Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence
A microfiche copy of thiivoiloWo fromrinted copiet fromeoufar receipt of NFAC report) in either microfiche or printed form con olio be orremged through PPG/RUB.
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
cclor of Central lute Iii gcnee/lfhcs toec.Pienls of this Specs! NaUonalence Estimate ol ihnd ofu fn, jtlcontrol and the protection of itsconkfnts
It is nothown to or drWd with persons lacting the necessary security cleaianee and need-lo.nlhoul his pnOi approval
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following inlelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimates
The Centred Intelligence Agency, the Deienw Intelligence Agency, ihe Notionol Security Agency, ond the intelligence orgonirolioni ol Ihel State. Tre-Olury. ond Energ,.
The Atnitont Chief ol Stall Ic Intelligence, Department ol the Army The Director ol Navel InteUigence. Deportment ol thehe As&lant Chiel ol Sloll, Intelligence. Deportmenl ol Ihe Air force The Director ol In'eligence. Heodcuarlen,Corp.
II. THE USSR. REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE. AND
Instruments ol Sovirl Forrieii
Infrastructure and Revolutionary
C Soviet PoIky To-nd Various Kinds of Revolutionary
D Soviet Acttvitiet Thai Benefit
E. Thc Role of Soviel Allies. Associates, and
III SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
A. Par thr
B Fot lhe United
ANNEX A: The Hmonal Record Soviet Unit to
raining Camps inR and Eastern Europe
Tlic Soviels ate dcepli cngagei! Ih support ol revolutionaryworldwide. Such in vol vein nilasic tenet nf Soviet policy, pursued iu llie interests ol weakening unfriendly societies, destabilizing hostile regimes, anti advancing Soviet Interests.
Tlie USSK pursues different politics toward different types of revolutionary groups that conducl lerrorisl activities ltli.it is.ines. assassinations. lidiupings, bombings, and the victim' izalion of innocrnl civilians)
WIichIkt lerrorisl tactics are usetl in the course of revohitioiurv violence isailer of indirfeience to live Soviets,ve no scruples against tliem Tlie Sov let altiiude is determinedwhether tliose tactics advance or barm Sonet inlcrests in tlie particular circumslances Rcsohuioiiary groups that employtactics are simpl, one among ihe many instruments offoreign policy.
is conclusive evidence llul lhe USSR direclly orarge number of nationalnd some sepa-ratlst-irredenlisl: groups Many of these entilies. of both types, carry out lerrorisl activities as pari of iheir larger programs of revolutionarvotable example of Sov iet involvement is lhe case of El Salvador, where the Soviets have coordinated and directls,he delivery ol arms to revolultonar, groups that use terrorismane lactic
" Some revohitionarv groups thai emplo, terrorism doeasure of Soviet conirol and dneilion. but many do not
International Department ol the Central Committee ol tbe Soviel Communis! Paity has primary responsibility (or managing contacts with movemenis in opposiUon to eslabbshed govern-
' NH-mIini.it tuvil moirmrnhml lodiniloim itircolilnil oiiriu.iMnnr.fis CumrOsolalssrV Hsr
r SWAPO Itnl
'Sma'dUir bwdrvitU swwm(hji ihu mnuiim- ni'iow-nhcui iniqudl
mlinwvimt nr iihV Contain ul wl> iituxmnili I. SSR mmu'ii Ol hit
mcnls. Tlie KCB. ttlf CltU. andh Directorate of llie Soviet General Staffroad range of military and paramilitary training lo mcmlxMS of revolutionary groups, in various camps in llie USSH and chess here, and provide arms and oilier assistanceide spectrum of rcvolulionary groups in thefricans, and Latin Americans' Much of this support is readily utilitahtc iu Icrrorlsl activities.
Tlie Sovictv suppori cvftai" allied or Iriendly governments andLibya, certain Palestinian groups. Eaststates. South Yemen, andin turn direclly orupport thr terrorist activitiesroad spectrum of violent revolutionaries, including certain of lhe world's nihilistic terrorist groups."
