ROMANIA: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE POLISH CRISIS

Created: 4/11/1981

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

ROMANIA! Repercussion* of the Polish Crisis

The workere' challenge in Poland present* Romania's leaders with the most serious problem* they have faced in recentresident Ceausesau regards ithreat to hie control because it could stimulate sore unrest among Romania'* disgruntled workers. If the Polish crisis ie not resolved soon, he may be forced tohi* economic policiee drastically. Oi the other hand,arsaw Paat move into Poland, it would damageindependent foreign policy posture and weaken Ceauseecu'e

domestic position. 4as*bb*TssBB|B

Tbe situation in Poland coincides with growing res-tiveness in Romaniaeterioration in the country's already low living standard. Discontent has mounted steadily since last summer over food shortages, pay cuts, and bad working conditions, intermittently causing local disturbances.

Caauseacu has worked hard to reduce tensions by granting selective but largely cosmetic economicby improving the standing of the official trade union, and by stimulating agricultural production. He also has warned against the establishment of "competing organisations" and hae tightened internal^^mm already among the moat repressive in Eastern Europe. (fal

The President hopes that these moves will enable the regime to minimize the repercussions from Poland without diverting Romania's limited assets away from the drive for rapid industrialization. They may have ln fact had an Impact, ea labor disturbances have remained small, uncoordinated, and focused on local grievances. At th* same time, however, none of these measure* seem likely to resultignificant improvement in living and working conditions, flj

-continued

Approved ior Release

tfid

consum.r Thl. could

The Intervention Issue

in Poland? oeitlon aa because of developments

forcefully reiter-

problems them^inC^ ^ aUowed *theirt;'1 "tin maintain, thia

would-mpoaed .olutlon ^vernment S lications for hi.

it. The? probably wouldiege

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On tho otheruccessfuldid not involve Bo-mania--could help Ceausescu domestically by demonatrating to his own people the futility ofparty authority.- It would also revive the fear of the Soviet threat. By publiclyove against Poland, the President could win support at home forup to the Soviets. *

Outlook

Ceausescu will try to minimize the repercussions of the Polish crisis by temporarily placating workers and consumers and by intimidating dieeenters. At the same time, he will privately urge Wareaw to crack down, while maintaining his public stance in support of allowing the Poles to solve their own problems.

If limited measures are inadequate, Ceauaoacu may make the fundamental changes in economic policy that ho has resisted. He already has admitted that overemphasis on industrial development to the detriment of agriculture haaistake. The failure to publishlan also suggestseassessment of economic policy be undoi way. ffffH

If party control appeared in danger of collapse in Poland, Ceausoacu probably would privately favorif requested by Poliah leaders. Be would not want to go on record supportingnove^however^and would resist any Romanian participation. saBmBmBmBmeasa

Original document.

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