Poland's Prospects Over the Next Six Months
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PR06UV
POLAND'S PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
lhe following inlelligence organizations participated in tho preparation of the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency. Ihe inlelligence orgoniia'ioni of lhe Oeporimenli of Stale ond Treasury, the Defense Intcfigencc Agency, ond the Notionol Security Agency.
The Aiiiitonl Chief of Stoff foe Intelligence. Deportment of ths Atmy The Director of Novel Inlelligence. Oeporlmenl of Ihe Novy The Asiitioni Chief of Stofl. Iniotcjance, Deportmenl of Ihe Air Force The Director of Intelligence, Heodefjorteri. Marine Corps
HE PRESENT STATE OF PI-AY IN POLAND
THE WORSENING ECONOMIC SITUATION
KEY ACTORS THEIR NATURE AND EQUITIES
ScJidarity and the Worker.
The USSR and lhe Warsaw Pact
I'ossible Coercive Options Open lo the Regime
The present crisis in Poland constitutes tlu; most serious and broadly based challenge to Communist rule in the Warsaw Pact in moreecade. Recurrent conlronlations between the regime and the unions have moved Poland ever closer to the edge of Soviet military intervention. Thc main factors sustaining the protractedunion demands, factionalism in thc Solidarity leadership andin the union ranks, the continuing erosion of party authority, and thc fact that Solidarityassive emotional rejection of the way the party has managed lhccontributing to an increasingly anarchic situation which no single authority seems capable of controlling.
Although some issues are more susceptible to solutions than others, we see no prospect for thc resolution of basic tensions between the workers and the regime in lhe months ahead. No coherent regimehas yet emerged to limit workers' political demands and to stem lhe consequent erosion of the parly's authority.
Because ofa poor harvest, lower laborhorterand ongoing economic drift, economic conditions iu Poland will coniinue to deteriorate over the next six months. If deterioration isPolish plannersinspired civilseem unlikely in the next six monthswift and steep decline in livingof triggering civil disorder that could cause Sovietbc ruled oul. This could happen,if Poland (a) cannot meet ils massive hard currency debt service obligations, (b) defaults,esult, on ils hard currency loans, (c) is therefore unable to borrow lorade deficit, and (d) thus sharply reduces imports from lhe West, with serious adverse effects on produclion and consumption. To meet ils financial obligations and keep importsatisfactory level, Poland will require aid from Western governments.
Party leader Kania apparently continues to enjoy Soviet support. But in an environment of continuing polilical instability time is working againsi him. Under such conditions Ins personal support from theand from within the Politburo will diminish. Cognizant of thisKania will feel increasingly compelled in lhe interest of preserving his own position lo initiate more forceful measures lo quell domestic turmoil, and to head off conservative criticism that his "leniency" is perpetuating instability.
To limit the scale of confrontation, tlie regime may seek to appear more conciliatory on issues with which there is widespread laborand support, such as thchour workweek, or to fragment opposition on such national issues by advocating locallysolutions. In addition, it will probably continue the periodic show of limited force against local protests, calculating thai such firmness willestraining effect nationally. The potential for escalation is hightrategy of limited confrontation, given the regime's diminished negotiating flexibility and probable Soviet insistence that it stand firm In the event of confrontation..
Solidarity's national leadership has come increasingly under the influence of its more militanl members. But regime efforts to factionalizc the leadership, and thereby dilute its national authority, have thus far failed. While internal disputes will continue tothe leadership, we believe that in future confrontations it will pull together rather than pull apart.
While we believe that the Soviets will not allow the present deteriorating situation to continue indefinilely, wc doubt they haveimetable for Kania. It is their continuing assessment of Polish events and Kania's reaction to them that will decide whether the Soviets forbear, increase pressure, or use military force. Moscow retains several options short of military intervention to induce moderation by workers and stronger actions by thechange inheavier political pressure, as wellumber of demonstrative military measures short of intervention.
The Soviets' reluctance to intervene militarily derives above all from the enormous costs they probably anticipate in eliminating Polish armed and passive resistance, and inolitically and economically viable Poland. Additional disincentives are the political and economic price they anticipate they would pay in their relations with Western nations, with the Third World, and within theCommunist movement.
Whatever the Soviet perception of lhe costs of intervention, they will quickly fade into secondary considerations if the Soviets see their vital interests threatened. Developments that would posehreat include:
A breakdown of internal order in Poland.
A frontal assault on the regime's authority, sucheneral strike of some duration lo which the regime did not respond decisively.
Indications lhal the Polish regime was becoming unwilling or unable to meet ils Warsaw Pact commitments.
Barring such developments, Moscow will coniinue to give Kania time, bul little additional leeway to maneuver and make concessions We believe that the Soviets are less confident than when Kania wonecember reprieve that he can in fact bring the situation satisfactorily under control. The trend is decidedly negative from lhc Soviet perspective.
In comparison with the0 period, tlic chances are greater that the Polish regime will respond with force,at Soviel urging, if facedajor confrontation suchrolonged general strike or the ibreal ofajor confrontation. Coercion would be useday designed lo minimize the escalation of violence. But the difficulties of manipulating force inenseare enormous, and the probability of an eruption of violence would be high.
