The Si no-Vietnamese IProbleaVew Baseline for Military
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INTRODUCTION il "';
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It he* been about twojyears since tbe Peoples Republic (PRC) invaded Vietnam as a lesson to the Vietnamese' in Southeast Asia would'not go unpunished. Since the Vietnamese have concentrated on consolidatingon Kampuchea,aunchlng forays Into Thailandthe effectiveness of the Kampuchean resistance The Chinese have from time'to time respondedactions in Kampuchea with military actions along with Vietnam, periodically threatening a; The purpose of -this Research Report Is'to reexamine1 tary icon test, now pertaining ioSoutheast As la andactors! The paper will explore changes Inandonshe potenJt ialcn any iconf1 let in Southeast As la that might reflect changes Inisk and thus In; the likelihood ofof bostil
addreeaed Pentagon, j
Thie reeearch report ia ithe product of the Strategic Warning, Staff and hoe nci. been'ifoordinatedrest of the intelligence aomrmitui Commente were eolioitedandincorporated at the discretion Of the trategic Warningueetione or oormente':on this report Should
Direator, 'Strategic Warning Staff,
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KEY JIJDOMENTS
Severe economic probicons to constrain the Chinese from launching a. i 1 at tack against Vietnam! comparable to9njrasponse to Vietnamese military actions in Kampuchea or along the Sino-Vletnamese border. Although the Chinese have vowed tosecond lesson" ilnternal conditions will increase their tolerance of military provocations by Vietnam and reinforce China's commitment to long term pressures on Vietnam coupled with periodic reminders', of Chinese ability to, Infltd heavyary damage. China is likely to continue to provide low-cost, but substantial aid to Khmer forces In Kampuchea, use mostly border forces to retaliate in kind for Vietnamese actions in the-Thai-Karopucbean and. Vietnamese nd stage exercises by regular forces in southern China toint imldate the Vietnamese and keep touch! of Hanoi's army tied:downe:^southern China. ss,prob1 ems;increase;fjexibilityto purmore vigorouslyl suppression camp'algrisi in Kampuchea and adjacent areashai land with' t'e'ljit Ive Impuniity J ns iseem much'moraavorabler 'Vi atnameVe ml li taryn in Kampuchea!erhaps at any tlaincejithe |conques| iof Kampuchjea.
Although mililary eierjtlonaj contribute heavily to Vietnam's, Internal and external problems, Hanoi's leaders could plausibly concludeore vigorous and more successful campaign in Kampucheaecessary step toward lightening many of their burdens. Kampuchea Is the one place where They can take action by using the army with some;prospect of Improving their plight largely by their own effort. Increased Khmer Rouge activity because of the steadyable Slno-Thal supply system and Thai distraction because of internal political disarray,aet tnducen>ajntsj for Vietnam jto [strike stronglyi athmer "enemy"restructure.
LL Althou?hreflectTletnam'a army ofandbefore I iT
long and dould have greater,hanfforts' Evidence,obrtiyle.'ofevel arger sweeps arious parts of the western border that ;Could also involve clashes Inside Thailand. Logistic and other : reparation. do;leattProlorged and
laU^,lt-JMlll in-- :
:
f
penetratI on Innam willof^ejecope and duration
te a
ione
.
by;;
that'
adminisecond lesson" against
TherU;are no- indications'I thatcalej #ar| wle,| initiatedhdellbefaWly in, Sdutheaat Asialr On theand, morie and possibly larger clashes are. likelyjto loccur [along the Tha1 -KUBpucbeah"and SIno-Vietnamese border jas routinej eat urea ]off the security situation.; jfThese; are not likely] to l| ii escalateroader or general Iconflict excepth* alafcubstantti wouljd Ibe1 very; difficult Ito provide much! warning that;ji{ escalation.was occur trig. Movementj toj-.the Vietnamese 'border numerous Chineserarmles .and jVlrounitaj,at resource *xPenditureaould]tronghina was! about jto, Vietnam.
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During Vietnam in; dlons
parties to' andtrains andtiles hand, more! also In nor ol the secu
the two years{since China's punitive attack' condl tlotis In Southeast Asia have evolved in thatexlby| of the major' the Indochina problem. Although there are enduring r trends, such as widespread Instability, economic
i jlese likely stress emerg*
thanas n .the other, in Kampuchea1 but out ine features
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hostility among the parties, these have developed so war in' Southeast Asiaxtreme conditions of frequent dat nly thern Vietnam, -are likely) to become
rity si tuition.
