had tailed to notice that the project had progressed beyond the Agency's capabilioes and responiibili-i
Tht Agency htcomr it tvrapped up in ihe miliury operation thai it foiled to appraise Ae chances of sutcesi reatiitteolly. Furthermore-it foiled to keep ihe national policymakeri adequately andinformed of tht conditions
itUCttSS.
In addition, the Agency had misused some of its Cuban partners, had failed to build resistance to Castro "under raihct favorablend neglected crucial in formal too on Castro'iS)
Kirkpatiick's learn hadetailed but flawed appraisal of ihe Agency's performance in the Bay of Pigs operation. The Survey'sargument obscured some of irs more important insights Forthe Survey did not explicitly conclude ihai ihe CIA's allegedly bungled effort to foster an inn-Castro insurgency helped co ensure that popular resistance to the regime wculd collapse by earlythat an invasion would be the only option left for Agency planners The IG Survey also missed otherio strengthen ihe logic behindonclusions. Important judgments were scattered almosi randomlyaphazard overall structure, which, combined with the internal disorganization of certain teciions, surety left readers wondering how some of the evidence collected by the IG's naff supported ihe Survey's key judgments. These weaknesses in rhe Survey gave its opponenu easy(S)
Tracy Barnes responded to the survey by attacking iu assumption thai the invasion was (loomed from ihe start. Mote deafly written (although no better organised) than tht Survey. Barnes's lengthy analysis insisted thai [MATE was noieal chance to succeed. Instead of proving ihir the plan was irredeemably flawed, Barnes argued, ihe Survey had busied itself with highlighting trivialand raising false issues in an effort to show that the Agency alone was responsible for ihe disaster. (S)
Arguing thai defeat on the beach was by no meant rcrtwdained, Barnes suggested that any serious inquiry would have looked it what actually happened instead of judging thatwould bave won anyway. Once that questionable hypothetii was set
Bay of Pigs
said Barnes, it then became clear rhar all rhe problemsbefore the invasion had nor mattered much because, despite all these obstacles, the Cuban Brigade had actually been trained and landecL The pre-invssson setbacks had only stowed thereparations; they did not diminish its fightingAlleged mistakes by ClA "were not in the actual event responsible for the rnilitaryhe Brigade could not hold its beachhead because io ammunition was lost at seahat the Agency had planned to destroy but was not allowed to attack again at the ethicalA's erroi wasidland!me. the Brigade but ia mtsperceiving Castro's ability ro rally his forces and crush the laneUng. Barnes argued that Kirkpatrick had missed rhis point:
It is impossible to say how(CIA 'if error ofihe plan thai wasmodified by eliminationD-Day aintnkt. HadAir forte beenall these fiomaiei
Turninghe substance of the IG Survey, Barnei complained that thr Survey was little moreist of niggling and ultimatelyerrors committed by the OOP. The organization and staffing of the Bay of Pigs opcracion had followed standard practices, according toarrangements thai the IG Surry had criticized had bothndto recommend them, and it was not cleat that ilrernanves would have worked any better. Barnes conceded that the operaiion's securitylogistic procedures, and
(raining efforts fell short ofbut he argued nonetheless they had been done about as well as they could have been. (S)
The DDP's analysis seemed toelling case against the IG Survey, exposing every weakness and tactual error in theffort. Nevertheless. Barnes had begged as many questions as he answered. The analysts offered almost no concessions to theindings, defending virtuallydone by theihe infamous "rice and beans" supply dtop mentionedtseemed as if Barnes wasodel operation.