The USSR accepts these suppori iiclions of Us allies and friends It does so on occasion because these actions also serve Sovietand on other occasions because they are part of the price lo be paid foi maintaining and increasing ils influence with allies and friends The USSH has noi made ils backing (or ihemon (heir desisting from aiding nihilis'ic terrorists or oilier violent revolutionaries In this sense. Moscow is willinglysuppori. albeil indirectly, to inter national terrorism
With respect to Soviet polio totsard nihilistic, purely terrorist groups, available evidence remains thin and in some respect* contradictory, even though lhe human intelligence collection programs of the Uniled States and its friends have been giving this problem close scrutiny (of some sears
activities of some ol lhe nihilistic teriorisi groups are carried out by individuals Irained b* Soviel friends and allies lhatihem with weapons, such terrorist* have sometimes transited Soviel Bloc nations Yel lhe lerrorist activities of these groups are noi coordinated by tbc Sovicls *
'Set inntieiiAor dVufli
ViAifuij air(roup*ilh hiilr cnblxil-monell M
>>itderil (rasa m
ed AmReJ tVnixirt m> St*'.rrlrt iKe ihr Wmn*sic iSiii rinm
nol ihr Dt'trioi Dtftmiffiwif. ihr 'iiu'uniSuit., ih*nl iMef-irnw. Ileitavwr
Cotilr iiiiiinrPruhimi' "I
StwwitirSir wla *ASxii* Ico-uriihrir Irriawii . U Cairrr^ lavninri. o- rUruhlre. o- indirect'i/
ik'oi.en liit fU'on<-ii- ruun/nn Cubjni rVrii.numorhi- MHtlflu*icn ihf laoHl it"'
ie Soviets have on occasion privately characterized certain ni-InliHic terrorism asnd have urged otliergroups lo cease and desist from terrorist acts the Soviets considered
protestations by the Soviets that the, do not backare compromised by the indirect Soviet support received by certain nihilistic terrorists, as well as by the direct support the Soviets afford to national insurrections and separatist-irredentist movements which conduct lerrorist acts
The Soviet policy of differentiated support of various kinds ofolence'benefils Soviet overall interests al low risk or cost, and witltout significant damage to Soviet prestige. It is therefore likely to continue
There is no basis for supposing that the Soviets could belo join lhe Wesl in genuine opposition lo International terrorism as a
The broader phenomenon of revolutionary violenceore significant and comple* issue for lhe United States than is ils terrorist component per se The severe instabilities tb.it exist in many sellings in the Third World are chronic.noi soon be overcome, and in many instances would continue to existof the USSR.
There is no simple or single solution lo these problems because of thc variety and complexity of circumstances leading toviolence and terrorism. Iu every case, theixture of three approaches reduction orof external support, police and/or military aciion to combat violence, and the opening of channels for peaceful change
INTRODUCTION A. Scope Note
1 Tt* Estimate dealt mm ihr natwc of Soon Mrpport lotterrorism.it run lhe broader framework of revolutionary violence. Tht Eailmalr (al riimino wch suppott In several conteiti and with respect lo various Ispcs ol ievolutionsry violence.ndicates the degree io whleh the Soviets directly or ir.'nc-ily support international tecroriim. (e) iwran how inleinslioasl lerroaurn ray eoosrilwl* lo Sovw* foreign policy obirrines. (d) aoessrs lhe decree lo which lhe perpetrator* ol revolutionary violence, particularly ihoseresnri to terrorism, are drurnd-ent on Soviet suppori; andIdentifies rhe slgnifl ranee (or Soviel and (or US interests of lhe several variant! ol revolutionary violence
2.aisuaitdnap-inev bombings, and other act! lhal octimiie innocent civiliansrequent component ol revolutionary violence, le. violence aimed al undermimnii orolitical Malm uuo The demarcation between terrorism and guerrilla and fuiamililarv activltiei ia wmet'tnes muily.
3 Revolutionary notrnor ananlfesU iuelf Ira lhe lorm ot national intoigrrtnn. lesaralistlrrerlentisl movements, and Mrntillic gioupt
insurgencies are broad based which seekniform the fundamental
'v by armed revolutionary meansol such (roup* which ihe USSR tapports or hu supported are SWAPO (bt Namibia) and ZAPU (in the former Rhodesia]
movements believe that they (onslituto nationt without states ind seek (0
assert iheir national autonomy or Independence The Palestinian (roupshuh the USSR wpporU or hai supported ricmplify audi movement l
Nihilist! are small groups with little public-Ilth rely almost ewhruvely en lerronsr act! lo destroyi to male -as for nrv. ones. Examples are the rUadeiMtmhC! group in Cermans. lhe laoencv Red Army, and the Red Brigades in Italy, wrack prolesa the -lhal Western imtiiulions ate their major inlago-
B. Nature of the Evidence
uman InteHigenee. particularly clandestine, is Ihe principal source of information oo Soviel assistance lo violent revolutionaries. The coverage of suchvaries greatly by legion Evidence is falriv good concerning Lalin Arr*rica, Africa, and theEast; il is lest certain concerning Western Europe.