We seriously doubt the Polish Army's dependability If called upon to quell large-scale violence, and we believe similar doubts prevail in the Polish leadership. In any case, we do not believe the Polish Army alone would be capable ol containing the situation The introduction of regular Polish military forces under such circumstances wouldigh risk of bringing aboul the intervention nf Soviel forces.
The size of any Soviet intervention lorce would depend uponassessment of likdy resistance from the Polish Army andWe estimate lhat, if the Soviets foresaw thc possibility oforganized resistance fiom the Polish armed forces, they would interveneorce of at leastivisions We believe tliey could readyorce and activate all of thc necessary communications inoays. If the Soviets were to undertake the kind of intervention they apparently planned in November-December under the guiseoint exercise, we estimate an intervention force of someivisions could be readied withinubstantially smaller force involving some half dozen divisions (or more, depending on the extent to which the Soviets draw on ready divisions from their forces in East Germany and Czechoslovakia) could bc readied in aboul two Io three days, but we think it unlikely, given the possibility of resistance, that the Soviels would actually intervene withmall force
It is possibleattern of negotiation will develop between regime and unions which will subdue lhe level of confrontation, and that under such circumstances the regime could gain the upper hand byautious policy designed to undermine the union's strenglh. It is difficult lo believe, however, lhatolicy could succeed, given the volatile situation in Poland and diffusion of tlie authority of both the party and lhe union Indeed,lieve Sovicl pressure on the Polish regime will increase, and thai if the pattern of domestic con-Ironlation continues, lhe trend is toward ultimate intervenlion.
I. Si* tnonlln after an increase in food prices Sparked Strikes throughout Poland, and spawned an ceganized workers opposition, the country's political and economic stability continues to be precarious The brief periods ol relative domestic calm which bate punctuated tensions between the Kania leadership and the unions mask an inherently unstable situation.the trend has been one of continuing economic and political demands by Solidarity or its localand thc diffusion of political authority away from the party, fed In part by serious political divisions witliin the party itself The present crisis constitutes the most serious and broadly based challenge to Communist rule in the Warsaw fact Inecade, and recurrent confrontations have moved Poland ever closer to the edge of Soviet military intervention.
threat tempers the behavior of bothregime, but it may not be decisive inand warding off an interventionfactors which now sustain Ihe protractedunion demands, factionalism in theleadership and indiscipline in the union ranks,erosion of party authority, and the factrepresents the massive, deep seated,reieclion of the way the party hasarc contributing lo an Increasinglywhich no single authority seems capable
PRESENT STATE OF PLAY IN POLAND
military activity in late NovemberDecember made the tlirrat of interventionto both Ihe workers and the regime Thisby key actors inside and outside of Poland.by Soviet warnings to lhe Polish leadershippublic US warnings to the USSR, chastenedThe Polish Church and the Pope assumedposition in urging moderation andon Polish workers The national Solidarityacknowledging the giavily of the situation, a strike moratorium Tlie pany
appealed for restraint and professed Us willingness to negotiate and compromise Thus, the widely perceived threat ol military intervention and the temporary convergence of interests itwith the diversion of the holidays and thc greater, if temporary, availabilityeriod of calm lasting four to live weeks
l Since early January the government hasarder line in dealing with the unions, bui has only generated more resistance Labor groups, increasingly under tlse influence of militant elements, pressed their demands, which, together svith thc hardening of the party's position, reintroduced the tenuous that have dominated the post months Twofor registrationrivate fanners union, called Rural Solidariiy. and the in: rod-act urnhourprovide the focus of internal ten skmis In calibrating its response ihe parly must tread the narrow line between preservingroding political authority and slaving within the bounds of Soviet loleranre, and responding todemandsvay lhal placates but min inures actual concessions Although some specific issues are more susceptible lo solutions tlian others we sec no prospect lor lhaof basic tensions between the workers and them the months ahead No coherent strategy has set emerged to hmil workers' political demands and lo Stem Ihe consequent erosion of the party's authority
III. THE WORSENING ECONOMIC 5IIUATION
5 Domestic economic conditions in Poland will continue lo deteriorate over theii months, and throughout IMI.oland receives the foreign financial and economic assistance it Is dearly counting on The modes! eeonomie reform measures introduced al the beginning ol Ihis year will have Utile impact in the ncai fuluie land probably will not Significantly affect economic performance even over iho long run) Polish officialsecline in CNPdecreases9 Contributors lo the anticipated drop1 include the repercussions on
food production of previous poorower labor product inly, lhe shorter workweek and lighter work regimen in lhe mines, and Lack of leadership control over lhe economy
Despite lhe1 pay5 billion) and interestthat Poland must make onillion debt-accumulated over the lastcais because of an ovcrambitiout development piogiim heavilyon imports from thewas forced to abandon the preslrikc priority accorded to improving its balance of payments Instead, it is trying loliving standards, or at least minimize theirin order to forestall public disorder
This obtective requires Poland lo continue lo run large curienl account deficits. To prevonl tlvc decline in coal production from reducingample. Warsaw has sharply cut coal cipocts even though coal is Poland's maior earner of hardLargely because of Ms emphasis on prraervrng production for domestic use. Poland appears to have run anothei large hard currency trade deficit lastleast SI 5is likely to run an even larger oneillion With Interest payments on its steadily rising debt alsothe current account deficit was at leastillion0 and will be overillion in IS6I.
