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A RAND NOTE
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THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE: AN UPDATE (U)
SEC^dsT
MO'fiCH
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tiHCUSSIHED
Inand issued Che final reporttudy of the Yugoslav military elitehe Yugoslav Military Elite
In view of the future Tito succession and Lhe key role
military by focusing on its leadershipelite. The Report combined dynamic statistical analysis of the transformation ol the Yugoslav military elite with traditional analysis of its historical development. Focusing on the key individuals in the Yugoslav military, the Rand Report complemented tn-house studies of the political role of the Yugoslav military as an institution
This Note reports the resultsmall srurfy initiated9
to update the findings of the
Rand Report since its cutoff date of The first task was to determine the extent of changes in the composition of the military elite
ET
three important conclusions:
they do not differ significantly in terns of background and career profile from their predecessors. The newly-advanced individuals seen still to be menbers of the Partisan generation, who had served in important positions just below those postulated to constitute the basis of the military elite
the recent careers of these individuals can be tracked. But rheir backgrounds and early careers are often (apart from an indication of liavlng fought with the Partisans) blanks.
hey are the end of the line of the Partisan generation. ew post-Partisans have appeared in third-level positions, and tea next wave of personnel changes can be expected to bring the post-Partisan generation to the fore.
)
It is the basic finding of this update analysis that tlie Yugoslav military leadership has been characterized by continuity, rather than any major changes over the past five years. The detailed conclusions formulated in the earlier Rand Report therefore remain, in general, still valid. More specific findings of this update study follow: (U)
has not yetenerational change in theleadership. The raedian age of the topfficersyears in the past five years. The apex of the militaryand evidently the broader military elite as well, is stillby the "late Partisan generation": peasant youth at theWorld War II who joined the Partisans as their first adultjoined the Party, mobilizedlatform of nationalunity, not support for the USSR or Cocmunistndprofessional commanders) have had military responsibilities foradult lives. Thus an experienced and consolidated militaryunder the firm control of Xikola Ljubicic, was in place for thepost-Tito transition. But this generation of military leadersperpetuate Itself another five years or so. Someercent ofcorpshole is now comprised of postwar officers, and some
of these will soon rise to the top. Tlie change of generations, when it does occur, is likely to happen quickly, and this may raise questions about the cohesiveness and strength of the military institution should the longer-term post-Tito successionroubled one. (U)
coctmanders dominate the apex of theeven more so than five years ago. LO dominate the military representation on theCommittee. The important exception is the position ofoccupied by Dzemailpotential source of
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References are to pages in the original Rand Report. (U)
leadership weakness in the future. Tito's hand was still visible in appointments prior to his death, but whether this favored or detracted frote professional competence Is an open question. Kamla's appointment as Chief of the General Staff dors raise questions in thislo teras of his professional competence, but in teres of hisas Chief of the Cencral Staffilitary institution in which ground forces are the dominant component.
3) The Yugoslav militaryultinational, quast-federal institution. At the very top, the proportion of Serbs appears to have increased slightly (toercent from theercent that existed5 and that is the proportion of Serbs in the Yugoslavore significant than this change in the continued gross overreprasenta-tion of pricanierbs from regions other than Serbia proper; they account forf thoerbs occupying theop key positions. This testifies to the continued crucial role of this group In the Yugoslav military leadership and Indicates that the reraoval of Djoko Jovanic as defense undersecretary In6 did not lead to aof the role of Serbs frost Croatia In the allitary leadership.
Whether or not any significant change has occurred in the national composition of the broader militarytopcould not be determined; the odds are against it. But "territorlallza-tion" has progressed ac die military region level. Consolidation of republican territorial defense coenands has reinforced this trend toward the federalization of the military institution. The military leadership, like the republican political authorities, continues to seek morenational representation in the officer corpshole and has expanded the opportunities for national affirmation within the military. The military institution has continued to adapt to the multinational federal political system of which itart, and this has strengthened the Yugoslav system. But Halted dissatisfactions on this score continue in Croatia and Kosovo and among Bosnian hSislims, and thisotential source of dissension in tha post-Tito period.
ft) In the second half of, the military consolidated (but did not significantly expand) Its political role in Yugoslavia. The military representation on the Central Committee selected8 Increased slightly over that selected The militarv Party
V ' i i
l. i :/ : :
zation of the LCY, and the feu military representatives on theParty Central Committees signify more the result of republican efforts to integrate the territorial defensehicants into the republican political structures rather than channels of influence on republican politics by the military leadership. The "political generals" who assumed civilian functions in theave been largely The military leadership has become an important factor in the Yugoslav polltteal system, bur its influence is exerted through theand internal security posts occupied by military men and through the role of the military Party organization in the federaloutside these institutionalized channels.
5) The Yugoslav military elite has remained fundamentally cohesive. The only intra-olite cleavage known to have occurred since theas the Jovanlc affair and that, however important, was easily contained. In contrast to the earlier Miskovic affair, none oflose asso-
ciates seem to .have rallied to his cause.