Reporting on Soviet links lo sera rat iitv ine-dembu is miiedf-
ihould be noted thii the differences ofwithin lhe tntdtlgence Communityoncertainmailer* relate primarily to the validity endof the evidence and (he degree to whichevidence and the karic ef givenconfident rudimenti beyond available
II. THE USSR. REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE. -AANO INTERNATIONA! TERRORISM
A. Soviet Interest in PevoJuliorvory Violence ond Terr or hmnstruments of Soviet foreign Policy
USSR and several countries wiih whichclose ties are the principal backers ol theviolence thai is suchprominent featureinter national politics. Moscow's leaders
'rtlieaer Conrnunili uUcai mot Orauadtnf crrlrni U>
amo men ngriulnU TV tullww. ol TV Tittb)b*nd ihtin th. ramon tod .
great deal of initial Md.ht beesherwebhouchaid citooivd. donimefaed.
. cubfelhc book(h. rrlatMlli.
el senili.ni canons xc carta. oUxti
*ra Inccnm <xtodetail SWrltne'i eontliBloethat ihe SmSTuur KM. -leVunwo. Ironoinl. bv* It- o-irtbut.
If* lo it InHiot
eieole andoverlanorel emcrnrau. HtRted-roel iheirII
/ rhe Oi'eetor.i,f.
tire-crIf* Airuteni Oar/Sta//iheihr arena. /lUriltee-ce. HWd. eumren.. oad rhe AuHioaf Chie/t*K. TneyteAeHiuranien.
airte avion* fiUAie'WnoS many onuh(*a. rhrbu
o/condmUmi are taamd am other Pain ofboa*..
-holrihrhedo .r. onsirthiiv to
e*/eo, lh. Somm Vale*bid* Icailrtf
Ih. pane.eaWf atea* end
rjlnttd in BOfitmA/ ih.Houomr'i nvnuna* e/
eonsKter revofutioruiy Croupi lhal employ terrorist tactics to mnply one .moo, lhe marry ico-rumenU in theolal foreign policy arsenal ofmiliiary.wlcapons The combined purpose of these iwliumenli is to facilitate what Soviel leaders brheue to be an inesitable march of historyorldolncreuiiscly favor.bte to the USSR and the Soviet Communist Parly. To the decree lhalviolence cootiihules to lhat process, it isWhen terrorism occurs.ccepted oras circumstances dictate.
T. Revolutionary violence occursariety ofinsurgency movements in the ThirdoldSWAPO lothnic and religious separatism io lhe Third Woild and on lhe fringes of Europe (eri. the Armenians in Turtey and the Basques inihilism fo Western Europe (ee,Red Brigades inBd ,heCTIomt aclisiiie* of states agairut one another. Libyanagainst Egypt) hi some cues,n oflshoot ol broader militantOut in otherthe European nihdins and several of lhe Palestinian separatist groups)mode of operalioa
S. Soviet support of revolutionary violence Is rauicularly generous in those situations where Soviei leaders conclude that revolutionariesood chance of trarssformlng an Mistingm into oneore amenable to Moscow or less fa-scuable lo Western interests Motco- prefers to refer to these groups ts -national liberation- movement Since the definition ofliberation" is fleaible enough to cover (he subversion of any regime disliked bs the SovieU. and since gueiritla Udles often Include terrorism, the oelhatthe tee roriit activities ol Ihe group, receive subsUMtal Soviet supporl
9 Moscow favor, group,. orhemsel.e. intowin wiih, mass movements utihans large-scale Mitalional. guerrilla, andilitary tactics. It does so for several reason*
Such move-menu enjoy greater prospects forIhan small bandl of tcrrorisU because they attract greater indigenous support and are more likely to be regarded as legilirrute expression, of popular wplraliow by the Third World and vac loos elements io lhe Wesl.