8 Taking other steps to free resources for use in personal consumption and in consumer oriented investment progtams. Warsaw has also:
that it will continue steep cuts ininvestment initiated Iwo years ago whilecapital outlays in agriculture, in housing, and in health, education, and cultural facilities
Raised lood subsidises byercent1 to
permitrices for farmers while keeping retail ptice* stable
increased money income for all segments of the populalion, withncome to rise byercent, almost twice as fast as9
9 Even if their plans are carried out. however.consumersleak year Although the regime hopes lo increase slightly the overall supply ofroodst has warned thai food supplies will fall Mini worrisome of allrop in thcof meal, production will fall al loaslercent
T following anercent decrease0 Imports are eipeeted to compensate formall proportion of the decline in meat production
Jving standards will rise marginally at best over tlir next six months, and are more likely lo drop Economically inspired rivtl unrest remains adespite the regime's let real from austerityThe population, however, has showntolerance for economic hardship in recent months in Urge measutc. It appears, because of thc new leadership's (a) candid admissions that pastand corruption have left thehambles, (b) promises of actions that it maintains will bringejuvenation of lhe economy, and fc) partial satisfaction of some of the population *ciample. formation ofhasemporary willingness to tolerate economic hardship* Consequently, economic hardship pei se. shortwift and diasliein living standards, seems unlikely to trigger wide-spiead public disorder over the next several months
apid deterioration cannot be ruled out. however, particularly il Poland does not leceive substantial foieign financial and economic assistance Poland musl noi only roll over principal payments a* they fall due but must also (ind new funds both to pay interest on its Western debt and to permitof haid currency trade deficit* If Poland cannot obtain the necessary financing and defaults on its loans, the country would be forced to balance it* hard currency Irade bv sharply cutting imports The impact on consumption and production would be severely disruptive, possibly triggering civil disturbances
Despite the rapidly diminishing confidence of Western banks. Polandood chance of tolling over much ol the principal coming due. since hanks evidently piefer such refinancing lo outrighl delaull. Hut Western banks are likely lo provide the new loans Poland requires lo finance interest and Irade deficits only if they receive government guarantee* Thus, if Poland is lo avoid drastic curtailment of Its purchase* from thr West, it will require prompt financialfrom either Western governments oi ibe Soviet Union, andum bolh Large-scale assistance may be reciuired very soon, since Poland's currentdeficit in the first quarter alone is likely lo be on the ordei ol II billion SuhsUntial Soviet til ha*been granted but not nearly enough tn meet1 need*
oland ha* been candid aboul ill nrcd (orand ba* lieen scrambling lo line up assistance sinceas already received moren aid, pari ol il in hard currency, Irom lh* USSR (some of which was usedndew hundred million dollars from other Kast European counlries Warsaw has also requested moreillion in various types Ol* aid from Westernnotably bilateral resettedulings andbacked credits Western countries have been generally sympathetic in considering Polish appeals because o( the contribution aid can make to both political stability and the interests o( Western eiport-ers Poland lias failed to win hard-and-fast pledges ol large amounts of assistance, however, largely because of tbe inability of Western counlries lo fashion aplan for aiding Warsaw, but also because of Western doubts that Poland will ever put its finances in order
IV. KEY ACTORS: IHEIR NATURE AND EQUITIES
ne key to Poland's short lerm future is whether party leader Kama or any subsequent leader can reestablish the integrity of the partv at anof effective political control The evolution of Solidarityompeting center ol authority and the deterioration of partv cohesion have proceeded hand in hand Some partv members have resigned, many have taken up umuhaneous membership in Solidarome local partv bodies have defied directives from the parly center, and the freedom with which the party's past tole and mistakes ami the natuie of its polilical authority have been questioned have led. not surprisingly, to widespread demand* lioui within the parly, and particularly from its lower echelons, for its decentralization *
1 Some of their haven in attrmpl bv lhe party toSolidarity
' tl is probable tint the Inncrr iiulibllil> in (he country penult.
