THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER: TRENDS SINCE 1965 AND

Created: 4/1/1981

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The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends5 and Prospects for

National

Foreign

Aitessnvrnt

Center

The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends5 and Prospects foru)

An Intelligence Assessment

Information available as ofI was usaiI tn ihe preparation of ihis report.

This assessment was prepared |

Office of Strategic Research. Comments and queries are welcome und ahould be directed to ihe Director of Strategic Research. I

This paper reflects contributions from the Offices of Centra! Reference, Economic Research. Imagery Analysis. Political Analysis, and Scientific and Wasposa Research. | |

This paper has been reviewed by ihcOfficer* for General PurposePrograms, and tbe USSR andand by the Arms Control

The Detelopmentof Soviet Military Power

Trench5 and

Prospects for

keySoviet military buildup during the Brezhnev era lu* emphasized

balanced development of all forces and increased use of militarypolitical ends. Since thehe Soviets have:

the number of their intercontinental nuclear delivery vehicles nearly sixfold, overturning US quantitative superiority, improving their capabilities touclear war. and giving ihc USSR an assured nuclear retaliation capability. Their number and accuracy make ihcse

a major threat to US land-based missiles.

Maintained the worlds largest forces for strategic defenseivil

defense program to protect the political leaders and most of the essential work force. (Even so. they cannot prevent devastationS retaliatory strike.)

More than tripled the size of their battlefield nuclear forces, reducing the credibility of NATO's nuclear weaponsounterweight to the Warsawarger conventional forces.

More than doubled the artillery firepower of their divisions, increased ninefold the weight of ordnance (hat tactical air forces can deliver deep in NATO territory, and reduced the West's qualitative lead in such key areas as tank armor. (Many Soviet units, however, and most of the Pact units, are still equipped with older and less capable weapons.)

Introduced new, heavily armed surface ships, nuclear-poweredand naval aircraft and quadrupled the number of missileon ships and submarines. The Soviet Navyrowing constraint on Western ability to project naval power. bu( its forces are still vulnerable to air and submarine attack.

Broadened military activities in the Thirdaid alone, through use of Sovie( forces in defensive roles and support of Cuban forces in combat, to offensive operadons by Soviet units in Afghanistan.

Supported their buildup by nearly doubling defense spending in real terms, more than doubling the size of thestablishment, and increasing by one-third their military manpower

Duringhe Soviets' options for further improvement of their military forces will be complicated by an uncertain internationalforeign military threats, an economic slowdown,eadership succession. The range of possible choices for weaponowever, is largely determined by development programs already in train We have identified aboutercent of ihc new systems thai could be introduced in, and on lhe basis of this knowledge we project thai

Continuing improvements in the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs will further increase the vulnerability of US fixed, land-based missile launchers. The Soviets will preserve their strategic offensive forces' ability ioS attack by increasing the capability of sea-based strategic weapons and developing land-mobile systems. (Deploy mem of mobile systems would complicate the US effort to monilor potential limitations on strategic forces.)

New strategic defense systems will increase the risk to bombersSoviel air space bul will noi be numerous or capable enough to counter large-scale attacks from missiles and aircraft Civil defenses will improve marginally, increasing the leaders' protection and including more of the essential work force.

and modernization of theater nuclear forces will continue, with improvements in short- and medium-range sysicms based in Europe. Unless countered by the Wesi. this will further reduce the deterrent value of NATO's nuclear forces.

Modernization of the Soviet's own theater air and ground forces (plus organizational changes that increase the units' firepower and flexibility) will keep pace with NATO's modernization efforts but outstripin ihe forces of the other Pad countries.

New naval weapons will reduce ihe vulnerability of Soviet ships and submarines und improve their capabilities lo contest Western use of open-ocean areas. The USSR may deploy its first attack aircraft carrier.

in airlift and sealifl potential couldtheapability for long-range projection of military power in. If the trend of increasing involvement in the Third World continues, the Soviets will use the capability more actively.

These future activities will not require much expansion of the forces, but if lhe Soviets follow through with them (and current evidence suggestsey intendhey will have to increase defense spending in real terms througholitical strains resulting from growing economiccould lead them io moderate the growth of spending, particularly laic in ihe decade. They could curtail or stretch out some weapon programs and alter lhe support structure of some of their forces. (These steps would appear riskyoviet military planner, but would not necessarily have much effeci on ihc trends outlined above or on the overall improvement in Soviet military capabilities that we project for the next decade)

Poorer economic conditionsore volatile political environment inould increase the possibility ofdiscontinuif.es in military policy. These could cause deviations on either side of our projection:An accelerated military effort couldharp deterioration in Fast-West relationsissolution of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and leadreater expansion of strategic or convenlion.il forces than we now expect.

A reduced military effort might result from internal political turmoileteriorating economic situation; it would probably affect conventional forces more heavily lhan strategic forces.

Contents

T

Key Soviet Organization* for Defense Decisionmaking, Manning, and Manae=nicnt

rogram Management 48

in Soviet Economic Performance

Among Soviet Defense and Civilian Industries

Strategic Attack Systems

Systems for Strategic Air and Missile Defense

Ground Forces Weapon Systems

Tactical Aviation Aircraft

Batileficldand Peripheral Nuclear Delivery Systems

General Purpose Naval Ships and Aircraft 88

Amphibious Ships and Transport Aircraft

Military Space Systems

of Soviet Ballistic Missile Early Warning and Battle anagement Radars

Air Defense Radar Coverage

Wartime Role of Polish Forces

Air Coverage of the Persian Gulf Region

Areas From Which Western Ballistic Missile Submarines Could Attack the USSR

for theeavy ICBM

House Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar

ank

round Attack Aircraft

Operating Base for theobile IRBM

Backfire Bomber

Kirov Cruiser

Ivan Rogov-Class Dock Landing Ship

Brezhnev in the Uniform of the Commander in Chief or ihe Soviet Armed Forces

oxbat Interceptor

omber

and Brezhnev

Successors to Brezhnev

Projected Soviet Tactical Aviation Forces

Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces

Soviet Sealift and Airlift Forces

and Alternative Projections of Soviet Inveslmcnl and Operating Expenditures

of Current Soviet ICBMs

of Soviet Long-Range Bombers

of Soviet Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

of Soviet Strategic Defense Systems

of Major Soviet Ground Forces Weapons

of Soviet Theater Nuclear Missiles and Rockets

of Selected Soviet Tactical Aircraft and Peripheral Bombers

of Soviet Tactical Aviation Weapons

of Newer Soviet Major Surface Ships

of Newer Soviet Altack Submarines

of Soviet Military Transport Aviation Aircraft

The Development of

Soviet Military Power: Trends5 and Prospects for

The Past, Present, and Future of Soviet Military Power

Soviet Military Effort Under Brezhner

For more than two decades, ihc USSR has been engagedajor buildup of its military' forces. In the Khrushchev era ihc emphasis was on siraicgic nuclear programs, but since Brezhnev came lo power4 ihere has been an across-the-board expansion and mode mi/at ion of all the Soviet forces. Among the many factors underlying this buildup, lhe most basic is ihe altitude of the Soviet leaders that military mightecessary and effective instrumeni of policy in an inherently unstable world. This attitude has been embodied in and reinforced by an ambitious military doctrine ihat calls for forces structured to fight and win future conflicts andolitical and economic system that gives priority to military requirements. Q

Taken together, these conditions haveonsiderable momentum to the Soviet military' effort. Thus, despite changes in the international environment. Brezhnev's deiente policy, and Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the overall pace of the Soviet military buildup has remained steady during the Brezhnev years. Annual Soviet military spending has nearly doubled in real terms and now consumes over one-eighth of GNP; military manpower has increased by one-third to moreefense research and development facilities have more than doubled in size; and weapon production facilities have expanded by nearlyercent.

The number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles has increasedew hundred5 tooday, overturning the previous US quantitative superiority. (The United States has justelivery vehicles) The accuracy of the newest Soviet weapons now exceeds that of US systems,ajor threat to US fixed, land-based missiles. These improvements have enhanced the capability of Soviet forces touclear war. Moreover, by hardening their land-based missile launchers andreater number of ballistic missiles on submarines, the Soviets have made their strategic forces so survivable that even afterS attack they could destroy masi of ihc US population and most US military and economic targetsetaliatory strike. I I

' This figure include*illion men *ho fulfill roles that lhe United Slates wouldrelated to rational

Soviet planners also emphasize defense against strategic weapons, but their defenses cannnot prevent similar devastationS retaliatory striker

Soviets have introduced systems to detect and defend against ballistic missiles, but technical limitations and treaty constraints render them largely ineffectivearge-scale US missile attack

They have expanded and improved their air defense network ithe world'sivingood capability against high-flying aircraft but only limited effectiveness against low-altitude penetration.

Defense against missile-launching submarines is poor despite its high priority in naval planning, because the search and detection capabilities of Soviet forces ate insufficientocale submarines in the open ocean.

Continuing atlcniion to civil defense has provided protection for virtually all political leaders, must key workers, and aboutercent ol the urban residents; but the rcsl of the population would be dependent on evacuation, and economic and mililary facilities arc still vulnerable. Q

The Soviets have eliminated the West's former edge in short- and medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe. The number of Soviet laciica! surface-to-surface missiles there has increasedhird, and the number of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons in Central Europe has more than tripled. The Soviets have broken the monopoly held by NATO sincen nuclear artillery and have introduced other new tactical delivery systems with improved ranges, accuracy, readiness, and destructive power. They may also have nuclear landmines. With these improvements, Soviet theater forces arc nowelter position lo match any NATO escalationuropean conflici from one level of nuclear war to unoihcr, without using long-range theater nuclear systems based in ihchose systems have also been improved by deployment of thentermediaic-range ballistic missile with three independently targetablc warheads and of the Backfire

ihc cxleni lhai Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces now check Ihose of the United Stales and Soviet gains in theater nuclear forces have offset those of NATO, the balance of conventional forces in Europe has becomesignificant. In (he conventional area, the Soviets expanded their

1 Tbe Somcuhope ioATO Warsaw Plcttoi :ibe use ofcoved in BfetSOfvet Union mm not to mnte retaliatory attack* Not tt he tew. the) doubt that niKlear eKiUtioe in sachcow Id be heid wit bin bound)

already large ground and theater air forces duringeriod and introduced modern systems, some of them equal or superior io those of NATO:

Total ground forces manpower increased by nearlyercent, while lhe number of major weaponsivision increased byhird and artillery firepower more ihan doubled.

The number, variety, and capability of air defense systems available tn tactical commanders increased rapidly, with deployment of all-weather missile-equipped interceptor aircraft and mobile air defense missiles and guns.

The latest Soviet tanks (now common tn most first-line Soviet units in Eastern Europe, but not yet widely deployed among units in the USSR) have armor that provides good protection against the most advanced antitank weapons.

New tactical aircraft deployed inave increased ninefold the weight of ordnance that Soviet iheaicr air forces could deliver against targets in NATO's rear areas (the Benelux couniries and parts of France, forore accurate bombing systems (radars, laser rangefindcrs, and computers) and precision munitions have improved Soviet capabilities against point targets and largely eliminated NATO's rear areas asin conventional war. |

On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact's military potential ts affected by its political cohesion and its will to use force. Pact performance on the field of battle would be heavily influenced by the attitudes and effectiveness of the non-Soviet armies, which have been assigned major roles in both combat and support. These armies are less modern than that of the USSR. More important, the solidarity and enthusiasm that they would exhibit in combat against NATO are open to serious question. Q

The Soviets also maintain large forces opposite China. Since the, the number of Ground Forces divisions along the Sino-Soviet border has doubled and their tolal manpower has more than tripled. Expansion of Soviet tactical aviation forces since iheas also been directed primarily al China.

In ihe, ihe Soviet Navyoasial defense force with limited capabilities Tor operations in Ihe open ocean, bui it is being transformed into an oul ward-looking force deploying heavily armed surface ships, high-speed submarines, and advanced aircraft. The number of ships has changed little, but the proportion of large surface combatants and nuclear-poweredis growing. Qualitatively. Soviet naval forces remain vulnerable to air and submarine attack; nuclear-powered submarines are noisier (and thus easier todctcct) than their Western counterparts; and capabilities for distant combaias the landing of troops and provision of carrier-based airextremely limited. But their numerous missile-equipped surface ships, submarines, and aircrafl enable the Soviets to control their own coastal waters and to contest ihe use of open-occan areas by the West.

To support the expanded combai capabilities of their forces, the Sovieisspace systems for communications, intelligence collection,and other military functions. They now have an average of abouioperational al any given time, of which aboutercentand anotherercent have both military and civilian uses.have also introduced new procedures and systems foroperations. These include an increase in the operational authorityGeneral Staff, creation of new intermediate levels or command,of mobile and hardened command posts, and deployment ofsystems. These measures have improved thesecurity, and survivability of

As their military power has grown at the intercontinental, theater nuclear, and conventional levels, the Soviets have increasingly used militaryto achieve political gains, especially in the Third World. Soviet exports of military equipment to the Third World have increased rapidly since their beginning in the.illion worth of hardware was sold to the Third World, and90 Soviet advisers were in Third Worldthan four times as many asperations of naval ships outside home waters increased sixfold5luctuated for several years, and increased sharply again9oviet naval ships now make several hundred visits to Third World ports each year.!-

2

Mililary involvement in Third World conflicts has become more active and direct:

In thend, Soviet air and air defense forces were used in defensive roles in the Middle East.

In the. Soviet logistic support transported Cubanforces to Angola and Ethiopia and sustained them there.

oviet combat ground and air units invadedfirst direct involvement of Soviet ground forces outside the Soviet

To support their growing military involvement overseas, the Soviets have improved the ability of their forces to project power:

The lift capability of primary Soviet amphibious ships has more than tripledhese ships can transport00 men (but ihey arc spread out among four fleeterchant ships, some of which have been specifically designed to support naval operations, arc also available.

The firepower, mobility, and air defense capabilities of the six combat-strengih airborne divisions have improved with the deployment of more modern weapons.

introducing heavy transport aircraft, lhe Soviets have doubled their airlift capacity (but their capabilities remain inferior lo those of the United States).

The Soviets have not developed many forces specifically for overseasThey rely instead on general purpose forces designed principally for use in Europe but also suitable for operations in more distant areas to which ihey can deploy without opposition. Most areas of vital interest to them arc close to the USSR, however, and thus Soviet requirements for long-distance intervention forces are less demanding than those of the United Slates

Factors Affecting Future Military Programs

As the Soviet leaders formulate ihcir defense plans for ihc future, they face major external and domestic uncertainties:

fluid international situationrudent defense posture, and the Soviets' perceptions of emerging military threats argue especially for continued qualitative improvement in forces.

+

On the other hand, lo maintainodcsi rate oTeconomic growth, those leaders must allocate more resources to capita; investment and must improve labor productivity, in part byising standard of Irving.

This dilemma could cause political tension, particularlyime oftransition^

These uncertainties make it particularly difficult to forecast Soviei policies. We have sufficient information on each of tbe factor* involved, however, to make fairly informed judgments about (heir probable impact on theofSoviet military power innd locxannne the possible effects of discontinuities in policy

In the international arena, tbe Soviets are concerned by the prospect thai the United States will augment its defense effort, by China's opening to the West, and by ihe possibility that US opposition to Soviet global aspirations will increase. They are troubled by instability on theirin Afghanistan thai they have been unable to suppress, anregime in Iran whose fundamentalist Islamic ideology could spread to Muslim minorities in the USSR,ajor threat toCommunisi Pan> control in Poland. They probably viewecade of heightened competition, in which ihey willreater risk of military confrontation with the United Stales and of actual combai with major powers!"

While they see increasing tension, ihe leaders and planners also see foreign nations making military efforts thai threaten io undercut the strengths of Soviet forces and exacerbate their weaknesses. These threats, as well as deficiencies lhat the Soviets currently perceive in their own militarymake continued pursuit of new weapon programs essential from the perspective of the Soviet planners They see the possible US deployment ofissile, for example,ual threat:

lis survivability il'rom deploymeni on mobile launchers or in multiple shelters) could force ihe Soviets io expend all of their ICBM weapons aeainstlone, were lhey loassive counicrforce strike.

lis accuracy increases the risk thai the United Suics could neutralire Ihe Sovicis" land-based ICBMs. which provide nearlyercent of ihe weapons and warheads on their inicreontinenial nuclear delivery vehicles.

i;11

The Soviets also consider NATO's plan to deploy advanced ballistic and cruise missilesropc as partS strategy to threaten Soviet ICBMs and to reduce Soviet capabilities for theater war in

Many other military developmentsause of concern to Soviet planners:

They foresee that new Western ballistic missile submarines, with their greatly enlarged patrol areas, will further tax their inadequate antisubmarine capabilities.

They are watching China's lengthening nuclear reach and the upgrading of French and British strategic forces.

They regard NATO's programs for armor and antiarmor systems,munitions, and nuclear weapons as substantial and technologically challenging.

They believe they must accelerate their efforts to compete with NATO in tactical aircraft and air defenses.

They are worried about the antisubmarine capabilities of the West and the vulnerability of their ships to air and submarine attack

They see the widespread deployment of cruise missiles on US ships as reducing their capabilities in ship-to-ship warfarethe long-range Tomahawk cruise missileew strategic threat lo Soviet territory.

- Finally, instability on their borders and US plans toapidforce have increased Soviet concern about military developments in

they attempt to react to the wide array of situations they perceive as either promising or threatening. Soviet policymakers willar more constrained resources picture than in:

Soviet economic growth, which has been declining since, has slowed toa crawl in the past several years. The real average annual growth90ittle over Iworst in any two-year period since World War II.

In, developing energy and demographic problems probably will hold GNP growth to an averageercent orhalf the rale at which defense expenditures have been growing.

If military spending is allowed lo follow its past irend. its share ol economic outpui could increase from about one-eighth now to over one-sixth in

More importantly, this increased military burden would reducethe share of the annual increment loGNP that can be distributed among civilian claimants to ease the political tensions that arise from competition for resources Military programs- especially those for nonsiratcgickey resources from lhe production of critically needed equipment for agriculture, industry, and transportation.^

The problems of Soviet leaden in allocating resources could be further complicatedolitical succession. Soviet President Brezhnev isnd in poor health, and most of his colleagues arc also in their seventies, many of them also ailing. The departure of these men could affect mililary policy, but probably not immediately. The process of Soviet national security planning and decisionmaking is highly centralized, secretive, and resistant to fur.dsmcnt.il change. It is strongly influenced b> military and defense-industrial organizations, represented by men who have held their positions for many years,ontinuity of plans and programs Because of this momentum, and the political clout of the men and institutions that support defense programs, wc doubt thai Soviet emphasis on mililary power would decrease in the early stageseadership succession

The attitudes of tbe senior leaders are another buffer against any quick change of direction. If Brezhnev leaves ihe scene soon, the chances are that he would be replaced by one of the current group, most of whom share his general policy views. The two most likely candidates are party secretaries Kirilenko (who has expressed views somewhal more conservative than Brezhnev's on national security policy) and Chemenkofwho has always been very close toventually, of course, the interim leader will be replacedounger man: but among the younger Politburo members who appear io be candidates, most also seem ioontinued high priority on defense. The effectolitical transition is inherently unpredictable, however, and wc cannot exclude the possibility that major policy changes could result |

In contrast to ihe imponderables of the economic and poliiical environments, weood capability to identify most future Soviet weapon systems. The farces ofill be equipped primarily with systems already in lhe Held and secondarily with Ihose now entering production or in laic stages of development (Because iiecade or more to develop and lest modern weapon sy stems, few of those now in early stages of development could be iniroduced insignificant numbers ine believe that we have identified aboutercent of the new systems likely tu be introduced

in this decade. Knowing Soviet military requirements and the amount of available development and production resources, wc can postulate others. These identified and postulated systems, plus existing systems, will make up well overercent of the weapons in the field0 I I

Soviet Mililary Power in

Taking these factors into account, wc can project in broad outline the prospects for further development of Soviet military power inc have made several projections. The most detailed (our baseline projection) is the one most consistent with currently available evidence. It assumes that pressures in favor of continuing the currentressures fromchallenges, from the Soviets' ambitious military doctrine, and from the powerful institutions that support defense programs- will offsetarge extent any inclination toward change that might arise from the leaders' growing economic concerns. The baseline projection allows for adjustments to defensethey do not significantly affect military capabilities!"!

Because changes in political and economic conditions cuuld lead to discontinuities in policy, we present three alternative projections: two that require an acceleration in the growth of military spending and one that requires an absolute reduction. We consider all of these to be less likely than the baseline projection butiscussion of them intended to suggest reasonable limits to the options open to Soviet policy ma kers.f-

Baseline Projection. For our baseline projection wcthe basis of the weapon production and development programs we havethe Soviets will continue their policy of balanced force development. Within the outlines of this continuity, however, wc expect them to increase their emphasis on strategic forces that canS attack, on strategic defense, andesser extent) on forces for the projection of Soviet power to distant areas. Manpower constraints will limit increases in the size of forces, but improvements will continue rapidly as new weapons become available. Improvements in Soviet military forces will lead to growing capabilities in manyncluding some areas of traditional Western strength! I

We expect the Soviets lo carry out programs aimed at maintaining or increasing their lead over the United States in most measures ofnuclear attack capability and at upgrading their nuclear war-fighting capabilities. They will continue to improve theheir ICBMsand

i.r!Ct>o::ii option l':':ki l: jk-.hv. ire"

new ICBMs.esult, the Soviet ICBM force- with or without the SALT IIhave the theoretical potential io desiro* most of the warhead* on US land-based missiles throughout the decade. Thisl be greatest in the, before the United Slates canew ICBM. But even in that early period. US forces could conductassive retaliatory strike

To maintain survivablc siraicgic forces in the faceoicnii.il threatown fixed, land-based missiles, we expect ihe Soviets to increaseof their submarine-launched ballistic missiles and possiblyin the absence of SALT constraints! tu deploy land-mobilemayew strategic bomber or an aircraft to carrycruise missiles, and ihey may already be testing acruise

Should strategic arms control negotiations be resumed, these weaponcould complicatealready difficult US intelligence task- Land-mobile strategic weapons and cruise missiles cannot be counted with high confidence.esult, monitoring strategic arms control agrcc-mcnts will be much more difficult inhan il was in-

Air defense improvements have been identified al Soviet lest ranges, and some arc now entering deployment. These include new surf ace-to-airand interceptor aircraft with radars that enable them to detect and engage low-flying targets. These defenses could make penetration of Soviet airspace much more difficult for large manned bombers of current ind lo"altitudes of modernore complicated problem, however, and we projeci that Soviet defenses will be less effective againsl these new systems duringJ

The Soviets continue their antiballisiic missile (ABM) programs, but ihc technical difficulties of detecting, identifying, and intercepting ballistic missiles have kepi progress slow. Moreover, ihc deployment constraints of2 ABM Treaty severely limit lhe effectiveness of defenses againsl missiles. (Should the Soviets abrogate the ireaty. they could deploy ABM defenses widely in ihc latter half of lhec expect continuing Soviet interest in antisaiclliie defenses and in high-technology systems for strategic defense. Possible developments in theouldpace-based antisaicililc laser system and few laser air defense weapons. Continuing

- Searei

civil defense efforts will improve protection for the leaders and essential work force, but not for the general population or for military or economic facilities. Soviet capabilities against ballistic missile-launching submarines will remain poor.r

Wc project lhat. despite ihe widespread Western deploy mcnt of countcrforcen, the Soviets will maintain the capability to destroy most of the US population andetalia Conversely, despite their own growing counierforce and defensivethey will not ine able toevastating retaliatory strike by remaining Western ICDMs and air- and submarine-launched weapons! I

Programs for theater nuclear weaponry will further eiode NATO's nuclear advantage in Europe unless NATO lakes actionffset them. The Soviets have programs under way to improve the accuracy and flexibility of nuclear delivery systems at all ranges These include Ihe introduction of new tactical aircraft and thort-range ballistic missiles, the continuing deploy mcnt of nuclear-capable artillery, and further improvements in the number and qualily of weapons on long-range theater nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and aircraft) based in ihe USSR | |

Our baseline projection includesoviet Ground Forces. They will continue tohe central role of armor: by the end of the decade mosi major Soviet units (and some units of their allies) will have tanks with advanced armor lhat provides good protection against current NATO weapons. The introduction of new artillery and air defense systems, as well .is organizational changes lhat involve the addition of combai units and weapons, will increase ihe capabilities of Soviet divisions lo respond to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. New fixed-wing ground attack aircraft and helicopters, with increased ranges and payloads and improved munitions, will increase the vulnerability of NATO's installations and forces and improve Soviet capabilities for close support of ground operations

With these new systems, we expect Soviet theater forces io keep pace with NATO's modernization programs The East European forccsof ihe Warsaw Pact will improve less rapidly, however, because economic constraints will limil ihe amount of modern Soviet equipment iheycan afford toaccuire and

fXIIT

Soviet naval programs will continue to emphasize open-ocean forces and the deployment of air power to sea These programs will improve the Navy's capabilities to contest areas of the open ocean with the West. Ships and submarinesew. long-range cruise missile are being introduced to offset Western gains in shtpborne defenses. The Soviets are producing nuclear-powered attack submarines at an increasing rate, and theintroduced in this decade probably will be quieter (and harder to detect and track) than current models.

Another naval development has important implications for Soviet militaryhave evidence of activities that probably are relatedew aircraft carrier It could be introduced in thend probably would carry standard fighter or attack aircraft and be nuclear-powered. (The Soviets have helicopter carriers and ships that carry short-range, vertical and short ukcoffand landing aircraft, but this could be iheir first attack aircraftt would improve the Navy's air defensesimportantly -it couldapability for projection of air power in distant areas The USSR could notarge-scale capability in theone or two carriers could bethis could emergeajor theme innd laterr*-^

We expect other improvements in Soviet forces for power projection, besides the aircraft carrier. Introductionew class of landingit occurs in theincrease ihe troop-lift capability of the Navy. The Soviets are reportedly workingarge transport aircraft, similar in sire to the. If they produce such an aircraft, their airlift capabilities by

, Ihe Soviets will continue lo improve their military space and command and control systems. We expect them to place in orbit new military space stalions. Io be used for intelligence purposes, and new unmanned satellites for real-time photographic reconnaissance and ihe detection of missile launches. We also expect further improvements in command and control, with emphasis on mobile systems and on the use of computers. I I

With these new forces and capabilities, we expect the Soviets toigh level of activity in the Third World to achieve both military and political goals They may be willing to use their own forces more actively in the Third World, even if the activityreater risk of confrontation with Western powers.! I

T

If the Soviets carry oul the programs that we have identified, their defense expenditures will continue to increase in real terms throughout. The precise rate of increase is difficult to predict. Il could be as highear, if no constraints arc imposed by arms control agreements and if the Soviets do not alter the support structure of their armedateercent would increase the military drain on the economy and the potential for internal political problems.]^

In an attempt to address these problems, lhe Soviets might try to reduce the growth of their defense spending to,ercent or less. To accomplish this they could:

Cut back the current production of some systems while continuingof follow -ons.