Wh^movrtivrnti. because lhe* Deed Urge-ieele military eutKancc. are more drprodnil on lhc USSH lhan air imallnd aie therefore mote suae* pi Maj lo Soviet iafluencr
he Key lector in the Snvari ralenlin. however, il clearlyellicular method ol operation, aior leiiorOnv bat what particular mlaluie ol diplomatic, military, rcooomir. nri advance* overall Soviel foreign polirv inierefli in each given situation and aleach rondure in lime Whether lenotism irroii in suchatter ol indllfrrrnce to Ihe Soviets, uho have no particular icrupli againatf cen-Iral importance lo ihem ia that the tatttn of ihose whom Ihey asiitl are effective in advancing binad Soviet inlerests When the eoportuniiv is presented, moreover, hloscow dees not hesitate In seek, political or inopaeanda advantages ftoin tlie aetiviiies ol terror-ms. as in the aeirure of lhe US Ernbaut in Tehran and (he recent beadingaliilani aiilinerabul
II. Where the it Uus or active-in of particular re%oare deemed of lesser importance lo Soviet intetesti than are competing groupi or good telalioni wiih lhe host lovetnoseni. lupporl tosually subordinated lo the broader impcraTives el overall Soviet policy The avowed position of thehat Ihey oppose terrorism, but thii public position iinnd by Sowset activiiief lhat aid rroare lhal use terror Um f*
oviel tnfrosfruclure rand Revolutionary Violence
s in Ihe case ol all othei aspects of Soviel for-eiin policy making, lhe ultimate locut of deoncci concerning Soviet lupport lot movemroli in opposi lion to cflabllihrd eovernmenli at the Politburo ol (he Communis! Patty ol (he Soviet Union (CPSU) The Sonets give public support lo various ievototionir> movements, and revolutionary leaden have regulailv
attended Soviet partv congresses. Individual Politburo members have met with lhe leaden el some groupa that have engaged In terroriithver Tambo el thcw Arafat ol lhe PLO. and Samuel Nurorna ol SWAPO.'
13 Under the Politburo, all asoeeu el Soviet na tional leeuriti policy are coordinated by ihr Central Commilleebureaucracy. Within the Centralapparatus, the Internal tonal Department of the Crnltal Commutee has primary resporuibility for theo-da > management ol Soviet roniarts with nenruling Commurbet parties and rrvraVionru)abroad The International Orpailment (ID) is run by Born Ponomarev and Mikhailchiel Soviet ideologue, lenaor party Kcrttaii.ull Politburohu long had teiponbbil-aies in ihe area ol Soviet relit torn wfeh foreign Com muni it patties and lef (tit movements The ID it almost certainly the principal link between lhe USSR's lop noheyrnaken and ihoae revolutionary moverncnti whleh ihe Soviet* support, ll Is reasonable lo aisume that the ID miles policy reeomwnditiora to lhe Politburo concerning lhe terrorist artlvities of these movement!
umber of Soviet cmbasiars have IDon their
ihey pet form both avaiaoo and idrelion in contactsforeign lefliit roevemenu and pro-Soviet parties The ID alio appears lo have resoorabil i'lvidi-i( fundi lo Such groups, though in iot instances the mertianirs of pasiing funds have been handled by the KCB
he Soviet Minlatry ol Foreign Alttii* (MFA) appears toore limitedhan the ID with irgard lo Sovirl contact with nonmhng pulley both Coram urt lit and non-Coin muni it. and wiih illegal pro-Soviet otgaruiatmro Thiiix&ar, ol Ubor wherein the MFA is rraponiible lor ilite-to iiai' rela lions with foreign governments, while the Central Committee appa'atui deals wrth loceiin pstliral par lies and movements
C. Soviel Po-ey Toward Various Kindi ol
Revolutionary6 Soviet iupowI of nationalkaog-Handing The Sovieis tcrk to iuitlfy their support by
sstchu rulinrul liberation"
irtovcrnertti Their li abundant evidence of (ninina of Thin) Woild insurgent! within Ihrell ji In Cuba. Soulh Yemen, various Palestinian nmia. and probablyrnpe The Soviets also provide large quantities of umi and cottsidenblruch iraurgenli and lhe>i> patron* Soar* of iboae traioed and equipped by lhe Snvirtl or iheir friends and allies ma We their way halo slriclry tetiorisl group*
V USSB also ha* Im with some groupsihe arcond general type ofmnm the cthnac and ieftgiosn separatists she eonatitule asource of revolsnaonery nolcaicf in coMrtn-poraiy politics and are main etnploiers of lerrorislDirect Soviet support gees largely In sepa-ratuts-irredentists lhal ihr Soviels bclinc wiU further llseir feteign policyn critical areas, surb as Ihc Middle En si. Fringe groups. houevet. also derive bench! from Soviel largess lo the eiienl lhat they al-lend training omits in the USSR (and possibis Easternr In such counlries as Cuba. Libs a. and Soulh Yemen lhal have csosr rrillth Moscow Abo. (lasl Bloc arms have been sent lo the mcei >iossrd of lhc separatists bv Warsaw Pad countries and bs groups and irglmes arilh dote palatal and rts&tsry lies to ibe USSR. bla> Fauh.ack and Syria. Certain sr-pareiw group* have alio received landing end fibe documents Irom rrgames that enaas close lebtions with lhe USSR
oviet policy toward lhe ihird general line of revolutionaries, the nihilistic, strictly lerroilsl groups.'" is ouile differenl Tlie USSR has olten condemned nihilistic terrorism In public and en occasion inSoviet leaders apparently consider rls main practitioners to be uncontrollable adventurers whose
well etwc* wlrv Ihr nvlm itim a( noraom VVVikriawh thrrer"ad aaaanalead.
