Implications of a
Soviet Invasion of Poland^*
Soviet leadership almost certainly recognizesarsaw Pact invasion of Poland would encounter significant, widespread Polish resistance by civilians and possibly by some mililary forces. Not only would it require large invasion forces, but it would also mire some Soviet mililary units for years in occupation and policing tasks. Soviet prospects for quicklya viable indigenous vassal regime would be dim. thus probably involving the Sovieis directly in administering Poland for tbe indefinite future. Civilian motile and productivity would tumble and the economy would fall into further disarray. The important role of Poland's armed forces in Warsaw Pact wai plans would be seriously undermined even if these forces stood aside and acquiescedoviet invasion. If ihey actively resisted, their curren^rincipal Warsaw Pact role would beat mendin
The resulting cosis for the USSR would be very large They would include:
A global propaganda defeat occasioned by the intervention, arrest ofnd spectacle of Soviet troops rooting Solidarity elements out of Polish factories.
The need toarge Soviet occupation force and to replace the Polish ground force divisions opposite NATO with Soviet combat troops.
Long-term subsidization of the Polish economy, which alreadyrain al the current level ofillion per year. Even if Poland's fixed capital sustained no damage, this drain would at least double if the Soviets sought merely lo keep economic activity from collapsing.
Imposition of Western sanctionsevel anduration considerably greater than after Afghanistan. Particularly painful would be constraints on access lo Western grain.
A political setback to Soviet efforts to split the Western Alliance.
The need to absorb at least some of the economic burden imposed on oiher East European countries b> ibe invasion, loss of Polish deliveries, and Western strictures on East-West trade.
A partial, if only le.-nporary, blunting of Soviet initiatives ir. :he Thirdthe Middle East.
A possible acceleration of defense cooperation between the United States ind
There are offsets lo ihese costs, some of which might be actual gains:
The invasion would shore up Soviet influence in other East European countries, at least in the short run.
Many West Europeans would conclude that the invasion had. at least over the medium term, weakened lhe Warsaw Pact and thus reduced the urgency of heightened Western defense measures.
An invasion would not destroy West European financial and industrial interest in trade with the Soviet Union, and this interestinitial West Europeanto selected commodity embargoes begin io reassert itself,
additional serious penalties the Sovieis theoretically could be made to pay if they did invade Poland would be:
The loss of key Western impons.lobal embargo on grain and severe constaints on sieel products. If the Sovieis could be persuaded that theyigh risk ofoss, it would actar greater deterrent lhan likely NATO actions, heightened COCOM controls, or imposition of Western financial restraints. Al present, however. Moscow has reason to doubt thateally lough Western embargo would be politically sustainable for long.
Placing Eastern Europe under the Western sanctions umbrella. This could effectively double the impact or sanctions on the USSR. Measures against Eastern Europe, though, would be the toughest to obtain from US allies.
Actions along these lines taken by the US administration iooviet
invasion, or raise its costs after the fact, could prove counterproductive both
rrom the standpoint of domestic US politics and of US-West
relations. Moscow would hope, in particular, that heavyhanded US prcssJte
on Wester* Europe to heighten its defense effort would deepen fissures
the Atlantic A .
Soviel Invasion of Polan^U^
ecent typescripthe National Foreign Assessment Center examined what the consequences might be if the Soviets did noi intervene militarily in Poland. The present companion paper, equallyexamines what the consequences might be if the Soviets did invade Poland. This paper also assesses the efficacy of various steps the West might take to deter or increase the costsoviet intervention. Clearly, the Soviet leadership would have toegree of resistance to invasion far surpassing that encountered in Hungary6 or Czechoslovakiay the same token, the costs of invasion would also be far higher than they were previously; indeed, the magnitude of these costs no doubt explains in large part why the Soviets have not already intervened. What the costs would be and how the Sovieis mjohtDcrceivc them are the focal issues considered in the analysisk
How Much Resistance The extent of Polish military and civilian armed resistance io an outrightoviet Invasion? Soviet invasion would dependumber of factors, including the intensity of Polish anti-Russian sentiment, the disposition of Polish armed forces, directives from the political and mililary leadership lo resist or noi, the position adopted by the Church, the military's command and control over individual units, and lhe degree of brutality demonstrated by invading Soviet forces. We believe it is likely that:
The Polish political and military leadership would urge the population not to resist and would either issue orders to mililary unit's to remain in garrison or not issue orders at all.