6) During the, the Yugoslav military elitereater degree of concern with thp Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. The explicit criticism of the USSR to Western officals, while suspect as tactically motivated, is reminiscent of language about the USSR utilized by Yugoslav officers in thend does, evidently, reflect deep-seated concerns about the USSR that pervaded the Yugoslav system in the. ituation of enhanced Soviet threat and anWestern military connection, differing views on tactics toward the USSK could arise, and this was apparently one element of the JovaniC case. But there is no evidence of "pro-Sovietism" (in the sense of wanting to realign Yugoslavia with the USSR, or the kind of qualified loyalty toward the USSR that characterized the Yugoslav Communists priorrrong the Yugoslav military elite, evenarginal phenomenon. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, senior Yugoslav military officers havereater interest in military ties
CONTENTS (U)
SUMMARY
Vi
T. CHANGES IN KEY MILITARY POSITIONS Senior Officials of the Defense
General Staff
Military Region Commanders Republican Territorial Def
II. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS III. INTRA-ELITE TENSIONS
IV. OUTLOOK OF THE MILITARY ELITE
1 11
1 27
31
Table 1
MILITARY REPRESENTATION IS POSTWAR REPUBLICAN PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEES 32
Table 2
MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN POSTWAR LCY CENTRAL
33
5
.If:
COMMITTEES
Table of Contents,
2Ke Yugoslav Military Elite
GLOSSARY
INDEX OF NAMES
SK/JKfcl
I. CHANCES IN KEY MILITARY POSITICKS
Senior Officials of the Defense Secretariat and Genersl Staff
Genera] of the Array Nikola Ljubicicontinues lo dominate the Yugoslav military establishment as Federal Secretary of National Defense. easure of Ljubicic's Important role, and Tito's continued confidence in him, was the public sttention devoted toh birthday in In the, there were reports that Ljubicic would leave his military position and become the senior Serbian political lender. Ljubicic hasational political figure. Heember of tbe LCY Presidium (and one of the inner circle of political leaders who hasey role in decision-caking during Tito's protracted Illness and since his death). 3ut Ljublci achieved this status on the basis of his position as head of the military establishment, and he has dealt effectively with several efforts fron vithin and without the military to limit his powers as defense secretary. It was evidently the challenge to his authority from CC Ivan Miskovic, Tito's foraor security affairs advisor, that led to Miskovic's removal fron office Sioilarly, the reeoval of CC Djoko Jovanic from his position aa r'SND Undersecretary7 was reportedly the consequence
of efforts by Jovanic to challengeuthority and. In concert
v f
with JovsnkS Uroz, to "kick him upstairs." Ljubicic has impressed Western officials who have dealt with him as unquestionably in control of the Yugoalav ntilicary establishment, capable, lough, committed to the policy of expanded military ties with Western countries, but wore cynical than soste of his subordinates about Western Intentions.
The position of Deputy Federal Secretary of National Defense was established9 for CG Milos Suraonjaerb from) in view of his poor health,ob less demanding than Chief oi the General Staff, the slot he had occupied foe two years.
References are to page numbers in the original Rand Report.
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Sumonja left this postvidently at his own request and without
political overtones, and became Yugoslav Ambassador to the Netherlands-
He officially retiredis former post has not been filled.
Kith the disappearance of the position of deputy secretary, the
incumbents of the position of FSND Undersecretary have served
Ljubicic's principal deputies. There hasack of continuity in
the occupancy of this position in the. The initial incumbent,
CG Djoko Jovanic'erb fromas, as
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noted, removed from his job Following the Miskovic affair, Jovanic'had concentrated in his hands responsibility for security, intelligence, and personnel matters.
Jovanic was removed for concentrating power in his hands to such an ex-
v I
tent that hehreat to Ljubicic.
He was accused
af overstepping his authority during Ljubicic's absence from Belgrade in6 and of interfering in the affairs of the Croatian LCYt ion, f
oreign policy component of the Jovanic affair. Jovanic reportedly differed with Ljubicic (and Tito) on the tactics of dealing with the Soviets on military affairs.
Ir should be noted, however,6ear of freeze
Yugoslav military relations, and in that context Yugoslavcould have argued that the military relationship vith theboth parties had pledged to develop during AssistantDefense Ellsworth's discussions in Belgrade Inadand thai Yugoslavia would have to rethink Its tactics vis aUSSR.*
Whatever his transgressions, they were real but not treasonous: Jovanic was not surwarily "purged" but was eased out of office. He continued to hold the title of defense undersecretary throughh birthday was commemorated in the FSND, and he retired honorably at the end
Following Jovanic'a retirement lnC Petal Maticerb fromhe former Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Rear Services, was appointed rofessional commander who had earlier served as Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations and had been prominent in the Vojvodina Party organization. Absent from4 LCY Central Committee, he was includedilitary representative in8 Central Committee. But at the endatic left the position of Undersecretary to become full-time head of the LCY Presidium's Commission on National Defense (one of the slots formerly occupied by CC Ivan Kukoc', see below). This transfer, and Matte's short tour as Undersecretary, suggest that his performance in that job was not found to be satisfactory; there is no evidence, however, as to the specific reasons for the shift.
*This interpretation is necessarily speculative. ugoslav perspectiveowever, the record. military policy toward Yugoslavia8 was not encouraging, and otherwise loyal officers could have begun to entertain the possibility of greater, if stillconcessions to the USSR as the price of obtaining sophisticated modem heavy weaponry.
The last known media reference to Jovanic was inwith his activitieseteran lender.
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Prior to Matte's transfer, but perhaps in preparation for it, CC Ivan Dolnicar) was elevated fron Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Civil Defense to Undersecretary. ppointment as Undersecretary was unusual, for it signified the assumption of the second-ranking FSND positioneneralolitical ratherrofessional career profile. Moreover, Dolnicar's political influence had declined in the
The only explsna-
tion that can be cited forppointment
Is his
widely-reported personal tie with Party leader St.ine Dolanc.
Dolnicar may have been intended to serveore "political" counterweight to Matlc, but In fact he had been in officeew months when Matte, wasto his Party post. Dolnlcnr himself served as Undersecretary for only nine months, after which he was appointed Secretary General of the state Presidency In9 (see
Matic'was succeeded by CC Dzemall Saraclav Muslim from Bosoia-Hcrcegovina; nd Dolnicar's transfer to the state Presidency staff inas left Sarac as tho sole FSND Undersecretary and Ljubicic's principal lieutenant. osition is at odds with the previous tendency toward greater weight ofcommanders ln the FSND, for Surac has neverine command position. He had previously served first as assistant defense secretary for political affairs and then as the secretary of the military Party organization.
v ^
A further pu*2le was the nisidenttflcatlon of LCG Asia Hodzlc as Undersecretary in the8 issue of Tkjrodna arwt.la. ("
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this appoint-
as Undersecretary, he was inaccessible Lo Westerners.
