EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980'S

Created: 3/1/1981

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Egyptian Foreign Policy in

Judgments

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rincipal foreign policy goafi in ihcre to complete the peace rvegotiauons with fsrad. preferably byreakthrough in the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy begun at Camp David, to end Egypt's illation in the Arab world, andolidify the benefits of close ties wiih the United States. To achieve these rAjcctives, President Anwar Sadat hopes to exploit Ihe changes io the Middle Eastby the Iran-Iraq war. Libya's occupation of Chad, and Ihe election* in Israel and the United States. |^

Sadat's strategy is aimed atreakthn the peace rvegofia-tions later this year or earlyadat hopes the Israeli elections in June willabor government that is more flexible than Prime Minister tsegini coalition. He opposes Labor's call for early Jordanian involvement in the La Iks. however, and hopes Labor will workompromise in the negotiations. To keep pressure on Israd and the United Stales. Sadai_will encourage greater West European involvement in the peace process ||

While Sadat will avoid jeopardiiirtg Israel's rctura of the rest of the Sinai ine alrnoai certainly will be prepared tothe rrormaliza-tion process after next April if be concludes that Israel is not lufTtcicatly flexible. Egypt will not go to war, but Sadat could threaten to break relations with Tel Aviv to set the stage for improving ties with the Arabs. Baaf

Egypt has been able to establish discreet contactsumber of other ArabSaudi Arubia andthe but year. The division) In the Arab world caused by the Iran-Iraq war have given Sadai much greater room to maneuver with the other Arabs..

anil press hard to expand Uiese contacts with other Arab states and to reestablish its positioneading force ia tbe Arab woctd. Sadat will try to offer the other Arabs face-saving way* to restore ties with Egypt, ^ff)

Egypt sees the Soviets and their radical Araba major threat to Egypt's interests and security.etermined to hall Libyan expansionism ia Africa and will probably increase supportib) an forces ia Chad and other African countries. If he brxrjrneafrustrated with Libyan leader tjadhafi or if Libya attacks Sudan.

Sadal may decide to revive his plansilitary offensive into

PeacymakMg Style Prcsideni Anwar Sadat has guided Egyptian foreign policy0 with his unusual flair 'or theAgainst the ad*wxot"many Egyptians, be has frequently cboacn to take enormous risks: Ihe owner ol* tbeSewieishe war with Israelhe visiijohe peace treaty with Israelnd the welcome for ihe Shahg?

Sadat's personality sets the tone for Egyptian foreign policy decisionmaking. He seems to search for ways to be unpred-ciable and enjoysentral role in world events. Egyptian Seconals ofar and ihe inp io Jerusalem indicate thai Sadat consults with many advisers batew. He alone makes theolicy choices, often sftertended periods of solitary meditation. Sadat's advisers are not counsellors but assistants who carry out hit deciiions

Sndkt often bypasses the normal machinery for policy formulation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs iskept uninformed of mayor policy decisions and of secret negotiations with other states. Sadat often prefers to use special emissaries inch as presidential adviser Hasan Tutu mi. who met secretly with then Israel) Foreign Minister Dayea in Morocco in7 lotel ihe stage for the irip to Jerusalem ffff

To gain Sadai'a attention, tbe leaden of tbe Egyptiaa foccsga pot ky bureaucracy frequently coaapsta with each other Vice Presidentused by Sadat for high-level consultations with otherhas proved adept ai out maneuvering rivals Uke former Dcfcme Minister Jamasi and former Prime Minister Khatil!

The Egyptian President is supremely self-confident. He firmly believes thai fait mission is lo lead Egypt and bring peace to tbe Middle East. Sadattrategic thinker who dislikes details. Hebig picture" mentality that encourages him to avoid involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the foreign policy apparatus. Instead he devotes his working day to issuing broad directives and making public appcaran

For Sadat, personal relations with foreign leaders are critical components of foreign policy. He valuesmacy with key leaders, hoping that close relationship* with other heads of state will help resolve troublesome tubstaolive

Setrret

to foreign attain has diffmxl mark-edly fromihaiof his picdoceuorasser. The key difference hat been the emphasis oa Egyptian nationalism instead of pan-Art bum.i quickhange (be countryi name from ibe United Arab Republic to the Arab Repubbc of Egyptopular move at home. Sadat has appealed to Egypt's well-defined national cortscioasncss and tbe Egyptians'seme of superiority over other Arabsap-poet this new policy orientation.^