Stretch out new production programs and postpone the target dates for force modernization.

Aitempt io improve efficiency in lhe military and the defense industries.

They could even take advantage of the limited financial savings that arms control agreements would permit by deploying fewertheir past actions suggest that they would procure forces to the limits of any such agreements.'| j

If the Soviets chose to make adjustments, ihey could spread them oul among all of the military services, minimizing the impact on the rate ofof the forceshole. These changes could be risky from the point of view of the military, but might be attractive to political leadersroader perspective. Wc believe adjustments sufficient to hold the growth in spending downercent would not significantly alter the majorof our baseline projection.Q

Alternative Projections. More radical changes in Soviet military policy are possible. Currently available evidence provides no clear indications that they arc in the offing, but the interaction of political, economic, and technological forces inould conceivably lead to major discontinuities.'

' Amu control agreement* could also reduce uncertainty about Western military programi and thus enable the Soviets io avoid some of the costs of hedgina againstiscussion of the circumstances thai could lead to major discontinuities and ihe ctues that intelligence sources could provide for identifying them, see

One possibilitythai the Soviets will reduce ihc level of militaryabsolutely trainer than merely reducing ihc rale ore believe this lobe unlikely in ihe ncaricrm. Thcirdim view of lhecnvironmeni would argue against such cms. and ihc guidelines ihey have published for ihcir nexi Five-Year Plan imply continued growth in defense spending. Wc have not detected any evidence that ihc Soviets are considering reductions. |

Nevertheless, reductions cannoi be excludedong-run oouibtlily: and. as one alternative proKCtion. we hue examined the consequencesut in defense expenditures Wc believe that to reduce expenditure leveb in real lerms the Soviets would have io alter the roles and missions of some of their armed forces They probably would spread the cuts among all ihe militarythem somewhat deeper in general purpose forces,ground forces Genera) purpose forces arc larger than strategic forceshey lake up more of the defense budget and use more or the energy, manpower, and key material resources needed by ihc civilian economy. Production of general purpose weapon systems cumpcics dnecily with production of equipmenl (ot transportation, agriculture, und(The resources devoted to production of strategic weapons, on lhe other hand, are more specialized and less readily transferable io important civilian

Another alternative projection considers the possibility that lhe Sovieiswifl increase defense spending more rapidly than in the past, toicpped-up military competition. This cffori (focused on cither strategic or conventional forces!could expand lhe forces and improve capabilities more rapidly than is forecast in our baseline projection. The range of program optionsbroad enough toajorefense spending, and Soviet military-industrial capacity is large enough to sustain il. Such an increase would arfcci the distribution of economic resources significantly, however (especially ir ii were in conventional forccsi. and ils political consequences could be exlremcly serious.

The Soviets' ability to increase investment resources crio long-term economic growth would be reduced substantially.

Per capita consumption might decline in real terms laic in the decade.

Key sectors of the economy would be disruptedj j

Wc do not know at what point lhe Soviets would lind an increased defense burden io be unacceptable This would depend on ihe internationaland the outlook of the leaders in power. Judging by their past behavior.

we believe lhal they would prefer, if possible, lo keep defense expenditures within iheir current growth rate, while still pursuing iheir mi'iUifi goals.

The Soviets probably will seek to constrain US programs and to reduce their uncertainty about I'murs US capabilities by urging further arms control negotiations.

They will also attempt, through propaganda and diplomacy, to undermine Western cohesiveness on security issues and to slow the pace of West European defense programs.

The Soviets' incentives for such actions will increase as iheir economic growth slows in. But Soviet leadersigh premium on military power and will not, for economic reasons iilonc, accept constraints on defense programs that they consider vitalheir interest. Q

Background and Structure of This Report

This report is basedajor interdisciplinary research effort carried oul by ihe Notional Foreign Assessment Center duringeriod. It surveys the development of So-iet militaryhe Brezhnevperiod of relative economic prosperity and politicaloutlines its probable evolution in. when declining economiceadership succession,omplex international environment will pose difficult choices for Soviet political and military leaders. To improve our understanding of these choices, more thanndividual research projects were undertaken by the Offices of Central Reference. Economic Research, Imagery Analysis, Political Analysis. Scientific and Weapons Research, and Strategic Research. The judgments in this paper arc based primarily on the results of those projects

Beginningiscussion of the Soviet military buildup underof the faclors underlying it. the paper then discusses the forces thaiSoviet power and policies in. These ideas underlieprojection for ihe period. Finally,courses of action thai ihe Soviets could follow arc outlined,as the conditions and constraints that bear on Soviet behavior andthat could alert us to changes in Soviet military

Sefrei

The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends5 and Prospects for

Military Power in lh* Brcifaat* En

The I'-iiindaiion of Power: Trend* in Military Policy

and Doctrine

egacy

Whan Brezhnev and hit colleagues look power inheyilitary and defense-industrial establishment thai in many respects boreersonal stamp. Khrushchev had restructured (he Soviet armed forces -against the advice of many mili-taryliftHe slashed conventional forces and expanded the research and development) establishment. He focused hison missiles and nuclear weaponsfor development of tbe missile industry tocreated tbe Soviet aerospace industry as wc know it today. |

Soviet military doctrine of the Khrushchev period helduture war wouldhort, decisive conflict that would escalate almost immediately to (heater*ide and intercontinental nuclear strikes In support of these doctrinal notions. Khrushchev emphasized offensive missiles and strategic defense forces and downplayed the importance of intercontinentallarge standing armies, and conventional air and naval forces. In tbee reduced the detenu budget, in large part by cutting back the size of the general purpose forces. The smaller forces thatweree rccquipped with missiles and other systems thai would enable them to operateuclear environment- Military expenditures began io riseriven primarily by increases in the amount of resources devoted to the development and production of missile and space systems. [

In thecries of event* reawakened Soviet interest in more balanced military forces andurther impetus to defense spending

The Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis strengthened Soviet resolve to shake off strategic inferiority and led lo an uitemifkalton of the effort on intercom inenial nuclear forces

Political relations with China worsened.

hich woulderiod of nonnuclcar war. This obliged Soviet planners totheir lenei that war would beginecisive nuclear exchange, and to plan foroperations as well.oationale for improvement of the conventional forces that Khrushchev had downgraded. O

Military Policy In iW Brrrkvnr* Years

The forces for nuclear war thai Khrushchev hadwere not well suited io mcei these varied demands. As Khrushchev's power waned, the military leaders reasserted (heir views and pressed for more balanced force development Bythe time of hisonsensus was emergingolicy of acrowihe-board expansion and modernization of all (he military forces The new leaders reversed Ihe rcduclions in ground and theater air forces and approvedprograms for new tactical aircraft, naval ships, and ground force weapons, all of which would be suitable for operations in both conventional andwar During theheyayor buildup of forces opposite China And at the same time they maintained ihe vigorous development andprograms for strategic nuclear farces that marked ihe USSR's emergenceuperpower.^

Organization ofthe Softer Military Establishment

onet military farces have been organized Into five services:

The Ground Fortes are reiponsiblefur land conduit missions.

The Air Forces are made upnital 'taokal! Aviation, which operates theater air defense and ground attack air; raft, including attack and support helicopters; Long Range Aviation, which is retponu-bfefO' bomplng missions againsl both intercontinental and peripheral targets; and1 ransport Aviation, which is charged with transporting troops and materiel

The Navyorce of ballistic missile submarines for intercontinental attack, general purpose naval forces intendedontrol waters near the USSR and to deny to enemy navies the use af other ocean areas, coastal defense forces to protect ports and harbors,mall force of Naval Infantry trained for amphibious operation.!.

The Strategic Rocket Forces operate land-based ballistic missiles of intercontinental range and also long-range nuclear missiles for attacking targets on the periphery oj' the USSR

The National Air Defense Forces are responsible for defense against air and missile attack and operate many of the Sovietpace systems.

The activities of these services are plannedeneral Staff and supported by theapparatus of the Ministry of Defense. The military establishment also includes construction and transportation units, as wellarge force of border guards and internal security troops.

Secjel

Khrushchev's successors continued io pursue aforce development policy ihiough. They notj in lamed the momentum of strategic force improvements but increasingly concernedves v.ore complex ,ind demanding scenarios for employment of their military power. These have evolved inioet of concepts codified in Sovietcalls for forces structured to fight .it ;m> level,imited conventional conflici to protracted nuclear war.) |

By the. Soviet ihcatcr warfare doctrineeriod of conventional conflict preceding nuclor war. The principal task of Soviet forces in the conventional period is to destroy or disrupt the enemy's nuclearSoviet tactical air force is toatiack airfields, theater nuclear delivery systems, and nuclear weapon storagend the naval forces arc io attack enemy aircraft earners and missile-launchingThe docirine docs noi specify the length or the conventional period, and Soviet planners acknowledge that it could last for weeks, but ihey still consider eventual escalation to nuclear war to be likely. They apparently believe that they must planar on two fronts, with Soviet and allied forces engaging both NATO and China simultaneously. They also have given increasing attention in their mililary theory to "local wars" that arc limited in area and in the scale of conflict.I-

The Soviets doubi that escalation can becither side crosses the nuclear threshold bynuclear weapon. They apparently inicnd toby striking first and heavily, if they discernis about to resort to massive use ofin the theater

Doctrine for the use of intercontinental aiuck forces has also become more flexible. Before thes the Soviets viMiali/ed using their ICBMsingle, rruved precmp<ivc strikeihc enemy struck first ingle retaliatory strike with their rerruin-int force* |lhe> hoped to have strategic warning of t'S preparations, which would enable them ioSn thehe Soviets began to examine other rmplovmcrt requirements One. for

The Dimensions ofMilitary Power Status of Forces,

Auatk fanei4

ICBM bundief.

.SLBVIIawtchc-.

Tmnt deliver, nhiclci

Stwexic Dcjr'it Fotett

missileea-li wari-inj niin

Mill

jnehcrs

lie liurtlcrsir missile I

firamtd faren

an onoytw JWOI

All forces. including inoie urxtergoirii; oonvenior

' Includeiauncher* lUicsiranitcihatirecor'iidcecd:ohe

pan of ihe open liana! force

Irtfludes only submarine, and louiCli lubes COuned undo Ihe Strategicm'taittn Interimludcs aircraft ccnfioiredancers. rcconna usance, or ASW platforms andest foe titie*

iii.luilcs equipment tnsiltidci mor:ar>

'0 sborl-iante hind-held Sam launcher*Includes 4II aircraft leerm-Mll, capable of delivering nuclearnre no: iraineC 'or ihilljuncherson.Wohriullrir and dtesel po-ced Othe> t'.uncher,Esoeripheral missionIneludcswirjifiifia division

1 Includes internal security, coeairutttoit. and tMmr**ij:ton

example (based on recognition thai they could not be sure of receiving strategics the launch of missiles on receipt of warning that an enemy attack is actually- under way. Other options envisage variations of protracted nuclear conflict, lasting up to several weeks. Under all of these options, the Soviets slrcss the requirement to limit damage lo themselves bycountcrforce strikes against theenem/sweapons for attacking the USSR fj^

To meet this ambitious range of options and to respond lo the threats lhat they perceive from China and the West, the current Soviet leaders haveroadly based and costly military program over moreecadealf. This program has markedly increased tbe number and sophistication of Soviet weapons and the capabilities of Soviet forces to execute their military missions. (Sec tabic onor the major Soviet holdings and appendix C,. for rhe characteristics of major Soviet

Soviet military forces now exceed those of the United States tn manpower and most types of weapons and equipment, and the costs of Soviet defense activities are larger than US defense spending. Moreover, the quality of the Soviets' new weapons has improved. Their newest ICBMs, for example, are more accurate than those of the United States, and their latest tanks are protected by advanced armor more effective than that of most Western tanks. As ihe Soviets haveand modernized their military forces, they have increasingly used military instruments inforeign policy goals.|

ludon of Power: Trends in Military Forces

Strategic Attack Forces The principal developments in Soviet strategic (intercontinental) atlack capabilities have been the overturning of US quantitative superiority in intercontinental deliveryhe emergencereemptive threat to US fixed, land-based missiles, and the improved ability of Soviet forces to survive an attack and deliver retaliatory strikes. An intense and costly effort has brought the Sovietstrategic

1 The Sovieit also maintain large mistlkand air force* bated in the USSR anil intended for nuclear imcki jgairai urgeti in Eur Mia Tlx* are (omei.mo refcrrtdong-range ihealer nuclear farces" Inpaper w< diwuu intra

?

! (he Iwadim or iheniei nuclur rimes

posture that is at least equal (and by some measures superior) lo lhat of the United States. Soviet strategic forces today:

Have aboutercent more delivery vehicleslaunchers and bombers) than US strategic forces have, but aboul JO perceni fewer weapons (warheads and bombs).

Have someerceni more equivalent megaionnageeasure of capability against soft targets like cities) than do US forces.

Have surpassed the US forces in certain keycharacteristics, especially the accuracy of the newest ICBMs.

Have deployed twice the destructive potential needed to level the US urban area. (US forces could destroy the Soviets' smaller urban area three limes over.)

Have more weapons capable of attacking hard tar-gels (accurate and powerful enough loissile silo, for example) than the US has silos.

Have ihe theoreiical capability to destroyof the US ICBM forceirst strike. I

^

This improvement in ihe Soviet strategic posiurefrom an increase up lo Ihen the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and rapid Improvement after that in IheirThe number of individual weapons carried by the delivery vehicles in the Soviet intercontinental nuclear arsenal has increasedew hundred5 tooday. The area of soft targets that ihese weapons could destroy has increased fourfold. The Soviets' capability to attack hard targets, which is determined by the warheads on iheir newer ICBMs. has increased sharply since the. Q

ICBMs are the mainstay of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, accounting for more lhan half of the delivery vehicles and ihree-fourths of ihe nuclearIn thehe ICBM force consisled ofndissiles, many al above-ground launch sites lhat were highly vulnerable to attack.6aunchers were added forndissiles -systems thai were more accurate and had shorter reaction times lhan their predecessors and were deployed in hardened silos thai protected them better against enemy strikes.

Accuracy af Intercontinental Missiles: Trend and Implications

accuracy wiihuclear warhead can be delivered is (he most important determinant of Us capability toardened targetissile-launching stlo. One of the Soviets'principal goals in modernizing their intercontinental attack font has been to improve the accuracy ol their ICBMs and thus their potential for destroying US ICBM launchers. Xew Soviet ICBMs are more accurate, and some of the newest are more accurate than the most advanced US ICBMs

The proliferation of highly accurate intercontinental nuclear weapons has increased the vulnerability of fixed, land-based weapons. Calculations of thecapability of the Soviet ICBM force, using two weapons against each silo, show that someoercent of US ICBM launchers could be destroyedoviet first strike.

Both the Untied States and the USSR have tried to make their ICBM forces morefirst by hardening the launchers, and then, as increasing wrapon accuracy undermined these efforts, bymobile basing. The Sovietsobile ICBM.ut did not deploy it. and they haveobile missile ul'intermediate range.he United States is studying mobile basingforCBM intern, which is currently in the engineering development stage. Mobile basing schemes can complicate the verification of compliance with arms control agreement!

Accuracy id Current US and Soriel ICBMS

US-LSSR Interim Agreement2 prohibited the corrKrociion of ne* launchers ind required the Soviets to dismantle eiisiing ICBM launchers inwhen they deployed launchers for ballistic missiles on new submarines. Modernization of the land-based ICBM force continued, however, as the Soviets deployed new versions of thend. more importantly, equipped moreaunchers with the latest generationndhis improved the force in several ways

The newer missiles tarry multiple independently targctablc reentry vehicles (MIRV'si. so thai the force can attack more targets even though it has fewer launchers than ithe silos for thendre considerably more resistant to attack than those forndhey(They arc also harder than US missileinally, the latest versions or thendre more accuule than the most advanced US ICBMs)

Launcher for Iheeavy ICBM

rmodtfietuIomofilu mailt an opt/Mount.-nh tmtJt many vthlttt, tmdtw win tifht or lOladtptadtaily la'tfloblt ttnl'y vrhitlti. Uk, all Oihtr <umalB.Hi. theUo lauath-tn. Bttaixt ihtie looaehtri oft ft xid. iakt moathl lo tonaniG, ondimbtr oftupporiintfociUttts.eon count iht numbtn of ICBM taunhmlftk tonfldnve

Soviets have also increased the size of theirforce at sea. In theheir submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force consistedof <i-lass submarines, each of which carried three missiles. The missiles* ranges were so short that the submarines would have to come close to the US coast (risking detection) before launching. The force was expanded and modernized, beginningiih deployment oflass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarineshich carryissiles. The range of Ihe missiles permittedlass submarines la cover targets from the open ocean I I

lass program was followedyoflass. which carriesraunchers for long-rangerissiles. Thesenow make up nearly half of the launchers in ihe SLBMthe launching submarine to ailack targets in the United States while operating in or near Soviet-controlled waters. Thentroduceds the first Soviet Sl.BM with

In contrast to the strategic missile forces, ihe Soviet intercontinental bomber force has declined slightly in size since the. It now consists of about IJj Bear and Bisontypes introduced in the) i

Hen llomr Ba Nixie MissiSr Early Waminf Radar

Thr"Aw 'odor, al ni loctlUmi on thi ftrtphrry o/ the USSR Ttit, <anfio*-dtn

Force*

The Soviet*complemented ihcir rorces foraiiacktrong defensive cf/ori designed io reduce damage from an enemy strutcgie attack. They have developed systems that can dclcel and destroy incoming intercontinental missiles and satellites inand have ined to devise defenses against missile-launching submarines. The Sonets have also continued locmphawe measures, familiar from World

forenemy bombers and protectingBut despite the high priority of these strategic defense forces, ihey would be unable to preventof the USSK fromUS nuclear strike] |

Soviet programs for the detectionallistic missile aiuck were initiated in the, and the first ballistic missile early warning tBMEWl radar* became operatiooal in ihehe Soviet* nowetwork of nine BMEW radars, which deteci and track

Sccre^

potent hi IK missile weapons, and the) arc construct-int four new radars lhal wtll improve and expand current coverage- The* have also constructed three over-thchorizon (OTM) radars, two of which areon US missile complexes. Developmentatellite system for detecting missile bunchesheespite difficulties.! fatdlitcs are now operational, providing conlingous coverage of US ICBM fields

esult of these programs, the Soviets nowsomeoinutes' warningSdepending on the performance of theand of the satellite system. They probablyibis inefficient and arc working to improvedetection satellite system They evidentlyto developnetwork, whichmore dependable

In addition to measures for deieciion, the Soviets have deployed aroundimited aniiballistic missile (ABM) defense This system, which becamein the, consisted untilfbovegrnund launchers for antiballisiic missiles, engagement radars to direct the missiles to theirand two battle management radars to assist commanders in assessing and controlling the combai situation. The battle management radars curremly do not cover all of the sectors from which attacks could approach. The system's capabilities toarge-scale missile attack arecoveringimited area, it must intercept missiles outside the atmosphere, where it is difficult to distinguishfrom decoys and other objects ^

The ABM Treaty2 and the related Protocol4 limited Soviet deployment lo six ABM radar complexesaunchers. The Soviets neverlhat many, but Ihcy have continued to fund research and development, and they apparently plan to upgrade the Moscow ABM system In9 they dismantled half ihe launchers, and recently they began io construct silo launchers, possibly for new type* of missiles. Tbey have also begun constructionarge radar near Moscow that we believe is intended to perform an ABMbattle management.

Trends in Soviet Strategic Air Defense Forces

Sec^t

The Soviet strategic air defense forces consisi ofmissiles (SAMs) and interceptor aircraft intended for use againsl enemy cruise missiles and bombers. These forces have remained fairly stable in size since the. The number of SAMincreased in theands the Soviets introduced the long-rangend enlarged their force of SA-3s. (Theissilehort range but can engage targets al lower altitudes than Ihe other currently deployed SAMsn thehe number of launchers decreased, as older sites were deactivated, and it now stands at. Recently the Soviets began preparing to replacendaunchers with thehich is as useful as the early systems against high-altitude targets and has potentially better capabilities at low

The number of strategic interceptor aircraft declined from thentil the, as themissile force expanded. Their capabilitieshowever, as older aircraft were almost entirely replaced with missile-equipped, all-weather aircraft. Present Soviet air defenses would have goodto defend against bombers at medium and high altitudes. They have major deficiencies in their ability to detect, track, and engage targets at low altitudes, but new systems now being deployed and others being tested offer the potential for

Recently the Soviets have begun to integrate theof strategic and tactical air defense forces.large tactical air defense forcesighter-interceptors andlaunchers) that are stationed in the USSRpeacetime. Most of the mobile tactical SAMscapabilities against low-Hying targets thanSA Ms do.

Soviet forces for defense against ballistic missileinclude open-ocean naval surface ships,and antisubmarine warfare <ASW) aircraft. In thehe Navy wasission of defense against enemy missile submarines and began development of new weapon systems lo counter the US threat. (In ihcoviet naval officers cited ASW as one of the principal missions of generalnavalhe first forces specifically designed for open-oceanMoskva-classcruiser,lass nuclear-powered attack submarine, and lheayoperational in the, and by thehree new classes of large antisubmarine surface shipsong-range ASW aircraft had been introduced. In thewo more ships with this mission became operational: the Kiev-classaircraft carrier andlass submarineigh-speed, deep-diving attack submarine thai had entered development in |

Since thehe frequency and complexity of Soviet open-ocean ASW exercises have lended toBut despite this training effort and the new equipment, Soviet capabilities against ballistic missile submarines remain exiremely limited.| |

The Soviets have also developed means of interfering with or even destroying US satellite systems. Theyonnuclear interceptor satellite that can engage other satellites in ncar-Earth orbil. The missiles of the Moscow ABM system and some of the Soviets' surface-to-surface ballistic missiles could be used for direct nuclear attacks on satellites. The Soviets can use various means of electronic interference and aretwo ground-based lasers that might have antisatellite applications.) |

The Soviet civil defense effortationwide program under mililary control, lis objectives arc to protect the political leaders, the work force at key economicand the general population, in that order; to maintain the continuity of economic activity inand to enhance lhe country's capability forfrom lhe effects of war. The effort to proiect people has two majorconstruction and

Since thelmost all facets of lhe civil defense program have improved. Construction of blast shelters probably increased in the: we are uncertain about the pace since the, but it probably has leveled ofr We judge thai the Soviets have enough blast shelter space for virtually allleaders, most of the essential work force, and overercent of Ihe urban population. They also have

;re(

The ASM Problem

are four basic tasks in antisubmarineof an undersea target, identification of the target as an enemy submarine, location of the target, and weapon delivery. The most difficult of these, especially against submarines operating in the open ocean, is detection. The potential operating areas of Western ballistic missile submarines are very large- on the orderillion square nautical miles. Measured against this requirement, the search and detection capabilities of Soviet ASWforces are poor.

An alternative is to detect the submarines as they leave their bases or pais through choke points and to maintain contactttack is ordered. Because

the submarine commander can take countermeasures if he know he is bring trailed, this tactic is best conducted using passive sensors thai do not reveal the trackers presence. Soviet Submarines, however,trail VSSSBSs by using passive sonars. Their passive acoustic sensors haveimited ability to detect the quiet US submarines, and the Sovietare so much noisier that they are themselves vulnerable to detection and countermeasures.

So far. the Soviet NtPry has not achieved an adequate capability to counter Western SSBNs. and the task continues toigh priority in Soviet naval planning

evacuation plans for aboutercent of the population inotal of aboutillion evacuees,

ank

effectiveness of these measures in reducingwould depend on Ihc time available for finalComplete implementation of all the plans would assure survival of most of the political leaders and essential workers and could reduce by0 million the immediate casualties in the aftermath of large-scale US attack But even with fullcivil defense could not prevent tens of millions of casualties and extensive damage toand military facilities in the

Ground Forces and Tactical Air Forces The development of Soviet theater forces since theas emphasized capabilities forconflict. The Soviets have retained theiradvantage over the West in standing forces and have narrowed the qualitative gap in conventional weapons. Expansion of the Ground Forces andof their equipment have increased theof Soviet divisions to operate as self-sustaining units, to defend against air and antiarmor systems, and to respond quickly to changing tactical situations.in the numbers or fixed-wing tactical aircraft and helicopters have improved Soviet capabilities to conduct conventional strikes deep in the rear areasombat /one and to carry out close support of ground forces. Many Soviet ground force units still lackequipment, however, and the tactical air forces arc inferior in quality to NATO's and would havein contesting for air superiority^

The Soviet Ground Forces and Frontal (tactical)forces were the primary beneficiaries of the Sino-Soviet political rift and Ihc doctrinal shift that reemphasized the possibility of large-scalewar. To meet these requirements, the Soviets first expanded and then rapidly modernized theirforces. Ground Forces manpower increased by nearlyercent5f men in each full-strength tank and motorized rifle division increased by aboutercent, toespectively. About half of the increase in ground forces manpower resulteduildupalong

0

the Sino-Soviet border, where the number of divisions has doubled and manpower more than tripled since Ihe.

The Battlefield Air Defense Environment

of ihe man rapidly chanting aspects of the modern battlefield has been the increasing number, variety, and capability of systems that tactical commanders have available for defense against enemy aircraft. Soviet Ground Force commanders receive air defense support not only from interceptor aircraft assigned to Frontal Aviation, but also from their own air defense units. Since thehe Soviets have steadily upgraded the air defense systemsavailable io ground force commanders.