and economic factors |ln the majorhave* Instablished'! 'new threshold for: ,1 j on1. Isolated init ernaty,almost uncontrollable economic problems and with simmering at home, Hanoi's leaders have little hope cf on]ong as tho, |Kampuchean occupationuesresources' and manpower. On the otherbe the one problem even remotely susceptible tothe Vietnamese forte. With Thai and ASEANthe latest proposals for talks, the Vietnamese wouldto lose byeightened military phase Despite; the costs of such action, tbe Vietnamese some; chances of at least gaining a respite and time for efforts to take 'root.j Although the rebels are !i-ontent] seriously Vietnam's bold on Kampuchea ,jultlmatelyidisrupt! the rebel supply system|beforejto restore normal security conditions can achieve i, ,
The Thai Situation
Instability- in the Thai government could encourage Hanoi. Vietnamese press reflects Close attention to Thai political developments and Hanoi's strategists could now perceiveindow for action In which' the Thai would be too preoccupied with political Intrigue to respond effectively until after the rebel' support system washatever the:explanation behind Vietnam'sesthaibathe effect of lullingast1 the border commanders* moat of
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.whom typically werej recently noted In [Bangkok Insteadeports, from Bangkok also reinforce! the not Ion igovernment is preoccupied with infernal matters and conditions manageable. "This ebb and flow of the border ia not new, but the present complacency ofmight further induce Vietnam to act in response to incentives^.!
ijitfl t
visit by Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to Thailand can be
seen ase demonstration of Sino-Thai sol idari ty,anoi's benefit. Zhao is hot known, however, to have carried any new formulation of Chinese commitment to Thailand's defense In the eventajor Vietnamese attack. The Thai have pressed foreart definition to the Chinese support. eassuring gesture, Zhao'sdid1 le to dispel enduring Thai anxieties, probably complicated Thai dealings with noncommunistjASEANinsighbors In the process jand i einforced Vietnam'js host iH ty toward |Thai land, j
after the Vietnamese transgression
hai land's other- major benefactor, the US, has also[because of; thejihdrd. line; projected 'by- the new Thisn: weeceived In Bangkok andcontributed tejthe willingness to reinforce ihe borderunitsanlfhblat tal ion formed lastft I
to and embarae escalate
Bankotv is cer'tjaialy-not seeking actively to embarrass Its benefactors but has( persistant interest In probing the limits of' their resolve. EAN and US support andnderstanding of Vietnam's' internal stresses encourage Thailand to continue to stand up to Vietnam. This policy Is not likely to change while Prem Is in power with military support, but Internal developments dilute Its strength at present. In this rather exposed and morend would be quick to
e, but strongly
to
enough
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is patronshe. event of trouble1. Caught by surprise rassed, thie Thai might react too late toil thwart the
order!
; Tpr^SCSREX
Constraints on China
cnipo
of
the
Ipbttch of the elite
changes, .
China's position Is particularly delicate, making themonths possibly the best time yet for Vietnam to act! in zone.. The Cliin^se have now concluded that 'the pace and political reform has been too fast and have]in the pjaaf. few months' to alowj
and the populace harbors serious misgivings andut the but the degree ofl internal discontent Is not clear..
Leaving aside ttia tborny political problems, the economic facts of life seem partIcularly troublesome. Since December. China has eschewed all but the most tightly controlled foreign trade and investment opportunities. Important aad costlycontracts have been'cancelLed[ major plants have been closed; In some cases whole'plants have been offered for salei the yuan has been devalued lor. forrign Economic spokesmen imply1 will bea year of little or no growth In most sectors and of actual backsliding In'some, such as mineral extraction and oil production. The Chinese have admitted that inflation, unemployment andajor budget deficit exist. Although' tbe measures!have not been characterised by panic, theyather typical pattern of strenuous action to beadofferious cash shortage that hreatens default on major obligations.
The economic{measures! are not confined to the of the economy. 'Capital construction funds have icut, Including those for the Peoples Liberationtrend toward decentralisation In the economy has beenin practice, with some sec'oral andions. Some provinces haveand
rationing. Agriculture and light industry" China's leadjnsL dVport earners, retain the highest development stress.
'east 'i project sjg in some ranks
I' The economic! [squeexeis,'al so hitting the Peoples Army.: No|contr,aCits-,for InoAern weapons' are likely for
Major
two years
under negotiation; [tor1 years nave oeen deterred, reduct ion|In force lis:underway, poss iblybegi nn
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resent the closure of the PLA| life because of early discharge and
standards. At.the same time, themselves disadvantaged.by: programs
standard of tarmeti- and workers.i'the relative difficulty that;
when the head of household
early lastne demobilised andmore;are aleaaan as an avenueetter tighter recruitment and promotion many on active duty!feel that have improvedvln'g The complaints focus largely! on miryave takjingncentives to improve the Ir nstyleaull-time soldier,
An analysis] last year
f
on probably
Indicated that the amount "it: unprogrammeq increase inilitary budget caused byijtfaje Sino-yietnamese9 almostxactly corresponded to the! increase in the *upply of paper money printed. The Chinese acknowledge, that the war cost somei billion yuan. Aside from,tha obvious Inflationary effects) of this financing technique and! the^lncreased deficit the war] brought, the net cost of the effort most likely far exceeded the public figure. The war cost'illion man-days in lost productlonj opportunities by {the armed forces alone. Manyan-daya were lost because of the^ disruption of the economiesarts of Kunming and Guangzhou Military Regions that was caused byzat Ionte mlia toheonal ly, defensive) measures,'. Including wholesale relocation along parte .of [the Soviet border, are also counted la thet;public figure^ |
forced to
any)< by extreme
reluctancej
best time Kampuchea'
reluctance probisbly would joe1 the border problems 'aecondilesson."