The leaders of the Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II would immediately condemn an invasion but would almost certainly advise the population against armed resistance.
Nevertheless, virulent anti-Russian feelings widespread within theat large and in the military, exacerbated by initial bloodshed, would generate powerful grassroots pressures io fight back.
The degree of organized resistance by ground force units would depend on decisions made by divisional and regimental commanders. Some would probably decide to resist. Without organization and control under central authority, however, open military resistancearsaw Paci invasion would be fragmented, not sustainable, and in the end largely ineffectual.
- Solidan'iy would calleneral srike, (he occupation of all major factories, the hampering of Soviet troop movements, and prevention of seizures of food by occupying forces. There could also be coordinated acts of sabotage, such as flooding mines, cutting communications and rail lines, and banking blast furnaces in steel mills.
There would also be substantial spontaneous active resistance to invading forces by the civilian populatiomj^
Altogetherould anticipate significant and widespread resistance by civilians and possibly some military units with much bloodshed. While any overt resistance by Polish mililary units probably could not be sustained for moreeek or so, armed resistance would probably assume the form of guerrilla warfare or terrorism, and passive resistance would grow in intensity as the invasion phase mergedoviet occupation of Polar.MM
The Soviel Assessment There is reason to believe thai Soviet leaders may have felt at one time that and Soiiet Options if Warsaw Pact forces could be inserted into Poland in support of the
introduction of mania! law by the Polish regime itself, there might be lessin turn would permit the USSR io intervenemaller force. The Soviet leadership may also have entertainedcreeping invasion" (beginning, perhaps,akeover of the main rail trunk lines linking the USSR with Eastr the possibilityro-Soviet military coup lhat could bc supported withedium-size, Warsaw Pact tnierveniionary force. However, we believe thai by now the Soviets, in contemplating military intervention, no longer see any viable alternative to an outrightto be sure, with whatever "invitational" cover could be arranecdgjfjjk
Given the Soviets' likely assessment of the substantial resistance that Pact forces would encounter, we believe they would feel compelled to employe large invasion force of alnd perhaps as manyivisionflK
Early Soviet objectives would include the seizure of Warsaw, theof Polish political and military leaders, the arrest of some Solidarity officials and proreform members of ihe intelligentsia, and the establishmentuppet regime. The Soviets would also seek lo gain control of urban centers and seize lines of communications and other key military targets. They would move quickly to isolate Polish armed forces garrisons and discourage resistanceapid show of overwhelming military force.
They would also act quickl> to put down any Polish units offering military resistance. This wouldarge undertaking and, no matter how massive the intervention, there wouldigh likelihood of substantial damage to the transportation system and other parts of the economic infrastructure of
Betweenoccupation of Poland's factories would pose the biggest problem
andthe Soviets in the immediate wake of the invasion. These enclaves would
provide the focal point of resistance, giving heart to those fighting the Soviels, countering Soviet propaganda claims over factory radio-transmiisioni, and denying legitimacy to the quisling rcgimcf^
The Soviets could not rapidly or easily remove these centers of resistance. The quickest course would be to shell the factories, but this would inflame haired or the Russian occupier still more, destroy production facililies. and further blacken the international image of the USSR. If Soviet troops were used to clean out the factories, this would lake time and could become progressive!)