Sere* are .iWSuUa al ruin Ik* Ik* Oaf* a.llMi cam Mm
aim* aanaau iV raaaa la> nolaa yuaSa sarin* (at lawurn' WaaQ hat lW* aliasa *cihaaawat aaamawa* aa the tmil of
hcu'MbI tn-aw Ur iWUTa ih*aad
annual aira ut lia IHh
"Farrtahol. IS*naadn lb*i Atmy
behavior anlagopiersgoserisnsettUima<nsg Is iheir interests, and onrnfaeafers Sn-se" personnel or urvtrtnUaai lhe Srarirt fJairclive ef lornctwiaif. aswsre broadly based rrMshalKirierv tramrmrras Korjcthrseas. sonse mhaltai appeal In the Irainiat camps of Sovsel friends, end have received funding and Cast Rlnc aimsati-eiy rd sources. The Smseti hair rW made theirInr ihese friends eruslingenl on llseir druilinai from aidiraj ruhilislic lerrorUm Ira addition, individual nihtUtti have apprarrdthe Icoa Curtail and have found refuge in Lanetn Lutupr and Cuba
n recentorth lype of terrorism has rjecome more rxonourscedlerrorismtate ln-sliument. nolaWv to lhe Middle East against hostile Hates and dissidents lising aheeed. Tliere. terrorism has been conducted bet-een Ssria and Iraq, and lirael and the Palm munimeu has employedagainst North lemeti and Oman. Libya has used it againsi Egypt and Ssna has initblrd leirorum againsi loidan. Libia. Sina. Iran. ChaV. andiU has* Irrioured dluideisti lisiisg abroadumber of eases, lhc icgimes emplotins terrorism have close iclaivaisi wiih ihe VSSR. and the Smiets hive good leaaon lole al uwne of lhe lirtrli lueK as lhe Sadat gave name rat aa Fgtpt
oviet Activities Thol Benefit Terroristi
he USSR and Ms allies and friends provide militaiy and political training for large numbers of Third World adivHii supply arms lo naiHms and oreaniralionj thai baei letrorisls.itl-nui iKipoiini or impirmeeiina: eoMreb over use or Iranslet. and are known on occasion lo have- permittedrnll of lertonstl though their Irirnory and lo have givca them lalrhaven
Thousands of Third World tevolu-
Itonafies have bom provided military training within Ihe USSR and Eastern Furope Such training snehades lhc trae c4 seaooos. sabotage.ndof value lo those mteirflfdco ltd urt ing isssuraencies. but ol value as writ to wtwild-tte le<rorislia|^
M la jiWii-Mihr training ofIn Ihr USSR (he Soviet! aho provide adviirn lot liaimnc facilities in other count hes (Cuha. Libra. SoulhIn (hcv situations. Ihe icvolulmna'v (icups inappoint thr Hudenu. and the Soviets arcic thai lome of ihr siiilihave been used
lo.ommil Inmiivl acta
V> Therce-dir* lo loene alWalieeu. teS aumanee fiomfact allies in llie iraininat of loreicn insuicrniy" Such use of the Easi Bloc would be advaMageoui to lhe USSR, by prriraol.nc bolh lhe armearane* and lhe italilynified Communul elloil toasuil Thild World revolutionary movement!