Ultimately, however, the sheerof che disaster daunted Barnes's efforrs to ihifc blame away from the Agency and forced him into cheof incoruiaccncy. Barnes seemed to want ic both ways. He defended the DDP against charge* ofpractices by citing (he unique nature of the Cuban operation, in which standard procedure* did not always suffice. At rhe same time. Barnes disputed Kirkpat rick'sof complacency at the sop by asserting (hat the Bay of Pigs opera-don was an ordinary piofect in many respect* and that lhe Agency's prion-pals did not need to do much beyondordinary call of
s
The fundamental dispute between KitkptKtitl and Barnes, however, waa ovei ihe operational plan itself. Wasood one gone awry (Barnes'sra wild gamble thai never should have been triedn taking ihu contrary view, the IG Survey unpliotfy sup poired the Taylorpeculative judgment that the Cuban Brigade was too small to have held its lodgment, even with proper airCIA planners knew thatan Brigade could lace as many0 well-armed troops of Castro's regular army withinours of its landing and would also face several thousand militia troops, albeit of quearicriabie ksyalry and rightingoth Taylor and Kirkpatrick concluded char the Bri gadc could not have heldmtle-widewith airlonger than it actually did. (S)
The IG Survey's argument andhinged on thisa point both obvious and infuriating co Barnes and che DDP. Kirkpatrick had indeed analyzed the Agency's performance apart from die Urge: contest of policy decisions made in Washington on the eve of the invasion. If the invasion had been doomed from the outset, Kirkpatrick implied, then its planners in the Agency should not delude rhemserws with me excuse that Picsident Kennedy's last-minute cancellation of key airstrikes had wrecked theKirkpatrick dismissed this alibi, arguing chat such logic begged die question of why the project had somargin for error that ir could be spoiled by one hasty decision. Thesrusbandiing of the operation from rhe beginning had produced "pressures andndto the developing
Experience had taught Agency officials toertain amount of chaotic uncertainty after the initial stages of any paramilitary covert
11
leading io grave errors of judgment and finally ioS)
In rhe end. Kirkpatrick and Barnes were talking past each other. Barnes was correct in saying thai OA could noi be judged in isolation from the motivation, amieiies, andaffecting policymaker* in the White House and other agencies. On the oiher hand, Kirkpatnck was correct in arguing that OA should be judged on lis mediocrein those areas chat it ran. Both assertions were true, but they did noc fully grasp what hadat the Bay of Pigs. (S)
hero Gletjeses's reorm analysisa way beyond this impasse. The basic error in ihe US Government's planning, according to Gleijeses, was lhe lack of any real effort to outline and assess the consequences that would followailure of the Brigade ro hold in lodgment. CIA bears primary responsibility for this omission. The Agency's principals accepted rwo general assumptions: that Castro was too weak to crush the irrvaders. and that Picsident Kennedy would land che Marines and fir.-if. Castro once and foi all ifeemed the Brigade was doomed. Beyond these two certainties. Bissell later explained to Gleijeses, specific planning was pointless because rhe
actual situation on rhe island wouid be too fluid as Cuban politicians and Army officers mounted iheirto Casuo:
In moilmmW
partietJarij thme thatarge paramilitarythe pUwntfor later ttaget is wry incomplete. Theofthe fint itaga of thesually to JiffSn.Il to pre diet (eipedaliy in operations lite PBSUCCESS and tke Bay of Pip. in whichery heavy reUanee on ptycholotuai umrfart) that it wouldn'teemed tenable to haw planned the later uogei. One tan plan the fim phaiei. hut not
This is what indeed had happened in Guatemalaeadquarters had all but lost hope that the CIA-crained invading force couldche leftist govt tn ment of Jacobo Arbem. when suddenly the Guatemalan Army turned on Arbem. who stepped down andxperience had taught Agency official* toertain amount of chaoric uncertainty 'her rhe initial stages of any paramilitary covert action, and not ro try io hold events to rigid plans and timetables. There were no such rigidities built into "MATE- "Arms were held0 Cubans who were expected to make their way unarmed through the Castro army and wade ihe swamps co rally co (henoted the IG Surveyint of sarcasm "Except for this, we are unaware of any planning by che Agency or by the US Government for this success (S)
74
Bay o< Pigs
CIA had learned one lesson fromarebut the Guatemalan operation held another lesson of equal or greater importance. PBSUCCESS did not succeed because the CIA-mined rebels won on the battlefield or had frightened Arbeni into fleeing. The operation won because the emigre invasion of Guatemala, combined with the Guatemalan Army'sover Arbeni's leftward drift and fear of US military intervention, gave Armyretext to force Arbeni fromlA-orches-rrated airstrikes and ground maneuvers had played an indirect role in changing the Army's mood, to be sure, but Agency personnel in Guatemala City itself had initiated the crucial race-to-face meetings that ultimately prodded the Arrriv*siride-cisivc leadership to act.
hifl Ttlel repeatedly with vacillating Guatemalan colonels, insisting that they save themselves and their nation by toppling Arberu before it was too late. Thisrogram" to influence the Atmy had proceeded with rhc support of US Ambassador John Peurifoy* What was this secondfrom PBSUCCESS* Very simple: divide and conquer. Get your adversaries fighting among themselves. (S)
JMATE had norogram1-significanr CIA or diplomatic effort ra persuade Cuban Army leaders to depose Castro It is difficult roxactly how Havana station waswith the Cuban militaryecause the station cables have beenevertheless, surviving records from Headquarters, Havana starion, and the Brigade training sites suggest that CIA's principals did nor expect the Ambassador, the chief of
Bissell probably believed that Castro would be dead
at the handsIA-sponsored assassin before the Brigade ever hit the heath.
