POLAND: Post-Strike Prospects
In the period irxediately before the Poliah regimehe Baltic workeretlement, the situation had deteriorated steadily. It seemed to ue that the continuing cohesion of 'he workere and their persistent demands for free trade unions and czher politioal concessions, combined vith the Polish Government's die-unity and inability to oontrol devslopments, were creating athat in tuns might bringoviet decision to intervene militarily in Poland. W
-.. The compromise reached last weekend interrupted that trend. .The parties involved accepted it because they felt that the alternative was disaster. The possibility of Soviet invasion was one thing that both the workers and the party leaders most wanted to avoid; the Soviets, also, wanted to avoid it as long as they were confident that Communist Party control of Poland could be main-'. tained.
So far, the workers clearly are the winners. They refused to be satisfied with economic concessions. They wrung from theettlement that offershance to institutionalize their right to represent the interests of the industrial work force of Poland over the -longer term. Under their pressure regime unity crumbled; negotiators were replaced.and critics of the regime's ;economic policy and performance were readmitted.to party leadership. The Soviets brought no great public pressure to bear,-and massive violence -wan avoided, sssssm
' V'bivld'ed withia itself and having made political and economic promises it will not be able to honor in full, the regime aayyriad of problems. The most
tha aabitions of Poland's naw worker leaders. eady sense of their new power, these leaders will be extremely sensitive to any sign that the regime is not honoring theiracgains.
--Restoring its own unity and commonime when the authority of party leader Gierek is questionable.
a new, mid-to-long term strategyeal with.Poland's economicto
service the huge foreign debt without lowering - the standard of living.
the Soviets and their East Eurooean allies that its concessions to the workers"have not undermined its ability to rule Poland.
the powerful Polish Catholic
Church fron ending its cooperative relation-,shiprwith the regime. -
Inhibiting Western support to Poland's now worker organizations while maintaining access to economic assistance and collaboration in certain foreign policy areas. tsssV
How the problems confronting the Polish regimeevelop, and with what combined impact, cannot beeen with any clarity, even by the Poles themselves. In general, we see throe possible outcomes:
workers' revolt in Poland goes thepredecessors. The workers are unabletheanisasto sustain their momentum. Thethus be set for another outburst ofunrest several years in the future,moro serious
-Disaster strikes. The regime is unable to pull itself together enough Co developprograms. The workers out of frustration renew their strikes, which turn violent. The Soviets lose confidence in the Poles' ability to workolution satisfactory to Moscow, and Soviet intervention becomes inevitable.
major Polish domestic forces work out a' new sharing of power with which all can live. In the process, Polandew variant of national communism. ^bb>
Of these three possible outcomes, all ourffick withering away of the worxer' similar to what occurred afterhe least likely. Beyond this there is disagreement. Some believe that miscalculations leading inevitably to Soviet Intervention is the best bet, givencractablethe Polish regime faces and its diminished ability to exercise control, others argue that the working outew balance of forces in Poland is more likely If only because alleclata efcxll there are limits to moscow's tolerance, fj^^
z 9,Original document.