The replacement of CC Stane Potocary Admiral Branko Mamulaerb fromn the fall9 has likewiseifferent coloration to theof Chief of the General Staff. Potocar reportedly gained theamong Yugoslav officersough professional little involved in politics, and this is corroborated by the Western officials who dealt
with him. e figured prominently in reporting as one of the
v '
potential successors to Ljubicic as defense secretary. But hisoccurred with an absence of political gossip and wasonsequence of poor healthesire to retire to his native Slovenia.
Maimila served in political and intelligence posts before he became chief of the navy. s Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Naval Affairs and Navy Commander, he also took command of the Split Military Region, relocating his office to Split.
His military writingseen interest in
i
and understanding of professional strategy, tactics, and organization. Mamula hai been accessible to Western officials; in some of thesehe spoke frankly about the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia before this hadommon theme.
Most prominently, Mamula is the author of MoimarieG naalim inorima [Navies on Large and Small
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Manilla's appoitiCi-Lcnt as Chief of the General Staff- a: wr. :
officeristinctly political component of his career profile to occupy Chat position. Moreover, given LJuMcic's clear track record of defending his position against inira-military challengers, Manilla's appointment is all the more Surprising
Manilla's advancement did substitute another Serb from
Croatia for Jovanic. 3ut no private account of the specific reasons for his pronotion has been forr.licoraing, apart from an indication chat his ties to Tito went back
At the level of Assistant Federal Secretary of National
Enver Cemalovicuslim fromas continued to be responsible for air force and air defense matters. raduate of Maxwell in, Cemalovic has displayed particular interest, in repeated contacLs with Western officials, in military ties with the West and in utilizing Western equipment to modernize the YAF. His influence in the Yugoslav milicarywas apparently reduced9 when the position of Commander of the Air Force was separated from the assistant secretaryship and assumed by the former Air Force Chief of Staff, Steven Rogllc (see
lthough this bifurcation occurred without any evidence
Cemalovic was in political disfavor and may have been related to
health problems, it probably reduced Cemalovic's influence in the military establishment.
LCG Steven Roglicerb) had served as Air ForceStaff prior to this appointment. Roglie's background and careerunknown; following service in Belgrade, he assumed command of theCorps3 and remained tu Sis' until8 appointment. Major Generale was promoted lo Lieutenant Colonel General Western attaches have considered him sympathetic toward diethis conclusion Is apparently based on his comments on Afghanistani tu:'h.ivi-ir p 1 tn_ ire
be questioned.
Following his appointment as Chief of the General Staff, Mamula
was replaced as Assistant Federal SecreLary of Nalional Defense for Naval Affairs hy his former deputy, VA Veljko Dokmanovic erb from Croatia). Dokmanovicartisan commisar but hasostwar naval career embracing military school and command posts. He established an association with Titohen hecommander of Tito's ship, Caleb. e transferred to the staff of the Split Military Region command, where he served under
Purisic. He then moved to Belgrade and represented Mamula inMamula himself relocated his office to Split. DokmanovicRear Admiral3 and was promoted to Vice Admiralthree years in grade.
The post of Assistant Secretary of National Defense for Rearwas, as noted, occupied by Peter Matic until his appointment as Undersecretary in Matic was initially replaced by CC Bruno, who had theretofore served as commander of the Nis Military Region and who had been promoted to
the rank of Colonel Generalfter six years in grade as
Lieutenant Colonel General.
Vuletic took over the
much more political post of Assistant Federal Seoretary of National
y
Defense for Civil Defense, following Dolnicar's promotion to The consequence was toenior officer withcommand (along with intelligence) experience andito connection in the FSHD's chief position for liaison wlrli the other elements of the defense system.
Vuleti/vas replaced by CC Ilijaerb fro*oroerly the Aaaiatant Chief of the General Stafffor operations. artisan comaisar, occupied intelligence posts untilhen he assumed connand of the 6th (Tito Guards) Division. 9 he transferred to the Ljubljana military region, evidently as deputy commander, and2 was appointed to his General Staff position. He was promoted to Major General o Lieutenant Colonel Generalnd to Colonel General Associated with Jovanic ever since the
Partisan war, Radakovlc was reportedly on* of the three officers
v
appointed by Ljubicic to review the Jovanic affair. He hasinterest in military ties with the West in his contacts with Western officials.
CC Dusan Vujatovicerb from Bosnia-Hercegovlna) continues to occupy the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Economy (which lie has held. As one of tho three senior officers picked by Ljubicic to review the "Jovanicujatovic's influence evidently increased after that event. As the senior KSND official in charge of military procurement and as the Yugoalav chairman of theYugoslav military commission astab-lishedujatovic has had perhaps the most extensive exposure
to Western officials of any of the Yugoslav military leadership. He
I
has appeared remitted to expanding military ties with the West.
The two career commanders who served as deputy chiefs of the
General Staff in theontinue to serve In those positions.