In thehe only mobile air defense weapons in ground forces divisions were short-range guns. In theheobile long-range SAM. was introduced at thend army levels, and short-range man-portable and vehicle-mounted SAMs were fielded with divisions. In iheir defense capabilitiesajorwith widespread deploymentobile, medium-range SAM. theach Soviet lank and motorized rifle division now typically hasaunch vehicles for this system, whichangeilometers. In thehe Soviets began to deploy theobile SAM. which operatesange bracket between that of thend she short-range SAMs. About one out of everyivisions has this missile. The Soviets have fielded another short-range missile.nd are developing other, more capable atr defense systems.

Firing Zones of Soviet Tactical Antiaircraft Weapons

In Warsaw Pact itrmtnototy. ofiomoint /win txmmand. roughly oaalogoutrmy group, coasiiung of ground and alrfo-sei. tombai tuppoit ilemtvi. andtomtumti nova/

i sin ih* Sac.

ini .hfOitu

ttwgo ol That SO ot

support the expansion of the Ground Forces in the, the Soviets initially increased theofank, forintroduced few new ones. One major innovation in, however, was formation of the nucleusighly mobile air defense systcr

Inew and increasingly sophisticatedbegan to enter Ihc Ground Forces. These new systems emphasized mobility, firepower, andin nonnuelcar conflict. Nearly all of the Soviet units in Eastern Europe are equipped with thesebut many in the USSR still have the older systems.

I l

The Soviets introduced4ew tanks that require fewer crew members than earlier tank* and have larger caliber main guns with longer ranges

ftottt' it ihe no the hu tSytort

and automatic loaders ro increase firing rales. These tanks have laminated armorore difficuh to penetrate lhan an equal weight of the earlier rolled or casi bornogeoeoui steel) and antiradialioa liners to protect against nuclear conumuiaiion The Soviets also upgraded their capabilities against enemyforces by fielding four new antiiank guided missiles (and three modificaiions of earlier missiles) with improved range, guidance, and armor-piercing ability.*^

Four new Sovietropel led artillery systems were introduced inThe United Slate* fielded such systems in (hewo of these can fire nuclear rounds, but their principal advantages are high rates of fire for conventional munitions, crewarmored against conventional attack, and mobility (hat enables them to accompany rapidly advancing mechanised forces-j

The Soviets reorganized their Ground rorccs between thend theo improve firepower and capabilities for combined arms operations. The motorized rifle division of the, for example.

had about one-third more major weapons than that of thehe added weapons had higher rates of fire than theirharphe amount of firepower that could be delivered per minute Q

In the'k the Soviets also expanded their tactical air lorccs. primarily those units opeoviic China. In Iheiheyan" 'ccquipment program, first for fighter-interceptor unit* and later for fighter-bomber units. The new fighter programs upgraded and improved the capabilities of the armed forces to defend themselves and their facilities. The Soviets introduced the Ftoggeria new fighterwith much mote capable air-io-airreater *peed and range,ore advanced vysiem for delecting and tracking targets* and upgraded tbe Fuhbcd These two aircraft now make up the entire tactical fighter-interceptor force. The force has good capabilitiesircraft al medium and highLike the strategic air defense force, however, it hasimited (bul improving) capability against low-flying

Modernization of the fighter-bom bet force stemmed from the Soviets' perception that,ar in Europe began with only conventional forces, one of their first goals would be to improve the position of their forces for an eventual nuclear exchange. Consequently,ain task of the tactical air forces in the early phase of conflict has been toarge-scale, theatcrwidc. conventional air offensive aimed at destroying NATO's nuclear delivery vehicles and weapons)

Development programs were begun in theo improve these capabilities, and the new aircraft were fielded ut the. Thesea ground attack version of the Flogger, and late model* of thegreater ranges, can carry larger payloads. are equipped "ita more advancednd are armed with more accurate and effectivethan their predecessors.esult of ihcse improvements, tactical aircraft can today deliver deepNATO's rear areas about nine times at muchas they could in the

Soviet ground attack aircraft ofere limitedelatively inaccurate visual bombing, but newand weapon delivery systems ofihe accuracy of bomb attacks. The Soviets also began to introduce more accurate tactical air-to-sur-face missiles Al least four arc now operational: thendequire guidance from the bunching aircraft or another platform, but the AS-9andome on radar emissions from the target. The Soviets have begun toaser-guided bomb

Complementing ihc improvements in Frontal Aviation has been Ihc upgrading of Long-Range Aviation's bomber component for peripheral attack, especially through the introduction of the Backfire. Ihc Backfire, which entered development in the. is well suited for the Soviet concept of conventional airas well as for nuclear strikes. Itetter capability than the carlicT"Badgcr and Blinderto penetrate air defenses. Q

Another major trend in Soviet theater air forces has been the introduction oflarge numbers of combat and support helicopters.5 the theater forces' only rotary-wine aircraftew hundred supportThe Soviets introduced their firstnd by the end0 they had nearly Six times as many helicopters in the forces asboutercent of these arc heavily armed ground attack helicopters. I I

In modernizing their theater forces, the Soviets have also improved their capabilities to sustain combatThe capability of Soviet divisions to moveoil, and lubricants (POL) and other cargo was enhanced by the introduction of more and newerThe Soviets have extensive plans for mobilizing their economy in the event of war, and they maintain large stockpiles of war materiel, but we do not know how effective these plans would be or how large the stockpiles arc.i |

The Soviets have upgraded their electronic warfare systems since the, improving the capabilities of their theater air and air defense forces to disrupt NATO communications and sensors. To weaken NATO's defenses against air attack, they havespecially equipped aircraft and have installed

jamming equipmenl in pods on atlack aircraft. To strengthen their own defenses, they have increased ihe resistance of their airdars to jamming and their capabilities to disrupt Ihe target acquisition and navigation radars on NATO aircraft. In thehe Soviets began to introduce new electronic warfare equipment in the Ground rorccs and to field additional jamming units to support front and army commands

Soviet battlefield rccortrurasjrtcc was reorganizedduring theto support warfare(Poor reconnaissance constrained Sovietcapabilities through ihc earlymobility of NATO weapon systems,Pershing missile, fai oulstiippcd the Sovietmonitor and targel them) New equipment,for aerial reconnaissance, was introduced tothe introduction of longer range striketo increase the capacity and speed of

Tbe Soviet theater forces art well ecuipoed and trained to operatehemical, biological, or radioiogical environment. Many Soviet surface-to-surface missiles, rockets, and artillery systems can be finedhemical warhead. These systems could deliveragents in the combat rone, and aircraft could deliver them against such targets as enemy nuclear delivery systems. The Soviets have produced or are capable ofange of chemical agents, but wc cannot estimate the size of possible stockpiles. Wc arc aware of Soviet research related to biologicalbut have no evidenceeapon program.|

TV Role of Non-So**rt Warn* Pact Force*

Another consequence of the evolution of the doctrine for theater war during the Brcrhnev era hashange in tbe planning for initial military operations in Central Europe The strategy of thealled for an initial attack primarily by Soviet forces, most of which were to be moved forward from the Western USSR prior to hostilities. By the end ofhe predominant Soviet plan assumed that the Warsaw Pact allies would contribuie as much as half thenecessary for initial operations against NATO: il trcaied forces moved forward from lhe USSRecond echelon. This plan requires less time to prepare

SAiet

Secaft

The Wartime Role af Polish Forcet

(he Soviets altered their concept for war in Europe Un thearsaw Pactfor war against NATO has assigned an important role to Polish forces. These forces are expected toront (army group) of someivisions, which would be responsible for operations tn the northern area of NATO's central region, as well as in Denmark. Poland's na val forcesea Landing Division" are to assist the Soviet Baltic fleet with sea control operations and to participate in amphibious assaults.

Polish forces are also assigned the critical tasks of operating and safeguarding the lines offrom the USSR through Poland.

Soviet military planners must have reservations about the reliability of Polish forces in wartime, and they probably have contingency plans that exclude them ar assign them less critical tasks Nevertheless, it would be difficult for Soviet units to replace the Poleswithout endangering vital wartime objectives.

11

Denmark

J.

Sweden

.

V

asx Polish Front.

Poland

Germany

;"LAG Ljf I

for operations buieavy premium on parlici- Ai Sovici insistence, most of the non-Soviet Warsa*

by ihehas required ihat theirbe upgraded.!

Pad countries have been expanding or modernizing their military forceseel ihese new requirements, though the effort has varied considerably from one to another and over time. The manpower of non-Soviet ground forces in Central Europe increased by aboul 15

percent over ihc past decade, io nearlyillion men The Pad ground forces' equipmenl mix is more highly standardized than NATO's, consistingof Soviel weapons. The holdings of non-Sovici armies arc less modern than those of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, however They arc slill armedwith45 tanks, for example, which were introduced into Soviet forces in.

n

In recent years, most Pact countries have acquired some modern Soviet *eapons.2 tanks and SA-ftSAMs Czechoslovakia hasa wide range of equipment, including some modern tanks and infantry Combat vehicles, SAMs. and late-model aircraft. ITic East German armed forces have new tanks andvehicles, air defense systems, self/propel led artillery, naval patrol and mincsweeping ships, and Floggcr aircraft. In Poland, modernizationhe ground and air forces; troop air defense was improved, and armor holdings were upgraded. (Poland and Czechoslovakia also have sizable domeslic armsungary acquired2 tanks, new Soviet-produced SAMs. and antiaircraft guns. Romania purchased interceptor aircraft2 tanks from the USSR and also stepped up production of domestically designed weapons. Inthere was some modernization of the air and air defense forces, but overall the rate of introduction of new systems was slow.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Since the, the NATO strategy of flexible response hasilemma for Soviet planners. If Soviet forces were successful in the conventional period ora war. NATO planned to escalate to theater nuclear strikes. For this purpose. NATOdvantage in the number of nuclear delivery systems based in Central Europe, as wellualitative edge.

Although theas now held largeof long-range peripheral strategic deliverythat could offset the NATO tactical advantage, these were based in the USSR, and Soviet planners probably feared that their use would invite nuclear attacks on Soviet tcrrilory In, therefore, the Soviets began to expand and modernize tacticalforces that could be based in Central Europe. Among the mosi important changes were:

- Increases in force size, the number of laciicalmissile launchers in Central Europe increased by more thanercent, and the number of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapon* there increased by moreercent.*

Improvements in the range and accuracy of nuclear delivery systems and in their readiness.

An increase in the number of nuclear weaponsto forces in Central Europe.

The introduction of nuclear-capable artillery. (Soviet Ground Forces units in the USSR have these guns, but they are not yet deployed in Central Europe.)^

The Soviets have also been improving theater strike forces based in the USSRew missileew aircraft. In the Strategic Rocket Forces, they arc replacing the oldermedium-range) andinlermediatc-range) ballistic missiles with the mobileystem Theas three independently targctable warheads, increasing the number of targets that can be attacked, and its mobility makes it difficult to locate and attack. The Soviets arc also replacing the Air Forces' Badger and Blinder bombers with the Backfire. This aircraft is well suited for peripheral strikes and Offers payload and penetration capabilities belter than those of its predecessors. P

AS the Soviets have expanded and improved their theater nuclear forces, they have also developed new-concepts for their employment The doctrine of thealled for theater nuclear strikesassive scale, to be delivered at the same time as intercontinental nuclear exchanges; this was modified in the, as Ihe Soviets experimented with new targeting schemes and the possibility of limited nuclear strikes. Soviet military doctrine became even more flexible duringnd now apparently includes options ranging from massive, Iheatcrw idc. preemptive strikes to delayed and limiied responses to NATO

nclude* aireufituitable for delivery ol nuclear -eapoe.i. oen <Iwubbined lor Ihtii

An Operating hW fol (h*obile IUM

attacks Bu! the Soviets still doubt thaito widespread nuclear war can be avoided.ither side has used any nuclear weapon. I

With the recent improvements in their tactical nuclear farces, Soviet leaders probably now consider thai they huve decreased the military advantages to NATO or using nuclear weapons and that the Alliance would be reluctant to use them to balance its weaknesses in conventional forcesilitary sense, the Soviets probably sec growth of (heir tactical nuclear forces as reducing the credibility, and therefore the utility, of NATO's (heater nuclear weaponsounter to the

Pact's conventional strength.oliticalhey probably seeii as reducing the credibility of the US contribution to European security and therefore rotcniiatly reducing the cohesiveness of the Alliance.

General Purpose Natal Forces Fifteen years ago the Soviet Navy was primarily udefense force with limited capabilities forin Ihe open ocean; now itajor branch of Ihe military with heavily armed surface ships, high-speed nuclear-powered submarines, and improved land- and sea-based aircraft The transformation gives the

The Backfire Bomber

a general purpose navy wiih capabililies for boih converiiional and nuclearcounter io Ihe previously unconstrained Western use of the seas. Q

The number of ships in the Soviet. Navy has changed little, but the composition of the forces has changed as older, short-range ships and submarines arc retired and replaced by larger and more capable units. The ships remain vulnerable, however, to air andattack. The nuclear-powered submarines are noisier (and thus easier to detect) lhan their Western counterparts. The Navy lacks Ihe types of sea-based aircraft required for defending its ships from airso that in wartime the surface forces would be required to stay wiihin the range of land-based air-ciaft Moreover. Ihe Sovici Navv's capabililies for susiaincd combai are limited.

The number of large surface combatants (those with displacementsons or more) has increased by aboutercentnd nearly two-ihirdsof them arc equipped with missiles. The general purpose submarine force decreased in size, but nuclear-powered units increased from one-tenth to more lhan one-third ofthche number of naval fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters increased rapidly, especially in Ihe.

The doctrinal changes, which recognized the possibility of having toonventional period of war, obliged ihe Navy to develop more flexible forces with greater endurance and improvedThese forces are expected to engage enemy forces wjih conventional weapons in the open ocean.

' Ballistic missile wbrrtarinri are considered lobe par? of the strategic and theater nuclear forcci (seend are not ecunled here. |

Soviet Priorities in the Design of Large Surface Combatant Shipseriod of conventional war. and carry enough nuclear weapons to conduct decisive strikes if theescalates. Q

To meet the varied demands of the military planners. Soviet surface combatant ship designers emphasize large numbers of weapons and sensors and high speeds. The number of guns, missile launch rails, and electronic systems on Soviet cruisers, for example, has increased with each new class introduced since theoreover, the number ol weapons that each new ship can deliver has increased even more rapidly, because the newer units have launchers that can he reloaded. The size of the ships has alsobut even so their maximum speeds haveSO knots.

The designers have paid more attention to thesethan to provisions for crew comfort and the ease with which equipment can be maintained.and crew conditions, however, are factors that limit the capabilities of Soviet ships for sustained peacetime or wartime operations.

Weapons and Electronic Systems on Soviet Cruisers

Omt* ft

To achieve these capabilities, the Soviet, emphasized missile-carrying aircraft, surface ships, andas well as balanced ASW forces also consisting of air, surface, and undersea platforms Theysurface combaianis that arc heavily armed with antisubmarine weapons (and in some cases antiship missiles) and also carry SAMs for protection against air attack when operating outside land-based fighter cover. Recently the Soviets commissioned their first nuclear-powered surface combatant, the Kirov-class cruiser. They began lo deploy aircraft on ships: ASW helicopters on destroyers, cruisers, and the iwo Moskva-class helicopter ships; and fixed-wing aircraft on Ihe two Kiev-class carriers. Theyihe Backfire bomber into Naval Aviation, increasing the capabilities of the force to attack targets at greater distances and lo peneirate air defenses. The ASW and reconnaissance capabilities of the Navy were improved by the deployment of modified versions ofthc long-range Bear bomber and by the introduction of satellite ocean surveillance systems. Q

Submarine forces were improved by the introduction of new nuclear-powered classes. These were faster, deeper diving, and quieter than the first nuclear-powered submarines but still behind Westernin quietness and sensor capabililies. Many were equipped with aniiship or antisubmarine missilesf' |

Power Projection Forces

The Soviet Union has improved its ability to project military power and influence abroad, even though it has not developed many forces specifically for lhat purpose Its capabililies for distant combat operations are limited in comparison to those ofthc United States, but arc similar lo ihose of the United Kingdom andignificant limitation iswith access to overseasair forces cannotsupport for Soviet forces in many Third World

u

The improvements have resulted primarily from the Soviets' procurement orgeneral purpose forces that arc designed for useontinental war but are also

World

suitable for employment in more distant areas. Their comparative neglect of forces (or long-distancehas been influenced in pan byareas of vital interest to them are close to theit also illustrates the Soviets" perception that they can rely on surrogate forces in the Third

Soviet naval forces that can be used in distant areas include large surface combatants and someships.he number of large surface combatants has increased Iscche number of active amphibious units declined in, but their tolal tonnage has increased as older landing ships in-on range arc replaced by larger and more modern units. Three classes of ships, the

Alligaior- and Ropucha-class tank landing ship* and the Ivan Rogov-class transport dock, can cany combai troops on distant deployments. Thehips or these classes tall of which were constructedSimakc up less than oncihird of the ships in ihc Soviet imr*ibious force, but nearly three-fourth* of theWith these ships, plus the addition5 of aboutoinocny^Uss medium landing ships, the bfi capaai) of primary Soviet amphibious ships his more than iripkd| |

The Soviet Union has no equivalent io ihe US Marine Corps, but itmall force of Naval Infantry intended primarily for initial amphibious assaults against NATO. The force was disestablished inut reactivatedt had onlyroops in thend is still relatively small0 men) and lightly armed The Soviet amphibious force has Ihe theoretical capacity toall of these troops, but many of its ships would not ile in the proper areas on short noiicef"

Soviet airborne forces consist of si* combat-strength divisions and one training division that washe. As is typical of airborne forces, these units are smaller and less heavily armed than other divisions, but their firepower, mobility, and air defense capability have been improved by Ihc introduction of new amphibious vehicles, self-propelled artillery,rocket launchers, and portable SAMs. as well as by increases in the number of assault gunsivision.

Military Transport Aviation is the Soviet force charged with supporting the airborne forces, as well as with general logistics support to Soviet activities in and Out of the country and the delivery to foreign nations of important ecooomic aad military assistance materiel. The number of transport aircraft in this force was less0 than5 In thehe Soviets had no heavy transports suitable for long-range operations, but they began to deploy them in the. Asa result, the lift capability of the force nearly doubled5t remains markedly inferior in capability, however, to LS airlift forces. ^

The Soviets have also modernized their civilian fleets of both aircraft and merchant ships, and these are assets that could augment military forces operating in distant areas. The state airline. Aeroflot. hasigh-performancetimes as many as Military Transport Aviation. At least one class of modern Soviet merchant shiplthe Kapiian Smirnov-cliti roll-on/roll-off cargo ship) was designed to naval

specifications so that it could

amphibious ships io landing operations. Theto build lOof these ships

Military Sauce Programs

Soviet space programs in the Brezhnev era haveemphasized the support of miliiiryIn the. Soviet space programs were dominated by heavily publicized space flights with scientific objectives. In the, as development programs initiated in theeached completion, the Soviets launched newer satellites with practical military and economic applications Thesatellites included systems for photographic and electronic intelligence, reconnaissance, navigation.

ID

Soviet Space- launches

coven communications, (he calibration of -adar signals, and ihe inicrception of other satellites.

In thehe Soviets began to test larger and rnore complex space boosters and spacecraft, but they encountered serious setbacks. They redirected their manned space programs to Eanh-orbtimg spacewith both military and scientific missions. Since the. Soviet space launches haveon systems for military support. They have improved the capability of their electronic intelligence and photoreconna iua neeeveloped satellites fitted with radar and passive electronic scanners for ocean surveillarice. andystem formissile launches They have alsoommunications saiellitc networkeosynchronous

orbit (thai is.igh altitude so that ii is sutioeury with respect to the

The number of successful space launches conducted annually has nearly doubled since Ihe, and the Soviets now have an average of aboutatellites operational al any given time. Aboutercent of these are military andercent civilian, tbe otherercent have dual military and civilian

( OBBMd and Control

Concurrently with their programs to expand andmilitaryhe Soviets have improved their ability to communicate with and control forces in war and peace This ha* involved changes in organisation and procedures, as well a* the introduction of new command control systems, fj^

Seer

f Sin id Tercet

i> iwmi lhat ihe Soviets ttoduced permit the General Staff to monitor and modify the readiness af Soviet forces. The Soviet approach to military readiness differs from that of the United States The Soviets routinely keepmall part oj their Jorces at their highest levels of readiness for war This includes the ICBM force, which Isof reacting quickly to the threatuclear attack. Forces ihut would bear the brunt of coping with an enemy conventionalexample, the air and ground forces in Easternalso ready to respond quickly.

Most of the Soviets' military forces, however, are at lower levels of preparedness. For example, only aboutercent of their ballistic submarines are on patrol, and they do not keep strategic bombers on airborne alert The operating rates of Soviet general purpose natal and air forces are lover than those of USforces, large amounts of ground force equipment are kept in ready storage rather than operatedhis allows Sotiei equipment to be maintained in beat' condttiun than lhal ofWestern forces

The Soviet rationale for this readiness posture is thai,urprise attack is possible,ore likelywarningperiod."charactemtd by increasing tensions, will precede any mafor East- West conflict Consequently only those force elements mostto surprise attack and must necessary loprosecution of the early itagesar need be capable of rapid response. Most of the forces are at relatively low readiness levels and are prepared forhased, deliberate buildupapid mobtlliaiion.

Soviet doctrine callsigh degree of materialthis alsoifferent form than in the United States the Soviets send equipment to the rear for overhaul and maintenance at frequentand operate it comparauvxlv little between these repairsigh peecentate of equipmentombatthe sense thai it has been recently overhauled. The Sonets probablyenalty in the proficiency of their combai personnel

greater ell.ci

Soviet. President Brezhnev is Commander in Chief of the Soviet Aimed Force* To aunt him and the other top political-military authorities in controllingoperations, in thehe General Staff assumed greater authority for directing the military services and for controlling their readiness. The Soviets have developed new command structures, whichintermediate levels of command. The use of these intermediate levels reduces the number ofthe higher authorities must control directly as well as relieving lower level commanders of some of the burden of coordination Tbe Soviets have alsosome of their forces to facilitate combinedThese change* offer the potential to improve the coordination of forces and eliminate redundancy, thus promising greater efficiency in the conduct of future operat

Over the pastears the Soviets have improved the survivability of their command facilities, beginning with those for the highest echelons and extending the improvements downward. They hove constructedardened command posts and provided suchfacilities us command ships and submarines and airborne and trainbornc command posts. They have introduced new communicationsuse of communications satellites, for example, is nowin the military. The command and control systems introduced in recent years have improved the security, survivability, and reliability ofand provided Soviet commanders with moreand redundant mean* of directing their forces. |

SccXi

in

I eonid Brrrimn in [he IluforBi of theicf pI (beAimed Form

InikenmraSikctnfeetvmjT.whomW>ow* rrtumrm tmlmknu

Amj.'ii

Resource

lhe Price of Power: Trends Allocation* lo Ifcfwis*

Defense Expenditures

To support their military buildup, the Soviet leaden have increased military expenditures in real terms each yearsincc the. In the Brezhnev years, their defense expenditures have grown at an average annual rateercent, with the growth slightly more rapid in thehan in. The growth reflected increasing resource(heall of the military services and missions More than two-thirds of Soviet expenditures50 went for new militarydevelopment and procurement.^

The distribution of Soviet military investment and operating expenditures' haschjnged during ihe Brezhnev era as budget priorities were altered tothe policy of balanced force development The largest shares *cnt lo the Air and Ground Forces and the Navy, three services whose budgets had been cut by Khrushchev. Hack has received about one-fifth of loti) investment and operating expenditures5 Theefense Forces absorbed aboutercent of the total and the Strategic Rocket Forces aboutercent, with national command and support activities accounting for the remainingercent, Q

There were several shifts in spending patterns between thend:

A slight increase in the Ground Forces' share in the, reflecting the expansion of the force, primarily along the Sino-Soviet border

A marked growth in the Air Forces' share in the, reflecting the modernization of frontal Aviation.

Fluctuations in the Strategic Rocket Forces' share, illustrating the deployment cycles of ballistic miuile*.

A cule share allocated to the National Air Defense Forces after deployment of the Moscow ABM system was completed

With these exceptions, the distribuiion offairly consistent over

5oviet military spendinga relatively constantoercent share of

the gross national productThis share can be calculated asoercent under the definition of defense commonly used in the United States or aso

IJ percentroader definition, which themay use The broader definition includesactivities, such as those for internaln (he past two yearsas increased to somef declining economic growth.

' Une-rci ua Jntluefftcm cipsneM.roare etetado) Tram iW iul>Molaiuit>iM arefttdo mot tot 'M danpror-.oabyversicr | |

S*cr<

Trends in Soviel Defense Expenditures and Costs

Etiiautcd Defense Spendim

and

Defense vpofo.noiOM b, oV'tiid oy

Oc'ersei CIA (felines il (ot companionUS acco-iM*

tSSficSMWi

OMBHii. SBiOiaTI0TO.

t'tilinaiod Defense Share* of Soviel Economic Reioarcc*

I M 1.

SO

so

I0L-

71

74

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2

ralillu-qntaisulalnl

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Defense Spending as Shares of GNP in Ihe Warsaw Part Countries (annual)

1.1

1 -

y pi

the lastears Soviet defense programsfor abouterceni of the final output of all Soviet industrial production and more thanercent of the final output of the machine-building and metal-working sector (which produces durable goods forconsumption and investmeni as well as militaryhe Soviet defense effort, directly andlook aboutercent of the gross Output of ihe metallurgical secior andoercent each of the gross output of chemicals and of energy (includingoercent of refinedefense alsoarge share of scientific, technical, and management talent (at least half of all Soviet research

and development personnel are involved to some extent in military programs) and drew heavily on the output of science and of high-quality components and cquipmcnl such as electronics! 1

Measured in constant dollar terms, the cost of Soviet defense activities was abouterceni of US defense spendingut0 it was aboutercent higher lhan US spending. This was due bothteady increase in the cosi ofSovict programs andecline in real US defense expenditures over mosi of the period. For the Brezhnev periodhole, the cumulative dollar costs of Soviet defense activities

is in Allocation of Soviet Military Re starch. Development, and Production Resources

aboutercent greater tban US expenditures. (Tbey were abouterceni greater if US expend-ilures for the war in Southeast Asia are excluded from the comparison.)