Sadai has not abasvdooed Art Rim bat has givenower priority. He hat appealed for Arab solidarity rather than Arabio forsake Nasser's dreamingle Arab stale for ibe more practical goal ofoalition of moderate Arab nates ffj

Ferssga Puescy feats

Egypt's principal foreign policy goab in therc to complete the peace negotisticmi with Israel and lo rebuild the moderate Arab coalition thai Ihe peace treaty destroyed. Sadat is eager to espaod the peace process to include other Arab status and the IS let tints as in ordernd Egypt's (notation ia the Arabreduce the danger of farther anti-Egyptian Arab and Islamic sanctions, and to protect Egypt's agreementmei |J

In recent mouths the danger of additional sanctions has rrosdad Majuffcaotly other Arabs arc drvened by ihe Irsa-lraq our, ihe Soviet invasion of Alghaei-

stan, and Libyanentral Africa. The Egypt is ns bops to exploit (be divisions In lbs Arab

world caused by these events to improve tie* with kay

states like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and

Tha Egyptians fear thai once Arab attention refotaae* oa the Ann-Israeli peace praeaaa, the hart has era, kad by Iraq and Syria, may again push for toughyanction Sadat la not willing to gain Arab backing, however, at tbe cost of endangering the peace treaty. Ha ia particularly daternstacd not toretext for refusing to withdraw from tha real of the Ssnai la

An equally inyporUM aad cJoaoty related Egyptiaa goal is to prevem ike rpread of So-set aad radical Arab isflseao* la the Middle East. The Egyptians believe the Soviets arc engagedullberate strategy of

subverting key countries in ibe Middle East and Africa by using local tar rotates io gain control of the oil resources of tbe Persian

Sadat believes Ihe Soviets see Egyptayor barrier io theirpension.is eyes, has increasingly been used by Ihe Sovietsase for subverting northern and central Africa. Sadat aces tbeccupation of Chad at aimed primarily at Sudan, which he hat described as Egypt* strategic hinterland. Egypt has increasingly turned its attention to blocking the Libyans.^

Tha Uruled State*ey role ia achieving Sadat's foreign policy objectives. Sadat expects the United Slates lo provide leadership ia the peace process and to pesos Israel to make carsorssiona. Ha also expects ibe US to prov-.ceies, espetiall- Egypt, with military and" to Nam Soviet CI paBBb

dot* Fence

Two years after signing the peace treaty with Israel.

Egypt continues to postpone rsorosaluting relations with Td Aviv. Although the two coaustrtca frequentlybigh-levd visitors and negotiating coensmtieca. they have made hula progress toward removing ihe deep psychological barriers between thcm-^B

Economic rets twos illustrate (he nature of the overall diaksgwe. Transactieru between Useere limned almost exclusively lo Egyptian oil exports toby Sadat al Camp David and Israeli loarisis visaing Egrypt- Total la-rweii od imports front Egypt0 amounted to anI7MJ aaflliaa, wwuu larwew ctporttt aerseatiusd to atew ausuda dollars.sraelis vuutcd Egrypt in the first three quarterstO. whilegyptians traveled to Israel

The Egyptians tee the pace of rsoraaliratoe as one of the few aspects of Ihc peace rsrocras over which theyreat degree of caasroi. and they are determined to extract cooexxeioau from Israd on other tstaes in returnprcmna; bduteral dee.gmwuf setlieeacaU policy, its efrorts lo straxsgtbeo rtscootrol Of Jcrwsaterss. and its hardtlste stance ia the aattaasonay

strongly about Jerusalem, however, and Sadat has consistently refused to recognite the legitimacy of Israd's annetaiion of the sections of the city com roiled by Jordansga

Sadatat Egypt can end its isolation in the Arab world only by achieving significant Israeli concessions for the Palestinians, and be icalouslythe PsIesUnians' right to self determination. He hot frequently critidaed the Palestine Liberation Organization for failing to recognize the reality of Israel's existence, but he supports tha PLO's daira of representing the Palestinian people. He has urged the PLO toovern meet-in-esile and has promised to be the first to recognireovernment.fg^pf

istufhed. Iiowever. by Labcs'i supportJordanian invoNenwnt in the peace isegotiaprt-

maturc Jordanian involvement would asnpt.cave the talks and even endanger tbe Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Sadat argues that neither Jordan not the Palestine Liberation Organization should ba brought into the talks until Egypt snd Israel successfullyautonomy negotiations and implement tbesr agreement, ussy

