POLAND: Challenge to Polish Leadership Increases
The Polish leadership is facing ihe gravest okallenge to ita authority since the strikes cn the Baltic Coast ended in Auaust.arsazj leaders cf Solidarity haveist of sic: political demands andarge-scale strike infactories if ihe :vgime fails to begin talks on these demands 'ry noon Tuesday, It uill ie difficult fcr the regime to acquiesce to iht union de-rands, especiallyrj of the TASS naming onailuoi' strike and cf ihe political euality of theemands. Thus tha present situation rrovea us closer to cserrivo -tasures by ihe regit*ossible Soviet military invasion. tMMM^
The union demands include:
release of the printer arrested and charged with betraying state secrets by copying athat deals with official policy on
naming of the authors of the document on dissidents.
release of jailed dissidents.
official investigation of the,peoplefor suppressing demonstrating workers during labor protests0
establishmentoint Government -
Solidarity Parliamentary Commission cVthe powers of the
--The limiting of the state budget for thooffice.
This new confrontation comes at an already tense time with reported strikes onovember by railway workers in Gdansk and Warsaw, by workers in several factories in tho capital and in 1odz, and by coal miners in Silesia.
if its past responses to such crises provide anthe regime will try to buy time, possibly by undertaking negotiations in the hope of splitting the national Solidarity leadership, bringing pressure by mod-orate union leaders and tbe Church to bear, andompromise solution. J R
In the event strikes in Warsaw ensue, similar work actions are likely to spread throughout Poland. In these circumstances the Kania regime wouldigh incentivee limited force in an effort to reestablish itsauthority, to staveoviet intervention, and to preempt widespread violence. imited use of force would probably include the arrest of militant union leaders and dissidents and the declarationtate of national emergency. The resort to force,couldprovoke the very disorder the regime seeks avoid, "f] B
while the Soviets will allow the Polish regime some time to contain the situation, these developments will serve to convince the Soviets that, unless the unions can be mode to go back to work peacefully, coercive measures either on the part of the Polish leadership or the Soviets themselves will eventually have to be era-ployed .
No evidence ,
howover, of the large-scale mobilization or logistl activity indicative of an imminent Soviet invasion!
less, the increased preparedness level of forces_that would probably be nart of an intervention force,
would indicate "thai rapidly to ready an invasion.iOriginal document.