Wc have less informaiion on the defense expenditures of the non-Soviei Warsaw Puci countries, bul ihe announced defense budgets of ihesc countries (which are belter indicators of actual spending than theSoviet defense budget) all show substantial growth since the. These figures, whichin coverage from country to country and reflect inflation as well as real increase* in spending, all increased rapidly in therowth inas more modest, rangingear. When inflation is taken into account, the real growih in spending probably variederceni- sufficient io support some expansion of ihe

non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armed forces and iheof some obvokscent weapons and equipment wua more modern systems. The share of total economic resources currently allocated to defense in Eastern Europe ii much smaller than in the Soviet Union (see charl on |

Military Research. Development, and Produclion Resource*

The Soviet* have expanded iheir military research andnent 'R&Dtand productionTheavailable for military RAD more than doubledJ5 (the earliest and latest yean for which data are available! Floors pace for the design and development of final weapon system*by about iwo-ihirds. with growth most rapid at facilities for development of missiles and aircraft Facilities engagedor subsystems and compo-

rrendi in Toltl Soviet Military Manpower

.

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i

i

< i

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commail

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Swuihi Ttoooa1

communication systems, and computers, for example) expanded more rapidly than thosein final weapons develorjmcnt. reflecting the increasing complexity of Soviet military equipment

The RAD facilities currently available to the Soviets can support the simultaneous developmentof moreeapon and supportair-craft, missiles, naval ships and submarines, principal ground forces arms, and military space systems There has been Imle change5 in the number of systems that the Soviets have in development(The increasing resources devoted to RAD facilities appear to have been related primarily to the increasing sophistication and compicxily of weapons )

3 the Soviets have constructedachining, fabrication, subassembly, and assembly buildings atey defense plants aad shipyards. Production fWspacc at these plants, which produce most mayor weapon systems, increased by nearlyercent. As with RAD facilities, the most rapidly expanding industries were those that produce missiles and aircraft

The number of production lines available forsystems is now aboutSO tomore thanhe increase inreflects an established praci.ee; whenintroduce new and modified weapontheir forces they build new facilities and usefacilities by continuing to produce olderfor their own military services or for

J7

Mililary Mai

The manpower resource* of lhe Soviet mililary cstab-lishmcni have increased since lheesult Of the rcvitulizaiion of general purpose farces and the buildup along ihc Sino-Soviet border. Tolal military manpower increased by about one-ihird (see chart onnd now standshe growth resulted primarily from expansion and modernization of the Ground Forces (additions to (he Ground Forces accounted for about two-thirds of the total increase! and,esser extent, from increases in manpower for the air. air defense, and naval forces and for national command and Support (

The number of men assigned lo the strategic missile forces grew between tbend ihc, as the number of missile launchers increased. Ii subsequently declined wiih the dismantling of older missile systems under thenterim Agreement and with the deployment of new systems that required less manpower than (heir predecessors. Over the period0 lhe Soviet military absorbedercent of tho lubor force: that share remained fairly stable over limc.[ ]

The Soviet military effort relies heavily onnearly three-fourths of lhe men in the Soviet military arc draftees. Inhe Sovietsa larger share of eligible young men than inibouiercent, compared tooercent in earlier years Moreover, thelevel of conscripta baspercentageecondary education increased from aboutercent5 to J5 percent in lhe, while the percentage withrimary education declined fromo less than 5

The Uses of Power: Military Forceolitical Instrument

The growth of Soviet military power has paidpolitical, as well as mililary, dividends. Theappreciate that mililary strength is the foundation of the USSR's claim to superpower status and see their

' Thi* tout includesillion men assigned to internalconstruction, and iramponaiion unit* which do noi fulfill roles that the United State* would ennstdcr tu be mililary j j

growing military might as providing the basis for the conduct of an assertive foreign policy

Tbe Superpower Relationship

Soviet ieadcrs sec the growth of strategic military power as the key lo relations with the United Statesosition of gross strategic inferiority in thend earlythe Soviets hive moved through steady effortsresent position in which their strategic nuclear capabilities are widelyas ai least equal to those ot' the Untied States. The Soviets consider this achievement to be the basis of their claim to equality with ihe United Slatesargaining partner anduperpower wiih global interests. Over (he last two decades, the Soviets have shown they are committed to improving their Strategic posture and arc serious in asserting that they will match any increase in the US defense effort J

Current Soviet leaders, unlike Khrushchev, havefrom threatening io use ihcir strategic might, bul they sec the USSR's improved military posture as an effective deterrent io similar threats by the United States They probably believe that their strategic forces would deter ibe United Stales from initiating intercontinental nuclear war in any arcumslances shortlear threat to US national survival.the Soviets proiibly believe that the current strategic relationship lessens the L'S ability to use military force or even threaten to use it in areas of vital concern to lhe USSR, especially where the Soviets or their allies also have ihc advantage in conventional forecs.Q

Europe and Asia

The actual use of Soviet military forces during the Brezhnev years has been largely confined lo theskirmishes with China and the invasions of Czechoslovakia8 and Afghanistan inbe border actions against China were deliberately limited and dcrrsorutrated Soviet resolve, although they may have accelerated China's efforts to improve relations wiih the V- est The invasion of Czechoslovakiaocialist ally in the foU. without permanently souring relation* with the West. Soviet operation* in Afghanistan have not succeeded inthe country and have led to political an^ cco" nomic sanctions againsl the USSR. There has not. however, been any signevaluation of the utility

uf military power because of Ihe Afghan experience. Indeed. Soviet military move* related io Polandjive once again the possibilityajor intervention. | |

The political impact of (be improvement of military forces has been uneven. The Soviets probably believe that ihe buildup opposite China is an effectiveto major trouble on tbe border. They are confident thai ihey possess dear military superiority, but they also recognize thaiuclear fences deter them from making the sort of surgical strike they apparently once contemplated, and that prepoodetant Sovietmight has not prevented ihe Chinese from competing with the USSR in the Third World and improving its relations with the West Q

The military balanceposes delicateThe Soviets probably perceive lhal their buildup of forces has been an importantormnued Western acceptance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. They probably also sec their forces as aagainsl political or military developments lhat would alter the balance of power in Europe. Enhanced Soviet militaryIhe prospect of nuclear incineration in an Eaai-Wcsiin-flucnced the attitudes of Europeansake ted NATO's united front. At ibe same time the Soviets know that if ihey appear too threatening they risk thepossibility of galvanizing NATO. Thus. Moscow has pursued, with someual policy improving us military strength on the one hand, and on (he other pursuing arms control talks, attempting to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and in vinous otheras the ma jot propaganda campaign against the neutronto undermine NATO's cohesiveness

The Third World

Khrushchev'* successors have continued to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet influence. Their primary political objective* have been to encourage opposition by Third World countries lo US. Wesi European, and Chinese policies and to affect ihe outcome of regional conflict* in favor of Soviet inietests. Increasingly, in the lastears, ihe Soviets have also pursued military objectives, seek-

ing greater access lo support facilities for naval, com-^bat^air, and air transport operations in distant areas.

Soviet exports of military equipment and military training programs have grown rapidly since their inception in. "The value of Soviet military salestates in the non-Communiu Third World0 wa* somericesl9 tbe Soviet* had0 military advisers in Third W'orld countries- more than four times as many as50 Third World military personnel have been trainedeioo

Since thehe Soviets have conducted six major airlifts of combat supplies- to the Middle East7o Norlh Yemen. to Angola. io Ethiopia. and to Vietnam9 Their military involvement in Third World conflicts has evolved in stages:

Soviet air and air defense forces were used in theon the Middle East.

Soviet logistics transported and sustained Cuban combai forces for intervention in Angola andin ihe.

Soviet combai ground and air units invaded Afghani-sun infirst direct involvement of Soviet ground forces outside the Soviet

The presence of Soviet miliury forces, especially naval ships, in the Third World increased rapidly from (bentil the. Operations of general purpose ships outside home waters, for example, grew rapidly5hey dropped off5ut9hen tbey exceeded the levelhepeak year. Port visits to Third World couniries by Soviet ships (including many io areas distant from the USSR, such as West Africa) increased from anumber in tbeo moreear in the. They then declinedesult of the Soviet expulsion from Egypt.

* Milnan iakt> are aa tfamroat? unponnK aoatoc of fwif <nr reavcy urnint* lot Ibe : flicanl

political influenceilitary ulri accounid tor al kailercent of rilrd currency tipotltj |

Soviel leaders see their military activities in the Third Worldajor asset and believe that they have gained from the increase. There have been setbacks, such as the expulsion of Soviet forces and advisers from Egypt. They have often underestimated the power of nationalism and how much some Third World leaders resent heavyhanded Soviet behavior. Bui the Soviet leaders also believe that other states' perceptions of the magnitude orSoviet power has created politicalThey have expanded their influence in some countries at the expense of China and the Wcsi, demonstrated that they are willing and able to support clients, and enhanced iheir image as (he leadersreat power capable of projecting mililary force far from its

Determinants of the Military Buildup

The causes of the Soviet arms buildup areno factor alone can adequately explain lhe generaland pace of the effort, let alone ihc particular mix of programsthey are also tightly interrelated. Despite the complexity of the subject, however, it is possible to describe some of the major determinants of the Soviets' military policy and some of the forces that have shaped their power:

The long-lerm upward trend in military expenditures and capabilities in the Brezhnev era springs from lhe Soviet leaders' belief that milUary force is anand effective policy instrument, (heir ambitious military doctrine, and their perception of powerin the international arena.

The principal constraint on the Soviet policymakers is the knowledge that the economic resourcesto them are finile and tbat mililary growth must be weighed against other goals.

The particular areas of emphasis in force planning, like the ultimate characteristics of the weaponthat are deployed, arc determinedix of technological opportunities and constraints,of foreign threats, institutional momentum, and competition among people and organizations within (he defense

Factors Encouraging th* Buildup

The most basic cause of the arms buildup is the Soviet leaders' long-held view that mililary power is aand effective instrument of policy. They see international politics as inherently unsiable. itsforces presenting both dangers and opportunities for Ihc USSR. They believe that ihe threat or use of force can influence the attitudes and decisions of other leaders and help the Soviets to achieve strategicThey view their mililary power as serving them well in this regard, but neverthelessequirement to continue to improve it. both toeversal of the gains Ihey have made and lo deter their opponents from interfering wiih (he processes ibnuigh which they hope to make further gains.

st

"0

This belief in the general usefulness of military power is reflected and reinforced by formal military doctrine. In Soviet usage, military doctrineody of views officially adopted by the political and mililary leaders on the nature of, preparation for. and conduct of war. Military writings arc the principal source from which wc glean lhe content of this doctrine. These writings specify that Soviet forces aree structured to fight and wm future military conflicts. The leadersbelieve thai Soviet forces so structured are the most effective deterrent to war; and the doctrine holds that if deterrence fails, the forces must try to attain victory, eveneneral nuclear war.

These broad and comprehensive goals have affected Soviet force developments and operations. Some of the indications are:

The trends in size, structure, and deployment of Soviel intercontinental nuclear, theater nuclear, and theater conventional forces described earlier in this paper.

The emphasis that the Soviets place on strategic weapons suitable for destroying US nuclear delivery systems, on active defense against strategic attack (including continued funding or ABMnd on passive (civil) defense

The way the Soviets exercise theirparticular, scenarios forrotracted war in which both sides use nuclear weapons. Q

Secret

Except possibly during ihe period of Khrushchev's dominance. Sovici military planners have consistently rejecicd the ideaation's military forces arc adequate when they can gravelyoicntial enemy. The concepts known as "minimum deterrence" and "mutual assuredcanower level of expenditure than would be requiredart of the Soviet criteria for assessing Ihe adequacy of military power.

Changing power relations in the international environmentthe leaders' perceptions ofalso affect Soviet military goals. For example, the Sino-Sovici riftajor facior in the expansion of Soviet theater forces in. Despite the reduction in US real military spending thai has characterized much of the Brezhnev era. ihe Soviets coniinuc to regard US military programs asand requiring corresponding improvements in their own forces. Together with advances in militaryand ihe upgrading of the forces of otherenemies. Ihese changes in the political and military environment have contributed to the upward trend of the Soviet defense effort. | j

None of Ihese factors encouraging the military buildup helpslear definition of how much military power is enough. Indeed, the Soviet leaders' altitudes and perceptions and their ambitious military doctrine, taken alone, would lead io essentially open-ended requirements for military forces. [ |

Factors Constraining Ihe Buildup

Nonetheless, the leaders and military planners must temper their desiresealization of what iseconomically and politically. They fund iheir military programs generously, but are limited by the need toate of economic growth thai is adequate to support iheir long-term domestic and international goals.esult, during nvosi of the Brezhnev era. the military effort increased roughly in step with the economyhole.| |

Factors Affecting ihe Direcrion of ihe Buildup

When Soviet planners approach decisions on iheof their forces, they look inside and outside Iheir borders, considering technical opportunilics andihrcats. And while the availability of technology is

one of the determinants of military programs. Ihe methods of Soviet planning and management have an important impact on ihe introduction of newand on ihe characteristics of Soviet weapons. q

Soviet economic activity is managed in large partystem of rules and incentives thai require managersdefense industryfulfill quantitative goals. This system discourages risk, encourages long production runs, limits technological changes in weapon characteristics, andonservative approach to new designs. Reinforcing Ihese tendencies is the desire of the military services for large numbers of weapons thai are not too complex lo be operated and maintained by continually changing conscript personnel.|

Consequently, the dominant theme in Sovici military system development has been to upgrade weaponsthrough the gradual introduction of new technology. Revolutions are few; most newlySoviet weapons reflect evolutionary changes from their predecessors. They usually use many components of earlier weapons,ingle missionimited range of missions, and are designed for high reliability and ease of operation. Weaponsaccording to these criteria can be produced and deployed in large numbcis.juth few delays, and with minimal technological risk!

This rule has had exceptions: the Sovietsillingness to accept the higher risks and costs of developing weapons based on newconcepts, but this hasecondary Ihemc. They have pursued this path when theapproach is loo slow to meet changing threats or doctrinal requirements, when ihe growth potentialamily of weapons is exhausted, or when aresearch effort creates new technological Opportunities. (Even in these cases, the Soviets insure against failure by continuing to produce olderhe failure rales for programs based on neware higher than for the evolutionary systems, and the development limes are longer.

Anoiher consideration for Soviet planners as they shape iheir forces is the need to counter foreignstrategies, deployments, and weapon systems. Their docirinal requirements make the planners cx-

planners tailor their weapon programs to counter planned Western systems The programs ac-auireanentum. however, thai some-nmes keeps them alive alter the original threat has disappeared Soviet development ol theoxbat interceptorase In point.

Accordingt hero-

gram was initiated in response lo US plans toigh-altitude strategic bomber,rogram beganevelopment contract had been awardedn the, the Soviets beganigh-speedoptimized for high-altitude defense theS interest in the B-aned during the, as the potential of urategtc missiles was more widely recopu:ed. andhe United Slates decided to build onlyor research

Therogram continued, ho+extr. The first flight test of the aircraft took placeerial production begannd the first deliver} to operational umts was in IO?l> -alterad been formally canceled.

The Soviets went on deploying theespitethat its capabilities against the currentUS bomber threat ore poor. (They aremodifying the aircraft to improve itscapabilities)

^deployment continued because tuts. technologically advanced aircraft that modernizes the interceptor force, even though it cannot meet the contemporary threat

TheFoimm

ircmcJy sensitive to foreign military developments and affect weapon program* and the organization of the forces Although there is no simple relationshiptotal US and total Soviet defense expenditures, the military planners monitor US pUns aod programs closely, as well as developments in Western andforces. Tbey draw up requirements to develop and produce new weapons when they gain knowledge of important foreign programs thai must be countered to maintain Soviet war-fighting potential or can beto improve il.Q

Institutional structure has also been important The Soviet lenders have organized their political andsystems to give first priority to Iheir military goals

Tbe top leaders who are members of the principal body devoted to national security, the Defenseparticipate directly not only in the overalland direction of national security policy, but also in many of the details of weapons acquisition. They thusersonal commitment tomilitary policies and programs.

A fourth important factor in force planning isTo fulfill doctrinal goals and carry out military programs, the USSR has created large and powerful military and defense-industrialwhose leaders have high political status (Many of tbcm have been awarded teats on the Parly's Centralhe five services represent all military missions and are powerful advocates (and presumably competitors) for new programs andNot only are the military andestablishments directly represented in the highest political councils, but senior political leaders often take part in lower level workings of these two bureaucracies. The defense industries are closely allied with theservices and receive substantial benefits from continuing and expanding military production.the military and the defense industries can control defense-relatedwithhold it from those outside their chain of commandp

Soviet system of economic management gives priority to military requirements, offers special incentives to individuals and organizations involved in development and production of military systems, and stations representatives of the military services at research and production facilities.

The Soviet social structure accords substantialto the military establishment, and the system of universal military service ensures that the majority of young men are exposed to military life. | |

Seq/et

SO'iCI Mill [in Pimrr

in

ihe backdrop of (he USSR's broadly based, dynamic miliiary programs of ihe past, Soviel leaders are now making final decisions on iheir economic and defense plans. The economic plan will be highly publicized, in pan, but ihe defense plan will be secret and available onlyew high-level officials. Becauseack detailed information on Soviet mih-tary plans for ihe earlybecause (hethemselves have not yet decided on some of their programs for the middle and laiccannoi be as confident in our judgments about Sovici military power in the coming decade as in our descriptions of past trends. Nevertheless, we have several clues to ihe future:

observation of theoevelopmcnt of Soviet power over more than ihree decades.

understanding of tbe Soviet defense policyand the factors thai affect Soviet decisions

Intelligence evidence on specific defense programs now under way and on the technology available io the Soviet designers.

Evidence and analysis along these lines permit us to make fairly confident judgments about the paths thai development of Soviel miliary forces and policies could follow in.

Tbe following pages outline these clues. The general view that emerges is our best protection of the course of Soviel military power over ihe next decade. Using this projectionaseline, we then discuss other options open to ihe Soviets and the probable effect on military power if ihey should follow one of these other options. |

and Brc/hnrv

for Continuity and Change

The environment in which the Soviet leaders arctheir choices on future military programs isThe international situation is fluid, and thefor CS-Soviei relations ire uncertain Maoyof these leaden, both political and military, will pass from the scene before the full force of their cut rent decisions will be fell. Soviel economic growth issocial values are changing; potential enemies arc

posing new threats; and research and development programs arc providing new technical options. None of these facion alone is likely to cause an> fundamental change in Sovtei miliiary policy Moreover, Soviet options forre constrained by program commitments already made and by the tigidilvcs of ibe planning system. But political, economic, and technical factors could interact in this decade in ways that could

SccA'

ihe likelihcod of discontinuities in SovielIn this seclion. we examine ihcsc factors in ihc conicxi of the Soviet system for planning and manage-meni of defense nolicvl I

Soviel Organizations for Defense Decisionmaking, Planning, and Management

Institutional Setting ofDefense Policy Organizations ana'Actors. In lhe Soviel Union,and management of defense activities areA small group of people and organizations participate in defense planning. The ultimateauthority resides with the Politburo. Ihe chief executive body of Ihe Communist Party. The Politburo hasull, or voting, members and eight candidate members who do notote. The Politburothe top officials of both the party and the government (the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs and the intelligence chief, for example, have been voting membersand considers the full range of domestic and foreign policy issues.

Many of (he important decisions on mililary policy probably are made by ihc Defenseorgan in the USSR devoted lo national security mauers. The Defense Council includes the half-dozen top party and government officials with nationalresponsibilities, supported by senior military and defense-industrial leaders. The members of theare the key decisionmakers on military doctrine, plans and programs, arms control, foreign military assistance, and the use of military forces. Wiihas its chairman, the Defense Council operates by consensus, so that its members are collcciivelyfor decisions. ^

Below the Defense Council arc four otherthat participate in planning and managementsecurity programs the General Staff,CommissionheDepartment of ihe Central CommitteeCommunist Party, and lhepparently none of theseany other where their jurisdictionsare resolved through compromise or.through appealenior

These four organizations have different sources and types of information and different ways of influencing decisions:

Seo^t

Polilou'ool ihr Cummaant Party

Council

Ultimate authority fc* national security decision!

General Slaff

Approves docfrrnal rrcuircrnrnU and defense plant; authorim majord product ionnukci rcCommcndailoni in PWilbu ro on the me of mi liury force*

Military-Industrial Commission (VPKI

hreat uieumeiiM and military forceormula let urareiy for operation of force) and plant for wartime mobilization: oversee* military planning and procurement by the military

Defense IndustriesOf tbe Central

Supervises and coordinate* military revearch. development, and

Oversee*ertor-far pany officials

Siaie Planning Committee <Cce.plan>

Military services

rurtnu la te* economic plans toand other

Defense-industrial

The fnt service* formulate weapon development and productionilitarysupervise the performance of research, development, and prodoc-(ion organization).

The nine miniitries developmilitary hardware.

- The General Staff is ihe main executive organ of lhe armed forces,pparently provides the secretariat for the Defense Council. In this role it would prepare and disseminate (he Council's agenda, list of attendees, and decision papers. The staff controls information about the USSR's defense posture and current and future military plans. This information is not routinely disseminated to nonmilitaryunless they have direct responsibilities for defense mailers. Through its Chief Iniclligence Directorate, lhe General Staff also controls the collection,and dissemination of foreign military

46

VPK consists of Ihc lop executives of Ihe Soviel defense industriesupporting staff. The VPK has detailed information and expertise on military technology and defense*industrial matters. Its staff coordinates decisions on weapon programs, but its most important function isroubtcshootcr. enforcing program schedules and ensuring that specifications are met. The VPK cooperates closely and shares information with the General Staff

Central Committee exercises politicalfor the top leaders. It has independent party channels, reaching into every level of Soviet military and industrial organizations, through which it can gather information on compliance with the leaders' goals It also influences the appointment ofoffkiab to senior military and defense industry posts

Gosplan is the main economic planning body It maintaicts iDformaiioa on the plans and performance of the Soviet economy and is the final authority on the ability of Ihc economy to meet military needs. Gosptan's internal procedures reinforce military pnoni.es (giving first attention to militaryin formulating plans) and limit theof defense-related informationon military programs is restricted to the top officials in the one department that does defense-industrial planning. Personnel responsible for civilian programs therefore have little information about military requirements and find it difficult orlo challenge them on technical or economic grounds.

Marugers in the defense-industrial ministries have information on dcvcloprnent and productionnot routinely available to the top leaders and planners. For financial and career reasons, ihcscstrive to fulfill or overfulfil! production plans Participants in military programsbonuses and awards, and there are disincentives Ior converting to civilian production. Al the same time, these industrial managers have other incentives that tend to retard the progress of military programs. Their fulfillment of planor example, it endangered by theof innovative designs that can disrupt production Thus, defense-industrial managers tend to be conservative unless senior policymakers intervene directly to force innovation Q

The energy, political skill, and experience ofcrfficials are the keys to the operation ofmilitary policy process Most of lhehave been associated with militaryfor many years. President Brezhnev andUstinov have maragedind supervisedindustries General Staff Chief Ogarkov hasin arms control negotiations andLev Vorooin. the First Deputy Cbairmanin charge of military programs, is aindustry officialackground inof ground force weapon programs.share common experience, pride inurrent programs

lhe next echelon are the organizations thatdecisions -the military services and industrial ministnes- They do not make decisions oo national policy, bui they can and do influence policies through their special expertise, j |

The military services originate requirements for new weapon systems, and each competes with the others for missions and resources. At development andorganizations, each service has its representatives whose duties are to enforce military claims to economic resources and maintain high standards of quality con-

Plant.nd Budgtit. Together, tbe decisions of these organizations and leaders determine the scope and direction of Soviet military programs Thehave three main activities- -planning,management, and resource allocation.

Soviet defense plans set forth the principal goals and lines of development for military forcespecific period of timeey sei targets but do not allocate resources, separate decisions arc required forhere arc three types ofFive-year. and annual.ycar perspective plans arc very general and deal with broad goah rather than specific programs. Five-year and annual plans are moreand. in iheory al least, carry lhe force of law. j |

Sccd^

Soviet five-year defense plan is prepared everyat the same lime as the national eeonomicii ptcsumabJy is reviewed periodically,is not completely revised and extended eachis Ihe case with the US Five-Yeat DefenseGeneral Staff drafts it, with inputs fromservices and other components ofthcDefense. Gosptan and the VPK review ihewith weapon procurement before Ihe planto the Defense Council. We believe thea threat projection that identifies foreignstrengths and weaknesses, with particularto new weapon systems and capabilitiesbe countered. It almost certainly includesof Ibe current capabilities of iSt Sovieta projection of targets for improving theseand meeiiag tbe threats.

We arc uncertain about the amount of detail inpresented lo the Defense Council. We suspectis fairly summary, backed up by more detailedlower levels. The defense plan probably containsoperational goals for each service andthe acquisition of major weapons. Il probablyprojections of military expenditures andrequirements and the share of nationalresources lhal will be required to fulfillThis information would enable the Sovietto assess the potential cost of Iheir defense

In drawing up the Five-Year Plan. Soviet officials base Iheir targets for acquisition of weapons primarily on development and production programs that are under way. We bave considerable infonnation on how the Soviets manage these individualthan we have on how they prepare ihe planningiliiary service determines that iiewresponseew threat, or because new technology opens an opportunity, or to remedy an operational deficiency. Service represemalivesequirement and passthe industrial officials, who draw up technical proposals for meeting this need. Usually these comeingle design organization: there is little competition in theystem. The originalor reviews the proposals andecommended approach with the designer Tbe negotiations tend to concentrate

Sosiel Weapons Rif) Program Man.grnwnl

Mane

Tactical-technical fouiremcni

Thii dot* mem. picpaiod by ihr

ell faith

ooeraiinnal rojuirtmcnii and

Technical auigomcnt

e-.iced by Miik.it> af Defease and CewalMetuj*

af

Awltofira Sr-ttowl rrwn atVi OMrm thrtmili pmotvni dririM by tod dtngr aria-

.