have reports (Wl. unconfirmed) of >
number of Iraiiiin,in CKehralovakia one innd leveral^nioeeified-inniileiiu. and Itnmar
lie deieiiiriHHi o( learning
hat most I on
iiiUi-lipe *eSr.Hki Souien dctrtlbrm. small und tactics. UW we of eiplm-vn. communications, and intelligence gather an*'1 Tin. training it more (Ian adequate preparation
Supplies. In recrnl resia. ute Sovtrishave made rilensiv* arena(oWorld One ronieouenre nl (line aimsbeen the ready avsilabltttt ol weaponsrrhlaior Soviet anusthea Syria) The Soviet* aiethai aome ol lime arehe ease ol FJ Salvador (he Soviets havedirectly participated in lhe delivery ol armsgroups The supi-wl and encourage-
given bv lhe Cubansroad lance of Ijitn American radical groups. Ihe aupport hy Libia and Sovnh Yemen lo various Palmiruan and Third Worldand lhc linti which those iroups in turn have with tetrorisl mginlulloni facilitate access of these groupt to modem weapons and eiplosives.mall aims of multiple national origin are reedih availableanetv ol soureei IO teriorbt croups
most d'amatiC inuances ofini.l. ol lerroriUi invotn
lheanporlablr antiaircraftwo mchlound In the poaaruMmroup ol ' (evroruta iabeywere le have been uard to shoot down ao brad, isauencrr plane as it landed in Rome Thr mu-stlei probably had been given to the Syriani for more conventional military use and subsequently found their wai into the hands of lhe Paleatinisn lerrorub in llah In Januarylhe Kenyam apprehended live mrmbrrs of the Popular Front for tlie Liberation ol Paleilinr 4PFLP) preparinc to uie SA-Ts against ae In-Itraeh airliner Mi Nairobi In ihis case, the mbr vln had been suppUed by Libya andintolh Somali aKbiance.ere aued by the ZAPL' iZimhabvie Afriren People'a Union) foteei lawice, ino ihoot down Vn-eount pasaencer planei. the weapom had iirobabli been delivered le SUPU by lhe Sovaet Union via ZJ.nlna or AneiJa In November ISTB Kalianies missilesan near the imall Adriatic port of Ottona. Three Italian! in the van were nvreben ol lhe ikluhalic croup Werlersordamanhe irandeMFLP mere-brr The issue of lhe ultimate destination of live mls-sileiai nevei resolved.
ll sbhouihlear lhal many reveJwtieaaaryand lepaialiali are lhe direct and indiiret recipient! of Sonet aims, (herenly limKed in-formatlrni about Ihe lourccsol armi totopun
'i i-v airw al ttorfnw liKHeaar iht OutturniA|nei. Hnln ggjgg
Unw Canm. awe" akr uniu CW mi Sufi. IwAew.hr* mnmm rat. aMeegl evasvwr.
rllIn twinoi ti writ
f MiauUlf Eta. It ahnint i
01iflty "Hffld/ldlVi1 " af ihu wu]]
to/wi- rAari nliHi i paeaanj What wan otax aa EaMi
" TSwfc nt sellinwb" UW Sa-xu iUntil, nvmnatver iufw-afi
tbiaii il.il iVmhalqwll
Iron mififit xhinVi and ito eUilaa al <
tilioel Iindodine lucrvr* I"lMiml lo homer lalinL and 'or owblicf
i noted above, llie PFLP appears lobe laiimsornwl lathe Workers Autonomy t'owp Hi llah and ahn poaubh la lhe Redwhach have uled Crerhnvlovak arms
ASvirl ereleiun ol Uinriu inirlal
fonrif and Se/rAaoen. Over (beerroioti have Iravelrd In the USSR and Eavtnn Furope. partarwlarry in East Cermany PFLP leaders. Ceorce llabbaih and lhe late Wedi lladdad. received medical Itealment'.'cinananew Red srm> aclivbt. Black Septemberoyembrii. PFLP terrorist!roup el
Irrrauli canving. my*jtcriiilml inl diffeicnl tinwv Torre
Sun: hren. report! lhal mnUn ol the
M Arm. Faction (Baadr.> Fart CVnWl Theie hai ahu brent. aliua
Ihai member! nlo. Rrd IABGm ensaard
li"ii Eunpr. aoub-'r CaBdhoalwal-a. and
I^tt hrrn inn aad uvkd hr <Jj*rt*alovelHrnacvri, ihr rehebaJay ofpen lo
E. rho Rut* of Sonet Alas. Aiaoraolei. and Chant)
JI The Saatxlt xfy heanlyn Ihor rflartidvance mahraoa. partMalaity ka Ihr Thud Wnaldaciclnr-nt anr lhc Cubana. ibr
PaW.cuarn. .nd ihr Libyan* SoMh Tyrarn provide!