CC Janko Sekernik) has particular
responsibility for territorial and civil defense, along with general
matters, within the General Staff. Herotege of Potocar, and
it remains lo be seen whether he will continue to play the same
J
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under Manula. CC. Dusan Peklcerb from Is responsible for the ground forces. On professional grounds
alone, Pekic was perhaps the logical choice to succeed potocar as
Chief of the General Staff. One Interpretation of the Manilareported by Western military attaches was that Pekic would play an enhanced role within the Ceneral Staff, but it is unclear whether or not this has in fact occurred, Pekic hastrongin Western military lies and on the occasion of Army Chief of Stnff Rogers' visit to Belgrade in9 delivered himself of the sharpest criticism of the USSR that Westerncinlst heard from i. senior Yugoslav officer.
y
The post of Chief Inspector, FSND, is still occupied by CC Dusan
Korac'ontenegrin from His public visibility suggests both his own Influence and the important rola played by the Chief Inspectorate ln the Yugoalav military cstablIshoent.Q
With regard to the more political assistant defense secretaryships, the replacement of CC Ivan Dolnicar by CC Bruno Vulotlc as Assistant Secretary of National Defense for Civil Defense (and other liaison functions) has been noted. CC Dam- Petkovskiacedonian from) continues to serve as Assistant Secretary of National Defense for Military-Political Affairs. His continuodin his native Macedonian Patty organization is Indicated by his position (anomalous for one oi the leading political officers) on Ihe LCY Central Committeeember of the Macedonian and not of the military organization contingent. Petkovski has had almost no contact with Western officials, but has been regularly Involved ln militarywith Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries.
CC Radovan Vojvodicontenegrin fromcontinues to head the FSND Personnel Department, ato an assistant secretaryship. Reelected to the LCYCommitteeojvodic'has had little contact withsince his earlier post (tin as Assistant Chief of theresponsible for intelligence.
The Military Security Service (the counterintelligence service, originally known as KOS) was headed49 by CC Dane Cuic
Vojvodic is identified as Chief of the Personnel Administration in media reports and he is not Included ln the official lists of the assistant secretaries, f
fKfcT
10
erb from.
to
military Party organization. He ban not dealt with western
officials.
Cuic was teplacod by CG Branielav JoksovicorLisan commisar who occupied political posts in the wnrleriod and then first served ln and subsequently lieuded the Gen-erul Staff personnel directorate7 0 he was appointed Assistant Chief of the Ceneral Staff for Organisation and Mobil(zntion
He was promoted to Major Ceneral to Lieutenant Colonel Generalnd to Colonel General His appointment signified continuity In terms of entrusting aamaamnal of the Military Security Service rofaaaloral officer who wasareer counterintelligence officer In the wake of the Miskovic affair.f
The position of head of the Party organisation in the armed
forces was, as noted above, occupied by CC Dzcoail Sarac until the
latter'rt appointment as Defense Undersecretaryhen the
v y
Security Service.
position was assumed by CC Dane Cuic, the former head of the Military
To recapitulate, there has been continuity In the senior Yugoslav military leadership over the past five years. There are five new occupants in theey positions examined (plus one change5ut the new occupants generally reseable their predecessors In teres of background. They are of the sane age cohort; overall, the incumbents of theseositions have "aged" another four years (the nedian date of birth having Increasedear,0. The national composition of the occupants of thesr key positions is also substantially unchanged.
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asll the regions except Kosovo (andojvodina) were reprenvnled In the top military leadership. But Serbs from outside Serbia continue toisproportionately large role at thistoday as5 constituting roughly half of tbe total.
There has been unusually rapid Turnover at the level of FSNDthe upshot Is the replacementeasoned line professionalore political, professionally less competent officer. In the Generalrofessional ground forces officer has been replaced by an admiralore diversified career history under somewhat puzzling circumstanceslose Tito connection.
At the FSND assistant secretary level, on the other hand, previous trends have continued. Officers with career histories of command positions and an association with Tito have moved Into the assistant aecretaryships for naval and civil defense affairs. The military counterintelligence service has been placed underenior professional officer from outside that sorvice, while its former head has returned to political work, now as head of the military Party organization.
"Commanders" with Partisan backgrounds thus continue to dominate the apex of the Yugoslav military establishment. The important excep-tion isareer political officer, who now serves as tjublcic's principal deputy but probably lacks the unified responsibilities for security and personnel matters enjoyed (and abused) by Jovanlc. Cuic, now head of the military Party organization, is the only other career political officer at tbla level. Personal ties to Tito continued to influence personnel policies, us Indicated by Dokmanovic's advancement and Admiral Maraula's unusual appointment as Chief of the Genernl Staff
Military Region Commanders
CG Dusan Corkovicferb from
Military Region.
In line with the policies of the Croatian Party organisation
and Croat sensitivities, Corkovlc himself fully endorsed Increasing the percentage of ethnic Cloaca ln the YPA officer corps. (S)
The Commander of the Belgrade Military Region5 has been CC Petur Gracaninho hasilitary enrnar of MCluStvoly command and military uchool posts. A Partisan commanderracanln's postwar career culminated in hla appointment as chief of staff of the Sarajevo Military Regionrief tour of duty as commander of the ground forces' command-staff academyreplacing the disgraced LCG Hirkond appointment to his present position in Promoted to Major Ceneralracanin was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General4 and to Colonel Ceneral inonly four years in grade in each case. He was elected to the LCY Central Committee that year.
CC Rahmija Kadenicuslim fromerved as Commander of the Sarajevo Military Region untilhen he assumed coennniul of the Higher Military School Center. Although removedajor line command position, his continued
"interview in Vjcsnlk. Corkovic died Inis successor is LCC Zorko Canadl<va Croat of HunR-rian descent. It is not known whether Croats consider Canadl an ethnic Croat. But for the first timehe Zagreb Military Region iserb from Croatia.
n-ran
Influential role In the Yugoslav military establishment Is certified to by the nature of hi* new position (an important one in the Yugoslav militaryis prominent appearances at public military events, and his election to8 Party Central Committee. Kadenic has
impressed Western officials with his understanding of military
Kadenic was succeeded by LCC Milan Aclcerb from Bosnia-Hcrcfgovina). artisan (the details of his wartime career arc notclc held co-amaad positions in;2 he assumed command of the Infantry Officer's School. He then shifted to political work, serving as the secretary of the military Partyin the Sarajevo Militaryexample of the recent tendency to fill such positions, not with political officers, but with "commanders." AclcPA representative on4 LCY Central Committee. Promoted to Major Generale served only four years In grade prior to his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel Generalrofessional coostander, his career was clearly boosted by his political posts in the. More significant was his nationality; in tha eyes of Bosnian Muslims, his appointment todenictepn terms of national equality within the militarysince it occurredime when prominent ethnic Muslims were replaced by Bosnian Serbs in several important political poats.