Preparation lor

mm, lasli and deadlier*by industrial miruiinea. Minain of Defense. General Siaff. and ibe service Then ciammed by Military.nmrnmiiin IVPKi Rnd Central CecnmiureIndmlry Dci-ilinrm Major lutein dwiiion. may ba te.ie.ed by Defeat, Council, rwult.niOini part)decree

precedes Ml-icale lealinj Aaiaoritea capital -ivounan. at

roducl-aa cMbT.l, de rio thai for

oe> aad typeaof

- M-

by Maaurr ofadun)

Co*no' and prastbey Fnlnbaro it-view may folio*

on technical details and schedules rather than on basic concepts.^

At this point, senior organizations and officials become involved. The lead designerraft document, which will initiate development, and sends it for review by industrial and military officials. The informal ties among participantsrogram prepare the way for the first milestone, (he development iniliaiion decision

The decision is made by the VPK (or by ihc Defense Council for majoruthorizes development from ihe design phase through the fabrication of lest prototypes, and identifies the major participatingAl this point the effort gathersThe Soviets decideingle design and freeze the system's basic technology at this stage P

The next major milestone is preparation forThis decision is made by the same officials who initiated the program. They authorize capitalat the series production facility. Thisirm commitment to production and often precedes full-scab: testing Once this milestone is passed, heavy resource commit men ts arc in train. It is now extremely difficult to actuallyrogram, although technical problemsolitical decision can lead to delays or modifications,

inal milestone, near the end of the test program,is nude on the number of weapons toand deployed Senior defense, industrial,planning officials take part in thisagain, major systems may require explicitby the Defease Council or the Politburo,

Allocation of resources for programs to fulfill plan targets is made each year through the annual plan and budget. Soviet defense programs arc funded primarily from the state budget. We do not know exactly how the expenditures are aggregated for scrutiny by the top

leaders One I

jreportcd

breakdown, major and minorand various operating expenditures.suggests breakdowns by militaryand geographic region. Wc have nothat ihe Soviets break the expendituresto missions like those in the USand Planning Categories,|

Officials involved in decisionmaking on militaryhave long tenures: this gives their policiesand consistency The Minister of Defense, for example, has been involved in defense-industrial mattershe Soviet Navy has had the same commander in chief

Il is secretive. Few officials know the details of defense plans, programs, and budgets. Even ihceconomic planners probably estimate totalspending by using "rules of thumb

There is little incentive to review the establishment's basic priorities. Fundamental national policy reviews are required only al five-year intervals when national economic plans are prepared. Fsen then, tbe plan targets tendeflect only incremental changes io existing programs Budgets specify the organizations that receive funds, but not necessarily the functions for *hKb funds are lo be spent This makes itto identify waste and duplication

It is resistant lo major alterations in plans andPlans arc not immutable -adjustments arc alwaysonce made, they set up complex production and supply relationships that arc not easily altered. Once developmenteapontechnical failure or an explicit high-levelare probably the only cvenis lhat wouldits eventual deploymenl.

romotes gradualness in change. At every level of tbe system, success is measured by fulfillment of goals, goals arc set conservatively, and risk it discouraged. This results in slow, evolutionary change and in weapons that differ little from one generation to

These characteristics of the Soviet decisionmaking process impart considerable momentum to military programs. They limit the ability of civilian claimants lexcept at the highest levels of the leadership) toihe milpriority access to resourcci And theyasic continuity in the dcselopmcnt of

is highly centralized. Top leaders are drawn into the details of military plans and programs and bear personal responsibility Tor their success or failure

Foreignerspeciim

The Soviets regularly assert thai victory overii ineviiaMc Their ideology and ihcif experience predispose the Soviet leaden to iec an overall historical trend in (ntcrnatioAil affairs in their favor. Since World Warhere have been several major events that the Soviets identify asavorable shift in the intcrnationil "correlation ofhese include Soviet acquisition of hegemony oser Eastern Europe, Ihc collapse of European colonial empires, the USSR's growth as an economic and military power (especially lhe change in its strategic nuclear positionis lhe United States) and lhe decline in LS dominance among non-Communist nations. Q

When viewing ihcir postwar foreign policies in this long-term content. Soviet leaders probably would evaluate ihem as largely successful. They were able simultaneously io expand their power and influence in the Third World and tothrough long-term efforts to build arms control and tradetheir relations with the major Western powers Butthose leaders view tne international scene today, they also perceive growing strategicontinuing possibility of setbacks, andigher risk than in ihc past of wars involving Sonet forces. ^

As they review their military plans for. Soviet leadersumber of specific foreign policy concerns They arc apprehensive about the newin Washington and about what they perceive torowing anti-Soviet mood in the United Slates. The Soviets expect that US relations with other NATO members will continue to be strained byon such issues as lhe conception of dcicnte and the definition of the common securityalone the sharing of its expense. They know they cannot couni on this strain continuing, however, and are concerned that US leadership may restore NATO's cohesion and thai ihe Alliance will seek to extend its geographical area of operations well beyond the traditional perimeter^ j

count n

The Soviets are also deeply concerned about events in Easternchallenge to Communist Party authority in Poland, the Romanians" continuingto them on foreign and military policy issues, and the economic slowdown in the East European couniries that increases the burden of empire. They see

Chinaetermined and increasingly effectiveThe poawbilily of Sino-US military cooperation hashreat the Soviets lake so seriously thai it is ihc one policy issue they have "linked" with SALT And Ihey arc concerned thai lhe Japanese maytheir defense effort | |

The Soviet leaders also see increasing instability in lhe Third World and believe lhat this will provideas well as opporiuniliea. They have been unable lo suppicss the insurgents in Afghanistan, and the world reaction to their military presence there has been harsher than ihey expected Moscow clearly benefits from lhe expulsion of the United Slates from Iran and sees the potential lor increasing its influence there over time. Nevertheless, the Soviets are concerned lhat the Islamic revolution may affect the USSR's Muslim population and thai instability in Ihe region may lead the United Slates to build up its military presence Q

"'Uncertain" is ihercforc the word for current Soviet foreign policy pcnpcctives This uncertainty is more profoundimple lack of knowledge about what the new US* ill do, although thatentral factor in it Whatever economic and political strategics Moscow may devise to deal with tbeinternational situation, its military policy must stress preparednesi andecade ofIhc risk of actual conflict-1 |

Current Military Strengths and Weaknesses

In evaluating their military preparedness for thisenvironment, the Soviet planners would begin with an evaluation of the current strengths andof Ihcir forces. For this evaluation, iheywouldorsi casea large-scale conllict against NATO and China, with probable escalation to intercontinental nuclear war andilitary actioneripheral area at the same time, j

This scenario would place heavy demands on Soviet forces.

For strategic offensive forces, the planners winapability for strikes al enemy nuclear and other military targets,ariety of modes (preemptive, retaliatory, or launched on receipt of warning of lylus enough flexibilityupport

Wei

rangingingle all-oul sirikeeries of exchanges over several weeks

Straicgic defensive forces would have the mission* of limiting damage by warding off ICBM. SLBM. and air attacks as far as possible and thus ensuringwiih passive civil defense efforts! the survival of the USSRolitical and economic entity.

Theater air and iniermediatc-rangc bomber forces would be charged wiih the early attainment of air superiority and destruction of the enemy's nuclear delivery systems and weapons and hb command and control facilities, theyo conduct nuclear and conventional strikes in support of ground force operations.

The Ground Forces would carryassive and rapid ground offensive into NATO territory to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or

destroy ports and airfield* lo prevent reinforcement If China entered the conflict, they would invade and

occupy portions of northern China to safeguard

Soviet territory and lines of communications In both theaters, the Ground Force* would be expected to

carry oul operations, either conventional or nuclear.

afterew days for mobilization

General purpose naval forces would have theof neutralizing enemy aircraft earners and ballistic missile submarines in the opening stagesar, protecting their own ballistic missilecontrolling the sea approacheshe Soviel Union, supporting ground force operations, and disrupting enemy sea communications by attacking European ports and merchant ships near theperiphery. If the war continued and the Navy performed its immediate tasks, it might assign more forces to interdicting the enemy's lines ofin the open ocean in order to tic down enemy naval forces.

the need for intervention or couniennsurgency operations elsewhere aroseull-scale war tn Furope and the Far bast, the burden of supporting ihe lower level involvement would fall on ihc ground and tactical aviation forces, assisted by airlift or scalifl forces. [-

Measuring Ihcir forces againsl Ihcsc heavy demands, the planners probablyumber of important strengths is well as some major

The Soviets probably coarsider thai their inierconti-neaial offensive forces could destroy ihc bulk of US land-based missilesountcrfoecc strike Moreover. Ihey probably believe thai because they have expanded and hardened their force of land-based ICBMs most of ihem couldS first strike. When their SLBM and bomber weapons arc added. Ihe Soviets could expect to have several thousand weaponsfor retaliatory strikes even afterS surprise attack. The surviving weapons would have the capability toarge percentage of US military' or economic targets.[ )

In addition to those weapons of intercontinental range, the military his peripheral strategic missiles andwith several thousand weapons that could be used against targets in Europe and Asia

Soviet planners probably consider thai their airnetwork could perform well against enemyattacking at high and medium altitudes. They probably also believe that their civil defense program, given sufficient time to implement sheltering and evacuation, could provide for the survival of theleadersarge percentage of ihc essential work force, as well as reducing by tens of millions lhe immediate casualtiesarge-scale attack.Q

The planners know that lhe Warsaw Pact ground forces in Central Europe are numerically superior to NATO's in men. tanks, aad artillery Moreover, the Soviets probably consider their own most modem ground force weapons lo be technologically equal or superior to NATO's They probably judge that, if supporting air and naval operations wee successful, lhe Pact ground forces couldATO assault and rapidly advance inio Western Europe. Theyalso judge that ihc Soviet ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border could effectivelyhinese attack

The Soviets probably bcltese thai coordinatedby missile-equipped surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft giveood capability in nuclear war io counter the threat from Western dir-

craft carriers. They probably also believe that they can effectively prevent amphibious landings on Soviet tcr-ritoryQ

Despite these genuine strengths. Soviet planners also know that their forces would have major difficulties in attempting to fulfill many of their wartime tasks. They probably doubt that their ballistic missile earlynetwork can provide reliable warningS ICBM launch and therefore do not have highthat they could launch most of their own ICBMs before the enemy weapons struck. Even with adequate warning, the ABM defenses at Moscow arc limited and could not protectarge-scale missile attack. The current Soviet air defense weapons are of limited usefulness against low-altitude attack, and the naval forces have almost no way of detecting and attacking ballistic missile submarines^

The theater air forces could do considerable damage to NATO's air defenses but probably could not achieve early air superiority. Without Pact air superiority, the Ground Forces would have much more troubletheir objectives. Moreover, the planners stillconsider the tactical nuclear balance precarious in Central Europe, despite recent Soviet improvements. They could not be confident that the Pactonflict confined to battlefield nuclearand are concerned that they might have tu resort to systems based in the USSR. Q

On the Eastern front, the Soviets probably consider their forces inadequate to hold Chinese territory for extended periods. An overall concern is that having to maintain large forces on the Sino-Soviet bordertheir flexibility for operations in other areas, j

Soviel naval planners probably consider their forces inadequate to ensure the destruction of enemy carriersonventional war and to carry out such secondary tasks as the interdiction of the sea lanes. They probably are also concerned about the vulnerability of their ballistic missile submarines to attack by enemyand of their surface forces to attack byand aircraft. They probably consider their limited sealift capability inadequate lo lhe potential demands on it.

Perceptions of Future Military Threats In estimating their requirements for new militarySoviet planners will take into account not only the condition of their own forces, but alsounder way in or planned for US, NATO, and Chinese forces. They will attempt to structure their forces to preserve their strengths in the face of these postulated threats and to prevent their enemies from exploiting Soviet weaknesses. Probably they will make conservative (worst case) estimates of future threats and for planning purposes will project Western weapon programs even though the governments involved may not yet have approved them for development.

For their strategic attack forces, the Soviets' principal concern will be the possible erosion of some of the gains they have achieved al greal cost over lhe past (wo decades. They see the possible US deployment ofissile on mobile launchers or in multipleshelterserious threat. If theyounterforce sirike, the basing modeould force the Soviets lo aim virtually all of (heir ICBM weapons against all of the possible shelters, including empties, and this would leave (hem few weapons for other targets. When they evaluate lhe possibilityS counterforce strike, they sec the accuracys an increased threat to their own ICBM force. (ICBMs make up over half of Soviet intercontinental delivery vehicles, and their warheads provide nearlyercent of thehe chart, opposite, shows our calculations ofhreat to Soviet ICBMs. p|

Other Western strategic programs in areas of Soviet weaknesses also worry Soviet planners. Deployment of the Trident submarine will expand lhe potentialareas of US (and possiblyallisticsubmarines (see map,. This will make even more difficult lhe Navy's task of locating andthese submarines in the open ocean. The French plan to improve their SSBN force, which is also of concern lo the Soviets. They sec the planned USof straiegic air-launched cruise missiles as weakening their air defenses, just as they have begun to achieve modest gains in low-altiiude capabilities.

"The United Kingdom currently aai metal PateidonLBM iviirma >nd may acquire the Trident missile.I-

Secfet

Survivability of Soviet ICBM Silos If Attacked bj US

Taui Sonet CAM *lot

-

b2

100

M

iiumMMiir*SWIM<MiCSM II)ill*

ihn WI .vhudi would c. vo*

Uo. In*i*-atnlmio uc" ikSimu-iii KtOiOilflit*ALT ii

The possible US deployment of an aircraftow radarso-calledcomplicate Soviet air defense probtcms| |

The Soviets are concerned about the growth andof Chinese nuclear forces. They monitor these forces closely, but probably are uncertain about their exact size and location. Soviet planners probably project steady growth in the Chinese inventory of land-based missiles. They probably also estimate thai the Chinese will procure at least two ballistic missilein. This would increase theof China touclear attack and stillwith nuclear weapons. Soviet planning must also take into account the addition of tactical nuclearto the Chinese arsenal

Another problem of particular concern io Sovietis the NATO decision todvanced Pershing ballistic missilesround-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe. The Soviets sec this decision as partS plan to improve its counicrforcc capabilities againsl Soviet strategicThe deployment of these new US nuclearwould complicate Soviet planning in several ways:

Their range would permit attacks on key Soviet military targets, includingercent of theaunchers.ercent of theaunchers, and many of the hardened command posts in Eastern Europe and lhe Western USSR.

The short flight of the Pershing would provide tittle warningATO attack on targets in the USSR.

The small size and the low flight profiles of the Tomahawk would tax Soviet air defenses, and the Soviets are concerned that its deployment could be expanded in the future, possibly to include other regions or launch by aircraft and ships.

Their mobility and their deploymentumber of NATO countries would increase the demands on Soviet air forces for attacking NATO's nuclearat the beginningar.

They would increase NATO's ability to carry out nuclear conflict against the USSR without using US intercontinental forces. |

NATO has planned other force improvements thai are of concern to the Soviets. They regard NATO'sfor upgrading iheaicr forces as substantial and technologically challenging. They are concerned in particular by planned improvements in NATO's armor and antiarmor systems and in precision munitions and nuclear systems. Enhanced radiation (neutron)arc viewed as particularly threatening to Pact armored forces. The Soviets have high regard for the technical capabilities of NATO's tactical aircraft and

'Alystvn mfc-sc ro as TridffM II with aC mpi'I suSna'ine and missile, isud* Oul not yet .proaramed fgr development.

defense sysicms and consider these lube areasihey musl accelerate Ihcir

In naval lorces. Soviei planners arc worried aboul US ASW capabililies, and particularly aboutrcat posed by US forces lo Soviel ballistic missileThey believe lhat the tailed States hatsome of ibe Soviet advantage in antiship warfare by deploying cruise missile defense sysicms and lone-

range carrier patrol aircraft and thai the margin will be further reduced by widespread US deployment of the Harpoon antiship missile. In ihcir view, ihcdeployment of ihc Tomahawk long-range cruise missile on surface ships and submarines could turn every US vesseltrategic weapon system and seriously undermine lhe Soviet Navy's abilityttack tea-based nuclear delivery systems at lhe outset of a

Seotcf

And Soviet naval officers continue to beaboul the vulnerability of Iheir own surface forcesnemy air and submarine attack. I

Instability on Sovici borders and US discussionsa rapid deployment force huvc broughtSoviet planners the need io be prepared forareas other than the traditional European andtheaters They probably hate evaluated theof their forces against indigenous andopposition in such areas as ihe Persian Gulf.international environment that (heinnd their information onplans to upgrade capabilities for distantwill be increasingly important factorsplanning for force developments in the

The Use of Arms Ccaafrol Negolia lions

In the past. Sovici leaders base integrated forceand arms control negotiating strategics well, and we expcci them to continue. They arc organized lo facilitate this integration. Decisions on arms control (like all other aspects of security) arc made in the Politburo and Defense Council, and the military and defense-industrial cstaMrsbrneou have major rotes ine details for iheir etecuinm Personnel of the Ministry of Defense. General Staff, and VPK work on preparing negotiating positions and serve on negotiating teams like Ihe SALT delegation (where ihey handle most subsianiivc mailers related ioforces andor. Smirnov. head of the VPK.ey figure in the finalegotiations at2

The Soviets have used arms control proposals in several

ways:

arc propaganda vehicles intended toWestern debates on defense policy or tothe USSR's "peace-loving" image Examples are the recurring proposals al ihe United Nations for "general and cornpteie disarmament" and teducitons of military budgets

such as the treaties dealing with the seabed and outer space, were intended to foreclose an area of military competition in which the Soviets had link

prospect of achieving important capabilities, in part these proposals reveal Soviet respect for Western military icchnology.

Some negotiations have been used to influence the course of Western miliiary programs ar lo limit ihe responses of the West io the growth of Soviet power Talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, the nuclear test ban negotiations, ihe dialogue on deployments in Ihe Indian Ocean, and ihe recently initialed theaierforce (TNF) discussions probably fall into this category. Such negotiations, in the Soviet view, help ioredisposition in Ihe West io see the growth of Soviet power as legitimate and natural.

Still other arms control agreements were seen as stabilizing the international environment andthe risk of unintended conflict: theTreaty and tbe Agreement on tbe Prevention of Nuclear War are examples|

The Soviel* have been most willing io move ahead on arms control negotiations thai ihey saw would forestall important LS strategic gains Thus, tbey sou gut in the ABM Treaty to bait the nvccierturnepioyrnenihich theyS advantage, while reiaining the option lo conduct ihetr ownABM RAD program In negotiating agreements on strategic offensive arms, Soviet leaders haveany wording that would oblige them io alter their basic military doctrine and their baste policies on force development and deployment. When compelled in SALT iohoice, they usually have reduced iheir demands for constraints on US program* rather than accept constraints on their own highly valued production and deploy meni programs [ |

The Soviets have shown some willingness io discuss limitations on new lypes of weapons before ihey have initialed programs to develop and procure them But once they haveommitment ioeapon (this usually occurs before full-teak testinghe Soviets have resisted proposals to prohibit its deployment Q

In negotiatinghe Soviets have gone to considerable lengths to preserve their options forforces and responding to threatseed to violate agreed provisions They often preferlanguage, and they are less interested than the United States in measures for verifying compliance with agreements. The Soviets conssder themselves bound only by mutually agreed restrictions, and tkey consider as permissible all activities not expressly prohibited They interpret restrictions literally and. if possible, to their own advantage, exploring on occasion the limits of US sensitivities on compliance.

Economic incentives clearlyole in the Soviet approach to arms limitations. Evidence of the relative weight of this factor Is meager, but in the past it appears to have been outweighed by political and strategic concerns. Arms control agreements have not reduced the overall groarth of Soviet militarywere no reductions in spending, for example, following2 SALT accords,

We expect the Soviets to continue their emphasis on arms control inn contrast to, when the growth of the Soviet economy matched or exceeded tbe increase in defense spending, the Soviets will face slower growth and increasing economicin this decade. Even though this may increase tbe Soviets' interest in arms control as an instrument of national security policy, tbey will continue to negotiate cautiously. They know that any saving Ihey mayfrom arms control would bemall portion of their defense expenditures, but they probablyeconomic benefits of tome kind. If an agreement reduced their uncertainty about futurehe Soviets might feel (hat they need not incur the additional costs of developing andcertain systems j

We believe that strategic factors will continue toSoviet arms control policy and thai inhey will strive to strengthen their areas of military advantage and overcome their weaknesses It isto predict the effect of arms control efforts on Soviet force development, however, because thesewill be directly affected by the actsons of other parties, including the United States. To deal with this uncertainty, wc treat arms control restrictionsariable in lhe sections on fulure force

Tbe Political Succession

Leonid Brezhnev,as led thr Communist Party of ihc Soviet Union forears. Hishas grown since thes important posts have gone to leuders closely associated with him. At1 Parly Congress ihis team was reelected unchanged Age and health make Ihe prospects poor for Brezhnev's continuing in office for moreew years. At his departure, the remaining leaders willtruggle for dominance, because neither law nor custom provides for the orderly transition of power in the USSR Q

This struggle could lead to changes in Soviet policies, including military policy. Changes in the structure of military forces have followed the last two political successions. Several years after Stalin's death,reoriented the forces and defense industries toward nuclear and missile weapons. In the. when Brezhnev and Kotygin took power, they acceded to the military planners' requests for greater attention to conventional forces (while continuing the emphasis on strategic nuclear forces!.

It is inherently impossible to predict the nature and timing of changes in military policy that might result from Brezhnev's replacement His successors might initiate major departures from past policies, inparticularly lo some development in the fluid international situation or to the distressing Sovietprospects But without clear evidence to guide our judgments, wc must fall back on historicaland our admittedly imperfect understanding of lhe policy positions of potential Soviet leaders.

Our task is complicated by the fact that most of Brerhnev's associates are in their seventies and several are in poor health. Most of the men who would make the succession decision are themselves likely to be replaced in the next few years, and in the course ofhole new generation ol leaders will move into senior positions. These men may have backgrounds and values considerably different from those of the currenl IcadcrsJ-

We know little about how Brezhnev's possibleview specific national lecurity mailers. In any case, lhe decade will be well along before much real change is likely to take place. New political leaders

The Military Succession

presumably would need lime to consolidate tbeir power before trying to effect major defense policyihey desired io. In addition, even if new initiative* were undertaken soon, long leadlines are required to procure and field modern military forces, and it would lake years to change the structure of Soviet forces significantly.) |

We suspect lhat. if theuccession occurred soon, it would have two phases. The first would be the replacement of Brezhnev as party chief by another senior leader, perhapseriod of several years. The most likely candidates for this immediate succession are close associates of Brezhnev These men appear likely to share his general attitude on nationaldesnite some perceptible differences in outlook,

tjj&despii

Star-Term Proipecii Among the potentialParty Secretary Andres Kirilcnko seems best situated lo replace Brezhnev, at least on an interim basis. Hiseems to rule him oulong-term leader, but at the moment no other contender can match his qualifications. As unofficial deputy. Kirilcnko has often performed (he dulics of General Secretary during Brezhnev's absences He oversees tbe staffing and operations of party organizationsihc country, has primary responsibility for the supervision of heavy industry, ranks second only to Brezhnev as party spokesman on economic mat'icrs. and has had experience in international Communist Party affairs ( |

oreign policy statements over Ihe years suggest an inclination toward an aggressive Soviet policy. He has erraorsed Brezhnev's efforts to improve Sovtcl-LS relations but has been suspicious of Western motives. He has been critical of the Chinese and is one of the Sonet leaders least tolerant of Easi European tendencies to deviate from Moscow's guidance. Kirilcnko alsoonservative outlook on domestic matters. He has firmlytrong defense posture and preferential deselopment of heavy

Although (he broader perspective of the Generalpost could alter his views, it currently appearsoviel regime led by Kirilcnko mighl place less

emphasis on dcicntc with the United States and be less willing to look for possible compromisestrategic arms negotiation,!

The other leading candidate is Konsiaminarty Secretary who formerly was an aide to Brezh nev andlose confidant.as risen rapidly in recent years. He is one of five in the Soviet hierarchy (Brezhnev, Kirilcnko, Mikhail Suslov. and newcomer Mikhail Gorbachev are the others) who arc both party secreiarics and full members of ihe Politburo. Chcrnenko probably owes his rapid advance to Brezhnev's growing reliance on him and to anby Brezhnev to balance Kinlcnko's ambitions.siaius in the leadership appearsave fluctuated in recent months, but be could emergeompromise candidate if the Politburo has difficulty agreeingew General Secretary |

Chcrnenko has staunchly supported the improvement of relations wiih the West, particularly with Ihe United Stales. In speeches, he has gone further than any other leader except Brezhnev in stressing tbe importance of SALT and in calling atiemion to the poientialbenefits of arms control. On domestic issues heopulist image and has argued for improvingperformance through better leadership | |

Longer Term Prospecit.ounger leader will accede to the top party post, cither following an interim successor or immediately after Brezhnev (if he outlasts his seniorhere arc several men who are less likely than either Kirilcnko or Cherncnko to follow Brezhnev in the short run. but couldemerge as successors.

Vladimirs lhe Ukraman party leaderongtime political associate of Brezhnev. He hasairly hard line on national security matters.

Leningrad party leader Gngonys one of the youngest Politburo members. He usuallyard line on defense issues andeputation for fostering innovative methods of economic

I

i:;.

Grishin. ihe Moscow party6 andeari attackhought to be conservative on most issues, he is one of the least

known contenders: we have no direct evidence on ha

defense policy view*.

s the youngest of theand is responsible for agricultural policy;on defense and national security issuesHe reportedly has opposedEastern

During the succession period. Soviet decisionmaking would probably be more collegia, than it is nowwould watch each other's positions closely, and policy issues could become political instruments as tbe leaders maneuvered for advantage. AH would be wary of allowing any one member too much initiative or power. Variations in policy could occur, bul ll would be difficult to change basic prioritiesew leader could consolidate power. During the jockeying period of collective leadership, the defense effort probably would not be significantly redirected. Few aspirants for the top post would risk antagonizing the professional military or placing tbciRseHcsosition to be accused of selling defense sbortj

Kcooomic Factors

Resource Constraints. The resource constraints facing Sovici leaden will become more severe in, with potentially disruptive political consequences. The Soviet strategy for rxc^rruchas been based largely on the forced mobilization of capital andbeen losing effectiveness sincehowdown in growth, which affected nearly all sectors of (be economy, continued through, and has been particularlyhe last few years.f [

The Soviet slowdown reflects exhaustion of Ihethai fostered rapid development, especially ihe abundance of labor, fuels, and raw materials. More importantly, itong-term decline in overall productivity output per combined unit of capital andtch bad increased ai an average annual rate oferceni during, fell byercent per year in. The decline wasof underlying deficiencies in ibe centrally

planned Soviet economy- deficiencies which include an inability io foster technological innovations and to motivate the work forccj

he Soviet economy slowedrawl. Tbe average annual GNP growth90lowest for any two-year period since World War II The poor performance was due in part to unusually harsh weather during the winter. but even with belter coitionshe economy rebounded only slightly The economic plan1 (approved ineflects scaled-down expectations, but proipccis for achieving even the reduced targets are poor.'"