In Sadat'a view, the autonomy talks are designed solely io end the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gar* and to setemporary adavnittfsiiou that can then negotiate with Israel Sadat hopes that

elf-governing Psiesuniaa authority exists in (h* occupiedgypt can slower withdraw

from the peace process and (et the Israelis, PsWaun-

ind Joedaruas* negouatt ths fstnre of the West

Bank aadM

The Egyptians arc well aware that they hsve little means lo press Israel toore fleiible approach toward the Palestinians, and Cairo hopes the Darted Stales ultimately will force Td AvW lo deal with th* PLO. Once Israel returns tbe remainder of ihe Sinaiadat probably calculate* that he will have more room to iiwjtcwvcr. sags

It is unlikely that Sadat would go so far as to renounce the peace treaty, sinceot prepared for ihe reneued boatih'Ues with Israel which that renunciation would provoke. Sadat probably wig be atotc willing toupture in relations sfler2 or uk* other rssyraa to convince Israel to be more fksibte o* the Palestinian issue,

The Arab WwrU

Wbea Egyptian Miawirr of State Manser Hassa an-aouoccd In Januaryill be tbe year of the Arab- Egyptian dialogue,'* be reflected Sadat's hope that the Araboo lo Camp David bat cooled iuffk-mto allows*egratson into the Arab world. Cairo hopes that tbe frta-frsq war. the Soviet thswssoa of Afghanistan, aad Libyan assevtrve-acaa ia Chad will push Arab asoderaua, especially tbeoward nppeocbciatm with Egypt f"

'Mother Arab, -ere

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BEST COPY WABBLE

9 (ice tabkl Ssdat takes comfort in ihe failure of the radical Arabs led by Syria and Libyaecure significant new unctions againai Egypt in theearalf Both ihe Arab summit in Amman in0 and (he Islamic lumrnil in Ta'if in1 failed to result in new anti-Egyptian moves. Sadat ha* oflcn noted that the economic sanctions udopied ji the Baghdad summit have failed to harm the Egyptian economy.^fj

In an effort lo fun her waorov* ties with Use moderateadat has substantiallyleast farpenchant for undent attacks on the Saudi monarchy. He will iacreasingly tailor has public commentsive the other Arabs face-saving ways to imreovc fff,

It is unlikely thai Sadat will succeed entirely inEgypt's leading position in Ike Arab world in the near term unless thereajor breakthrough in the autonomy talks or an tlternettve negotiatingis widely adopted.ore likely that quiet contacts between Egypt snd the moderate Arabs will develop on miners of mutual interest in Ihe yearn>

The PaliillaUaa aad Jaeuaai

The prospect of Sadai's sucobm at improving liese ota ba decenda in la rge pa rt oa convincing the Palestinians thai his peace efforts will work. Egypt has mewed recently to improve and publicise ill tics wish ihe Palestine Liberation Organisation to increaseonions in the Arab- Israeli peace process -ffh

Egyptian-PLO relations were never fully severedtbe signing of tbe Egyptian-Israel) peace treaty inublic break. Sadatto maintain discreet lies with the Palestinians both in the PLO and in the Weal Bank and Gara through Egypt's interests sections in Amman andew Palestinian officials remained in Cairo.

table

Egyptian Diplomatic Representation hi Arab League Countries

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Sudan

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Minister All publicly urged the United Stales onanuary to recognize the PLO andialogue with ihe Palestinian leadership.

A PLO Esecalive Comrniliac member. Ahmad, visited Cairo in early February to meet t'eiaK.

toad the European Pari ia merit onebruary thai he favors an 'iraeli Palestinian dialogue.

After his trip to Europe. Sadat repeated earlier calls for the creationalestinian governmcni-in-esik.