Coanand of the Skopje Military Region waa assumed by LCG Laiube Kihajlovskl ollowing the death of CC Vasko Raraangelski in Kihajlovskl wasartisan; details are lacking. rofessional armored officer In the post-war period, he commanded an armored brigade in the Zagreb Military Region in the. e was appointed Karaangelskl's Chief of Staff. He was promoted to Major General7 and elevated to Lieutenant Colonel General Following his appointment to replace Karaan^elski, he was elected to the LCY Central Coomittee
/
Following tlie death of Admiral Tvo Purisic Inft, Admiral Mamula himself assumed comnand of the Split Military Region (thus combining the functions of Military Re$ion Commander, Ccesnander of the Navy, and Assistant Defense Secretary for Naval Affairs). With Kanula's appointment as Chief of the Ceneral Statfhe Split Military Region Command was taken over by VA Tihooir Vilovlc (date of birthroat). Vllovlc'sareer history is not known. 0 he served In the Split military districtIvan Dolnicar to the United Statesnd was appointed an assistant to Mamula He served69 as personal aide to Tito. Promoted to Rear Admirale was elevated to Vice Admiral8 after only three years of service. Hisbypassed several other naval officers with greater experience and seniority and signified the advancementamula protege who had been associated with Tito. His appointment returned the SplitRegion Command to an ethnic Croat.
CC Franc Tavcartill cosaBsnds the Ljubljana Military Region. rofessional commander, he wasto the LCY Central Committee
In, following CC Bruno Vuletic's appointment as assis-tant Defense Secretary, command of the Nis Military Region was
assumed by LCC Aleksandar Janic' Nothing is known of Janlc's back-
ground prior to his promotion to Major Cenerale is probably
3 Serb. Observed in command positions In the Belgrade and Sis Military
Regions in the, he became Chief of Staff of the Nis Hllitary
Region He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General the same
year, after only four years in grade. If he iserb from
V
Serbia, his appointment transfers command of the Nis Military Regionnative son."
To recapitulate, at the level of the military region command, the balance sheet for the past five years is one of continuity. Four of the seven full military regions received new commanders in the past five years, but the new incumbents hud career profiles ulmllar to those of their predecessors, as line commanders born With the
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exception ot" Vilovic, all were seasoned professionals; Vilovicrotege of Mamula and Tito. All seven conroanders were evidently now "nativen extension of the tendency toward "federalization" of the YPA at the military region level that was evident in the. At the same tine, the commanders of the Zagreb and Sarajevo Military Regions were ethnic Serbs from the respectivea source of discontent to the dominant national groups within those republics and at the same time an indication of the refusal of the military leadership and Tito totrict ethnic quota toprofessional qualifications within the military elite. The namingroat (of Hungarian background) to head the Zagreb Military Region inresumably defuses this diycontent in Croatia.
Republican Territorial Defense Commands
There has been substantial continuity in occupancy of the position of Territorial Defense commander in the six republics and two provinces. In Serbia, this post is still held by CG Rajko Tanaskoviceading theoretician and former head of the Htgher Military Academy. Tanaskovic*'s retirement had been announced forut he has continued in his position. He was reelected to the Serbian Party Central Committee
In terms of percentage shares of the population, this issue is much clearer-cut in Croatia, where ethnic Croats constitutef the population, than in Bosnia-llercegovina (where the relative proportions areercent Muslims,ercent Serbs, andercent roats). But the timing of the changes Is important. CC Djoko Jovanic (an ethnic Serb) becamearget of Croat national grievances after he assumed commandthe Zagreb military region7 because his predecessors had been ethnic Croats. Kadenlc% the first ethnic Muslim to command the Sarajevo military region, assumed'his post just when Muslim natl. ,ial consciousness was developing, making his replacement,ll the more vexing to Bosnian Muslims.
CG Mirko Vranicroat from Bosnla-Horcegovina)
remains in the post of Territorial Defensein Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Formerly Comnander of the Sarajevo Military Region, he
was elected to the Bosnian Party Central Cormittee'.
measure of his political importance inincluded
in the Bosnian representation (not the military representation) on the
CY Central Committee.
LCG Boro Causevacedonian) continues to serve as
head of territorial defense In Macedonia. The first and lo dale only
V
head of territorial defense in Macedonia, Causev was appointed to ibis
positionareer of internal security and Party jobs in Macedonia.
Heember of the Macedonian Party Central Committee Presidium. V
LCG Ethem Recica (date of birth unknown, an Albanian from Kosovo)
co-iriiiu.es lo serve as Commander of Kosovo Territorial Defense. The
v
first general officer of Albanian nationality, Recica was included in48 Kosovo Party Central Committees and promoted to his present rank of Lieutenant Colonel General
The Territorial Defense Coannaud in Montenegro is still occupied by LCG Djuro Vojvodic (dale of birthontenegrin). Promoted to Major Generalojvodic'was an instructor at the National Defense School prior to his appointment He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General6 and elected to the Montenegrin Party organization Central Committee
fall pfGdate ot birth unknown, Slovene) replaced CC Rudolf Hribernik as Comma rider of Territorial Defense Forces in Slovenia. Hribernikistinguished military career culminating in command of tho Skopje Military Region; he was thereafter semi-retired In Slovenia before assumingi.:i! . . d ir. l')1'S. Jcrkic, In r of lhe First Division in the Ljubljana Military Region. In
Jerkic served fnn the YPA Counterpart Staff that dealt. military assistance officers.
e became Chief of Staff of the Slovenian Territorial Defense Organization. He was promoted to Major Ceneral2 and to Lieutenant Colonel General fter only five years Inember of8 Slovene Party Central Committee, Jerkie'Brepresents somethingeparture from past practice In stuffing the territorial defense commands on two scores. He has recent YPA division-level command experience and he became involved in Slovene political life by virtue of his terrllorial defense position, not vice versa.