The Soviet leaders must begin to dealrtortage of labor. Birth rales in the USSR declined in, and recently this has begun io be reflectedall in the number of young people entering the labor force. The problem will become much more acute in tne; by then the working-age population will be growing at lessercent annuallytoercen( inxcess farm labor has long since been siphoned off io develop oihcr sectors,ural population thai is alreadyandisproportionate number cfunskilled Field hands

A further complication of (his demographic problemnearly all of the increase in the labor force inwill be among non-Slavic (principallypopulations. These people are sironglylo migrate from Central Asaa io tbeindustrial areas in the European or

The supply of oil will be Moscow's most critical natural resource problem in. New Fields arc being found and dwloped too slowly to offset tbe depleiiori of older Fields. Production may now be peaking; weecline to begin in the nexi few years and continue through the decade The discovery of new fields may arresi the decline eventually, but the areas of potential deposits are remote, and their exploitation will require massive investments in infrastructure.f |

Prod ne; inn of such oihcr energy sources as coat,power, and atomic energy is being pushed about as hard as Soviel industrial capabilities permit,

Economic Prospects in Eastern Europe: Implications for Military Planning

the USSR, lhe non-Soviet Warsaw Pact INSWp) countries are facing economic difficulties Inll of them experienced an economic slowdown thai worsened as the decade progressed The causes wereinherent inefficiency of the economicsystemsole, as did rising prices for energy, raw materials, and Imports of technology from the West.

In several countries the economic situation wasby mounting hard currency balance-of-pay-ments deficit* and continuing poor performance by the agricultural sectors DrPotand, labor unrest affected industrial production and upset economic plans. The East European economies are likely to experience further slowdowns In, and living standards will stagnate or decline.

6

The Soviel Union has been pressing the NSWPto accelerate ike growth of their defense spending and to modernize their forces more rapidly in the coming five-year, East Germany has given some indication that Ii may comply. But because of economic problems, most NSWP counirieswill not fully satisfy lhe Soviet demandshas publicly refected the Soviet call for more defense spending, and Poland. Hungary, andwill have difficulty even matching lhe pastverage growth, let alone surpassing it

Soviet pressure and their own efforts to remedyforce deflctences probably will cause all the NSWP couniries to experience real growth in their defense budgets. Overall, however, the average real growth in NSWP spending for the armed forces is unlikely lo exceed lhat achieved in, and ihe pace of military modernization is likely to fall short of Soviet goals

the help of imported Western equipment. The Soviets art attempting to conserve oil. but Urge sources of savings arc difficult to identify (mosttransport, for example,orand industrial rather than privateven with conservation efforts and vastly increased investment in fuel production, the growth of domestic energywill fall short of demands in

Still other economic problems confront Ihc SovietWeather was better than average during most of the Brezhnev era. but in the past few years poor weather has wrecked harvests and disruptedIf weather over the Soviet land mass returns to ihe long-term pattern, harvests could regularly fall well below requirements. This could complicate the foreign trade situation by forcing Moscow to increase grain purchasesime when oil, its principal hard currency export, will be scarcer^

Finally, the Soviets face rising costs for other fuels and raw materials as well as oil. This is because ofof reserves west of the Urals and the high cost of developing resources in Siberia and Central Asia.|^

Under these circumstances, we expect the Soviel economy ofo be very different from tha: of. In the past, although it grew more and more slowly, its growth permitted the policymakers toboth defense spending and investmeni and still have enough left over for some gains for Ihe consumer (howeverver the next several years, however, developing demographic and energy problems will combine with the difficulties of longer standing toarticular dent in growth. The annual growth increments inill be smaller than in most of; Soviet leaders will have to make tougher choices among defense, investment, and consumption: and the political competition for resources is likely to become more intense.

Possible Economic Effect of Constraints It ii difficult to forecast the precise impact of labor and energy shortage* on Soviel economic trowih We have.ver, used eovrweneiric models to make simulations of Soviet economic performance over (his decade These models, although subject to uncertainly, help us to gauge the general magnitude of Soviet economicand (he impact of various policy options ongrowth.

Our simulation (see (able at right) suggests (hai Sovic( economic growth will sloweal average annual raleerceni5 and to lesserceni from (henrowth in investment and per capita consumptionalso fall sbori of past trends.| )

If defense spending continues to increase al ils historic rate while economic growth slows, ihe share of Sovici economic output devoted lo defense will increase The defense share of GNP. which wasoercentouldercentage point higher5 and three or four points higheroreover, tbe defense share of the annual irvcretnent lo GNP could increase from about one-fifth now to between one-four ih and one-lhird in thend io as much as three-fourth* by the end of Ihe decade. This would drastically reduce the ability of (he Soviet leaders io allocate additional resources to investment and consumption and would erode the annual growththat has been so important in ihe past in easing political tensions that arise from ibe compeliiion for resources. { |

Sovici leaders are concerned about their economic prospects, andParty Secretarylinked economic problem* directly io Ihe costly defense effort. In0 Brezhnev called on theommunity io assist the civil machine-building sector in developing more effective products of higher quality. His speech probably does nothift in (he longstanding priority accorded ibe Soviet defense sector norignificant transfer of resource. Nevcrtbctcu. il may portend an increasing miercsi among tbe Sovietin moderating ihe economic impact of their defense programs)

defense pa aaiamii ind Ibn moSe-atcioovore ituacty maich ihe rale ee* growth ol the economy. (U)

Changes in defense spending, in themselves, areioolution io ihe economic problems thai Ihe Soviets will face inor do Soviel leaders appear to view reductions in defense *pending as the cure for their economic ills. Instead, Moscow seems lo believeariety of marginal change* in many sector* of ibe economy are needed to reverse the declining trend in economic growth. Thus, while the leaders are unlikely to make major shift* in allocation, some tinkering ai the margin seems feasible Some slowdown in Ihe growth of defense expenditure* could facilitate marginal increases in the growth ofor consumptionime when even smallcould be particularly significani.| |

The trade-off* Between (he growth of defeniend the availability of ecooomic resource* are illut-(ra(ed in gross terms in (he three panel* in (be chart onhe curve* ia ibe first panel were derivedimulation of ihe trade-off between various raies of growth in defense spending0 and the resulting rates of growth of Soviel GNP in the first and second halves of. The curves arc nearly horizontal, indicatinghange in (he growih of

The Soviets' Perceptions of Their Economic Problems

do not knot exactly how the Soviet leaders assessconomic performance and the irade-cdfs between defense and civilian economic activitieshat their economic concepts and measures, which are Marxist in ongtn. differ from those lhatse to assess Soviet economic performance andlightly higher rate of economic growth. Both Soviet and Western figures, however,ersistentin rates of growih. and it Is this trend thai is most worrisome lo Sovietlowdown In growih. however gradual. will make policy choices moreand will increase tensions among rivalThe targets for ihej^lih Five-Vearndicate thai the leaden recognize thai growth will continueecelerate in thefuiurt.

The Soviet leaders have laken note of the fort that growih in consumption It falling and lhat increases in laborkey to keeping economic growth al adequate levels in will he difficult to achieve unless more consumer goods can he made available They also recognize thai their energyare uncertain. Probably ihey hope that oil production can be maintained at current levels or even increased slightly but fear thai the more pessimistic

Western protections may prove lo be right. The leaden also admit that their agricultural problems artand probably foresee another decade of unreliable performance from lhe farm sector.

The Soviet leaden, then, are clearly concernedeconomic future, and they have identdied theareas They have not shown, however,to take radical action In response toThis is probably due principally topersonal identification wiih theand policiesinvolvement lhat makesfor them to accepi extremely pessimisticMoreover, they seem io be optimistic aboutgrowth prospetls. In their view, iheoffer someto lhe laborrite again, albeit less rapidly than in the(assuming ihtir investment strategies arenew energy resources may be available. Theto views pariecent siatement by aacknowl-

edged that the fUwBringaaeiline in growih from the rates achieved inndut confidently predicted belter times for

spending would noi change the growth of GNP by much. Forhangeercentage points would alter the growth of GNP in cither period byittleercentage point. This is because changes in defense spending cannot make up for the dcficicnccs in labor and energy thai the Soviets will face | ]

These calculations, however, probably understate the effects of changes in defense allocations on economic growthgains in the civilian sector thai might resultlowdown in defense programs (These could now from an improved ability io allocate scarceresources or to provide more consumer goods to stimulate the workecond, the model docs not take into account: the impact (hat reduced defense demands would have on specific sectors like machine building and transportation; the improvements that could accompany the release of high-quality labor, machines, and materials for civilian uses: or theeffects thai the removal of bottlenecks in different parti of the economy could have on overall economic performance.^

Nonethclcst. there seems to be noalteraiion in defense expenditures shortajor budget cut thai could maintain the current levels of growih in Soviet GNP. investment, or per capita consumption through.ubstantial increase in the growth of defense spending (for example, doubling the rate

ercent) would reduce the rale of growih in GNP but probably would not. in itself, reduce ii to zero or less. Q

A change in the rate of growth of defense spending would, however, alter (be distribution of economic resources, even if tbe overall rate of economic growth remained largely unchanged. As lhe second panel shows, the defense share ofdetermines the share thai will be lefi over for investment andrange from one-tenth tajme-fourth. depending on the rue of growth of military spending Thus, given the slow rale of growth that we project for the Soviel GNP in, almost any acceleration in the growth of defense spending would have considerable impact on lhe share of economic output available for civilian uscs| |

The most important effeel of changes in the rate of growth of defense spending is that they determine the size of the annual increase in economic resources that civilians can have Thishown in the thirdajor increase is mililary spending could sharplytbe availability of additional capital for(and duringhis capital will be needed to develop ihc infrastructure required to exploitresources in distant areas)ajor defense increase could bring per capita consumption to stagnation oreasurable declineecline would influence popular morale and laborwith serious political and economic consequences. It is conceivable, therefore, that the Soviet leaders could sec some reduction in the growth of defense spending as an attractive elementolicy program, even though its specific contribution to economic growth would be small.

The impact of defense programs is particularly severe in several key sectors of industry (RAD. machine building, and metallurgy, fornd Soviet leaders probably would focus on these areas if political factors led them to make changes in defenseThey know their long-term defense effortthat these sectors continue to grow, and they are aware lhat current defense programs take ahigh share of the sectors' output.

Some Soviet defense production compcies directly with civilian products thai will be critically needed in. These include

Transportation equipment, especially iocomotrves and rolling slock for the overburdened Soviet rail system.

Mining and drilling equipment to exploit rawdeposits.

Modern machine tools to replace obsolescent capital equipment in industry

Materials-hand ling equipmenlree labor for more productive tasks.

Agricultural machinery lo improve productivity in the farm sectorof the most backwardof lhe economy. Q

Many plants produce defense goods sidc-by-sidc with these critical civilianthe defensefirst- -and thus military programs preempt capital equipment and trained Labor from civilian product ior Tanks and railroad cars are produced in the same plants, for example. Increases in production of tanks inere accompanied by declines in ihc ouipul of railcars. Production of armored personnel carriers competes with production of tractors. Naval shipyards produce parts for transportation and agricultural machinery, and ai least one submarine building yard also produces oil pipelines.,

Other military plants, such as most of those for missiles and aircraft, also produce consumer goods. These are generally less important io the economy, however, than the durables manufactured at shipyards and plants for ground forces weapons. These relationships arcin the table on page

In addition to capital and labor, some militaryalso preempt materials that could be used for important civilian products. Military ships and ground force armaments use combinations of materials similar to those needed by industries producing pumps,tools, mining equipment, and construction and transportation machinery. fThe patterns of material inputs supplied to the aircraft and missile industries, on the other hand, are more specialized and do not closely parallel ihosc of any civilian industry.

Tank Plant at Nizhni} Tagil

This tank float Iiajor producer of rail ears. Some of ihe basic manufacturing and subassembly facilities beer art used/or both military and ciltla* production.

patterns of materials use suggest thai resources which ihe centrally planned Sovici economy currently devotes to shipbuilding and production of ground forces armaments could be diverted fairly direcily lo those critical civilian sectors. Moreover, theand ground force weapon industries probably are heavier users of energy and metal than are the aircraft and missile industricsCn

Political Implications of Constraints. The economic slowdownajor political dilemma facing the Current leaders, who must also cope with their uncertain international posilion and Ihe impending

political succession. To protect their international political gains and advance toward further goals, ihey will be strongly motivated to maintain tor eventhe momentum of the nation's military effort. The military planners' views of deficiencies in Soviet forces and of the dynamism of Western defense programs will reinforce lhat motivation, j j

Buichieve even modesl rales of economic growih Ihe Soviets musl rely on increased produciivily, which ihey can only achieve by directing more resouices to investment and consumption. This tension between internal and external goals has the potential to fracture

Weapon Programs in Train

Soviet weapons in ibe field throughill consist primarily of syiicnu already in the forces and those now entering production and in lale stages of development The forces will alsoew systems thai now arche developmeni cycle. Except for these, most of (he systems have already been identified by intelligence, and many of their characteristic* arc known. Even for the systems not yet positivelywe can make judgments about generalon the basis of our knowledge of ihe current Soviet capability in key military technologies.

We estimate thai ihe Soviets currcnily haveayor weapon and supportmilitary aircraft; principal land arms; missiles and miliiary space systems; naval surface combatant, mine warfare, and amphibiou*nd submarines Manyem will continue in production through theoviet weapon production runs tend to be long by Western standards. The average production periodiliiary aircraft, for example, is aboutears andank or armored vehicle aboutean If (he Soviets continue their present practices, tomeofurrent systems being produced would still be in production in ihe^

Our estimates of ibe number and types of systems still in development are leu precise, but weood capability to identify most major Soviet weapon devel-opmeni programs before tbey reach operational status. Our capability varies from category to category:

We can usually identify programs for aircraft, mi*-siles, and spacecraft ai least by the flight testbefore deploymeni.

Because major naval ships arc highly visible andong lime to build, we usually discover them several years before they become operational.

Our record is poorest for ground force weapons, which we sometimes have not identified until ihey were operationally deployed

Wilhin each category, we can usually identify new designs more easily than modified versions of existing systemsj

Soviet Management of New Technology:lass Submarine

mililary development and productionfavors the evolutionary approach to weaponbut in some instances, the Soviets have been able to overcome the bureaucratic inertia and lo develop weapons based on advanced technology. This hasrequired high-level intervention and has typically taken much longer than the normalase in point is lhe development of thehigh-speed, deep-diving ASW submarineitanium hull.

In the. when Khrushchev restructured the Soviel mililary forctsyhe appointed Admiral Sergei Gorshkov as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy wiih instructions to expand ihe role of submarines In the. the Navy tasked the defense industries toubmarine that could be employed against enemy SSBNs, could diveelers. and could cruise atnots At thai lime, the Soviet submarine force consisted almost entirely of dlesel-powered units with depth capabilitiesew hundred feet and speeds af less thannots; ihe first nuclear-powered submarines iwith speeds of up tonots/ were lusl being introduced.

Most of lhe proposed designs for the new submarine were rejected because they were too large, but two reportedlylass torpedo attack submarine andIass cruise missileBoth were high-risk programs incorporating new technology. Onlyss unit was butll, and ihe program evidently was canceledhelass unit was completed9 and began sea trialst encountered serious problems and was cut tnio sections and never reatsembled. Six other units have been launched: four of these are operational or on tea trials.

The Aclass first becamefullyy US standards)ears after theprogram was started. In contrast, the lessrisky submarine programs that began at about ihe samefor the C. V.lasses -took eight toears.lass program is typical of Soviet experiences with advancedll required high-level inlertsiong time, but il did permit lheotorerformance lhat can be Incorporated, with less risk, into future submarines.

We have firm evidence onovieland space ckvxlopmcnt protnmi- *omeof the systems that we expect the Sovietsin the nexiboutre inphase, and past Soviet behavior suggest*all of these will be deployed (Since themore lhanercent of the system* thattesting have beenhemake the decision toeaponduring the test

We believe lhat the Soviets have made commitmentsat leastew systems in the next fewbase this judgment on the identification ofactivityumber of weaponfacilities. Suchuthorized whendecision is made. Productionhave also been made (or will be mademoat of the other systems being tested.

Number of New or Modified Soviet Weapon Systems Deployed

otherr so systems on which we have firm evidence arc in stages of dcvelopmeni before tcsling. We expect most of these to be deployed as well. This evidence on development programs under way, as well as daiaapacity and military requirenicnis for. suggests lhal the Soviets could introduceew or modified major weapon and space systems duringhe chart show* the steadiness of the effort over two decades!

7

into account weapons now in the inventory thatexpect the services to retain through thit decade, those in production whose manufacture is likely to continue, and those now- in testing or doxtopment. we believe lhat we have identified well overerceni of ihe weapon systems that will be in Sovici forcesur KJcniificaiion of theseogether with an understanding of the other factors affecting Soviet miliiary policy, forms the foundation of our projecl ions of the course of Soviet military power in| |

Problems in Projecting

The evidence and analysis outlined aboveumber of themes that are likely to characterize Soviet military forces and policies over the nexiears. Translating these themes into concreteore difficult now than in earlier years because (be economic and political coodibom thaiaffect ihe evolution of Soviet power0 arc unusually complex. To accommodate (hit uncertainty we discuss several possible courses thai the USSR could fcJIerw.!-

The first projection, which we characterizeaseline, is the one most consistent with our current evidence on factors that will influence Soviet military program* and policies for. Although we arc uncertain in some cases about Ihe precise number and characteristics of weapons to be produced (andaboui how much they wille believe lhal we have identified most of the weapons (systems under developrnent, currently in Ihend beinglhat will shape ihe evolution of Soviet miliiary power over ihe nexi decade. This knowledge, plus our

W. atNtviittcnOcnacoaatoatrisis if

- f caseQ

under landing of Soviet decisionmaking and of ihc mililary. political, and economic environment in which it takes place, leads us to believe that Soviet forces and doctrine will develop much as oul lined below

The* may not. We cannot rule out the possibility that Soviet military programs inill differ from our baseline projection because our evidence, though fairly definitive on future weapon systems, is less conclusive in such areas as tbe political succession and is loo general to pinpoint the foreign policyand economic performance in any given year. But it ishese less predictable factors that could make tbe greatest difference in Soviet

To lake these uncertainties into account, we present three alternative projections of the Soviet military posturessumesharp discontinuity in the environment for Soviet military policy will occur in the. All assume the same weapon systems as the baseline, because of the long leadtimes discussed onhe projections differ, however, in lhe sire of the forces, the numbers in which the new systems arc deployed, their rates of production, and the relative emphasis given tomilitary missions.^

That there will be no fundamental changes in the intcmaiiOAa! environment, such as the dissolution of Soviet hegemony in Eastern buropeino-Soviet rapprochement

the successors io Brezhnev will share iheattitudes of the current leaders on the need to maintain massive military power.

That Soviet economic growth will continue tobut without sharp discontinuities such as those that could resulteries of disastrous harvests.

That the internal political environment will no! be so volatile as to destroy the current consensus or.priorities

That the Soviets have correctly projected most of the major Western and Chinese military programs for

That no Soviet technological breakthrough will significantly reduce the development time for new weapons.

ihe Soviets will show the same degree of commiimcnt as in ihc pasi to theirrograms.

Wc treat arms control constraintsariable in describing the range of force alternatives under our baseline pr on.j |

Baseline Projectioa Assumptions

In forming our baseline projection we must relyumber of assumptions that can he deduced from past Soviet behavior and currently available evidence. These assumptions are:

That Soviet leaders will continue to emphasizepowerrincipal asset in international relations

That they continue to base their judgments about military requirementsoctrine that emphasires forces structured to Tight and win future military

conflicts.

That there will be no major changes in thearrangements for Soviet decisionmaking on defense

That the influence of the defense andestablishments in decisionmaking will not diminish significantly.

Projected Military Forces and Systems

The evidence currently available indicates that, under these assumptions, the Soviet policy of balanced force development would continue in, withshifts to redress critical weaknesses and to meet new threats. In particular, we expect emphasis on survi. able strategic attack forces, on strategiceaserforces for the projection of power to distant areas. Demographic problemswill limit increases in force size, but wc expect modernization toapid pace, as new weapon systems enter the forces.f^

We anticipate that total Soviet mililary manpower will increase little in, remaining slightlyillion men. There probably will be some increase in ground combatalong theborder but possibly also in Afghanistan and the western and southern USSR. We expect the number of units opposite NATO to remain fairly stable, barring an agreement on force reductions in Europe We anticipate little change in manpower for other forces.

Soviet Military Manpower Issue* in Ike Eighties

mililary planners will face several manpower-related issues in:

' Demographic trends, markedecline in the size of the draft pool and shifts in its ethnic composition, will make it more difficult for the mililaryprocurement system lo meet the needs of the armed forces.

Continued introduction of advanced weapon systems willreater burden on Soviel mililarythose for the short-term conscripts.

' Sagging civilian labor force growth may createon the military to reduce manning levels.

We believe, however, thai lhe Soviets can deal with these problems.

A decline in the size of the draft pool fromillion9illion9 will require the armed forces to modify their manpower procurement system if ihey wish to maintain current manning levels.planners have several options for adjusting io this decline. Including increases in lhe term of conscripied service, recall of more reservists to active duly,of more career enlisted personnel, and greater use of women and civilians. Although the Soviets are likely to implement some combination of thesethey can most easily meet their manpower needs by extending the term of conscripted service from an average of two years to twoalf.

Increasing numbers of Central Asian minorities will have to be brought into the mainstream of military life as their share of the draft pool rises fromercent9 toercentofactlttaie this process, the Soviets have instituted more rigorous publicprograms, which stress Russian languagefor minorities. While the success of these programs may be limited by continuing racial distrust anddifferences, we believe the gains will allow minorities to continue to function satisfactorily in the armed forces.

The Soviet mililary system is well Suited to deal with problem of maintaining the combat capabilitiesargely conscript force as more advanced weaponare introduced. Several aspects of it protect ihe conscript from the brunt of technological advances In weaponry:

A conservative design philosophy which stresses standardization and reliability of weapons, with few changes from one generation to the next.

Reliance on technically trained Junior officers for complex operations and maintenance tasks.

Emphasis on narrow specialization in conscripts' mililary duties.

Enforcement of rigid, calendar-orientednorms at Ihe unit level.

We expecl thai ihese factors will continue lo allow the Soviets to use relatively unskilled people to operate and maintain the more advanced weapon systems Ihey are deploying.

although the size and manning requirements ofIbices would be affected by limits on strategic arms. | |

Projected Strategic Attack Systems1

judgment that modernization will move rapidly is based on the number and lypes of weapon programs we foresee Someercent or these have been identified from direct evidence of production or development activities. We have postulated Ihe other new systems because we have evidence on the availability ofand production resources and the requirements of Soviet forces. Most of these postulated cases relate to weapons projected for deployment late in the dec-

Strategic Attack Forces. Inhe Soviets will continuetrive:

For counterforce capabilities to attack the silos and bases of US strategic forces.

For flexible capabilities against other military and industrial targets.

igh degree of reliability and survivability for iheir own strategic forces.

Precisely how they will structure their forces willon arms control agreemcntsaswell as on US. NATO, and Chinese programs-P

In general, we expect thai the Soviets will continue the modernization programs now under way for their strategic forces and willariety of options for responding to the actions of potential enemies.esult, they will retain the capability to carry out an effective retaliatory attack. Some of their technicalthose for mobile ICBMs and long-range cruisecomplicate ourof arms control

Evidence of programs currently under way supports our estimate that the Soviets couldumber of new or modified strategic delivery systems by the end of the decade. (The exact number will depend on the limitations imposed by any arms controlor their missile programs, they could chooseumber of payload combinations,ossible maneuvering reentry vehicle for improved accuracy Construction activity under way at major missile plants suggests that the Soviets will increase theof their SSBN force and develop solid-propel-

Medium-size solid-propel-lant ICBM

lmpro>cd wrvji

'ivabitity

lrrtpro.edSS-ITlCBM-

row "tight, and accuracy.

Upgradediih better accuracy.

Small solid-propcllant ICBM'

ar lhat -as tested but never deployed) Probably would be deployed on mobile launcher*

ImprovedCBM

ImprcedSS-lSICBM

Upgraded version ofccuracy.

ImprovedLBM

Upgraded version of SS-ll -tiem proved accuracy.

Improved accuracy and payload: deployed- and Dll-dus SSBN*

M

ImprovedS SLBM

Long-range SLBM -tti rrmltipfe independently largctaolc reeairyand better accuracy;on new submarine withaunchers.

Improved accuracy; deployedIUIastSSBNi.

New long-range

ImprovedSS-NX-.OSLBM Miltipte-RVmdaingle-ftVwiih improved accuracy.

ir-launcbed

aircraft to carry' cruise missiles.

Probably mil hast versions wiih both iriviiy bombs and air-launched cruise misides

Based on past Soviet praeiicc. and on Ihe availability of design

eeipeet tbe Soviets to improve, modify, or possibly

replace some of these systems during.

'Coald be deployedingle reentry vehicle to replaces

or -ltr, MIRVs to replacend possibly

< Probably would be deployed only if mcdium-Mce sohd-propeHani

ICBM is fielded wtihoui MIRVs

Under SALT II. th* Soviets wockJ have to choose between thii missile and ihe medium-lire solid-propcllaiu ICBM.