Si da! is attempting to improve hit relations with the PLO to ensure thai Egypt remains at the center of any new efforts mounted by the Arabs, the United States. Israel, or the West Europeans to deal with the Arab-Isrsdi problem. The Egyptian leader also hopes thai bis contacts with the PLO will counter efforts to bring Jordan into the negotiations and reduce Arafat's dependence on Syria

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to support Sadai. but they probably helped lo reduce ihe tension between the two Slates. Since0 the probanda war between Egypt and the Saudis has quieted, tftf

Sadat's Miir-eiuA of King Hussein began toon ificr his trip lo Jcruinlem. when ihe Joedantaa wsooarcB re-buriedrging* (rat Amman join ihe peace pence i new wider after Camp David, whenhad noto along with the rote envisioned fee Jordan in ihenegotiations, fjnxt

Nonetheless. Egypt and Jordan haveutci dialogue abool ihe peace process through their inicrcalt sections. Hussein hai taken no action against the large Egyptian worker population in Jordan and haa OOI pressed 'or new anti-Egyptisn ia notions

Egypti .rotations with Ihe smaller Arab slates of ibe Culf are cool andmprovement probably will come only after closer relaiioos between Egypt aad Saudi Arabia are restored. Egypt has interests sections in all the Gulfew Egyptian officers'are still seconded io Ihe United Arabnd Egyptandful of military aovisers in Kuwait and Bahrain.

Cairo has no representation ia Marxist South Yemen and haa sought io organize dissident groups opposed toAden regime. In1 Cairoeeting of Yemeni dissidents who were promisedEgyptianmove Sadai may hope will curry favor with Ihcho also oppose ibe South Yemeni Government.

Saudi Arabia aad the CssbT Arab*

9 (he Egyptians have seen Saudi Arabia a* the keyhcir efforts lo break oat of their isolation Sadat hopes to improveh Riyadh bythe Saudis' atienlion on the two countries' common interest in Hemming Soviet aad radical Arab and Islamic in Horace in the area. He has often prettn-iscd to defend the Culf stales against Soviet andforces. Incon after ihc start of the Iran* Iraq war. Sadat offered to defend Saudi Arabia against stuck front Iran aaa

The^gyptians have alsoonvince Riyadh toinancial aid loamountedoui SIear before Camp David. The Saudis have refrained, however, from removing their deposits from the Egyptian Central Bank and have continued to permit private investment in Egypt and lo allowgyptian workers in ihe kingdom toeir remittances'

Despite this effort. Sadai has failed to persuade ihc Saudis ihai Ihe Camp Davidll solve the Pa lean nun issue, which Riyadh views as acause of ihc radicalieation of the Middle East. Sadai ha* failed to prevent the development of an Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement since the Baghdad lam-msi. and this alliance has helped rodeos Saw*on Egypt for support against ihe radi

The Egyptians have good relations with Oman. In0 Vice President Moubarek visited Oman, and an Oman! military delegation traveled io Cairo in December io discuss increased militaryEgypt has provided some military equip-iwessnjo Oiraaasssga

a*nanaaaVat ako serveda broker for Egyptian contact* with Saudi Arabia and Iraqi

oe Egyptians have succeeded ina series of discreet higb-lcvel ducustions with ibeoot the peace nroccss and mutual tecurity measures. These contacts have not convinced ihc Sau-

T

Scjrret

aad Iran

Egypt! relations with the Baathist regime iasharply after the Camp David agreement!raq look the lead ia pressing the Arab campaign against SedsL Iraq ii itPI in the forefront of efforts to suspend Egypt's memip in the nonaligncd movement and other international bodies and has maintained Ilea withprominent anti-Sadat Egyptian dissidents,Mohammadrominent journals! of the Nsiir era. Despite this hoatilc relationship, the Iraqis have retained some contacts with the Egyptians and have not acted against thegyptiar workers in Iraq .MR

The Egyptians have been alarmed by tha rise in Iraqi influence ia tbe Arab world nr.eespecially because the Saudi tilt toward Baghdad has come at Cairo's espense. At the start of the Iran-Iraq war the Egyptians were worried that the Iraqis would score aa easy victory snd gain farther influence Iraq's failure to winictory and the subsequent stalemau on the battlefield have pleased SadaL fA

How far Iraq rapprochement.