rumpao rprolulioaary hare* urerled
aailou tinneivUive Arab rrt>BBO* aad iahn govern-
Nonhyria,el un* liiur o.
auutlwitujancM Sonet arma aaal/ar fundi lo Ihr pr'C" atari of rmJnrmarv
VI Moace* curta vannal daarrer* of naanra aad ir.fV^iOT on* aa aba aad friend* drpendxie u* on Ih* <aad reaaaa of artrrttan le Alum,a ihougb the Cohaan haw aaeae obanr-lina ofbeyJjeaiel dirrc-
more lerwiv in lalin Ammri. howem. aial i. icii aurne lalui AnirairanK> ownandBv lheaaafaj VAan, IJhyeictrvfaa* ar* Kid. Karnj at Oadhafi own Inerta brae. Thr Swam reonve eooaalrrablc iaf uaanaa af bard onioro rho. aaaaa aafea tond aof Sonet iiaman in truni.tuar.rriiufen funda aadrta* k> am.. in Afnca, the MatdU Pan. or rlvwlnrv
ailmarn" Caanaav ami Ckcoo-
- I- polieiei are n
aad arr lubant lo. hawaaeal
firejuenrhSonat partner* in rapport of eanigauci
aadaanaraU wfakfc trrrnamtlyiaraivihiarr ianal>orajuppori "area Ihai lo loin ettarr in Imoriambae* IrnoruU In aAhlkm. leiroraliaorae Eatt Hmoprancale Into Tavkrv. whereIramenlL'*
a Th* USSR and Cab* arr raarnaaajof td*(Jai*ralrirrpraaa an Ihr Third World aad iheywerlhr* Meat Cuban raWrnot diimndIr.owrver. If II wei* notmiliary and erwnoraie aad to
Cuba,be anabl* lo
lantr-anb oueiatioea oetaide ili hordervCuba haa bam la Ihr lead io araHulia latin Antrim, and the Sonata' -matt* baa TWraarr rrcrtth- lhe San>ta, eiranV autaraaiLai I* lhal a* lenor.
aUr (ntiiuuue to Bartr rflnru to mvdnrrUor caatWai
w. an anon, in* USSR and Cuba appear In beong-term coordinated cam pa iin toiympaiheltc Lalln American regimes In ihitCuba and other Soviel friends and allies aie play-int lhe more directin supporting, revolutionary groups Irtfrmsified Soviet activity in this regionari increase ia terrorist behavior there.
Libya. Libya ismaior and direct supporter olerrorism and has purchased large Quart-titin of arms from the USSR. Although Libya is not controlled by the USSR. Libyan and Soviet short-term goals have often been complementary. Because the current relationship benefits the USSRumber of ways, tt it highly improbable thai Moscow would see* lo pressure Libya to withdraw supoott from terrorists
While Libya's oil revenue* allow ithop widely for aims and development assistance, it has spent heavily in the Soviel Bloc Currently, there ere mereXX) SovietOO East European civilian techniclani in Libya.ilitary advisers from lhe Bloc ate active in every branch of the Libyan armed forces. The Soviels base sold Libya Quantities of weaponry far in eicess of Ihe capability of the Libyan forces alone to use. Moscow has notthe transfer oflightlhe Libyans to third parlies!