Poland inSecurity. Once the initial invasion period had ended, the Soviets
face monumental problems, and it seems almost inevitable that they
would be dragged even deeper into fulfilling bask administrative tasks, including those in the security field. It i> doubtful thai the Polish police or mililary wouldeliable force for internal security duties, particularly if. as it likely, there were prolonged passive resistance The Soviets would probably have to_bear much of the burden for policing the population for an extended perk
Passive resistance and noncooperation with authorities would become the rule, but this would be punctuatedubstantial amount of violence against the Soviet occupiers and Polishhe Church would counsel against excessive violence but would be careful not loollaborationist role. Although Solidarity would probably be officiallyand limits would be placed on the Church. Solidarity_would become lhe core for an extensive underground Polish society,ide variety of services for the population ranging from underground schools to noncemored communication^ organizing demonstrations, strikes, and oiher forms of oppotiiionfcfc
RtgeaeraiioHunctioning Go-ernment. Obviously, the Soviets would prefer to use their own forcesackup to new Polish party and government leaders who would take over the day-to-day governing of the country. Whether they would have more success in establishingunctioning indigenous regime than they have had so far in Afghanistan is not certain. They would have difficulty finding enough quislings, especially if the intial invasion had been particularly bloody. The party, especially at the lower levels, would probably disintegraie. and much of the jovern mental apparatus would slide further into passivity or obstructionism. The Soviets could certainly not count oniable pro-Soviet regime with anything like the speed with which they did so in Czechoslovakia, and even the medium-to-longer-term chances ofadar-type regime enjoying some legitimacy in the public eye would be slim. Thus, the Soviets would probably be heavily and directly involved in administering Poland for the indefinite -
Economic Disarray. Probably the best economic situation the Soviets could hope for in the wake of intervention would be to encounter only general passivity in workplaces. Production in polish industry would decline rapidly as morale and productivity fell to new lows. Critical bottlenecks soon would appear in essential services such as transportation and distribution. Civilian disruptions would be made worse by the military's prior claim on the transport network. Widespread hoarding and the withholding of output by private farmers would add to the shortages. Finally, foreign trade probably would quickly grindalt. Even if Western ships were willing to enter Polish waters, there would be no guarantee Ihe ports would have the capacity to unload civilian cargoes or that the Poles would be working the docks. Acts of sabotage and damage to plant and equipment would of course make the economic plunge even steepcraf^^
The Warsaw Pad. Because Poland's role in Soviet plans for war against NATO isoviet invasion could do substantial damage to the war-fighting capabilities of tbe Warsaw Pact. Poland's armed forces are the second largest in the Pact. Their principal wartime assignment is to form andilitary front (army group) by themselves. They are also assigned responsibility for supporting the wartime movement of Soviet troops and supplies through their territory and securing Soviet lines of communication to Central Europe. Their combat and logistic assignments exceed those of the Czechoslovak or East German forces and make Poland in some respects the most important of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies.
Even if all Polish mililary unils stood absolutely asideoviel invasion (which we regard asoscow would noi be able to interpret thai passive response as ensuring the continuation of Poland's current role in Warsaw Pact plans for war. The Polish mililary isonscript force, and each year itpercent turnover in its conscript troops. It also relies on mobilized reservists for much of its wartime strength. Thus the Polish armed forcesubsequent wartime mobilization would be composed for the most part of troops who probably would share the antagonism of the Polish populace toward the Soviet invaders. The fact that the Polish mililary did not actively resist the invasion at ihe time it occurred would be no test of how future conscripts and reservists would respondrisis with NAT^Lflb
Acquiescence by the Polish militaryoviel intervention almost certainly would leadrastic deterioration of morale, even for officers and NCOs, andoss of Polish popular support for the armed forces in general. As in Czechoslovakiaoviet invasion would probably cause massive resignations from the armed forces and continuing problems in recruiting qualified officers and NCOs. Consequently, the Polish military's combat capabilities would sharply decline, and Soviet expectations as to Poland's ability to contribute to Warsaw Pact mililary strength would bereduced^j^
Resistanceoviel invasion by the Polish armed forces probably would put an end to Poland's crucial role in Warsaw Pact war plans for five toears. Even if the resistance were localized and slight, ii probably would convince the Soviets of the needhorough purge of the Polish military. Until this purge was completed, the Soviets would place Utile or no faiih in the reliability of Poland's armed forces.urge would take years to complete. This was true of ihe Soviet purge of the Czechoslovak armed forces after the invasionhen the Czechoslovak military offered no resistance to the Soviet invadcrsf^
Finding an alternative means of fulfilling the wartime responsibilities now entrusted to the Poles would be difficult and costly for the USSR. Current Soviet plans for war are sufficiently flexible to allowomewhat lessened role for Polish combat forces. But the Soviets have not exercised plans for securing their lines of communication through Poland with their own troops and do not appear to have forces allocated or prepared to assume such support assignments. An invasion of Poland would certainly require Moscow to take on this task. Moscow might even have to compensate for the loss of most, if not all, of Poland's armed forces to the Warsaw Pact. These
forces numberen in peacetime and would more than double in wartime. Replacing them wouldtaggering task for the Soviets, and the difficulty would bc all the greater in light both of the sizable additional postinvasion forces that would have to be committed simply to police the Poles, and of the need to maimajn the USSR's current commitment of troor* to AfghanisiarmUa