The Iraqis have been pressed by the war soore flcaibicgypt- la1 Baghdad increased the sura of the Egyptian interests section. In February Baghdad requested Egyptian military aid to fight

Better Iraqi-Egyptian tics would benefit Baghdad in several wajuT*"

Iraq weeds brood Arab pohiical support fur aconflict with Iran.

The Egyptian ability to produot munitions for Iraq's Soviet equipment would offset Moacow's itinginean

improved ties with Egypt would please Baghdad's new, ooejerva ii re Arab sllkea

A working relationship with Egypt would increase Iraq's ability to Influence the Arab-Israeli peace

The Egyptians haws beau at csastaa with eaapsaaaw* eg thc Islamic goveraaswai ha Tctnwa, kneradiag tha Pahand Sadat makes nosecrut of hit bops thai

Ays tollsh Khosnesat win be nwetthswwn. Thsare deeply concerned that the Soviets will steadily gain influence ia Iran andro-Soviet regime may ultimately sapplant the Ayatouah.esult, they have urged the United States andackWesirrn-oriented opponents fff/

Syrke

Syria is the Arab country that feels roost betrayed by Sadat's treaty with Israel. In Damascus' view the treaty constitutes desertion of an ally and has left Syria isolated against Israel. Tbe Camp David agreement is seen ss the culminationcries of "traitorous acts" by tha Sadat goverensent. bcgisuiing with the ani-tattral cans*-fire st iJm wad of) war and ioduding the second Sinai disensrsgerncut sccord

The Egyptians fas turn see rVcsidcac Assadlaort-sighied arsvaer nuwifJang to (she risks for peace beta sac

of has wask norncstjc pouocal pewmon, Sadatfood of pcanting out that Assadwsnber of the masonry

Alawite Muslim next, which dominates Syrian politics.

The Syrians have beers the principal Sponsor of the largest an ii-Sadat caite opposition movement, ted by Sasd al-Shsili. Egyptian cfuef of eu/Tdoring5

Se/ret

war. Sharii has thus far railed to develop acc^.tuency io Egypt-Syria hasaboswruored several abortive terrorist aitacksgyptbn leaden and tiyptian diplomats abroad. These attacks bavc had lillle impact on Eg yptun policy, however, and Syria has reecnily lurned its attention away from Egypl and toward its dispute* wilb Iraq and Jordan, faaj

The Syrians have accosed Sadat of supporting ami-Assad dissidents, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, which

LHrya and Sedan

Egypt has signifies nlly increased its aid to Hiisern Habre's anti-Libyan Chadian dissidents based inin hopes of getting the Libyans bogged downrolonged guerrilla war. The Egyptians have sentweapons and ammunition to Habre's forces and coordinaicd their aid wiih thai from Morocco, France, and Sudan, ftp

Sadat has abo repeatedly warned that Egypt will send forces to Sudan if Libya attacks Sudan or Habre's bases in Sudan. Egyptian forces aided President Nimeiri inoup attemptnd the two countriesutual defense pact6 after anothertempt backed by Libya. Suds nese officers train aisrcolle

Libyan leader Muammar OadhaTi has been Sadai'a principal enemy since Ihe. Relationsthe two leaders have always been stormy<rf Qadhafi'a desire io succeed Nssir as tbe P* rs mount leader of the Arab world and. nress^ errort* Weapon his -Green Revolution- to the rest of the Islamic world. After an urisocccssful effon at un.ricaiion in the. Libya and Egypt3 war.5 Smai agreements, Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, andmp Davidj|

The antagonism briefly flared into open fighting jnhen Sadatibyan attack. The weeklong war .as Iwondiisive and very uripopular ia Egypt- Few Egyptians are eager to right Libya, fjfg

In the law Jew. years Sadat has come to see Qadhafiawn of the Soviet Llnion. Sadat believes the Soviets are us.ng Libyaase for subverting both Africa and tbe Middle East.anicuUriy alarmed by Libyan and Ethiopian efTorts to subvert Sudan, Egypt's closest and mast important ally in Africa, astj

Nimeirr. need to pLtcate his Saudi .irun-

J^lLtf^ Khartoum's quiet

hat coTirvWa^David process. Moreover, die

" often bct^ Sadst use, tbem rc grsntcd

and item ikm at inferiors who must follow ihclead. Sadal, for hii pan, has oot always been sentiiiv* io Krtanoum'i delicate balancing act with ihe Saudis. |p