5?
station, or any American in Havana to influence the Cuban Army. The possibility of turning the Army against Castro looked too remote to consider. An unsigned DDP analysis from0 compared the earlier situation in Guatemala with the contemporary scene in Cuba:
rofessional Army officer, had left the armed forces of Guatemala virtuallycould not rely on them in the crisis: Castro has largely liquidated /deposed Cuban dictator fulgencioj Batista 'i armed forces, filled key military pons with his trustedandystem of intense ideological
Fidel Castro had drawn his ownfrom die Guatemala operation, and he was determined ro leave no Opening for the sorthaos" that PBSUCCESS had exploited. <S>
CIA's Havana station Had littleto persuade Castro's new army in any event. The IG Survey noted that she station reported creditably on political, economic, and Communist Party matters, but "found that its agents in Cuba lacked access to high-level military sources" whenasked fat more military reporting inastro's secret policelose watch on station and
Embassy personnel, and. inaught three Technical Service Division technicians redhanded as they were installing listening devices at the New China News AgencyThe slim opening forK-Program" in Havana slammed shui inl, when the outgoing Eisenhower administration severed relations and closed (he American Embassy. Thus JMATE proceeded without onecapability that had proved vital to PBSUCCESS. (S)
The possibility of personallyCuban Army officers had been discounted in the earliest days of the operational planning, but CIA had another arrow in its quiver. Bissell probably believed that Castro would be dead at the handsiA-spon-sored assassin before the Brigade ever hit the beach. This expectationkept Bissell and Barnes overoptimistic about JMATE, but project officers themselves were not privy to assassination plotting, 3rid thus should have been looking for any available method of working within Cuba to influence the loyalty and effectiveness of Castro's milirary.
They hadfact madeclear in hindsight, lacking direct contact with Castro's army, project officers by1 had convinced themselves that the mere survival of the Brigade on Cuban soil would suffice to turn much of the milirary against Fidel. Grasping attacitly assuming that they were trying to teplicstc the dynamic tha: had operated inseven yearsDDP analysis now portrayed Castro'sreorientation of Cuba's armed forcesource of weakness for Castro and strength for the CIA;
Bay ol Pigs
ur eitimate that /Castro i) fortts. ifconfrvntrdrained opposition with modem ueapo*nifiedmil largelys significant that most of the leaders of the anti-Castrogroups art Army officers who oncefougnt with Castro agasml Boasu The Army has been rr-temadcaU, purged, and moss ofis now serving in labor battalion, oi on routine garrison duty. There is great rtientment in the Army at this downgrading, the nthordination to the Militia, and the imprisonment of such popularubtt Mam.(S)
Dm wai wishful thinking disguised as analysis. The Agency had "no intelligence evidence* that there wai anyone in Cuba who 'could haveinternal leadership for an uprising in support of the invasion,"
noted the IGMATE thus coasted along on the tacitthat something good would happen within the Cuban Army, once the battle was joined and the emigre Brigade demonstrated itspower. (S)
At least one DDP leader had theto have recognized this ettor and the authority to have actedronically, that manDP Tracv Barnes, who had commanded the CIA's LINCOLN nuk force at the climax of PBSUCCESS. and who beenide for JMATE. Yet the long apologia for JMATE that Barnes wrote in response to the IG's Survey seemod deaf to the real lessonUCCESS and the way in which it was unlearned during the planning of the Cuban operation. (S)
Conclusion