the neaier nich demand* -ill bmimr Theiifoii. ciuliia |ha labor
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i lor Iliad reran byboOM. barriBg parry ollicub liooimlm*tii Dcamom. in luting ImmIii* ponon (ram brim, aad holdin the lop
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Mindful ol iu irli.pietroalien and Ihc limit* ol Soviet lot crime, thc pally leaoViihip milvrlD itfutc lb luppoel loch
iiii* changes, bul alio wlD wink to lAlore in euentallv Ofthvdoi. hierarchical paitv oi nam rat Inn
IS. Kama's (nil political imperative Is tohu own political position within the Politburo and within the partyhole Under the banners of "reform" andnd an antioorruptiona purge has been set in motion, apparently .sponvwrd by Kania. which is nottruggle for reform buttrategy to rid the paity of hisopponent* Kama has encountered stiff resistance from the numerous middle- and lower-level party of-ficiab. and from within (he largely Gicrek-appointed Centralier, for whom "renewal" wouldertain loss of their privileges and even eipubion or worsefforts to recorrstruet lheparameters lhat Moscow willnothowever, so long as he remains incapable of puigmc ihe party of these elements. He must proceed with more deliberale speed in purging tlie obdurate elements, as well as in reining in those in the rank andnonetheless much of his supportwho are pressing for far-reaching relorms as tlseeitraordinary parly congress approaches The fact that the congress, initially skated for late March or early April, ha* reportedly been postponed to mid-May suggests thai preparation for It is running well behind schedule
t is difficuli to assess the current constellation of forres in the Politburo eicepl to say (a) that there probably piuvails an uneasy consensus around Kania which deriveshared interest in his neat-term success in calming the situation and (b) that noopposiUon to Kania by individual* or group* has yet surfaced' Whether this consensus will last will depend upon Kami's success in bringing lhe domestic situation underrucial factor,ovicl support for Kania. it is unlikely that he would bc unseated without the acquiescence oi support of lhe Soviets. While Kania apparently continues to cniov Soviet support, he may not do so indefinitely Indeed, in an environment of continuing polilical instability, tune Is working against him and. under suchhi* personal support from the Soviets and (rom within lhe Politburo will diminish Cognizant of this liability. Kama will feel increasingly compelled in the interest of preserving his own poutroo lo imitate more frjrceful measures lo Quell domesticnd lo head oil etvettvi criticism that his "leniency" is perpetuating instability
'n- uirvc lime, some Pofilburo iaem.hr.ii melliuici Inghl and probably oommund wme personal tuppoil Irani within it*nch figures are Obto-ski and Mccui Olwswtlii i| reported loltdy icpLoHnrrit lor Kania should thehdijw iheirIrom ihr prnent parti leader
Soidoriiy ond the Workers
19 Solidarilv is an unwieldy aggregation ofoillion Polish workers born of years of frustrationhared sense of economic and social grievance. The average Solidarity member is probably motivated above all by lhc desiie lo improve his standard ofHit goals, impioved pay and emoluments, tend to be immediate and his time horizon short Solidarity is not an organization whose membersommon goal of political reform, and its leadership hasfromrogram of political Indeed, rank-and-file Solidarity demands for geocial political liberalization Iiave been notable lor thetr absence over Ihe past chaoticept as they aflect the workers' right to strike on behalf of maierial demands
nevitably, however. Solidarity's economic ob-(ectives have resulted in demands lhat have been essentially political' In addition, tbe workers haveieice pride in their organization and its ability to pressure the authorities- this in itselfrofound change in Polish political life. Il is likely lhal some in the labor movement harbor am bit sort* for fundamental political changes (which may stand In contradiction to one another) but have held back fromolilical program in order to fend off charges that, ultimately, Solidarity aspires toohlieel oppoulion Kurt her more, as Solidarity'sweight has grown and as its gains have altered the onion - polilical climate other groups have been encouraged lo organize and tn seek the regime'sas legitimate interest groups with lhe right to participatehat is becoming an increasinglypolitical system
olidarity's national leadership consists of somendividuals electedegional basis, many ol whom apparently identify closely wiih local laboractor which may eiplain the dJviiive-neis that besets the national body Not surprisingly, theNational Coordinating Commission headed hy Lechbeset by distension over goals, tactics, and philosophy. There are moderate^ around Walesa who generally favor avoiding con-
Cor rumple, ill* Oclotiw-November iliuwlc over thr- inOitri'
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gaitaaarw it* laaiaaitioasfItgfBI
ion. limiting demands lo economic mors, and emphasulng organization and consolidation of the movemeni Hut there are ahohoolicy of more direct pressure to prevent the regime from backsliding,hird type who are rnore receptive lo lhe regime's position than Walesa. But tire composition of each grouping seems to be constantly shifting depending on the issue At both Ihe national and llie regional levels Solidarity continues lo draw upon thc suppori of groups of experts consisting of dissident intellectuals associated with the Committee for Socialefenseith the movement for Civil and Human Rightsembers of lhe legal profession, and advisers from lhe Catholic laity, some of whom act as emissaries from the episcopate As open advocates of politicalon and as longstanding critics of the regime, some of Ihchave been publicly criticized as "aniisocialjsis" by both the regime and thc Soviets. Thus fai, however. Walesa has refused to see them as political liabilities, although be clearly wants to avoid identifyingwith KOR or its political reformist point of view
The divisions in the Solidarity leadership and the inclusion of political dussdenti create political vulnerabilities which lhe regime has attempted to ex-ploit Hut regime efforts lo factions hie the Sobdarity leadership, and thereby dilute ils national authority, have thus farense of common causeealization of lhe dangers of succumbing tohave bound thc union leadership together during pasl crises, despite its divisions. At llie same time, to maintain unity, and to preserve his own leadershipWalesa and other moderates have had to accomirtodatr lhe harder line, as evidenced during lhe January dispute over the free Saturday issue The question for lhe neat lew months is how the Solidariiy leadership will behave as the regime luughens its stand While internal disputes will continue tolite leadership, we believe that in futureIt svill pull together rather lhan pull apart
Tbe ability of the national leadership lo conlrol thc Solidarity rank and file is limited In someSolidarity members have persisted in localactions in defiance of the entreaties of the national leadership Thts situation increases the danger that confrontational positions assumed by local Sobdantv chapters will burgeon into nationalutationof tbe perceived rti-cd bv tbe naUonal leadership
