fir^alcefsed th* Preparedness of Sovi*
t such an intervention. In addition, thethatssociatedmaller tctions sucn as maneuvers on Poland'sPoland in support of Moscow's efforts xher deterioration of the Poiisn situa-
The Soviets have publicly endorsed Kania and could hardly have cxpecttd him to have brought the situation -near control within two weeks ol his appointment. Thc stzj^tion has continued to deteriorate, and anotheroetveen the regime and workers cannot be rjle< enewed confrontation could be precipitated by the workers' recent decision to insist on theationwide union organization and/cr by tr.air rerorted intention to call for renewed job action* it they decide that the regime has not made adequate progress Id registering trade unions by li October. the regime can reverse current trends thereigh probability that the Soviet Union will escalate its political and military pressure on Poland. If thc Sovie Union concludes the regime is losing control of the coun* try or that Poland's loyalty to the Warsawjact is in question, they will intervene militarily.
the immediate future Moscow will mount increased public warnings and heightened propaganda campaigns deer* ing the new unions, and nay arrange visits to Warsaw by high-level Soviet leaders. Moscow -ill also continue to take measures to enhance its readiness to intervene mill4 tarily in Poland. Near-term moves nay include increased exercise activity in theilitary
There are important considerations whichagainst Soviet intervention, Either with or without tho cooperation ot the Kania regime, military intervention undoubtedly would oe perceived in Moscowast resort Nevertheless, the geopolitical importarca of Poland and Moscow's determination to preserve Soviet influcn the hiill be overriding considerations. |
zier tenia'syanicrciy ioward MonteltiaHKRPolish party will, MB doubz, be etoou,already waaositivez his of placing the Poles' house in order.
Party leader Kania yesterday dismissed fron thePolitburo Zdzislaw Crudzien,ong-tine Gierek Grudzien was also replaced as head of the key party organization ina^or center of Poland's mining and industry, j
His succussor is Ai.drzcjyear-oid party secretary Kama brought into the Politburo when he breame party leadareptember. Zabinski was bornatowice and spent much of his career there. ative son is intended to reassure partv members in Katowice that their interests will still be' well represented in Warsaw. | ^
Kania clearly felt compelled to put his own stomp quicklyarty organization that has longpecial rote in Polish political and economic life, under Gierek. Kania may have also folt thac he could not work well with Grudzien who reputedly isand not very bright. Kania would alsoan of his own choosing at the head of the Katowiceto soften opposition to any chnnges of economicthat might adversely affect Katowice.
_ :atecithat 'he
Soviet leadershipigh regard for new Polish First Secretary Kania and is confident of his abilities.'
ulso assorted that Kania is closely associate with Soviet Politburo member and KGB chief Andropov.ments accord with other evidence that Moscow supported Kania's selection as party leader and Isto give him somc^ane^iverin^rpom to resolve Poland's
the Polish ie lack of overt indicates that much roren Eastern Europe, iob of the Soviet
The absence of open Western government meddling in Pcland has not, of course, stopped th* Soviet media from
leveling charges against the West of interference in Polish internal affairs. In fact, the frequency and
level of such propaganda has increased. An article in today's ivavda under the byline of "A. used to indicate high-level Soviet party approval, is the most recent and sharpest example.
In the same vein, (or the first time since Kania took power the East Germans have openly expressed their apprehension about what is happening In Poland. eekly paper pu* .shed by the Ministry fo- Foreign Affairs has warned that there is no middle path between socialism and capitalism and that every search tor one has encour; counterrevolutionarioa.
n Gdansk og registering authorities.
about tnelr resignations from them. Key non activists, inso, will be meeting iln on Monday in further preparation for :hoir national advisory organization with thc
Search :or Aid
Poland has requested emergency economic did fron each Fast European country. Since these countries have serious economic problems of their own, itunlikely that theyble ot willing to provide Poland with much aid.
So far, the Kania regime has announced thatand East Germany hove promised to send additional quantities ot raw materials, food, and other consumer gocds. igh-level Czechoslovak official, however, said that Prague is still undecided about the aid to be given to Poland. Any aid package will be designed to avoid domestic shortages and cutbacks in Czechoslovak exports. East Germany also eaytrouble aeeting some of its aid pledges. bj
Hungarian aid so far has consisted only of additional supplies of edible oil and probably will not includeincreased exports of meat, which the Hungarians con sell in the West. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia reportedly havo agreed to speed up deliveries of food. Since both coun' : are also facing shortages in then curt dowostiT markets and must meet export commitments, Poland -rehab!much aid from these source*.Original document.