Economic Costs. The most immediate cost for the Sovietof lhe invasionprobably not loom large in Soviel eyes, even if the Poles offered substantial mililaryar more significantburden would be imposed by the large Soviet occupation force lhat would have to bc kept in Poland, possiblyong time, to cope with the widespread popularresistance, insurrection, andthe Poles could be expected to mount. Maintenance oforce, plys lhe need to replace Polish military forces opposite NATO, wouldajor reordering of the Soviet force structure and missions. The increased force requirements would comeime of growing Soviet manpower stringencies, especially inasmuch as the forces would have to be combat troops that would be drawn largely from the Slavic rather than the ethnic minority population. The cost implications of all ihcse measures for the Soviet defense budget arc difficult lo estimate, but ihey would be substantial.^^
An additional, indirect cost of Soviet mililary action could be theof the Soviet harvest The harvest season runs from July througheriod during which Soviet agriculture relies heavily on the military for help. Preemption by the military of much rolling slock and civilian vehicles would also cause extensive and projpnged dislocations in lhe already severely strained transportation syst<
The most serious and longest lasting economic cost for the USSR, however, would be thai imposed by the need to restore the Polish economy to some functioning basis and to sustain itevel sufficient to reestablish some degree of poliiical stability. This wouldainful but inescapablefor the Soviel leaders, since ihey would want, in the short lerm. io minimize lhe effects of ihc crisis on CEMA irade and economic acuvjivand. in the long ictm.horeadly shaken Warsaw Pan allnned^B^
The cost io the Soviet Union of subsidizing the Polish economy is already substantial: on the order ofillion this year. This cost would at least double if the Soviets did little more than provide enough grain and other foodstuffs io keep Polish consumption from dropping precipitously, and
enough energy and industrial materials to ensure lhat key Polish industries and mining operations were maintained. If the invasion resulted in extensive damage to fixed capital, the costs would be much greater siill, as the restoration effort mighl then require rehabilitation of Hooded mines and reconstruction of damaged plant and transport facilities'^
Western creditor's demands couldnlunge Poland into default, and such a
Poland's hard currency debt service obligations would not need iourden on the Soviet treasury. Moscow would not want to see Poland default on its debt, since that would reflect badly on Easl EuropeanBul it mighl encourage Poland toebt moratorium and to open discussions on rescheduling. Ai the same time,ingle
possibility cannot be ruled out
Moscow is well awarelociy intervention in Poland would lead lo the imposition of Western sanctions on the USSR. What costs these sanctions mighl impose would depend on their scope and duration. The United States by itself could do litileurt theough sanctions program adopied jointly by the Uniled States, Western Europe, and Japan, however, couldar stiffer price than did the post-Afghanistan sanctionshe strength and durability of allied cohesion on ihis issue would depend in part on how bloody the confrontation in Poland becamcQM
A sanctions effort limited to denials of equipment and technology sales would not create muchardship, simply because few large projects are on lhe horizon. The notable exception is the proposed gas pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe. It would be an early casualty of Western sanctions,tartup date completely out of reach. Particularly painful for lhe USSR would be constraints on its access io Western grain. Agreement among the US. Canada, lhe EC, and Australia to limit sales would leave only Argentinaotential supplier (although even Buenos Aires has stated it would consider joining an embargo if the USSR invadedestern denials of industrial goods would also be costly to Soviet planners facedrowing gap betweenic produciion and needs for items such as machinery, steel, and pipe and chemicalF>
Impact on Soviet Relations WrrA Westernovietn of Poland, particularly if it were bloody and actively resisted, and ledrotracted armed struggle, would destroy optimistic West European assumptions aboul an East- Wesi security relationship that have persisted "
since the. In the short term, the Soviets realize, an invasion would heighten West European perceptionsoviet threat and seriously set back Moscow's efforts to weaken the Western Alliance. The Soviets would not believe, however, that an invasion would destroy West European hopes for eventual East-West rapprochement, or nullify the economic and political djsjres that drive West Europeans toward accommodation with MoscowS^
The ebb and flow of Polish developments have given NATO some time to prepare its immediate reaction to an invasion. Moscow is probably aware that the allies have agreed on an economic and diplomatic sanctions posture, including trade curtailment, recall of ambassadors, and scuttling of the languishing Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (although not of the Helsinki Final Acthile allied armed forces would be placedtate of heightened readiness, giving NATO some enhanced military flexibility, Moscow gould not anticipate that NATO would take any serious military actions^fe^
West Europeans have viewedcareful construction of ties meant to constrain and define the boundaries of East-Westmaking war in Europe less likely, and increasing mutual confidence in the motives and policies of competing powers. Some West Europeans have expected that detente would increase the Soviet sense of regional security enough so that Moscow would not need to fear social evolution within the Warsaw Pacify
A Soviet invasion of Poland would undermine these assumptions, reviving West European doubts about Soviet intentions, exacerbating West European perceptions of the Soviet threat, and thereby reducing public confidence in thcEast-West relationship. Detente, inense, would cease to exist