to suppoit ils conslitueiils or risk serious divisions within the movemeni Rank and file discipline and retention of worker loyally over lime also depend on what progress Solidarity is able to achieve on workers' material demands (lor example, on food, wages, and work hours) Given the economic disorder, however, and the widely recognized problems associated with meeting Ihese demands in the nexl few months, it is unlikely thai disappointment over consumptionwill lesl rank-and-file loyally to Ihe national leadership over the next six months
eipect lhat the near-term future willrecurrent confrontation. Solidarity is likelythe regime for implementation of tbesettled last summers strike wave Solidarityof the regime's hardened position and itsroom for concession and. unless provokedby increased use of regime force ors unlikely to ptcw suchas the curtailing of police practices. Thcleadership is aware of the fragility of Ihesituation and lhat the regime will seek lo useof Soviet pressure to attenuate unionore conciliatory policy Bui il is alsoto the factrolonged general strikeperceivedrontal challenge, and it wsllRubicon onlyast resort Wcesponse lo regime actions that threatenedof Solidarity as an organization Workas the one-hour national strikectoberboycotts ate lhe tactics more likely loover the next few months. Werolonged general strike, thefeel it necessary to respond coercively toits conlrol and to preserve its own
the Communist takeover theChurch has fiercely and successfullyits independence and retained lhe loyaltycountry sCatholicthc electionolish Pope. John Paul II.triumphanthe Churchenlianced its effectiveness as aOut II has always used its influencebehind thehas extended itsto Ibe government in limes of national cns.li
In early Dceembei, ventingovietintervention was increasingly likely, bothWyn> mki. the Polish primate, and Pope John Paul IIomewhat ambiguous penod ol silence to urge calm and to ease the pressure on the regime. Thisosition to which tlve Church now appears committed and which couldecisive factor in future confrontations VVe can eipect to see the Churchore outspoken role in urging modera lion in future confrontations In tbe present situation, thc Chuich hierarchy has lent its support both toand to thc Kania regime, but has avoided committing itself to an alliance with either
ut Ihe regime can retain the support of the
Church only so long as il eschews lhc use of force. In
addition, live Church has patticular interests and will
pose demands of itsaccess lo Ihe media.
church construction, expanded clerical and leligious
education, etcthereforeatural inter est in
rogressive, if cautious, liberal.ration.
and in exacting its own political price from thc regime for its suppon.
nder the impact of lhe prolonged crisis, not even the episcopate has escaped internal dissension some elements ol* thethe youngerquestioned the wisdom of the strong support Cardinalwas seen lo haveto lhe regime apparently at the expense ofBut the episcopate is likely to remain united under Wysaynsfci. who envoys strong papal backing, and to continue tooderating role toward the regime, Ihe workers, and the population al larste VVys?ynsbi. however, is boih aging and ailing, and his departure from the scene wouldoid lhat no successor could readily fill
olidariiy hasational example anda license for the organization of similar interest groups. Ihe establishment of which further dilutes party authority For example, the organization ofunions and their petition to register as thevoice of Poland's students has been accomiianicd by lhe sseukening ol thc countiy's party-supportedstudent organ) ia lions Liberalizing pressures have been in rvidencr in the writers' and morns lists communities This spontaneous pluralizalion of the body pohlii. if il remains unchecked, could pose the
most irnportanl longer lerm threat both to the parly and to Poland's experiment We doubt that Use party can eradicate such pressures in the near term It mav. however, be ablem por ire on demands for legal registration of new unions One social group whosrthc regime may not be able lo temporize on it thc farmers. The petition of Rural Solidarity (which claims to represent one-third of Poland'sillion private farmers) for legal status akin to that olcould be the focus of the next confrontation in view of Kania's uncompromising stand against such an Organization
The USSR ond lha Warsaw Pact
Moscow has probably made il clear that, while lhe immediate problem is checking furtherlhe Polish leadership's basic task must be to begin to reverse the trend While we believe lhat the Soviets will not allow the present deteriorating situation to conlinuc indelinitely. we doubt ihey haveimetable for Kama It is their continuing ussessmcnl of Polish events and Kama's reaction to them which will decide whether the Soviets forbear, increaseor use military force
The Soviets retain several options shot! olintervention If Kania is unable to achieve aacceptable to Moscow, the Soviets could optnolhcr change in leadership. Moscow also retains some political pressure tactics not fully utilized We mav see explicit public warnings from Soviet leaders and additional Warsaw Pad summit meetings in which tbe Soviets urgeauler stance on the Polish leadership. There areumber of military measures short of military intervention which the Sovietsmi Id undertake lo induce additionalin Poland and stronger actions by lhe regime They might conduct publicized miliiary exercises along Poland's bolder, engage in small-scale Sovlct-Pnlish exercises mside Poland, or even undertakelimited augrnentation of Soviet forces In Poland
The Soviets reluctance to intervene militarily derives above all Irom lhe enormous costs they ptoh ably anticipate in eliminating Polish armed andresistance and inolitically and economicallv viable Poland Additional disincentives aie Ihe political and economic price ibey anticipate (hey would pay in thrir relations with Weslernsvith the Third World, and within tbe interna*
lional Communist movement4 In view ol lhe obvious Wesl European interest in maintaining stability in relaltorti wiih the USSR, lhe Sovieu might conclude that, white the inevitable damage lo Sen-let detente policies would be enormous, il would not necessarily be irretrievable. They might further conclude thai cfforls lo portray ihe intervention ass an aciion undertaken in response to Polish requests wiih Polish collaboration, andimited move vilal lo lhe maintenance of politico-miliiary stability incould mitigate thc setback to Soviet policiesWeslern Europe and exacerbate differencestlw United States and its allies. Another related Soviel consideration would be lhe anticipated US-NATO miliiary response ll is unlikely that Moscow would foresee active Western military oc-oomIkmi But Sonet intervention would surely alter NATOolillingness to resort lo force in crisis situations, and lhe Soviets would expect new Western efforts to augment NATO's force posture. This is not in itself,alculation which woulda-or role in stayingSoviet intervention
halcver lhe Soviet perception ol such costs, they will quickly fade mlo secondary considerations if thc Sovicls see iheir vital Interests threatened Wethat one or another form of Soviet militaryikely in the even! of:
A breakdown of internal order in Poland
A fronlal assault on lhe regimes authority, sucheneral strike of some duration to which thc regime did not respond decisively.