Following the death of CC Karko Perlcln-KaoenjarC
Mllenko Radovaaoverb from Vojvodina) look
over the consand of the Vojvodina Territorial Defense Forces. Like V
Causev in Macedonia, Radovanov assumed his position after service in the Vojvodina political bureaucracy; he had transferred from active to reserve status7ilitary career in intelligence and propaganda positions. He was elected to the Vojvodina PartyCentral Committee
In Croatia, following the donth of CG Mate Bilobrkhe Territorial Defense Command was assumed by CC Augustin Jukic (date of birthroat evidently born in Bosnia-Hercegovina but raised inrofessional officerareer history of both political and command positions. Jukic*had served as Chief of Staff of the Ljubljana Military Region prior to assuming his territorial defense post. He was promoted to Colonel General8 and elected to the Croatian Party organization Central Committee that sane year. Hla appointment meant that an ethnic Croat continued to command the Croatian territorial defense forces, as has been the case since theirwhile tlie Zagreb Military Region was commanded by an ethnic Sorb from Croatia7 to
In summary, three of tho eight territorial defense commands have changed handsut the collective profile of the communders does not Seem to have altered substantially. All continue to be "native sons" of the dominant ethnic group (except in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the occupant is an ethnic Croat). There are three Colonel Cencrali
SlZHET
four Lieutenant Colonel Generals, and one Major General. Two of the new cooaanders ariHumed their present positions after holding major YPA commands; onerovincial government figure. Iteasure of their roleolitical affairs nt the republican level that seven are rubers of the respective republican Central Committee; the exceptionember of his republic's LCY Central Coeoittee delegation. As active officers, theyhannel of influence for the regular military on republican political affairs. Yet this does not invalidate their reeponslbillty to republican political authorities on territorial defenso matters. Their memberslilp on the republican Central Committees should probably be viewed more in terms of institutionalizing thedefense commands in the republican political structures and "cooptlng" the commanders rather thanhannel for the military leadership to affect republican politics.
unclassified
11. MILITARY IN VOLVKKENT IS KLmCAL AFFAIRS
Involvement of the military In Yugoslav political affaire increased in the first half of. mall group ofenerals occupying what had come to be considered "civilian"reemerged for the first time since the. Most occupied security-related posts, reflecting the Tito leadership's heightened concern with terrorist and subversive threats. ew military officers were called upon for othur services, both political and technical. eneral increase In the political weight of the military was codified ath LCY Congresshich formalthe status of the military Party organisation as the ninth constituent suborganiratton of tho federal LCY and allocated Iteats on the Central Corimitteo. Total military membership on the LCY CC increasedargest proportion of military members In the postwar period. But this greater military weight in central Party councils did not translate Itself into apresence In nonmllitary bodies at the republican or local levels. At the republican level, military representation on Party centralmlttecs reached its peak9 and4 had declined substantially
This greater Influence of the military ln Yugoslav political life was on balance consolidated, but not greatly expanded. In the latter half of, llifs consolidation was on an Institutional,ersonal basis. Military representation on the republican LCY Central Committees increused only slightly. (See Table 1) The few additional military representatives are all connected with territorial defense; today all the mililary representatives on the republican Central Committees are (with one exception) key officers in the republicandefense apparatus, not the YVA. The constriction of military representation on the republican Central Committees since thes consistent with the role of the nilitsry Psrty organization4ull-fledged constituent subarganlistIon of the federal LCY. It emphasizes the unique, extraterritorial nature of the military Party organisation, which (the presence of territorial defense officials on republican Central Committees notwithstanding) lacks formal lateral ties with the republican Party organizations.
unclassified
AC the federal LCY level, military representation on8 Central Conslttee wasercent, constitutinglight Increase over4 status. (See Table 2)
Military officers continue to occupy important civilian posta, hut several of the officers who first assumed these posts4 were replacedn part because they reached retirement age and in part because of the principle of pen-onuel rotation. Of the "politicalnly Defense Secretary Ljubicicajor Yugoslav political figure in his own right. Formally the "military" rcproscntatIvc on the LCY Presidium, his role in Yugoslav decisionmaking Is by no means limited to defense matters. |
CG Ivan Kukoc as replaced aa military
"representative" in the LCY Presidium Secretariat followingh
Congress by LCG Milan Daljevlcerb, region of birth v
unknown). enior military professional, had served as Assistant Federal Secretary for National Defense (first for military economy and then for personnel matters)6 and was promoted to the rank of Colonel General Notwithstanding reports7 that he wouldajor position in his native Croatian Party organisation, he retired quietly at the endB; his tour of duty In the Party Secretariat did not leadrominent civilian Party position. Daljevlc, in contrast, has less seniority. His only known posts are political; he served as Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, first in the Sarajevo Military Region and then in the Ljubljana Military Region,1 7 he assumed the position of Secretary of the military Party organization In the Pador.il Secretariat of National Defense. He was promoted to Major General onlynd to Lieutenant Colonel General
analyst Slobodan Stankovlc calculates this military representation atercent (Radio Free Europe Research, but his calculation includes retired military officers who were excluded in arriving at the totals in Table 2.