in
for them with the
could have; catastrophic consequences have now been delayed five or six year remain atrpnglyjed.t; jln practical terras, China probably cannot afford to go tohe Chinese leadership's present appraisal Of the economic problems serves!to t6 strike ativietnam again unless Although1 the Vietnamese^ may ,inot be( aware fully of 'any China's par t, the. next few months' too clean up Itheir least feanhinese '
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Al'thbugh tin- Soviet- have been the main beneficiary of the turbulence in Southeaat Asia, theyubstantial interest in at. least[burden of carrying Vietnam, now said by
cost the Soviets at least $6 1 |
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miUion dtllT iai iiutf^ilTTTTary aid alone.
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not, perbaps 1coulfli BDt.'restrain* Vie tnameie operat Kampuchea, even if they spilled over Into Thailand.
Military Considerations: Shooting but No War
Military condl11ons along the Chinese border withxemplify the "no war-no peace" condltlone Both sides have Improved border Idsfenses and reinforced substantially their respective garrisons. Artillery duels, border violations and exercises by regular forces near the border are reported
,Bithe 'I
threatened Jsecond lesson"jseemed quite real but later proved to be an elaborate Chinese bluff toietnamese dry season offensive in Kampuchea that never developed on the scale 'that earlier seemed 'likely. Periodically the Chinese also threatened a "second ut instead increased the tempo of fighting along the common border, generally in reaction to threatened or real Vietnamese operations in western Kampuchea' or depredations along the Slno-Vletnamese border.
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The pattern that has emerged from the past two years is one of threat and counterthreat punctuated by increased combat In,
local areas, but the flghtii., has remained tailored to the gravity of the provocationjand has been limited. Neither China nor Vietnam seem toor are they likely to delIberately
initiateajor test of arms for some
In contrast, significant changes have occurred in Vietnam's military posture ;ln Kampuchea that do portend Increased 1
fighting. These Includen '
ground forces organisation, manpower recruitment, lOglst'ics and! possibly air activity. This new] deveack'
scope to presage an InvasionThai land or other provocation' 'J
ift'!ii:hd
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enough tohinese lesson, but do threaten; greater conflict In the Insnediate weatern bprder; region of Kampuchea They also would increase :the|kel ihood ofoveriinto Thailand and the dangera of
A continuingeportS|nformation confirming that Vietnam's extensive and conventional. iiT
ary
provided effort is
jdivlsloh refinement ih the nature
: | The overall structure has changed very little, estimates still lack prexi sion, and defon. The consistentietnam hasroopa in Kampuchea
land! below point!ontinuing aaA style;of -the occupation army.
has
recruitment programa'|in;ivisions alongorder,of Kampuchea
morale andigh desertion rate, and poor performanceng the to an
robably,with Soviet advice.
1 acted-ja;move away
to
command ofary command vested ingle division commander. This was partially aimed at making Vietnam's command structure more distinct from China's by adopting Soviet practice.; It .caused substantial atlV In. Vietnamese military circles 'prompt Ing commentary and explanations by high level mi l'i In addition other problems, confusion of [command authority was seen as inhibiting effective ry; (per formance .] |
In
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antit, the Vietnamese clarified and simplified the functions of tbe occupation force through a reorganisation of at least some of th* maneuver divisions. |
"groups" have been formed From regiments and
indoctrination, population1 control, and training of new km-puchean
for the Vietnamese-
I group forces'are heavily involved in harvest worhT fton,
controlled Khmer army of iHeng.iamrin.
with the
of tbe groups Is'the formation, jot a_ greater number of Heng Samrin
1 are led by Vietnamese
These measures1 have had an.important effect on the regular Infantry divisions.' Some have become moreo and less .tied] to territorial, controlles. Increased use of Kampuchean units has freed Vietnamese manpower fori combat Instead i of rear area dutles. '
'-In.
i! 1m !
i Probably related to tbd (ormatlonl of the groups | J.
was twardt shift by Vietnamese unit* west of
Mekong KiVer.
zone have
Vietnamese Intelenet hasjgenerally been1 quireflected in the disposition of divisions along the border opposite known Thai supply points and Khmer rebel bases. Vietnam's past attempts to box the Khmer in tbe
not succeeded, andj deelined. till,"
the1 occupation army's effectiveness has imaynd larger
forces will evidently be usederies oi Ihrge sweeps to destroy rebel forces luredj Into set-piece battles in the border area.
followed
lure
[to
rebels seem situations.