If Libya move*Sudan. Sadat could respondircci military move acres* ihe Egyptian-Libyan border. Tbe Egyptian Pressdenl has consideredove In the past only to be dissuaded in part by Ihe arguments of his generab. who fear that Egypt racks the logbUcal base lo bunch aa operatioa deep into Libyan territory.7 Egypt hasmproved its forces la Ibe Western Military District lhai border. Libya Some tOJXC Egyptian troop, are sis boned ia the area, aad Cairoslowly buikiiag ap lis tafrestrectsra near Ibe border to supportcei ansa

In the event of, move inio Libya, Egyptian forces probably would be abia lo defeat Libyan forces along the border, but they would be unable to push deep Into the country and topple the Qadhafi regime. Sadai would be in danger of gelling bound downar with another Arabar that would probably become Increasingly uiipopular both with tbe other Arab slate* and wHh hit own people-

The Egyptians provide scene support for antit^dbafi exiles, many of whom live In Cairo, loEgyptian iafa Libyan iHaor-ai aootjudaafi iToupa. So Car.

have faded lo perms da ihc diverse etesacM* of tha

Qudhafi hat longaetivitieaand has irr^tad fa effcet. ioEgypuan leader. Libya hasajordissident leader Sharkbabty provide, aidof the mors extreme Islamic group, fa Egypt.the Libyan threat Sadat declared martialihe Western Military District in0 afterUtermttfr.cJ.

Sadai probably will continue loay lo dispose of his Libyan enemy.vidence, however, thai Qadhafi would like lo Improve relations. Press reports suggest Libya may be willing lo reduce forces along the border If Egypt doe* the is me. and (here have been some quiet contacts between Tripoli and Cairo. The Libyan leader may hope lOfliiiet tension wiih Egypt lo allow Libya lo devote more resources to Chad.

Tbe differences between the two leader* are too deepresolved over the long term although theyemporary redaction iaaught aid Sadai't efTons to ease Egypt s

f-rda men taints

In the past Sadal has been constrained from stiackieg Libya by cepoaition from Washington, Moscow, aad key Arab countries. He may conclude in the future, however, that ibe United State* has no choice but to bach Egypt and willostile Soviet reaction. He could abo calculate thai Tripoli ii so Isolated in Ihc Arab world that no Arab leader would seriously tup-port Oadhafi against Sadat and that key tea tea like Saudi Arabia would be neutral. fffg

Ifrica. Rett

To counter Libyan activities in Africa and Soviet support for radical regimes like thai in Ethiopia, Sadat is recent nsooiht hasscecfrican affairs. The Egyptians baretougbii the ceher Arab tsssuoan inya threatenslesthcsKef EgypteedSodaa^

Cairo haa bad asodeat tascceas kt persuadingMorocco loialogue withr

Sadatlack Africa, -ben Use Arab-Israeli nsue hai km unpad. The Afnan haveided with Egypt in the nonabgaed no* meni and opposed Iraqi effort* to out Egypt. Egypt's leading role in opposing Qadbafi has become more popular since Libya overran most of Chad in

The Egyptians have developed military lies withmoderate African regimes interested in opposing Soviet and Libyan activities;

gypt has provided Somalia wiih0 million in military aid includingetround and air defense weapons, and

am muni lion.

In0 Egyptechnical military cooperation agreement with Zaire. Il ia currently training Zairians in Egypt aad hasewlo Zaire.

Cairo gave4 tanas to Togo ia January.

More limited military autuuance has alao been given to Zambia. Ttaraaia. Ghana, and other Africantries. A|

TVSo-kesgsal

tieadily

EgyrVs VeUlion* with Moscow have since Sadat loo* power. They react.hen Sadatoviet and East tluropuan military adviaen ia Egypt, closed their conauUiea and cultural centers, andthe Sonets to red.ee their diplomauc preaenc* in Cairoandful of ggMgfc Relations remain at ihe charge level. SJSj

Tbeae move* reflect Sadat's deep concern about Sovietgypt's domesticver since behallenge to his leadershipro-Soviet faction of the Egyptian leadership Inadat hat been coavhKed that ihe Sovwta want to remove him from power. Soviet officials are often expelled from Egypt for alleged invoeVtanwatMbvcrsrve