Wrie-bodycrniie missile aircraft

.ill

HI II

J.

missiles ibai could be deployed on mobile(Mobile ICBM) are difficult to count with high confidence, and their deployment would complicate the monitoring of limitations on the number ofdelivery vehicles if]

We also expect Ihe Soviets to introduce in lheheir first intercontinental attack bomber since. Wc have evidence that two or three such aircraft arc undci development; they probably will carry both bombs and air-launched cruise missiles. Even so, bombers will stillelatively small pari of the strategic attack force. We also believe that the Soviets arc workingong-range submarine-launched cruise missile iha: mightiraicgic

The size of the Sovietack, force will depend on the presence or absence of arms control constraints;

The record of ihcir attitudes toward arms control indicates that they will pursue strategic programs to thelim;tsofany treaty restrictions.

SALT constraints, the Soviets probably would feel greater uncertainty as to US actions and seek greater safety from surprises by retaining older systems, deploying more warheads on their ICBMs, and fielding land-mobile siraicgic systcms.| |

Given the wide range of Soviet options, andabout treaty constraints, we can at best bound the size of Soviet siraicgic forces under varying assunsptirjns. If wc assume levels of effort consistent with past trends, our analysis suggests thai

strategic forces would havevehicles if constrained by SALT II limits and upf unconstrained. (Larger increases arebut unlikely for technical and economic

The number of individual weapons and warheads in ihe force would continue to increase in any event, under SALT II it could double from its present level of, and without any limitations it could nearly Quadruple.

The number of weapons deployed on highly survivable deliveryICBMs andincrease even more rapidly than the total number Reentry vehicles on SLBMs andICBMs could increase from about one-fifth of total missile weapons (at present) to more than one-ihird. Moreover, Soviet ballistic missile submarines introduced inay be quieter than the current ones, thus eroding the capabilities ofacoustic ASW surveillance systems undthe survivability of (he SLBMs.

MlRYcd

The average accuracy of ibejScoicii ICBM force could improve|

esult of this improvement in accuracy, lhe number of weapons suitable for use against hard targets could increase from its present level ofonder SALTon what payload options are chosen) and to as manyQO without limitations | |

With these forces, lhe Soviets would improve their war-fighting capabilities They would maintain ortheir already substantial lead over the United States in equivalent mega tonnage The deployment of increasingly accurate ICBM weapons would increase the threat to US ICBM launchers in Ihc; and the Soviet ICBM force, with or without SALT, would have the theoretical potential lo destroy the bulk of US land-based ICBM reentry vehicles throughout the decade. (Soviet SLBMs probably will not have hard target capabilities in the IggOs-f^

]

Despite these improvements, US air- and sea-launched strategic weapons, together with such ICBM weapons asoviet attack, couldarge percentage of Soviet mililary and economic targets and population even during the earlyperiod when US ICBMs will be most vulnerable. Thisforce will probably inhibit the Soviets from deliberatelyuclear

r

Projected Soviel .Strategic Attack Forcei

Dclintr Vthidn

. hi.

1M0 C SALT High No SALT

slow.

iCBw.

tfT57T

o

1

if,ttack"

0

DM

s.ooo

iobo iaoo 0 ibim

SALllov. SALT High ho SALT

w

il

7-

Typhoon Ballistic Missile Submarine

tie Ant submenu of ikU clasi war launched0 II If larmr than iht US OhHKtns ITrldemtarit,aunthtriew bollislic miiiilr thai ii now bfing mini, andprchably will be wfttr ihat current Sarin hallinit mistile submarine!.

If lheystem is deployed. Soviel ICBMs will be increasingly vulnerable io atlack in lhe. Even during this period of peak vulnerability, however, the Soviets could expect many ICBM or SLBM weapons toS attack-enough to destroyoercent of US economic or military targetsetaliatory strike]

Strategic Defense Forces. Wc expect the Soviets to pay more attention to strategic defense in the comingwith substantial modernization of forces foragainst aircraft, missiles, satellites, andThe improvement in air defenses will increase the risk to bombers attempting to penetrate Soviet airspace at all altitudes, but will be less effective againsl cruise missiles. The ABM network around Moscow probably will be upgraded to improve defenseight or accidental attack. (ABM capabilitiesarge-scale attack, however, will remainork on antisaiellite systems will continue, and by the end of the decade the Soviets could be able to destroy satellites in high orbits. We foresee noimprovements in ASW capabilities^

Continuing efforts in civil defense shelter construction will improve protection for the leaders and essential work force, but the general copulation will remain dependent on evacuation. Despite their growingand defensive capabilities, duringhe Soviets could notS retaliatory nuclear attack from causing tens of millions of casualties and the massive destruction of urban-industrial andfacilities in the

We expect the number of SAM launchers to decline over the nextears as the Soviets phase oul their older sysicms. But lhe overall effectiveness of thcSAMagainsl low-altiiudcincrease withof thehis systemetter capability than earlier SAMs to track and engage several targets at once and will be somewhat more effective against low-flying aircraft. Wc project the introduction in theodified version of lheith better capabilities against low-flying aircraft and with some capability to engage cruise missiles.c expect about one-third of Soviet strategic SAM launchers to be for the SA-r iis modified version (scechari on page 8C

Projected Systems for Strategic Air and Missile Defense '

Systran

SA-IOSAM

Improved target - ndlingaod better ability to engage aircraft approaching at lo* ah

Modiried Foxbat interceptor Capability to detect, track, md

Hack targetsa nil tides

New airborne warning and Improved detection of airlow-altitude largcti) and

control of interceptor,.

New balliitic missile early Will expand il* coverage andlnc tracking ability of the

Soviets* early warning ntlworfc.

Modified SA-IOSAM

Mid-mot

Two i

interceptors

Improved capability against lowaircraft; increased capability against

Improved ABM system

Better capability than curreai iniev-ceptorj lo engage targets at lower

New ballistic missile early warning radar

Upgrading aod expansion of tbe Masco- ABM systemaunchers and an additional ABM radar, deployment of tooigh-acceleration missile thai can engage targets after they bate reentered the earth's atmosphere.

PcMible ground-based laser air defease system

Single system could both track and destroy targets, probably effective only at short range and could be deployed, during thit period, only in small numbers.

Improved target discrimination and tracking; will close ciuung gaps in ceptoradar that can look down into duller to detect and track targets flying below it (UShave had this capability since thend other NATO countries willy tbe

In the, the Soviets are likelyeploy two new interceptor aircraft (now being tested) thatwill have improved low-altitude capabililies. They arc also likely to modify other aircraft in the strategic defense force and introduce several news much as three-fourths of theforce probably will have at least some capability against low-altitude attackers.

In addition, we expectew airborne warning and control aircraft that is now being tested will bein Ibe next year or two. This aircraft will be able to track targets ai tow altitude over land or water; as many asight be deployedroviding continuous surveillancerisis of ihe main ovcrwaier approaches lo ihe Soviet Union.j

Recent activities at ABM facilities near Moscowmore interest in defense against ballistic mis-siVca than at any time since the, when ihe Soviets began deploying their current ABM defenses These activities, together with informaiion on research and development programs related lo missile defense, suggest thai ihe Soviets are upgrading and possibly expanding their ABM network. We expect them to deploy several new early warning radars, and they currently are constructing silo launchers as well as another new radar ihai may have target tracking, missile guidance, and battle management capabilities.

It is possible lhal the Soviets will field components of iheystem, which is now undergoingtesting This system (unlike the currentat Moaccrw) will be able to track and engage urgcts well within the atmosphere, after peisetrauoe aids and other extraneous objects have been stripped away by the atmosphere during reentry)

i 1

A new ABM system around Moscow could improve the effectiveness of Sovici defenses against light USmissile attacks or attacks by third couniries against

Seer

Projected Sonet Strategic Air Defense Forces

Surfacc-te--Aituncliort

city.aunchcr timir. imposed by ihc ABM Treaty would severely hamper tbe capabilities of the systemarge-scale US attack. But theof the Moscow ABM system would place the Sovietsetter position to expand their ballistic missile defenses beyond Moscow should they decide to do so in the future. (The possibility of expansion of the ABM network is discussed on page

altitudes in synchronous and semisyrsehronousmany important US satellites

We expect the Soviets to continue their developmental effort in advanced technologies for air. missile, and space defense. They may nowround-based laser capable of damaging some satellite sensors, and there is some evidencerogram topace-based laser weapon that might be used againstThe Soviets might also,uccessful high-priority effort,ew ground-based laser air-defense weapons in the. They evidently are investigating the feasibilityaser weapon for defense against ballistic missiles and of panicle beam weapons for air defense. Such weapons probably couid not be deployed in ihis decade .[

A New ABM Radar Under Corslructjon Near Moscow

i tit'aaa,argtit nmulia-neouily ikon both of tht txUUnt Moxow batllt-manatmtni radon can bandit tagtibt'.

Antisubmarine warfare willigh-priority concern of Soviet planners over the nextears, as they attempt lo repair their weaknesses in ASW against Western (and. in the future, Chinese| missile submarines and to protect their own forces against submarine attack. Duringe expect that emphasis on nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) will increase. The Soviets regard SSNs as the most effective ASW platforms. They probably will construct four or five annually throughnd

might add another one or two each year by converting ballistic missile submarines if ihey were required to decommission them under SALT constraints. By ihe end of the decade, ihe Soviets could have moreSSNs| |

f

number of large surface combatants probably will remain about the same over the neatut the new ships introduced will have improved ASW sensors ande know, for example, thai Ihe Soviets are working on at least two improved ASWbe number of long-range fixed-wing ASW aircraft probably will increase from theo.ew sbipborne ASW helicopter probably will beimroduced in the early

We anticipate continued improvemem inf Soviel sensors for submarine deteciion. For ihe most pari ihe Soviets will make marginal improvemems in ihe types of sensors (primarily acoustic) currently available, and their detection capabililies will continue to lag behind those of the United Stoics. But they probably will also iniroduce several new types By ihehey could deploy lowed acoustic arrays, for example, and by thehey may beginlonger range acoustic sensors moored or suspended above ihe ocean floor. It is also possible that late in this decade they -ill introduce several new nonacoustic ASW sensors: an airborne laser search system and systems for detecting ihe wakeassing submarine

Despite these developments, we expect littlein Soviet capabilities to detect and track ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean, indeed, ihein US SSBN operating areas accompanying deployment of ihe Trident sysiem will exacerbate ihe Soviet weakness in defense against ballistic missile submarincs.j j

n

We believe that Ihe Soviets will continue lotheir miliiary programs for strategic defenseationwide civil defense effort. Our data are too tenuous to forecast the precise number or capacity of civil defense shelters lhal might be available by (he end of, but an expansion of about SO percent in shelter capacity is consistent with the availableThis and other improvements in civil defense planning and preparations would increasearge percentage of the leaders and tbe essential work force coulduck

Set juaew fatiire (eaetal

Expected increases in ihe Soviel urban population, however, as well as planned improvements in US strategic forces, would more than offset ihe increase in shelter capacity, so thai tbe Soviets might expect an even larger number of casualties from an attack in thehan from one today Moreover.* foresee any ssgnifieant irrirjroverneni in ibe abalily of ihe Soviets to protect tbeir economic facilitiesuclear strike] "|

Ground Forces and Tactical Air Fcrcei. We expect little expansion of conventional ground and fixed-wing theater air forces in this decade, bui continued quati-laiivc upgrading of both, as well as formation of new combai helicopter unils. primarily for ground attack. The number of ground force divisions probably will increase only slightly from its current tola! ofnd the number of fixed-wing tactical combai aircraft probably will remainOO. We expect an increase of aboulercent in ihe number ofto.

The principal thernes in Soviet development of theater forces inre likely to include:

Widespread deployment of lank* with advancedthat affords good protection against current NATO antitank weapons

Introduction of improved air defense systems that will increase ihe ability of ground force units to engage multiple targets and low-alliiude attackers.

Increases in firepower through organizational changes and the iniroduciion of weapons with higher rales of fire and improved munitions.

Deployment of advanced fighters (wiih improved capabilities for low-altitude intercept) that willground force air defenses and enhance Soviet capabiiities to establish air luperiority.

Introduction of new ground attack aircraft andhdKxspters with increased ranges and payloads and more accurate munitions, which will improve tbe capability of tactical aviation to attack point urgeti and to support ground force operations f

Se+ti

Sy.ten

Early Itm

urface-to-air missile

ink

New towed acd self-propelled gun* and mortars

rmy. and front-level turf.ee- to-air missile

Helibcne antiunk mtttile

MU-IMBt

Follow-on0 lank

New armored personnel carriers

Follow-on tontiaircraft gmn

New surface-to-air missile

Medium-range di-iuonalunproved capability toutgeis.

Slightly2 and mugi-vally improved incapahitiiv

Improved mobility and rales ofbe capable of firinashells.

Improved capability lo engagelargels al king ranges: possible limited capability against short-range Ballistic mimlea.

Improved accuracy, more effective warhead

Probably will incorporate mayorin armor protection. firepower, and mob-lily.

Improved mobility: protection ol personnel enabling them lo operate

in Mih: environ mcnt.

Longer range and larger caliber

improvM cspab In. n;ttitmCt urjets

withnd some of Ihe firsi-line units in Eastern Europe probably will have Ihe more modern tankJ_

We expect the Soviets lo upgrade division air defenses by continuing to deploy theAM andthehese systems will increase the range al which divisions can engage air targets, iheir ability lo track multiple targets simultaneously, and the number of launch rails available We also expect the(at the front and army level) of an advanced long-range tactical air defense system that we designatehis system could be effective against high-performance aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles like the US Ijnce. We know the Soviets are working on another system to intercept lactical ballistic missiles, but we cannoi confidently project its deployment-depending on its characteristics, il could be prohibited under the ABM

Divisional firepower will continue to increase as deployment of the newer self-propelled artillery pieces continues and as more advanced guns and rocket launchers are deployed. We also expect the forces to receive improved conventionalas fuel-air explosives and clusterwill increase the lethality of their weapons.Q

The Soviets will probably reorganize the Ground Forces divisions to make them more heavily armed, mobile, and self-sufficient than current units, bui we are uncertain about the details. In their tank and motorized rifle divisions, ihe Soviets have beenwith new structures which improve theof tank regiments for combined operations of armor, infaniry. and artillery and which increaseAt least some organizational changes have taken place in aboutivisions. If the use of these new structures is expanded, the manpower, number of weapons, and firepower in divisions will continue lo increasej

We know of several new aircraft that are likely to be deployed with Fronial Aviation in thisarge new fightermall one probably will enter service in the. We expect thai ihey will havecapabilities against targets at low altitudes and will be better suited than current aircraft for close-in maneuvering combai. By the end of ihe decade, ihese

Projected Improvements in First-Line Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions

VVcapomirst-Line Motorlicd Rifle Division

irst-Line Meiorired Rifle Diiision'

Meinc Ion a

m. de'wj'ile fit

.

aircraft could make up about three-fifths of thenterceptors we project j 1

The Soviets have also tested an aircraft designedsupport of groundfirst Sovietspecifically designed for this role inhoto on. Deployment of this aircraftto begin soon. We anticipate twoattack aircraft programs: one for aof the Fencer and the otherew(orariant of the small newreplace FJoggcr and Fitter fighter-bombers. Inthe Soviets will introduce new weapons,one or more new tactical air-tc-surface

We expect the Soviet fixed-wing ground attack force to have increased in size only slightlyut these three new aircraft could make up nearlyercent of Ihe total. Some of the new ground attack aircraft probably will be modified for reconnaissance roles, and by the end of the decade they could account for nearly halfactical reconnaissance force ofircrafi{_

These fixed-wing aircraft programs will improvecapabilities to achieve air superiority in theater war and to destroy targets on the ground. Wea continuing increase in the range and payload capabilities of Frontal Aviation. Moreover, thedeployment of advanced ground attack aircraft with better avionics and precision weapons willthe ability of the force to destroy point or area targets with the same payload weight (see chart on

Projected Tactical Aviation Aircraft

Sosiet Ground Attack Aircraft

fighter-bom perNew atlack helicopter

Increirxsul improvement inuck capabilities.

Incremental improvementir support capaWities.

Could be used foe delivery of nuclear weapons.

alrxrafl has bm icsleJ by Soviet fonts In Aflhaeluan

expect continued expansion of tbe Soviet attack helicopterew version of the Hind, which represents an incremental implement osC: litecurrently in the force, is now being tested. An entirely new helicopter,ore substantialin weapon delivery capabilities, could be fielded in the 1

The Soviets probably will slightly expand their force of support helicopters, by increasing the number of Hip medium-lift helicopters and by beginning in the next year or two to deploy lhe new Halo heavy-tifiwhich has twice the payload capability of the currenthis will improve the Soviet potential to transport weapons and equipment for rapidly advancing ground forced )

Thiaitr Sac tear Forces. The fixed-wing aircraftprojected for Soviet tactical ami ion forces,is other new systems, will improve Sovietfor theater nuclear war. Unless offset byor by arms control agreements, thesewill further erode NATO's theaterand the effectivenesshreat ofwareterrent to conventional attack*Warsaw Pact.)

The Soviet programs lhat we have identified include nuclear delivery systems for employment at various distances, from short-range artillery systems to long-range missiles and aircraft based in the USSR The new systems will be more accurate than theirsome of tbe short-range missiles, for example, may eventually have terminal guidance systems. With this accuracy the Soviets can attack iheater targets

Projected Soviet Tactical Aviation Forces

weapons of lower yields, reducing damage to surrounding areas thai they might want to preserve, and can use nuclear weapons close to friendly troops.

n

The new nuclear delivery systems will have better reaction times, giving the Soviets greater confidence that they can launch preemptive strikes before enemy forces canarge-scale atlack. Finally, short-and medium-range theater nuclear weapons (ihosc with ranges of lessm) will increase both in absolute number and in ihcir share of the total delivery systems. This will give the Soviets more flexibility inuclear war innd confining it to non-Soviet territoryj |

In the, the Sovieis introduced lhehori-rangc ballistic missile (SRBM) to augment or replace the older FROG series of weapons. Thehich offers greater range and better accuracy than the FROG, has been fielded in limited numbers io dale, but we expect more widespread deployment soon. In addition to thehe Sovieis have developed another SRBMonger range, thehich they may be fielding. They are working on yet another short-range missile lhat could be deployed later in the decade. They have already introduced theore accurate replacement formcaleboard. By ihe, theinveniory of battlefield SRBM launchers could increase by as much asercent, to. []

The Ground Forces are continuing to receive heavy artillery brigades equipped with nuclear-capable guns and mortars. By the. Ihc total number of

such artillery pieces could increase as much aserceni. to. The Soviets may have introduced nuclear landmines, and they might augment their theater nuclear delivery systems by deploying nuclear warheads for tactical surface-to-air missiles. (Some SAMs for strategic defense already have nuclearj Tbey have the capability to develop andneutron-enhanced radiation weapons, but we do not know if they will do so.

We aniicipate lhat the number of long-range theater nuclear delivery vehicles based in the USSR willto less0 The Soviets will continue, however, to upgrade inequality of peripheral strike forces. We expect them to continue deploying theRBM for another year or two. until they haveobile launchers. An improvedith belter acewracy and reliability, probably will begin to replace the earlier version in the nexi few years. (While ihey deployaunchers, ihe Soviets couldumber of launchers for olderedium-range mtuilesl 1

The Soviets will also modernize Iheir force ofattack bombers by deploying (he Backfire and possibly (depending on SALT corutrainu) equipping ilong-range cruise missile We expect ibe total number of peripheral bombers in Long Range Aviaiion to decline lo lessircraft by the end off Ihcm will be stationed oppositemong. there probably will bethan three limes as many as are deployed at present

We expcci the Soviets io phase out their forcelass dicsel-powered ballistic missile submarines by the end of tbe decade By deploying or- SSBNs carrying MIRVed missiles, however, tbey will increase ihe number of submarine-launched warheads and improve the capability of ihe missile submarine force lo attack targets in Europe and Asia as well as in the United Slates 1 |

The new weapon systems to be introduced inill give the Soviets greater flexibility in employing nuclear weapons at the theater level, and we expect them to explore new options. Since ibe* Soviet concepts of escalation and theater warfare have become more flexible, and we expect this tiend lo

continue inn Ihe coming years, the Soviets will continue to evaluate new strategies for limited or selective initial use of nuclear weapons and control of escalation, including further reducing reliance ondelivery systems based in ihe USSR. Bui ihey probably will remain doubtful lhat escalation lo wide-spread nuclear war can be prevented. |

Central Purpose Vara/ Fortes The major themes in development of naval forces inill beemphasis on open-ocean forces and on deploying air power to sea. New programs will strengthen the air defenses of Soviel ships, as well as Iheir antisbipand iheir ability lo operate at sea forperiods. ASW willajor weakness, bul new Soviet submarines will be more difficult to delect, reducing the West's ASW advantage, {aa.

In overall size, ihe general purpose navy probably will not increase, and it may even decline slightly over Ihe decade. In force structure, however, the changes lhat have characterized its development in the Brezhnev era are likely to continue. The number of naval aircraft (especially ihose deployed on shipsj probably willThe number of large surface combatantswill remain fairly stable; virtually all will carry missileshe submarine force and ihe force of

small surface combaunu will improve in quality, though each rxooably will decline slightly in number of units.q

The principal tasks thai have spurred the development of Soviet Naval Aviation in theat enemy ships, reconnaissance, andbe the principal determinants of force structure in. Weincreasing emphasis on open-ocean ASW.as well as an expansion in the deployment of shipborne tactical aircraft as new and larger aircraft carriers are build

Projected General Purpose Naval Ships and Aircraft

My mm

Fi-cncaurface comtsttsnisfiaeiudint; Ihe Timsurface warship)

ontinuing increase in tbe number of naval aircraft, especially ASW aircraft and shipborne fighters. Naval Aviation's force of antiship strikeprobably will decline slightly in iiic; more than half of it probably will be naval Backfire aircraft intended for attacks against surface ships in tbe open

Wcumerical decrease in the Navy'sforce, as older Bear. Blinder, and Badger aircraft are phased out and replacedew. long-range reconnaissance aircraft with improved range and sensors. We also anticipate introductionew shipborne reconnaissancehe. Weontinuing increase in the number of aircraft for antisubmarine warfare, with thein the next year or so of an improved ASW helicopter, continued production of theong-range ASW aircraft, and the mi reduction in theew long-range aircraft^ )

The component of Naval Aviation due for the greatest change is probably the shipborne fighters. As lhe third and fourth Kiev-class aircraft carriers enter the force, the Soviets will coniinue deploying ihe Forger vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft; tbey probably will intradnce an improved VSTOL aircraft in Ihe

More significant is our evidence of Soviet activities that suggest the developmentew aircraft carrier.hip could behend probably would have nuclear power. It could carry standard fighter or attack aircraft (probably variantsactical aviation aircraft) thai would have much greater, ranges and payloads than the current VSTOL

Improved tensors

New cruise nnauw auSmanre

Ne- ASW helicopie

ASWerth

mi-im*

Ne- times al mill iabnjii.se*

and

Ne. toc-raaee rued, aircraft

r.rnBihijarry itandafdaircraft

New reeonr.aiit.iM iviicopie.-

ASW

w-Jurance. and ASW aeasort

Nuclear-cowered aircraft ise-utaur aircraft

Nc

ar ranee: improved weapons and msn.es

ill

lasproaed raiw* tod

Improved VSTOL aircraft for use on Km-claat earners

Second ciasa ol auckar-pow.^d

1 TaB lack luuhe pr^optl slupi aad airaafi projected

fighters Deployment of this ship would improve the capabilities of tbe Soviet Navy to protect its surface ships against air attack and to project air power away from Soviel shores]^

In addition lo lhe new aircraft carrier, the Soviets are workingumber of other programs for surface combatant ships Tbey are currently corwructing four new classes of cruisers, including their first nuclear-powered surface combatant, ihe Kirov-class cruiser Two of these classes probably will carry new cruise missiles (intended to improve Soviet capabilities against enemy surface ships thai carry short-range

1lasi Nuclear-Powered Submarine

This mew SSGN eariitlmitheri for ihtiorrr- raw emUr mteiitt.

and missile defense systems) as well asmissiles,aval version of theof the cruiser classes has medium-calibersuitable for antiship warfare and the support

A programew frigate is under way. and we project constructionecond, smaller class ofcruisers, beginning in the. As these and other programs are pursued, the proportion of ships armed with missiles will continue io increase. Thus, although we expect the number of large surface combatants to remain fairly stable, all of the force in

1

1 Projected Amphihinuvransport Aircraft

lank Undine thip

carryoop* on distant dtpkwnwnt.

heavy transport aircraft

capacity umilar to thai

-II Si

medium-isflee tactical Irani* peel aircraft

tiaaapori for (heuiei notations.

1

the capability to provide air support in distant areas But the Sovieis will not have enough carriers toontinuous presence tn distant areas inhere probably will be some improvement in tbe Soviel Navy's capability for amphitWus assault aad in tbe airlift capabilittct of transport aircraft. Q

We expect thai power projection programs willto rank behind strategic and general purpose theater programs in Soviet mililary priorities for this decade. But thc programs ofould set the stage for further developmentong-range power projection capability tn

The Soviets will complete thc second landing ship of thc Ivan Rogov class and may build one or two more They mayew dais of lank landing ship in thcnd could have as many asy the end of the decade. If all or these programs are completed, thc theoretical capability of Soviet amphibious ships to lift Naval Infantry forces to distant areas wouldby aboutercent, to nearly nine regiments0 men and theirn practice, the capability of the force would be less, because not ail ships would be ready for operations and some would be engaged in other

The Sovietseir capability for scalift of troops io distant areas by using merchantbey arc improving thc potential of the merchant marine to undertake military wpport operations by acquiring shins with Klf-coniained advanced cargo-

Stat)

Projected Soviel Sealift and Airlift Forces

an act of Nival Aia-hlbiou* Ship*

rhooeird memo ton*

Daily Toi-MHe Capability of Trim port Aircraft'

Million ton-milaa

systems. These can discharge mechanized equipment more rapidly than conventional merchant ships, and some can do it almost as rapidly aswarfare ships

The lift capacity of Soviet Miliiary Transport Aviation probably will continue to increase as the force acquires moreeavy transports in the. The daily ion-mile capability of ihe force, for example, could increase byoercent. Even with this increase, however, it would remain less than half of0 US capability. Moreover, ihe increase inprobably will not keep pace with the needs of the airborne forces, as they receive more and heavier equipment. Late in the decade, the Soviets maya follow-on to theedium-range tactical transport or equip some of their transports for aerial refueUnj"

The Soviets are reportedly workingarge, long-range transport, similar in size to ihe US CSA. This program is apparently behind schedule, reportedlycf difficulty inuitable engine, and it does not appear to haveigh priority. If the technical problems are solved soon- ihe Soviets could introduce the new long-range transport in thend could haveoy the end of the decade. This would give them an airlift capability0 about three-fourths lhat of US forces today. q

Satellites and Command and Control Systems. We believe that ihe Soviets will continue to use andvirtually ail their current types of militarysysiems throughnd will introduce many new sysiems as well. They mayew military space station andontinually manned complex of several stations. Like previous

miliiary space stations, we expect ihe new ones lo carry photographic and electronic intelligence

The Soviets arcmall, reusable "space plane" lhal coulderry vehicle for space stations oreconnaissance or satellite inspection role. During, they apparently intend to make considerably more use of satellites in high-altitude orbits for communications, meteorology, andWe also expeet the Soviets to launch:

Advanced photographic reconnaissance systems capable of transmitting data to ground bases electronically.