Kukoc had also served as Chairman of the LCY CC Commission on National Defense. Followingh Congress, this post was occupied, nut by Dal>evie, but by CG Petar Matic, who prior to that had served as FSND Undersecretary. emotion for Matic, this transfer did plaee another professional military officer in the federal Party apparatus with influence over, if not administrative authority for, defense natters.
he chief editorship of the LCY weekly, Komunist, was assumed by LCC Veljko Miladinovic; formerly, that position was occupied by civilians. Miladinovicerb from Croatia)areer political officer who served07 as the FSND Party organ-ization secretary (the position later occupied by Daljevic) and7 became head of the military Party organization's Commission for Ideological-Political Work. Earlier service as chief editor of the military weekly,i--nij;i. prepared him for the Koniuni SI editorship.
In the federal government, CG Franjo Herljevic roat
from Bosnia-Hercegovina) continues to serve as Federal Secretary for
Internal Affairs]
Vuko Cozze-GuCCtlcroat) continues to serve as public prosecutor, but he retired from active service following his appointment. Military influence over civilian aviation has evidently declined, for LCC Ljublsa Curgusn Bosnia-Hercegovina, nationality uncertain) left the post of head of the Directorate of Civilian Aviation7 and retired from active service. Hisare now apparently shared by the head of the Federal Aira civilian, and the head of the Federal Aviation Control(air trafficG Jordan Faganel, the former head ot the
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23
meansess senior political officer in thatpresumably, with less influence who is more rather than less responsive to the Party
V
Presidium. arallel may be drawn with Sarac's position In the FSND in this regard). enior professional officer still heads the LCY's defenst sion. Civilian aviatim: hn:< 1olitical general, the former editor of the military daily, is now editor-in-chief of the Party weeklyarticularly important post, given the decline in the importance of Komunist). eading political general with demonstrated sympathy toward the West hasey administrative job in the State Presidency, but neither the political importance of the job nor of Dolnicar himself should be overestimated.
secret
TIT.
TE TENSIONS
An examination of controversies within the Yugoslav military elite
in the decade prior5oncluded that the Yugoslav
military, like any group, had experienced internal divisions, but that
cleavages had been contained with relative ease and had not undermined
the fundamental cohesion of the military establishment. Opposition to
prevailing policies or leaders was on internal grounds; none of the
cases involved foreign policy issues, especially attitudes toward Moscow.
The cases reviewed involved national differences (the Milojevic affair
and Croatian-related cases) and intra-railiiary institutional
(the Miskovic affair and relatedhe latter also involved efforts toconservative" faction that threatened the military leadership.
The Jovantc affair apparently alsooreign policyfirst such case within the Yugoslav militaryne possible interpretarton of the affair
is Chat Jovanlc. while in
-*
no senseay haveifferent balance than did Ljubicic
and, ultimately, Tito, of Che dangers of military ties with the Soviecs vs.
Che prospectsilitary relationship with. that could boost
Yugoslav defense
During this period, one former disgraced general resumed public activity: CC Ivan Miskovic, disgraced3eappeared ins chairman of the Civil Defense Council. Although the post is unimportant in Institutional military terms, the appointment did indicate that Miskovic had at least partially redeemed himself in the
eyes of LJubici/and Tito. Onother hand, the "Slavonian
s
LCCBulovic, CC Radojlca Kcnczlc, and CG Otrarwere
purged in conjunction with the Miskovic affairemainconfirmation of the seriousness of their(which have never been explained)
*It should be recalled that Blagojeember of thein the immediate postwar period, honorably resigned inof his opposition to tho policy of accepting American
In summary, in the past five years there has been one major case of intra-elire controversy with important multiple dimensions, apparentlyid for personal power, an effort to promote the national interests of ethnic Serbs from Croatia, and the relative emphasis to ba placed on military tics with the USSR vs. those with the West. The first dimensionamiliar one. In Yugoslav circumstances, so is tha second; what is surprising is the apparent absence of other,intra-elitc confllcta within the military in th* past five years. The third dimension, involving relations with the USSR, Is new and of crucial importance. In context, intra-military differences over th* tactics of dealing with the USSR and the United States on military Mtters were to be expectedhere is no evidence tliat Jovanic (or any other officor) was "pro-Soviet"reasonous sense or even in terns of fundamental sympathy toward the USSR. There Is no evidence of controversy within the military in theelateduestioning of the strategy of total national defense. Nor has thereesurgence of the institutional and organisational conflicts within the military evident at the beginning of.
secret
IV. OUTLOOK OF THE MILITARY ELITE
The Yugoslav military leadership, and evidently the military elitehole, is still comprised of the "late Partisanhe judgments made about its outlook in theppear to remain valid. The military elite is strongly influenced by its members' first adult experiences in the cause of patrioticof their country and reestablishment of an integral Yugoslavia. Assimilating the changing values of the Party, the military leadership hastrong loyalty to the Yugoslav State and the Yugoslav Conmuinist political system. The Yugoslav military elite is thoroughlyt is committed to the policies of self-management and non-alignment that were the hallmark of the Tito era. |
Throughout the postwar period, the military elite has been preoccupied with external security, primarily the real or potential
Soviet threat. The present military elite has been concerned with the Sovietcontinuation of military contacts with Soviet
bloc countries (resumednd the purchase of some advanced Soviet weapons (Initially, at least, in the absence of alternative
Western suppliers) notwithstanding. There is no evidence that this threat perception has been disputed within the YPA, although the Jovanic
affair would seem to confirm the existence of differences on the proper
approach to dealing with the USSR in military affairs. |
This conclusion is supported by institutionalYugoslav military doctrine and force deployments. It is buttressed by the record of bilateral- military relations since
their contacts with American (and other Western) officials
ugoslav military leaders began to articulate, with thereto fore unaccustomed explicitness, their concern with the Soviet threat as the cole threat to Yugoslavia under present circumstances. Prior to
secret
tlie Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in conjunction with heightened international tensionsenerals
jspoke privately to American officials in this vein. The expanding Yugoslav military ties with the PRC alsooncern with the Soviet threat.