Thesuon ofaceat SovicS friendsbip treatoes with Syria aad Sooth Yemen, and Libya's activitiesChad have all ooatrtbated to Sa-

Egyptians havecadiag role in oppcaiag ihe Soviet presence in Afghanistan and have pubooty of. rcred ihe Afghan insurgents arms and mining

Sadat ha* been careful to leave open tbe possibilityimned improvement in Egyptian-Soviet relations if tbe Soviets wish it.0 speech, for example. Sadat said Egypt would reply to any Soviet initiative for improved relations. Nonetheless, Ihe Egyptians almost certainly do notundamental shift in Soviet policy toward Egypt and ihe Camp David agreements. (J)

As relations with the Soviets have deteriorated, Sadat has sought to improve tics wilh China. The Egyptian* have been panKularly interested in miliiary lies to offset ihe loss of Soviet equipment snd spare parts.ow Egypt's aecead moat importsat arras

Cairo has received someighter aircraft from Bojing. two battcriaa of surface-to-airaval misuses, aad (pare parts. Theove alsoto provide aad lor the Egyptian navy aad may sol Egypt additional areraft gkmt

The United Stoiearitical rokc ia Sadat's planning, and Sadat eapecu Washington toery active rale la the Arab- Uracil peace process and in Middle East securityis espeetaiions of the United Stale, are varyia ford of saying (hat tbe US controlsercent of th* cuds in theeli conflict ftg

Sadal li always uneasy when thenew ad(km in Washington. He is said lo have been particularly alarmed last yuar by press report! that tbe new United States administration favored tha "Jor-daniaa option" aad would pay lea* mention to Egypt The Egyptians haw* also been oUrorwd by reprsru thai to* US will pay km atlssnina to Ihe peace acgotiatioas than ii has ns the i

The Egyptian Anhaaaiaaw to tha UaitudshrafGheabaL thai Soda* betsewes it ra

r-

rdalloaship wiih President Reagan.io Chocbal. Sadai believes lhai an early meeting wiih Reagan is essential io Sadat's prestige in the Middle Eaii because of ihe Egyptian President's close identification wiih ihe "American connect ton."

Sadal expects the United Stales to move quicklyreviving ihe peace process once the Israeliii overew government ii in peace in Td Aviv. He it preparede patient, but he will be sensitive io signs thai Ihe US it ignoring the Arab-Israeli problem. Sadat't trip to Western Europe la February and his public endoriement of the European peace initiative were meant hn pan io-arn thrit Egypt hat alternatives to US npport.fB

The Egyptians prefer Ural the Uruicd States not move away from the substance of the Camp David sgree-meait and thai tbe US make tuecestfuBy concluding ihe autonomy negonti-.ni its highest priority. Sadai etpects Ihe US to press Israd lo be more flexible on Palestinian issues like water and land rights in the West Bank, cxtrtaiLiog tcttlcmeni activity, sadJerusalem in ibe ncgotialions. AB

Sadat It preparer! to be flexible. He is probably willing io abandon the symbolism associated with Camp David if ihe tubals sec is retained, aad he may be willing lo accept cattynvolvement if the United States endorses such aa approach. He will want US auura rices, however, thai bringing Jordan Into Ihe ddibcra ilorts would not reduce Egypt's primary role in ihe mgotuiiom aad withtt*fj

The Egyptians are abo troubled by other potential irritants In ibe""Americanlthoughb eager for an increased US militarySe Mddle East, he it coocerwedbe dc-Kttt poliiicBl oasts of too dose an idcniificsijoo with the United States. Sadal has been careful to make clear thai be will not give ihc US bases In Egypt, especially In the Sinai, and thatffering only the use of Egyptiaa fsdlilies. The Egyptianor-ried that the United Stales will push for more pcrtsut-neni military presence la Eci" ansa

The Egyptians also want ihe United States to continue to provide substantial economic asslsiartce, and they have been concerned about reports that fofdgn aid may be reduced. Cairo wants increased US aid. espe-dslly more military equipment lo replace obsolete Soviet equipment

Sadal believes he has taken caorrnous risks in the peace negotiation! which have beaerned (he United Sitics In return he expects the Untied Slates to give Egyptian concernt andigha par wiih those of 1st id

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