* .Snutlir' dvic lourwdoi*n-babti ike druie ia arced dint* axnbtvv mm poor i* tW bit February cuacrea ol
ibe&Mir* Oeantunuf Patflr Aho anirartxaair.IBM laaaM*-
enticipation si lhe econorac roar, which could lie roruideceble While ihe Sovieti exnool laietell the naruic or lhe ritcril ol resisthy lhe Polah lilmi lorce, Ihey nsuil eonlernplalF lhe pnuihil'lv ol eilecdcd teimoni< dlutiptsonesult ol wusftprcad paiioe reslilannt and even industrial ub-
ouae The IIVSR toiM have sole uappurl for Po-
bad Soiuiol siaa>Vii> aad sorllecu el ili
ecemorric uWllaMi On trad* and eCMoeaar dcireoummr ekrwlirrr
In Euirin ti.nK- We [inrul lundMI lhe soale ol Poland'snoinlrull in in iheol an invuion. bui. aioviet aidi wr iiaraesl an oiciill lliine lor lood, fuel, raw mile* Ills and vimm rlbtvnlalnl to be lhe eomvalcnt ol SI0pat veir The So-ieli ala-oal terulr I. would nor asw.Tier teence cent to il< Wen. brat use. couU not nliothe debtol Ihrl'erl iamadd have tailcreilii-oithumi Warsaw would probablyniiiinreiv moratorium on del* agrvaoamenu andlotched uIiim
that the Polish regime wai becoming unwilling or unable lo meet ils Warsaw pact commitments.
n addition, we beheve thai the inter play of condition" such as lhe following would influence Soviet calculations in favor ol intervention
Tlse increasingly open display of anti-Sovietor phenomena in Poland on the part of the public or Solidarity, prompted bv(hat thc Soviets were preventing reforms.
A marked diminution of the party's leading role In society.
-- ntinuatioi of thc current instability
rcpetcusslons from thc Polish events elsewhere in Eastern Europe.7
l Is improbable thai Ihe positions of olherPast leaderships willecisive effect either in conducing lhc Soviets lo use force or in leslraining them Wehat all Warsaw pact Icadciships in varying degrees oppose the longer lermof Ihe Polish leadership to Solidarity's demands, and (eel potentially threatened by the trend of events The bnrup of East European attitudes towardilitary intervention would differ, depending on the form lhat il look or lhe circumstances under which it was Initialed East Germany andthose with ihe most immediate cause loprobably Bulgaria would be willing to lake pari regardless ol its scale or lhe form that il look Moscow is hkely lo limit East German participation, however, given lhc history of Polish-German hostility. While the Romanians would not participate in an invasion, lhe Hungarians might feel compelled tovm-bohc contingent of troops
e beheve thai, barring the type ofnoted above. Moscow will continue lo give Kania lime, but little additional leeway lo maneuver and make concessions The Soviets will also increase
DrSjumiieei thernri iSnsaoaj oltdc
-noil den-nek bv the hketihoad ol iWlnrnors
the iilualnn iixmi lhe SoneiIn view ol the
olp|oi*nenls and the romi-ciinginleresu lnvul>ed.mdershlii coiueiuui on miliiarynrton mas- in-
volvr tunkinanl Ji-hoie
pressure on Kama as necessary lo move morelo bring lbc silualion under conlrol This would involve resisting Ihc escalating demands ofstudents, and farmers, moving againstchecking lhe push for greater democracy in the paily; and maintaining the regime's police powers intact Thc strategy of thc Polish leadership has now in effect been determined by Moscow, and its options for dealing with the protracted crisis have been drastically narrowed. Wc believe that lhc Soviets arc less hopeful than when Kania wonecember reprieve that he can in fact bring Ihe situation satisfactorily underThc trend is decidedly negative from the Soviet perspective
V. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
Possible Coercive Options Open to the Regime
bviously, the Polish leadership seeks to avoid lhe resort lo force. Rut it has probably accepted that the limited application of force may now be necessary inolicy which tries to hold the lint against further union demands and in underwriting the credibility of ils resolve. In early January for thc first time the regime used thc threat of forceand successfully to break up two smallof provincial government buildings. Seeking to project both reslraint and determination, the regime's hope is that such threats of force will serve loand restrain, rather than to provoke. Wc would expect toepetition of this kind of coercion at thc local level.
ecause its options for dealing with the domes-tic turmoil and Solidarity's challenge are nanower in comparison wiih the October-November period, the chances are greater that the regime will respond with force, probably at Soviel urging, if facedajor conlrontalion suchrolonged general strike or the threat ofajor confrontation. Thus we believe lhal ii cannoi alford politically under thc presentto exercise thc degree of restraint which il demonstrated in the crises of August (when the Cicrek regime rodeassive wave of strikes for three weeks) and of October and November. Again, coercion svould be useday designed to minimize thc es. calahon of violence. For example, in response lo ihc threateneral slrtke we would foresee plant lockouts, the arrest of dissidents, and of some of the
more radical Solidarity leaders. In any suchthe regime would hope by Ihe measured use of foice lo avoid violence and bloodshed. Bui thcof manipulating force inense situation are enormous, and thc probability of an eruption of violence would be high.
