SPECIAL ANALYSIS
USSR-POLANDi Moscow's Reaction to Crisis
-It thia point tht Sovittt mutt be questioning whether the Polish leadership hat the will or ability to restore stability ir. Polanday that leaves intact the party's authority and the regime's socialist orientation. eases*
Moscow probably is willing to give party leader Kania more time to pull the situation together but can hardly be impressed with his progress so far.
trade union leaders continue to cooperate with political dissidents.
they maintain the initiativeli the regime.
is confusion and discord in the lower levels of the party itself. assmsV
we have already seen substantial Soviet politicalnotably Moscow's hand ln the sweeping changes that were made in the Polish leadership last month. Moreover, Moscow has advanced the Ideological justification for any action they wish to take.
trade union issue is portrayed ashe interest* of internationaledicated to exploiting the current crisis to thsof Poland and socialism.
assistance to "antisoclalist groups-has been noted and described as interference in Poland's internal affairs.
--continued
Approved far
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Leaders of the strike movement have been aaid to have "counterrevolutionary aimi/
Soviets have pointed to trends
in Warsaw similar to those in Czechoslovakia during the Prague spring.
They describe th# notion of independent unions representing thc workers better than the party itself as "inconceivable.#
believe that the Soviets are taking some prepara tory Military measures with of force piav be neccs
Options
Additional Soviet political pressure and military preparations can be expected as the Polish political crisis continues to unfold. This could take the foraoviet-Polishroader Warsaw Pact summit,ublic statements by Soviet leaders, and much higher levels of polemics.
If Kania is unable to make demonstrable progress toward containing the situation, the Soviets could hold additional military exercises including somo with scenarios that rehearse the invasion of Poland. They could also conduct more extensive mobilization in the
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western USSR as well as nove airborne and air transport units. Such developments would be reminiscent of Soviet actions before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This level of activity night be accompanied by efforts toAdditional Soviet divisions intoPoland under the guiseWarsaw Pact maneuver.'
It Is possible that tho Soviets have alreadyecision to intervene militarily. We continue tohowever, that they have not passed the point of no return and that thuir decision will depend on where the situation goes from here, and not on what hasthus far. The Soviets realize that Kania cannot move precipitously or reverse" the situationff time, Moscow, however, is now" plaeingVitselfetter "osition to threaten and even use military force if Kania annct limit the concessions granted the strikers, or if is roves to regain controliolent popular reaction. esammememv
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Original document.
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