Improved radar systems for ocean reconnaissance.

Improved high-altitude electronic intelligence sys-terns!"- |

In thehe Soviets probably will be able to complete their launch-detection satellite network to provide greater reliability for their existing continuous coverage of US ICBM complexes. This would give them greater confidence that they couldassive flight of their own ICBMs on receipt of warning that an ICBM attack was under way from North America and before its impact. The Soviets probably will not, however, achieve similar coverage of SLBM launch areas in this decade j J

We expect the trend toward more centralizedsystems to continue over. Io addition lo new communications systems based on satellites, the Soviets probably will continue to emphasize mobility for their com munica lions equipment and to make greater use of computers aod data linkfor the control of forces. They probably will also continue their policy of deploying the samesystems to all ofthc military

Projected Doctrine, Srralegy. and Operations

The new weapon systems and capabilities that Soviet forces will develop in this decade will give Soviet leaders increased flexibility in the employment of their military power We have little direct information about how ihe new flexibility will affect their strategics for using their forces. However, on ihe basis of recent Soviet writings, trends we have observed in theof doctrine, and the characteristics of fulure Soviet weapons, we can draw some inferences as to

Soviet intentions for wartime and peacetime use of their forces, j

We expect thai the Soviets will continue to emphasize counterforce strikes in intercontinental and theater operations:

For strategic forces, this means ihey will target weapons againsi enemy intercontinental deliveryand the elements, particularly command and control facilities, lhat support those systems.

For general purpose naval and air forces, thetargets in the early stagesar will continue lo be enemy theater nuclear weapons.

They will work to improve capabilities for launching their strategic forces on tactical

Projecled Military Space Systems

System Comment

ItSOi

plane"

spacecraft far resupply

support of space nations or for

rocteoroiigi-

coveragerge

sateUiie

pMofeoonnainancc

of transmitting stored data

ground statical

of launch deiee-

provide ccrnanuow and reli-

satellite system

coverage of US ICBM

electronic

provide nearly continuous cov-

(ELINT) sat-

of targe areas

eed satellite naviga-

contmuous, accurate position-

system

of land, sea, and air forces.

recon-

provide nearly instantaneous

system

of data lo ground

radar ocean

cawbUlty to provide

satellite

instantaneous targeting

Thc Soviets ire thinking about ways touclear war. They probably will experiment wiih ways to con-trol or manage escalation from conventional to nuclear war. including:

Improving the iheaicr nuclear capabilities andof forces deployed outside ihe USSR.

Possibly examining options for thc selective use of strategic forces |

Il also appears thai ihc Soviets are seriouslythe prospect of protracted intercontinental nuclear operations We believe they have contingency plans for such an eventuality and lhat prc*.pective imrraemcnis will be designed to improve lhe performance of iheir forces under conditions thai would exist after an initial siraicgic nuclear exchange.^

More attention will be given to developing forcesrotracted conventional conflict andeveloping forces and tactics suitable for waging local wars. The Soviets probably will alsoigh level of military activity in ihc Third World to achieve both military and political goals. They probably will stress military aid and advisers, but thc further expansion of asd and advisory programs will be influenced both by the attitude of clients and tbe condition of the world market. If past trends continue, thc Soviets may be more willing to use their own forces instead ofin combat roles in the Third World.Q

We expect Soviet naval ships to continue to make several hundred port calls in the Third World each year and. as lhe decade progresses, lo employsophisticated ships in this rote. Tbe overall pace of operalions of Soviet general purpose naval forces probably will fluctuate around its current level.

Military:

To carry oul lhe mililary programs described in our baseline proicction. the Soviets will have to increase defense expenditures in real terms throughout. Thc evidence currently available indicates that they are prepared to do this:

The number of Soviet weapon systems in production and the production rates of major weapons arc at high levels that are consistent with past trends.

SccAi

number of weapon systems in flight (cm andindicator of the lysicms that are likely to enter production in the next fewremains ai the historic level.

Capital construction is under wayumber of keyacilities and production plants in preparation fur the development aod production of other new weapons farther down the road

The addition of men and equipment to the Soviet forces is continuing, althoughore moderate pace than in.

The Soviets have published targets for their next five-year plan for total ecorsomic growth and for its civilian components (investment andhich leave ample room" for continued growth in defense spcnding.| |

The precise rate of increase is difficult to predict.of the costs aiaociilcd with thesuggests that the rate could4 to lessercent per

The higher figure reflects Ihe estimated cost of the forces we project assuming the absence of SALTand assuminge Soviets do not cut back the support structure of their armedercent rate of growth wouldontinuation of past trends and consistent with our evidence onand production activities.[ [

Toe lower figure reflects the estimated cost of these same forces if we assume that, as economic growth slows, the Soviel leaders will have an increasingthroughouto reduce ihe growth of defense spending. They could reduce the growih of military expenditures byercentage points if they took advantage of ihe potential savingsALT II agreement (or another agreementomparable impact on ihe size of strategic forces and ihe introduction of new systems) and made otheradjustments in planned miliiary programs These adjustments could include

Curtailing some weapon programs that arc near the end of their production runs. This would permit the temporary transfer of some resources to civilian

production, but retain the option of further force modernisation through follow-on programs.

' Culling back or eliminating some support programs, such as those for naval auxiliary ships and transport aircraft, and increasing the use of merchant ships or civil aircraft to support military operations.

out some weapon procurement programs and slipping the lime Khedule for forceslightly

to improve analysis of alternative future military forces, efficiency in the defense industries, and economy in ihe use of supplies by ibe military

the forces to improve efficiency and reduce or eliminate duplication in missions.

therograms more closely and possibly culling back some marginal activities, j

These adjustments could be risky from the point of viewonservative Sovief military planner, and probably would be opposed by powerful defense and defense-industrial interests Nevertheless, if pressed, the Soviet military leaders could make alteraiions that would not significantly affect the ability of the forces io carry out iheir most important missions in

If the Soviets made these changes, they could spread them out among the military services and missions and thus minimize their impact on ihe size and overall rate of modernization of the forces. (For example, they would not haveorgo any of the mayor weapon programs discussed in the baselineome instances theyon tbe magnitude of theto slip some of their force modernizationhis is because the Soviets arc already investing so much in militarythat merely continuing procurement at thelevel would ensure an increase in their stocks of military equipment and theof their mill-tary capabilities

Soviet defense expenditures were lo increase atper year, the military share ofand ofeconomic growth dinder.di.ercent, tbe military sharewould remain about the same as at present.dollar cost of all Soviet militarytheeriod, under theiiiiLwould be on the order ofrillion

Altrrnatiie Projection* Options and Disconlintiilies

If we alter some of the assumptions that underlie Ihe baseline projection, future trends in Soviel miliiary policies might be considerably different. We therefore present in this section three alternative projections, two high and one kowj^

To place realistic bounds on the alternatives, we have examined trends in Soviet defense expenditures over ihe paslears and chosen the periods of the most rapid sustained growth and Ihe largest absoluteto represent the limits of Soviet options These periods were:

The, when the rapid buildup of strategic forces and space programs caused defenselo increaseeal average annual rate of growih nearly twice that exhibited in.

Tbe, when lv^Tisbcbevs restructuring of military forces sent expenditures on current forces downear. (Tbe resources saved, however, were shifted to build upnd production facilities.)|

On the basis of these precedents, we assume forigh projections that growth in Soviet rnjliury spend-ing increases to almost double lhat in the baseline projection and for our single low projection lhat the level of real military spending is reducederceni per year (see chart on page

We consider both of these extreme assumptions un-

kelj rhe gfc alternat ies woulderous risk of disruption to economic and political relationships within the USSR The low alternative, on the other hand, would entail serious political and miliiary risks

outside iheprobably would be opposed by powerful military and defense-industrial leaders and organialions. But these projections, howeverpermit us to explore what might follow if the Soviets adopted inome variantilitary program thatrecedent in recent hisioryj |

We discuss below the high projection tn which the increased effort is channeled to strategic forces and on pagehe one ia which il is channeled to general purpose programs (These arc intended to illustrate ihe range of Soviet options Other choices are open lo the Soviets, including mixtures of elements from these twoor both of ihese projections, we discuss the changes the Soviets might make in their forces, as well as (he circumstances thai might cause such changes and the impact tbe changes could have on the

A similar discussion of the low projection begiru on. Finally, one discuss Ihe clues lhat intelligence sources might provide that would help us to detect (in its early stages) any discontinuity in Soviet military policy{ ]

trategic Coaperttkv.

Effect oh Miliiary Capabililiis. If ihe Soviets were io repeal inhe defense spending pattern of thend were to focus iheir efforts on strategic programs, they could expand iheir strategic forces considerably over those presented in our baseline projection For example,0 Ibe Soviets

havenicrconiinental delivery ve-htclea in (heir forces, compared loo

n ihe baseline projection. (The range in ihe baseline projection,eflects varying assumptions about arms limiudon agreements; this high projection reflects the assumed absence of treaty constraintsore rapid pace ofimprovements than is reflected in the baseline projection.)

equip these delivery vehicles with more lhan

ndividualf whichr nearlyercent, could be suitable for use against hardened targets.

Baseline and Alternative Projections of Soviet Investment and Operating Eipeoditues

<Ml-M

ap-nrlirgair-cai pu'poaa

MOT aire >

S^Nail fo-caaalo" gwaaad Fere**

aan

al to.r MM iiaai f-ftaciri- aj our taalol

wav-vg tt* ata.

7

9*

increase th* number of peripheral strategic delivery vehicles to. compared to lessn lhe baseline projectson.

Could have moretriiegic SAMin the field, about one-third more than in tbe baseline projection. More than half ofould have some capability against low-altitude targets.

Could deploytrategicsomeercent more than in lhe baseliiw projection

(Aboutercent of these would be suitable for operations against low-altiiude attackers,!

Could fieAd an ABM network: ofaunchersites, and improve their ABM battlecapabilities. (This would require abrogation of thc ABM Treaty.)

Could buildore ASW submarines than we forecast in the baseline projectionnd iboul SO more long-range ASW

These program* would permit ihe Sovielloarge number of USsiloshelters, while stillweapon* for other targets. Theirwould be improved by increases inof delivery vehicles and in the number ofand subrnarinc-Uunched missiles. Sovietto counter penetrating bombers would inv

prove more rapidly lhan in the baseline proyeciionQ

The expanded ABM network would increase iheconfidence in (heir defenses. Il would provide improved capabililies io reduce the damage fromBritish, or French nuclear attacks against targets of high value to the Soviets, and it would require the United Stales to develop countermeasures and allocate large number* of weapons to suppressing missile defenses. Soviet ASW* capabililies would improve, but would slill be limned by technological constraints Q

Causes and Consequences. The Sovietsrogram if Ihereharp deterioration in relations with the United Statesomplete breakdown of the SALT process. Other circumstances that would bearoviet decision to upgrade their forces with emphasis on strategic power might be

Open conflict with China combined with an increase in Chinese strategic programs.

Renewed distrust of the USSR in Western Europe and an acceleration of NATO's strategic and theater nuclear programs.

Better economic conditions lhan we currently protect.

" Political and miliiary leaders more skeptical than Brezhnev about Western and Chinese intentions and more assertive in foreign policy malterJ

The Soviet economy, in ihe aggregate, is large enough lo support an expansion of strategic programs of ihishe expansion woulderious impact, however, on ihe slruclure of the economy and on ihe allocation of resources. Il could increase ihe defense share ofGNPio nearly one-fourth of the lota!nd before the end ofefense would be consuming almost all of the annualNP.

" Theollar terms of the stepped-up stralcaK iomprtiuonbe someoerceni fieaicr lhan lhat ol the baseline

projection. [ [

hange would probably cul sharply intothus mortgaging future economic growth in order tohort-icrm strategic gain. J"

Coruumrstion could also be affected, resulting in reductions in morale and productivit) Thts mightthe Soviel kaders to increase coercion to keep ibe population under contiol

The Soviet defense indusincTprobably have enough final assembly capacity to support ihe strategic buildup postulated in Ihis alternative, but they could have difficulty in meeting production targets for components. Most of the increased production would be for miss ilea and aircraft. These systems for tbe most part do not compete directly with investment goods, allhough tbey do use metals and electronic* thai are in shorthe civilian economy If the buildup included an increase in submarine construction,this could reduce produciion or pipelines, drilling equipment, and pumps needed by Ihe oil

The defense industries would also find it difficult to produce enough nuclear materials to supply tbein the larger postulated force. This manywould require nuclear materials exceeding our highest estimate of the amount that could be supplied by existing facilities. The Soviets could increase produciion somewhat by altering their processingor by canceling contracts with foreign countries for use of Soviel enrichment plants. Bui lotrategic force of ihe size postulated they probably would also have to build new facilities for processing nuclear materials r-

Fxpansion erfForces Effect on Miliiary Capabililies. If the Soviets were lo increase defense spending int or near the rate of the, and if they were lo emphasize general purpose rather than strategic forces, they could0ubstantial buildup in (heater forces and an improvement in capabilities to project power in distant areas. They could, for example:Man and equip abouidditional Ground Forces divmotu.

Addactical interceptors and groundaircraft lo support the larger ground forces.

Double the production of long-range heavy/ transport aircraft over the number in our baseline projection.see.

Build enough large amphibious ships to more lhan double the capacity of their forces for combat lift of troops to distant areas.

Increase production of large aircraft carriers to three or four units and provide the necessary escort ships.

These programs would permit the Soviets loontinuous presence with aircraft earners and amphibious forces in an area of critical importance such as thc Eastern Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf, or to concentrate two or three carrier battle groupsrisis. They would also give the Soviets thc capability to move larger ground and air forces into peripheral countries more quickly than they could now. The Soviet airlift capabilitiesJLwould beto those of US forces todayC

Causes aad Consequences. The economic and political conditions lhat could leaduildup emphasizing conventional forces are similar to those that could underlie an intensified strategiccoming to power of hardline leadersigher economic growth than we now project. In addition, the Soviets mightajor expansion of conventional and power projection forces:

If conditions in Eastern Europe deteriorated until the Soviets no longer entrusted their Warsaw Pact alliesajor role in an East-West war.

If thereharp downturn, bordering on open hostility, in Sinc-Sovict relations.

If the Third World, especially Southwest Asia and thc Middle East, became so unstable as to threaten vital Soviet interests or tolear opportunity for the Soviets to gain vitaldeny them to

Like the postulated strategic buildup described onajor expansion of general purpose forces would cost in dollar terms someoercent more than our baseline projection. The Soviet economyhole could support this kind of buildup, as it could the

strategic, but the political consequences of this reallocation of resources could be more serious.^

The impact of an increase in general purpose programs on investment growth and on critical sectors of the economy probably would be more severe than thc impact of an expansion of strategic forces:

Il would take more men. General purpose forces (especially ground forces) use much more manpower than strategic forces do. and this kind of buildup would exacerbate the labor problems that Ihe Soviets will face in.

It would take more energy and raw materials. Production of ships and land armaments (ihc bulk of thc increase in this alternative projection) consumes more energy and metal and uses more machinery per unit of output than docs production of aircraft and missiles (thc bulk of the increase in thc projection that emphasizes strategic forces).

- II would take up amoreof production capacity. The Soviets produce both tanks and raikars, both armoredand agricultural machinery, and both mililary and civilian trucks in the same plants. An increase tn military production at one of these plants would reduce the output for transportation and agriculture.

would demand more construction. Constructionarge number of new ground and air force facilities would divert labor, machinery, and materials from civilian uses. These arc needed io reduce ihe already growing backlog of unfinished consiruction projects in the Soviet economy and io build lhe new facilities and infrastructure needed to exploit naturalin undeveloped

With thc cumulative effect of ihcsc more serious sectoraliepped-up conventionalprobably wouldreater reduction in the growth of GNP and in thc availability of resources for investment and consumption lhantepped-up Strategic competition

A further reduction in railcar production, for example, could disrupt thc Soviets' already over-burdenednetwork, causing delays, boltlenecks. and

ret

throughout the economy. The inability to turn out more tractors and harvesters could threaten the political leaders' programs to increase foodand cause seriousrequiring highly repressive measures to contain consumer unrest. The implication of this analysis is that the Soviets might be able to handle an increased strategic arms competition more easily than an intensified buildup of conventional forces, (j

A Reduced Military Effort

We have also examined the effect of absolutein military spending like those the Soviets made under Khrushchev in the. There is nothat the leaders are considering such an option. Nevertheless, we have attempted to identify theprograms that ihey might alter if domesticturmoil inompelled them to reduce their resource commitment to

Our assessment is necessarily speculative, because there is no direct evidence on possible Soviet choices. But historical precedents, as well as our understanding of Soviel military priorities aod of the economicbetween civilian and military programs, provide some insights!

Effect on Military Capabilities. We believe that the Soviets would prefer to negotiate for mutual cuts with Western nations rather than to cul any of Iheir Own forces unilaterally. We also believe they wouldany cuts among all of the miliiary services, as they did in, for two major reasons:

would minimize political wrangling.

is also required by doctrine- in which the services have complementary roles in an overall strategy, so that expansion or contraction of oneimilar change in the others. We judge that they would attempt to preserve the key programs for each service and to make the smallest cuts in those programs that are intended to remedy major weaknesses.

Finally, we would expect Soviet leaders to cut in ways lhat would benefit ihe economy. They would depend on the key organizalions in the Soviet decisionmakingVPK. Gosplan, the General Staff, and

irade-offsj hoices would not be

the Centralassistance in making these i

The choices would not be easy, however. Unlike the marginal alterations in defense spending discussed in the baseline projection, an absolute reduction in defense spending probably would require actual reductions in men and equipment in some military services and threaten programs of great importance to each. For example, the Soviets might have to cut back sharply or eliminate several of the following programs:

The intercontinental attack bombers of Long Range Aviation.

One or more of the new interceptor aircraft for the strategic defense forces.

Some of the Navy's large surface combatants.

New fighter-bombers for Frontal Aviation.

Some of the new or improved light and medium ICBMs-

artillery and air defense weapons for the Ground Forces.

Cuts this deep would be hard lo make within the framework of the current doctrine and missionof the armed forces. They would probablyedefinition of Soviet military goals and changes in .roles and missions of some of the military services.

a

Such changes could only be arrived ai afterconflict and political infighting, whose outcome we cannot predict with confidence. There wouldet reduction in expenditures for all of ihe services, but we cannot forecast exactly what missions andwould suffer most. Il would appear most logical, however, for the Soviets to concentrate the reductions in general purposethe Ground Forces. This is because:

The Soviets probably arc more comfortable with their military position (against the West and China) in general purpose lhan in strategic forces; in particular, they probably consider themselves ahead in the number and quality or their Ground Forces weapon systems.

Rcduciions in general purpose forces could return more people lo Ihe work force.

Thc production resources now devoted io general purpose forces can be transferred io critical civilian needs more readily than can those now used for strategic forces.

Finally, thc last time the Sovieis reduced defense spending, ihey cut back on conventional forces and tried (unsuccessfully) tooncent ofihrough strategic nuclear power.

< fl-in and Coayrqaeaces- Wc consider an absolute reduction in military spending unlikely (as we do the two kinds of buildup! Under some circumstances. Isowever. tbe Sonets might feel impelled in thaiThese include:

conditions poorer than thoseeries of disastrous harvests causing an actual reduction in economic output.

Thc spread of popular unrest from Eastern Europe to the USSR, coupled with the rise to power of political figures sympathetic to the consumers' plight

Sino-Sovieteneral lessening of tensions with the West,ove by West European countries closer to the Soviet orbit and away from US influence]

An absolute reduction in the level of military spending inear wouldotal cost of5rices) forercent less than tbe cost of thc baseline projection. This reduction might increase only slightly thc overall growth of thc Soviet economy. But all of the growth could be directed to civiliangrowih of investment could increase on the orderercentage points and that of per capita consumption could be upull point. Q

The most important resulteduction, however, would be thai ihc Soviet Union could step up ihc production of machine tools and thc equipment needed for transportation, energy, and agriculture. This would occur particularly if thc reduction were concentrated in general purpose forces j j

Clues to Future Soviet Policies

If Ihe Soviets continue (heir mililary programs as they have begun. Soviet mililary power will develop ins described in our baseline projection. If they change lhe military programs in one of the three ways discussed in our alternative projections, we wouldlo receive evidence from intelligence sources lhat would alert us to thc changej

The paragraphs below discuss some of theeconomic and military that wc might see if the Soviets changed their plans. Some are fairly clear in their imphca'.io-s. but many (especially thoseolitical or economic nature) arc ambsgtsous. W'e have listed tbe indicators according lo ourabout the direction in which they most probably point But no single clue would be adequate toolicy shift. We would have to detect at least several indicators, and evaluate themear or more, before wc could be confident of identifying an actual change.Q

Suggestionstepped-Up FJTort Political- Thc evidence we might obtain about thc political environment that might signal an accelerated military effort could include:

Reliable reportingoviet perception thatwith the West or with China (or both) were likely to deteriorate sharply.

The accession to leadership of relatively hardline Soviet politicians and the emergenceolitical consensus favoring even greater emphasis on defense. (We could ascertain this by ovonitoring the leaders' statements and reports from human sources.)

A hardening of Soviet positions in arms controlsuch as persisting in clearly nonncgoliuble demands or threatening to break off discussions or to abrogate existing agreements.

n increase in domestic political repression.

t

General economic evidence thai might be relatedn increase in military spending could be:

More optimistic official forecasts of economic performance

Publication of plan target* for investment and consumption that are measurably tower thanurrently expect

A more rapid increase in capital construction at defense plantslowdown at civilian industrial facilities.

Increased secrecy about economic data lhat could be analyzed to reveal general trends in ihe defense effort.

Greater concentration of investment funds on heavy industry) |

In addiiion. there are more specific economic dam thai, if available, could suggest the direction of the increased military effort:

Construction of new facilities for production ofmaterial and abrogation of agreements tomaterials for foreign countries could portend an increase in strategic programs.

Reduced production of merchant ships, civilianraitoars. and agricultural machinery would suggest lhat additional resources were being devoted lo general purpose forces. |

Miliiary. Specific evidence probably would also be available on military programs. Signs of an increased defense effort could include:

A sharp increase in weapon testing activity. (The types of weapons being tested could suggest the direction of the effort.)

Increases in production rates for major weapons. (These probably would be detected only after Ihe items produced began to appear in military units.)

The formation of new military unns.

Discussion, or testing in exercises, of new ways of employing various forces

callup of reservists, an increase in annual conscription rates, and changes in policy on deferments.

Stigaestionseduced Effort Political. Political evidenceeduced militarycould include:

Reporting of greater optimism in the Kremlin on the prospects for detcnie.

The accession to leadership of political figuresto support civilian economiceven ai the expense of theury.

The admission of additional civilian participants to the defense decisionmaking process

A more flexible Soviet Slancc on arms control, in particular, movement on MBFR couldesire to improve economic performance by reducing expenditures on theater forces.

Signs of greater tolerance for experimentation in economic management and more sympathy forcomplaints.^

Economic. Economic information thai might reflectreduced defense program could include:

Pessimistic Soviet forccasu of economic growth.

Energy shortages developing early in.

Major shifts in plan targets reward increasedor consumption at tbe expense of defense programs.

Reduction or hailing of cotmrviction activity atplants

increases, actual or planned, in the output of civilian transportation or agricultural

Miliiary. If the military effort were being cul back, we might also see:

Cuts in weapon testing levels and produciion rates.

Dissolution of military units and reorganization or consolidation of forces.

Releases of men from active duty and reduced draft calls.

Evidence of debates on tbe roles and missions of Ihe military services and on the naiureuture war and the goals of military strategy.ebate is now almost entirely absent from Soviet writings.)^

The research lhal led to this assessment wasby an NFAC Working Group. The members of the Group were:

Office of Economic Research

Office of Imagery Analysis

Office of Political Analysis

ice of Scientific and Weapons Research

Office of Strategic Research

Contributions to this assessment were also provided by analysts in the Offices of Central Reference. Economic Research. Political Analysis. Research andTraining and Education, Scientific andResearch, and Strategic Research and I

This assessment was reviewed by members of the DCI's Military-Economic Advisory Panel.

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Appendix A

Selected NFAC Publications Related to Soviet Military Forces and Policies in

Some of ihe studies on which this assessment was based are noted below. The listing includes only studies classified Secret orist of the principal studies of higher classification lhat were used in the preparation of this assessment is available to appropriately cleared recipients on request, ft)

Sowe/ Economic Problems and Prospects,6 (Unclassified)

Some Implications of Demographic Trends for Economic Policies,2 (Unclassified)

odel of rhe Soviet Economy,1 (Unclassified) Simulations of Soviet Growth Options1 (Unclassified)

Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance,Secret NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

Soviet Spending for Defense: Trends5 and the Outlook for,7 (Secret)

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Appendix C

Characteristics of Selected Soviet Weapons

This appendix contains line drawings of ihe principal Soviet weapon systems mentioned in the report and tables showing their most important technical characteristics. The estimated characteristics arc based on all available sources of intelligence and. except as noted, are agreed Intelligencefigures.

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Original document.

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