If thc regime decided to use force againstin one or more of the major industrial centers, units subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairsegarded as the most politically reliable, wouldbe committed first- In circumstances where lhe regime faced multiple slrikesumber of cities, such paramilitary forces svould be inadequate because of their limited manpower and geographical availabil-ily. In either case, tlserefore. lhe regime would have lo be prepared lo support MIA units with troops from lhe regular armed forces. (This was llw pattern in0 disturbances when thc regular police were bucked up by regular units of the armed forces using tanks, armored personnel carriers, andse of the armed forces to control civil disturbances, however, would come only after it was clear thai forces of the MIA were Incapable of maintaining or restoring order We believe lhat Polish authorities svould commit the tegular militaryast resort in staving off Soviet military intervention
We cannot predict bow regular Army units would behave under such circumstances, eipeciallylf ihey were called upon to fire on Polish svrxkers. and see believe similar doubts prevail in lite PolishIn all probability, thc responses of different units
1 Purine0 diiiwhums many soldiers apparentlysympathy "ilh lhe demonstrators and followed uidos onlv icWlantlv In oddllian. the uv ol lhc armed lorces0emoialiiirat ellcci on the Aimv for these reasons, put. and mil. tan leaders alike exanvd mist^ings about irung the Army undei ueh elrctioitlar-*et. and lhc Elflbth Plenum ol the Polish
Gxnmuni'l Pail volondrmnrd the use nf thefor maw Inrrinal repression Us-iinr. ih* ditfuihancei ofolish Defense Ministeridr-lv reported toold political leaden not io count an Ihe Army, lhat "Polish soldiers will rail fire on Poliih corkers" In lhe currenturly loofces-iiuii iiiiod In Nnvcmtwi lhal "ihc Palish Army will not lake pin In workingolitical soluiion lo the siluation io ihehe lid lhat lhe national crisis has laUcd so Ions and that Solidarity has tiliird such itmpithy in the twoulalion aleans thai simibr altitude! aie rdtcclcd In Ihc armed lorces larA and file, andIn the officer corns We know thai ihe party and military leadership is monitoring militus altitudes dowly. and we have in-dN-atiuro in some units ol widely held wooer! lor Solidarity. Thai calls further ikvt.il un Annv dependability If called upon in oppoie
wouldut on thc whole we believe tbc picture would.he oneeg rat ion in tbe armed forces and would be perceived as such by thc Soviets. Inin which martial law were declared, and the regular Army deployed before thc outbreak ol civil disturbances, it might remain intact and loyal In the regime. But we seriously doubt lhe Army'sil large-scale violence were to erupt. Under such conditions we do not believe the Polish Army alone would be capable of containing thcTlie Introduction of regular Polish miliiary forces under such circumstances wouldigh risk of bringing about tbe intervention of Soviet forces.
Soviet Military Intervention
he Soviets actually began gradually to increase the preparedness of their forces in and around Poland as far back as latehen Polish strikes began toolitical threat to the Gierek regime. The measures taken during the following months in-eluded theish ment of communicalions lhal might be usedilitary intervention in Poland, mobilization activities in selected units, and field training unusual for that time of year. By mid-November some mobilization activities had occurredmall number of normally low-strength (category HI) divisions in ibe western USSR Most of thc more ready (category II) divisions in lhc Soviel Miliiaryalong the Polish border had engaged in earlier training activity which had brought themigher state of preparedness In late November miliiarywere stepped up in (he eventolilical decision was takennovemenl of forces intoA temporary restricted area along thc tCastPolish border was put in effect until 9and preparations were apparently undertaken for an unscheduled joint exercise.
he introduction of Warsaw Pari forces into Poland was apparently planned lo lake place under the guise of this >oint military exercise with some cooperation fiom the Polish General Staff Brezhnev all but confirmed such plans when he told Indian Prime Minister Candh)ecember lhat thehad planned maneuvers but posiponed them be-
' For eiartiple. lhe Polish airborne di nitonralov ^rid) Is an elite unit considered amccig Ihc mw reliable ul Poliih aimed (orcit and could be Introduced Quickly in any area ot Poland
cause of objections raised by Polish officials. Tbepresumably believed that introducing troops under ambiguous circuinstances would mitigate antagonistic responses from either the Polish population or the West. Moscow's precise intentions regarding theof Iroops was not clear. The presumed mission, however, was to use such an exercise (similar tu those which took place in Czechoslovakia In tune ando intimidate Ihe Poles. Moscow may haveto use Its forces lorackdown hy thc Polish securily foices.
he Soviets did not complete the mobilization reoulred lo bring most of their divisions in lhe western USSR to full readiness for rnovemenl in Poland. In retrospect, we believe that the November-December military preparations were undertaken in anticipation ofa political decision which would determine whether military foices would be moved into Poland. Mosl of thc increased readiness measures have been relaxed since mid-December and Soviet forces are nowal routine readiness and activity levels Bul Ihe recent mobilization-related activities and training of elementsotential invasion fence improve theii general state of preparedness and leave them capable of responding quickly to future developments.