The major sweepinearast Deembe^ limited withdrawal fVoW the| border, designed
concentrated orces deeper
lo
the
i;tt>ki bait there andrilar;
h
for the ;dry season especially In the westernupplied adequately to support!
st.ockpi les do not ed penetration of*
Vietnam'stoi prepare
combat was fairly extensive. Although western units|
seem sufficient to .sustain al deep and
air 'force hasostly supporting role since the initial conquest1 :ofjKampuchea, concentrating on flying cargo andedivacuatnd border '. reconnaissance missions. 1
tactical aircraft |may beed to supporg ground operations in western Kampuchea, although no deplo^yments to Kampuchea have been I
ecent1 spate:of Vietnamese reconnaissance forays in
Thailand has set the stage for fighting on Thai soil, poss
destroy the rebel supply system. |j
bly to
With intelligencehe. reconnaissance teams are conducting limited spoiling operations to disruptjthe supply system; in Thai land or counterecent increase in Khmer jr4bel| operat ions'. Simi lar, operat ions preceded the0 incident attBanNon Mak Mun in Thailand. 'Now as then, the teams do not appear' reluctant to attack Thai forces when encountered as1 well as Khmer/rebel Vt division- evel sweeps are conducted, it seems likely that Vietnamt, least, conduct! hot<pursuit intoubsreastub 1icized clash with^Thai forces could easiIt occuread to. an escalationhe border fighting.
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Whereas Vietnamese^ intent ions, towardnd.'arc not fully clear, the! recent: surge| in Khmer rebel'action is'aimed at preventing.or disrupting feared maj or sweeps byam. ee late last yearubs tant ia 1jSi no-Thai resupply effort has' invigorated theho1 have mounted operations by units uplto
: jl.: 1 | jji ;
tots cere err.
battalion: (several hundred men) i
The Khmer are: also moving into areas
several unusual
abandoned by Vietnamese units that have consolidated and seemnclined to treat thla lasja sign of success. They havejon :
small border towns--
occasions assaulted and seized acts of daring byi the rebels.
sources; allege an increase recruitment and the overall strength of
Khmer rebel the rebels.*
Reportslormation oi new mimer
of hmer expect major Vietnamese In Thailand. Activity deeper In near Siems mostly ofaw and order problem. [Most been forced to abandon the
has relocated closer
rebel units, but [most sources rate Khmer Rouge strength atthanut any figureuestionable. Activity has been quite vigorous^ near all of the Thai border supply points)and in the western interior
Kampuchea, probably because ithe sweeps against their, base areas -t'he Kampuchean Interior, except nuisance value and on the!level of one Khmer Rouge division has eastern interior'[of Kampuchea and apparently to the Thai border; if
As for the Thai, the arrival of a fresh infantry regimental combat team inas increased Thaitrength beyond recent levels. From Laos)to the Gulf of Thailand, the Thai now have close0 military and paramilitary troops. Although still no match for theietnamese arrayed immediately in the Kampuchean side of the border, the Thai leaders evince Increased confidence. If not complacency, that no large fighting wljll occur!and that they have the abilityounter local Vietnamese;.border depredations. The Thai have also stepped up theirMown border-patrols |ln some areas and generally increased reconnaissance and spoiling operations in Kampuchea.
I- Although the Vietnamese and Thai do noto be deliberately planning major battles against each other, |their Inclinationi to.sponsor!nto each other's areas of control contain serious'lrjiska of;iescalatlon. The risks will be (somewhat worsened by the actlyities of the Khmer rebelsoth Thai land and Kampuchea. Once battle- were joined, It Is'Unclear whether
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either the Thai or the Vietnaroe.se would be willing to step, back from an escalating situation.
imp 1icat ions for warning of the changed conditions in Southeast Asia and China are:
The current westward orientation of substantialI Vietnamese forces shortens considerably the amount of time* necessary for the Vietnamese to mount ajor invasion of Thailand. Available evidence, however, indicates that the Vietnamese are not now considering an invasion.!
and
lthough likely lo be liuited, clashes between Thai Vietnamese forces in the border areas will carry a riskjof escalation through ml sea leu Inlion thai will be difficult to foresee
oves southward of major Chinese forces would require expenditures of resources which the PRC can Ill-afford economically. Any such move would be a serious indicator of intent to openes with the Vietnamese.
Original document.
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