USSR-POLAND: MOSCOW'S DEEPENING CONCERN

Created: 11/28/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USHft-POLANDi Moscow's Disponing Concern

ftttaum jaala) the mpetrritVirwiu'e rmttOM yc0tar.hu of MMlMr-uito.it*

Ifehatnuuj

tfibUUi, to Jmflmmm,tounrd

1 MrttJ* ll iiiii || rtthor I* tha Foltnh roatn*

or i, the CovUtM

Moscow cannot be ploasvd by ovonts since theovember Supremo Court decision, striken havoand some of the now unions have extracted oollt-lcal concessions. $Mm%

Tho Soviets probably are also concerned with scmo ofxporlments at democratization, Including the selectionatholic deputy premier. Control Commit-too department chief LoanldrequentTor Sovlst Prosidontcriticised the Polish regime for permitting "antisocial1st- olemonts to establish the "structural and legsl basis" for chal-lenylnu tha established order, Koscov subsequently wornod implicitlyeneral tranaport strike could affect Sovlst security interests. 0MB>

The Soviets have indicated thst they wouldnited role for the now unions ss the price of social ond political peace ln Poland, Soviet public andmanta, howovor, suggest that the nev unions must not oxcood certain bounds, including acceptance of tharole of tho party, continued support for publicand adherence to Poland's internationalents, inoludlnu defenso cooperation with Moscow. Recent* Soviet criticism of tho Polish situation has boon touchod off hy Ooltdnrtty's infringement or thoae principle. fjB

--continuod

ovrabi-r I'jRb

Soviot Options

Ono courso open to tho .lovlotn la to cohtlmia to try to Isolate tho foil ah crUlu from domestic Soviot ond Last European audloncoe and dvo Kania additional time to assart party authority. Moncow mlqht hopeintor of discontent, aggravated by consumer1 sobor tho population and docroaao its domonds for political and social change. This patient and modorato courso, however, has not improved tho situation over tho MBB*

Olszowski

liln ncceotoblo

A second option for tho Sovlots is to begin lookingnow loader In Poland. Politburoo fan

is ono candidate/ tho Sovlots roportodly foundone poBBlblo suc-connor to GlaroK. MB*

Moscow also could actively raise tho specter of ln-torvontion. So for tho muted public level of Soviot con-corn has had little impact on Polish militants, who nuomtign of flovlot unwillingness to intorvono,

est

ow prohabl roaii^oB thtt nana of tho abovo ou* oroQChoi would guarantao on ond to tha crUls. Tho Soviot loadorihip muflt bo giving iiorloui thought to military in-torvontlon ond tho impact thla would havo- bothly and abroad.

for Wontorn jlooctlon

oonvareationo tho Bovloti tako

on

with Amorloaniother Wotulto dlffforont lino, portraying Moacow as Intont on lotting tho Poloi ronolvo tho problom llowavor dlBlngonuouo, thin lino doon rofloct Moacow'n

vrahrril

a*

realization that military Intervention would impinqe on ita ofCorta toialogue with tho Incoming US administration, compromise its goals at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting, and ensure Wostorn cohoslonon theater nuclear forces and dofunso jxuondlturoB. mm*

Although such considerations will give Hosccw pause, wo beiiovo they would not be pufflclent to forestall mill tary action if Moscow sees the Polish authorities losing control or conceding raoro to tho unions than the Soviets can tolorc.to. mm*

Although tho situation is deteriorating and Kania may bo slipping into Soviot disfavor, Moscow probably has not yet written off other elements and personalities in tho party. Moscow, moreover, probably still hopes that moderating elements In tho Church and even within Solidarity itself will push tho union militante into an accommodation. Wo expect Moacow to try to promote auch an accommodation by increasingly sharp warnings that its vital intoresta are at stake in Poland. %fc

Tho latest ovenfts in Poland nevertheless must be making the Kremlin Increasingly pessimistic that it can decisively Influence tho situation short of military nvaann. qw***

. Moscow's contingency military preparations ore Since early November, the Soviets haveproparodnoaa level of some of the divisionsbo part of anv force ro invade

Original document.

---

---