The West Europeans, however, wouldeed toew basis for Easl-West relations, and would begin to do so once the Polish situation had stabilized. Many would believeialogue with the East was still necessary to reduce dangers of war. Some would argue thai the Soviet invasion occurred within ihc USSR's own sphere of influence, and therefore constituted an understandable, if deplorable,ore common, if less immediate, reaction would be lhat economic interests required an East-West modus vivendi. despite the intrusion of military diplomatic shocks. Resumption of an East-West dialogue would not be far behindjMfr
Soviet military intervention in Poland might helpime to defuse West European opposition to NATO military modernization. The allies probably wouldaccelerate implementation of Long-Term Defense Program goals. But the allies probably would not significantly increase their defense spending. While incremental adjustments in defense budgets would be possible as part of an initial, angry reaction to an invasion, few West Europeans would be willing to sacrifice social welfare andprograms for the sakeefense buildup. Indeed, on reflection. West European governments might well conclude that the invasion had. at least over the medium term, weakened the Warsaw Pact and thus reduced the urgency of heightened military spending. The allies perceive little benefitilitary buildup because they do not believe lhat they can match Soviet conventional strength, and do not want to increase reliance on nuclear weapons to counterbalance it. An invasion of Poland, therefore, would at best only temporarily help NATO's effort to drploy new long-range theater nuclear
The West Europeans would retain their long-term interest in arms control. While an invasion would freeze or end existing arms control talks, the West Europeans would continue to believe that arms control offers the best road to military securty. LRTNF talks, even if suspended In the immediateof an invasion of Poland, wouldbe quickly revivedest European condition for missile deployment flftnfc
A similar pendulum swing would be exhibited in the area of East-West trade, since an invasion would not permanently destroy West European financial and industrial interest in such ties. Initially, the West Europeans would agree to selected commodity embargoes, although these wouldbe of limited duration. Negotiations for the construction of plants, pipelines, and other major economic facilities probably would be suspended, but not permanently terminated. Although West European governments would agree to limited application of economic pressure, they are skeptical about the usefulness of broad economicave complained in the past that such measures hurt their own* at least as much as they hurt the Soviet cconomyjJJ^p
The extent of individual countries' financial exposure in Poland probably would have little impact on their initial reactions,ebt moratorium would undoubtedly be declared. If default did occur, it would be unlikely to cause widespread bank failures or serious jeopardy to the intc* national monetary system because central banks would step ir.ttkk
A Soviet invasion of Poland couldrofoundly negative impact on the fortunes of West European Communist parties, which these parties would attempt to forestall. Italian Communist Party leaders have already strongly hintedoviet invasion of Poland would lead the PCI to break relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Spanish Communist Party, as well as th; smaller British, Dutch, and Belgian parties, would strongly condemn an invasion. Even the French Communist Party would denounce an invasion; the legacy of its stance against the invasion of Czechoslovakia is the sole remaining source of the PCPs claim to "Eurocommunist" status. The PCF has alreadytronger anti-invasion line asnart of the price for participation in the new French GovernmenuMR
Other International 'n the short run atoviet invasion of Poland would shore upin other East Europeanof course, would have
been one of the primary objectives behind the invasion. An invasion and subsequent rollback of reforms would put an end to any "spillover" effects of Poland, reinforce the more pro-Soviet elements within the other East European regimes, encourage the imposition of hardline internal policies, and strengthen pressures for still closer alignment with the USSRBJfi*
The main costs to the Soviets in Eastern Europe would probably beAn invasion would,rolonged period, further reduce Polish deliveries of coal and manufactured goods to some of the other East European countries (notably East Germany andisrupting CEMA economic ties and forcing the East European trade partners of Poland to seek more costly substitutes. The capacity of the East European economies to cope with their economic difficulties by introducing modest reforms would probably be further inhibited. The East European countries could all expect to suffer from reduced credits from and trade with the West, although the severity of the impact would depend in part upon thewith which individual East European regimes were seen in the West to have fulfilled their "fraternal obligations" in invading Poland. While the Sovieis would undoubtedly be unwilling to underwrite all the costs to their allies of an invasion, they would probably be compelled to absorb some.of the burden in response lo pleas thai failure on their pan to dj^so might spread destabilization within the "Socialist CommonwealthjHj^
Elsewhere in the world, the Soviets could count on few benefits from an invasion of Poland, although many of the costs would probably prove to be transitory. An invasion would obviously noi improve the Soviet image within
the Third World and in the nonalignedif this had few operational consequences. An invasion might also have the effect of partially blunting Soviet initiatives in tbe Middle East and inspiring somewhat greater toleranceS military presence. Most importantly, from the Soviet standpoint, an invasion of Poland could lead to an acceleration of defense cooperation between the United States and China and. perhaps, to further crystallization ofa "Beijing-Tokyo-Washington
Costs and US Actions While the present paper is premised on the assumption that the USSR
would invade Poland and that the Soviet leadership would incur the costs outlined above, it is conceivable that some additional Western or US actions beyond those noted above could either enhance the deterrent nature of costs already anticipated by Moscow io follow from an invasion, or intensify these costs in the wake of an invasion. US leverage in either instar.ee is quiteby the fact that many of the penalties the Soviets would have to pay would be independent of Western action, and by the limits of US influence over relations between US allies or third countries and the USSR.