he size of any Soviet intervention force would depend upon Moscow's assessment of likely resistance from Ihe Polish Army and population. We estimate that, if the Soviets foresaw the possibility oforganized resistance from the Polish armed forces, tliey would interveneorce of at leastivisions We believe thev could readyorce and activate all of the necessary communications inoays. If the Soviets were lo undertake the kind of intervention they apparently planned in November and December under the guiseoint exercise, we estimate an intervention force of someivisions could be readied withinubstantially smaller force involving some half dozen divisions (or more, depending on the extent to which the Soviets drew on their ready divisions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia) could be readied in about Iwo to three days, but we think It unlikely, given the possibility of resistance, lhat the Soviets would actually intervene withmall force
nder any intervention conditions. Moscow will seek to enlist thc backing of the Polish leadership and lo tooiit the Polish Ceneral Staff Tliey would prob
ably hopeolish security force* would (aleeinSoviet (oreet lo
coocentiatr on maintaining order and crushing armed resistance They would abo try lol.-ol iheir move inlo Poland by utilizing such pretexts as "exercises' in order to minimize lhenf lull-scale military resistance by the Poles and in an atlempt to lessen lhe internalosts. We do not believe lhat thc Polish miliiary would present armed oppositionnder central authority, although isolated units under individual commanders might reactoviet move. Such reHilance would noterious orobstacle to Soviet military obtectivei in Poland
If the Soviels do decide to intervene in ihewe wouldequence of preparationslo what we saw from late November to mid-December Additional steps that would be taken wouldallup of reservistsuch larger number ol divisions, logistic preparations at civilian vehicle parks, military motor transport gariisons. and ammunition depots Preparations for intervention would become progressively more intense atgarrisons and more widespread across the force, and probably among East Cerman. Crexhoalovak. and possibly other East European forces, as the Soviets nejr.il full readiness for an intervention
Soviel forces will soon begin participating inmultinational and ioinl forces training exercises As (bis tiaming becomes more intense, it couldthe Polish warning problem by providing the Soviets wiih an opportunity to disguise preparations lor intervention Despite these ambiguities, however, we believe lhat the size of lhe larger intervention forces we postulate, their command char act colics, their geographic scope, lhe required logisticand the extent of preparations required will(his activity from normal Iraining andus lo identify ils hue nature, especially as the intervention beeutnes more imminenl Tbe Director. Bureau ol Research andpartment of Stale agrees that we would probably be able to detect, and to distinguish from eierctse activity. Sovietat ions lor an "invasion" of Polandr more division* would be readied lo cope wiih possible significant Polish military resistance, tint he isthat we mighl not be able to distinguish con-
fidently orimely maunet between thc large-scale maneuvers we expect al this Ume of year ami Ihe preparations lhal would be needed toubstantial number ol Soviet divisions (lhat is. ISnto Poland under the guise uf an exercise like lhe one we believe was contemplated lasl Deeember
he situation in Poland continues loigh degree of intubditv The pattern of the past months, in which tensions have mounied and subsided in response to event* and to the reactions to Ihem of the major actors, is likely tu continue, barring aapplication of force There it little prospect over the next six months that Solidarity's demands will abate. On lhe contrary, lhe union leadership islo press for implementation of concessionsin summer strike settlements and is being in-Cieasingly inllueisred bv tlie more militant clement* of its constituency The regime continues to be in an essentially reactive position, although it hasarder line in dealing with the workers It can no loners make maior concesuoru to union demands without ieopardiiing its own position and increasing the risk of Soviet iMervenlion The only politically viable response, therefore, seems totiB tougher policy, which may repine (he expanded use of force
ll Poles share an Interest in avoiding Soviet intervention, and therefore in containing tensions But this has failed to stabilize tlieo give riteorking relationship which can manage persistent conllict IIeasure of restraint on both sides. Il is possibleattern of negotiation will developregime and unions which will help to subdue Ike level of tension at least for lhe neif half year if lhe pattern of haphazard confrontation continue* Both the party and Soviet leaderships can probably tolerate continuing sporadic and isolated strikes, and this in itself is unlikely lo reunite ihe regime to use massive lorce against -orkers or tnovietIn short, the situation could be one ofbut controlled, conflict Furlhet, it is possible thai under such circumstance* tbe regime could gain tbe upper hand byoiitious policy designed lo undermine tlie union's llrrnglh
Il is difficult to believe, however, that iootentially volatile setting, and wtth the authority of both the paity and the union ddfused.ituation can last Miscalculation by the regime of the union could occur as either pressed ils position in an altempt to probe Ibe otber side'srecipitousin tensions -forew general strike threat on behalf of Rural Solidaritycould occur
We believe that Soviet military activities In November and December demonstrate lhal the Soviets
ate in fact willing to intervene militarily As time piuscs and if the regime shows no convincing progress in consolidating the party and gaining eontiol of events, (he Soviels are likely lo conclude lhaloptioni arc insufficient We cannot say exactly when Ihis might be or what specific combination of events might finally bring the Soviets to tfiat decision We believe lhat Soviet pressure on the Polish regime will increase and that, if the pattern of domesticcontinues, the trend is toward ultimate intervention
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