The disconnect between what CM wantedrmy te do and how the Army would be persuaded lo do iti|or flaw in the invasion planning. It, in tuin, distorted the Agency's advice io President Kennedy. Ii mack Allen Dulles and Richard Basel) overconfident, and thus retributed to the disastrous nusundemanding explored by Picro Glcijeses's reieni analysis. CIAdid not spot this omission before ihe Bay of Pigs, and iheover the IG's Survey of ihe
bjured the lesson and ensured that few Agency principals would understand what had gone wrong. (IT)
Forgetting history kept Barnes and Kirkpairick talking past one another in their respective reviews. Barnes had turned ha apologia into an attack on the IG Survey and the Inspector General's motives. The DDP would have served itself and CIA better byarefulof the operation, particularly the way ia which the assumptionsin the JMATE plan evolved on their own without conscioiu revi-sion and constant comparison with current intelligence and policyKirkpairick hadambling report and then bungled iu presentation to CIA's principals, thus incurring lasting resentments and helping io ensure his report would not be heeded. Neither the IG nor the DDP prepared clear insighu thai could instruct Agency leaders and planners. More attention to the need to understand the Bay of Pigs invasion might haveen-
of CIA officers from believing that one more airstrikr would have saved the Brigade. IS)
What difference did historyichard Bissell. Tracy Barnes, and the DDP had forgotten one of the crucial lessons of PBSUCCESS.esult. CIA convinced itself0 brave andainedwith no help from Americanand intelligence officers inholdiles of beach against Castro's toughened military long enough tooupenera! uprising. Dulles and Bn-sell then sold this plan to the White House, apparently believing thai ihe details did nor nurrer much anyhow because Castro would either be asm-linated or President Kennedy would send in the Marines to rescue theFidei Castro and his Soviet allies, however, had studied4 events in Guatemala and resolved to avoid Athens's mistakes. Thus ihe surrender on Blue Beach onhen the lessons of history meant plenty for the men trapped and taken prisoner. (U)
78
BsyolPigs
. The Peal CIA (No. York.ew Wyde*.wTxp TVINew YetU)
Pino GlcifeKt. "Sh.pl in iheCIA. ihe White Houiefay o*
AmtmsH Snidtet.. {U)
aoik.
UniieneJ memorandum (probably Col. Jack Hawkins] to Jacob fcwer-kne. Cbef.. Reou.frd fo. Co-doe. of Strike OperaMw Agaaratt Gove ro-meni ofSlu> tno. rWH'1orli-u-
lion of iht need for a
. (U)
irkpstnek. ThtfealClA.. (U)
General, 'Inspectorurvey of theIA Huror. Siaff filet.U)
ct*anck. IG. loJcJttI
A. McCone. DC. 'Irapector Gen eral Survey of the Cuban Operator, (datedarcutive Reguiry,olderS)
aehard Binell. with Jonaihan E.nd hwa T. Pudlo,*f* Ctldrhe Bay if fig. (New Haven. CT Yale Ur-veruryUl
10 ctio-un-in of tht Cuba*8,I. p.ar. net'i official titleAaiaant Deputy Diretior (Planil forand Pa ra mi liiary Action. (C)
irkpaimk. TheHealC/A.
(U)
C Survey,U))
IhJUi
/*W.U)fkft,. (U)
. IU)
DDP Analysis, see. I.
The estimate of the me of Cutio'a feices -ii provided by Allen Duilei io ihr Taylor committee; teeperant* Zapaia.. The Taylor comDrntc'i judgment ihai ihe aitault brigade *mjudgment from which Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burkebe found onU)
U)
-
PU)
adwlas Cullaiher. Operant*
PBSUCCESS: Ihr VilmiWashing-lon: Central Intelligence.Si
24 IG Survey,Ul
25. o
iVHOorr amawAr f'-aarf< (Prance ion, NJ: Pnncetoa Ur.ivemry.. (Ul
ulUihet. PBSUCCESS.
uriii Hcmnpheie Drviiion,n "Debrief-,ng Reports. Pro|ectoatin Amerxi
Di-aaon JobIO25A.. foWetC- 01
27 DO lane. Anenea DMsftBl rettied recoreb inventory the cables to and free* Havana1. whichdestroyedavana nation diipaichci aur-vived in LA Diviiion. boxiampling of ihoie from0 showed no con-racu with the Cuban Army. (U)
Unsigned memorandum.of Plans. "Covert Action againiTo dare pmh.M.r. Latinob. bo*)
IG Survey,If)
cLean. "Weiitrn Hrrm-yherelandesrinc Service* Hiiiory[CSHPi uudy.IA Hiiiory.ee alw NsuSan"Out Men incataja.jMB-fpBMtS)
Vettem Hesoufhete Dwision. "Anu-Castro Ren nance in Cuba Actual and Pot6atin America Dinuon. bo.olderS)
IGU)
ti
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