At the same time, the "anti-Sovictism" of the Yugoslav military leadership has its limits, which relate less to perceptions of the USSR than to perceptions of the United States and other Western countries. Yugoslav military leaders are concerned with other threats, specifically with threats from emigre terrorists in the West and with the specter of intervention by either superpower to deny control of Yugoslavia to the other. The outlook of Yugoslav senior officers thus differs from that of defense officials in Sweden, Switzerland and Finland; developments5 notwithstanding, they cannot be imputederception that the West has purely benign intentions toward Yugoslavia or its political system. Limited progress in armaments sales to Yugoslavia by the United States and other Western countries can only have fueled Yugoslav doubts on this score (however one judges the approach of the Yugoslav side to those negotiations).
Nonetheless, the Yugoslav military leadership has become morewith the Soviet threat than it was Since Afghanistan, senior Yugoslav military officials have been somewhat more candid with American officials in discussing their defense problems. Their evidently serious interest in acquiring "samples" of American weapons systems for training implies reliance. delivery of such weapons in quantity in crisis or wartime conditions. The Yugoslavs never accepted Soviet weapons on these terms. Their interest in. weapons on thissustained and if such transferssignify morereliance on Western military assistance at an earlier pointrisis involving Yugoslavia. That would constitute an important modification both tn Yugoslav military doctrine and in the outlook of the military elite.
*The sensitivity of the Yugoslavs on this point, and Their tendency to read nefarious motives into the absence of significant arms transfers, should not betlmat.ed. The sensitivity has cieep historic roots. Yugoslavs believe that Stalin denied them weapons during World War II
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/ 29
On the. domestic front, following the political turmoil, the military leadership echoed and endorsed the injunction of Tito and other Party leaders that the military also had an internal mission: toservant of theYugoslav state and political system against domestic as well as external challenges. It evidently sees one of its functions as promoting social stability. The military continues to recognize the importance of respecting national rights within the YPA for the functioning of both the military institution and the political system of which itart. Military leaders and institutions regularly endorse the principle of proportional national representation within the officer corps.* The military elite remains committed to the system of
in order to control the Partisan movement; one of the most poignantof incipient Soviet-Yugoslav friction at the time was Politburo member Mosa Pijade's fruitless wait on Mount Dunoitor forays3 for Soviet weapons that never arrived. talin cut off weapon deliveries;. linked deliveries of MAPto the state of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement;8 the USSR evidently halted or delayed weapons transfersorm of political pressure. n public remarks probably addressed primarily to the USSR, but also the United States, Ljubicic said:
One often hears statements made abroadtrong and stable Yugoslavia Is desirable but that there are fears for itsf what they say were true they would show it with deeds and not words. They would not exercise pressure or engage in sabre rattling In the vicinity of our borders, they would not impose limitations on the sale of military equipment tu our country, and they would not make various economic and other difficulties for us." (Speech on Serbian Uprising Day, FBIS/Il/July
Ljubic'ic's accusationollowing the breakdown of theDragon sale, that. sought to "play games" with Yugoslavia on the prices of weapons, is quite consistent with this outlook.
*Tlto forcefully reminded the military on Army Day7 that"also be present inside the country" and "insure that we willto move ln the direction we have
See the statement of then-LCY Executive Secretariat member
:he
CG Ivan Kukoc on this point, in NIN,7
Restated, for example, In the "action program" of the military Party organization, published in Narodna arml.ja,
SEJJRE?
UNCLASSIFIED
u)
MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN POSTWAR LCY_.CENTRAL _COKMITTF.ES_(L')
Percentage of
t
CC Membership
Congress)
1
Congress)
Congress Presidium) 3
Congress)
Congress)
Congress)
Congress)
Official proceedings of each Party CongTcss.
UNCLASSIFIED
r
KvCEiSSiPfEB
SECEtET
mm
INDEX OF NAMES
Acic,
Alagtc,
Bllobrk.
,5
Bulovic,26
Causev.17
8
2
1
2
Dokaanovlc.11
Dolanc,21
3
7j. r.L
Gozzo-Cucecic,
Gracanin,
Herljevic,22
Hribernlk,
Ilic,
Jadrljevlc,
Janle,
Jankovic,25
Jerkic,17
Joksovlc,
,.
7
JuklC,
Kadenlc.15
Karaangelaki.
Korac,
Kreacic,
Kuhar, Slavko Kukoc, Ivan Ljubicic, Nikola
Hamula, Branko Katie, Petar Mihajlovskl, Lambe Hikulic, Branko HUadinovic, Veljko Milojevic, Miloje Miskovic, Ivan Nenezic, Kadojica Neskovlc, Blagoje Pekic, Dusan Pericin-Kamenjar, Marko Petkovski, Dane Pijade, Mose Potocar,urisic, Ivo Radakovic, Ilija Radlsavlj evic, Dragosiav Radovanov, Hilenko Recica, Ethern Roglic, Steven Sarac, Dzemail Sekernlk, Janko Stalin, Josef Sunonja, Milos Susnjar, Janko Tanas kov ic, Raj ko Tavcar, Franc Tito, Jostp Vilovic, Tihomir Vojvodic, Djiiro Vojvodic, Radovan
22
9
,,
9
,,5
7,
1 24
,
26
26
,7
9
29
14
87 16
11,
,>
14
1, 3, ,9
5
16
9
Original document.
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