From the standpoint ofoviet invasion, whai is most important is sustaining Moscow's perception lhat those costs which are potentially within Washington's capacity to impose would in fact be imposed (and lhat they would not be imposed in the absence of aneterrence, to the extent that the United States can effect it, depends on the Soviet leadership's reading of the US administration's willingness and political ability to get Congress and the American public lined up behind threatened responsesoviet invasion of Poland, and its ability to achieve and maintain agreement with allies over punitive actions. Similarly, further raising the costs of an invasion already unleashed by the Soviets would depend on sustaining the US reaction and that of allies and third countrie^j^
Potentially, the most profound additional deterrent against an invasion, and most serious further penalty the Soviets could be forced io pay if they didPoland, would not be possible NATO actions (which ihe Soviets wouldeightened COCOM controls, or the imposition of Western financial strictures, but the anticipation or reality of losing most Western grain imports. The USSRrain import requirement of perhapsillionear, and an add-onillion tons for Poland, assuming the latter is included in the Western embargo. Argentina in recent years has had an export capacity ofillion tons of coarse grain and wheat.
Thus even if Argentina failed to adhere to an embargo, denial ofrain by the US. Canada. Ihe EC. and Australia wouldajor setback to Soviet consumption and the livestock sector. Moscow has reason to doubt, however, thatomprehensive Western embargo would be politically sustainable for long in the face of tumbling pricesorld grain market that would quickly beconv gluttedf^
The West could effectively double the impact of sanctions on (he USSR by placing Eastern Europeanctions umbrella. Indeed, putting the burden of additional support for Eastern Europe on the USSR's shouldersime of increasing domestic economic stringency would prove far more disruptive to Soviet plans and options than would Western measuressolely against Moscow. To the Soviet requirement of at leastillion tons of Western grain would be added an East Europeanofillion ions of grain. Eastern Europe also depends on the West for substantial amounts of industrial materials and advancedtnd equipmeni. In terms of impact, its denial wouldultiple of the actual value of tbe trade lost. Only by supplying the Bloc from Soviet production could Moscow replace forgone Western trade; even if the USSR were willing, comparable replacements do not existumber of instances.
Measures against Eastern Europe, however, would also be the toughest to obtain. All the allies would be quick to note that these would undermine any movement toward greater liberalization in Eastern Europe, hurtingthe West has tried to wean away from Soviet
Moscow policymakers would certainly hope that actions taken by the US administration looviel invasion of Poland or raise its costs afier lhe fact would prove counterproductive. In the United Slates, they would expect substantial domestic opposition to be mounted by key groups whose interests would be affected by the imposition of various sanctions, and tbey might hope that attempts to push such sanctions through Congress wouldcleavages within the government and weaken the presentIn other Western countries, the Soviets could count on growing resistance to US efforts to employ lhe prospect or realityoviet invasion of Poland to get allies to adopt extra sanctions beyond those already agreed upon, to further heighten military readiness, to increase defense spending, to deploy additional or new weapon systems, or to accept the abandonment of various arms control agreements or initiatives. Moscow would attempt to capitalize on this resistance to divide the Wcsiern Alliancafi^