he Me.liniana. Tne M'fM have Jong "sup: ported Ibe Palestinian* and llieit umbielia mgimu-Iron. Ihe Palestine Liberation Organiialion (PLO) Together with llseir Fait European allies, the Soviels provide Ihe single moil Important source of armiby ihr 1'itesr.lnlani In lheeais alone, lhe SovieU have provided thousands ol Palestinians with military and paiamllilary training icjaci'ilies in the USSR and elsewhere. Those liained have tnrtkded members of organiutiona such aa thend lhc yrtandominated Saiqahave engaged its terror
l Salvador Is lhe moB prominent currentof lhe Palestinian* tn Latin America. Do ringtrainedalvadoran lebeu
SI. Souin remen. tne rnaiauimo-cratie Republic ol Yemenunder Sovietandalar crostioadi (or internationalnd ladiealtraining, -capons, ttamit. safehaven. (oaged pasioocls. and Other servieei For iderdogScal and econoraie reasons. Moscow hai greater irJliaence in the PDRY than in any other country in the Middle East. The nrKng Yemeni Socialnt Parts Is committedariety* ol obirctivTi urth which the Soviets lympaihate: ibeot revolution to the Peinan Call, rebellion in Oman, subversion in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and the promotion ol radical cauiei in general The Aden regimereaty ol friendship and cooperation with Moscowolds observerin the Soviet Blocouncil for Mutual Eeonomie Assistance (CEMAk. and Is dependent on Bloe auiuanec.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
A. for Ihr, USSR
ince the Bolshevik capture of powei in Russia, one ot" the principal, consistent Icoett of Lenin. Stalin, and their luceessors lias been thai the pcoletaiian
worlen of the West and the colonial or foreurly <olo-raial people* al -hainow call the Third World are.H bnonve. natural atbet ot thc USSR aaal ah Gommimi* Party For Western worker* lhal docirvnr hai renrralli been invalidated by thr failure ol meal ol liteme attracted to Soviel Commtirnim lo any ligmfiranl degree Out Soviet doctrinal faith withIn the Third World hai mbwanliafly more toat The rvormoui weaknrves el allriot there.o Soviet(ragililv of pufcllcil. locial. and eeonomie ItWuulloais. Ihe many pauvnnatr tribal and ethnic Mparatbtth* many diipules between and among Iheie ui'rv lhe *ip*rience el those countries with Wntrm but not with Soviet cetonaaIritis, the eibteece of the rich US treprgoat. and widespread diualiifaclion wiih certain VS policies. Allflet viiioro lo Moscow of Commonist advance, huiried along by Soviet eaparnution.
SI This prospnt helps eiplaui -hin hai* mid*oncerted elfert, (or so mans years, lo tiain Third World people of aR mis of lift. Al letituHv liillr cost but with consilient aim. these pro gram, have been mended noi eel. to Third World'.iar. pervonncl engineers, eduraton and the hie. bail to re.ohiiionariei ai -ell Hence lhe USSR hai dricloped ils wide ranging program* oland indirect lupport for many kinds ofviolence in ihe Third World, in the expectation that Soviet irneirUi -all be accordirxti advanced For yimilar rraioni of sell-interest. Soviet pohev is quale dilferem -ilh tripect to nihilistic, purely tniorUt groum Many ol them operateholly different. European setrlne. have little popular suppori. mas general* reactions that let bark the fortunes cf itvelu-tioriarsngage an aetiviiies thaiaim Soviet imtillilioni snd personnel, and mayrelations with West European and some Third Wot Id countries
SS Suoaanet of revolutionary violence, includinr. it*omponent, provideseans of Incnirai or eiploitinc walenl and deslabilmng conflictegional ai -ell at global scale, with small tul ol US retaliation or direct military confrontation with the United Slates. Trrroriim in Third World rrtroru hai fiequc-ttyhe initial nage el anll is vubarqutnlly uaed in conn-mlion with Iniurceni activrlici thai aie desiined to undermine thr eilablnhed Eovrrnmenl The intent ii to oiomolr
JPiI NOfOM/NOCtffWrs ACT/OftCOr*
obiectives and lo eipand Moscow's influence and presence in aieu ot lhc Third World, including those which supply oil aod olher vital raw materials or which lie oo Ihe access routes to these strategic resources.
oviet support of revolutionary movements thai employ terrorism Is sometimes an effective and cheap means of fostering instability, thus confronting lhe United Slatesifficult choice: to aid shaky authoritarian governments in the difficult problem o( establishing order over the long term, or to acceptand reduce the American presence. Also, where Soviet support of revolutionary movemenis aids their accession to power, such regimes ihen provide the Soviets with platforms snd surrogates for beginning or accelerating the terrorist revolutionary cycle anew- in neighboring countries.
support for national insurgencies inWorldumber of foreign policyinclude:
establishment ol ami-Western regimesto Soviet interests
Attempts, to weaken or undermine governments that are friendly lo the United States, as In El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America and the Caribbean.
Opportunities to acquire potential strategic advantar.es, as In southern Africa and fhe Middle East.
The cultivating of ties to "futureuch as Samuel Nuiomj ol SWAPO.
The undercutting ofhineseand the cultivating of pro-Soviet factions of inuirgcril movements, as in Soviet support for ZAPU in Zimbabwe
The enhancing ol lhe USSR's diplomatic stature bv supporting the "legitimate revolutionaryol "oppresseds reflected In Sovirt support for black nationalist insurgentsto thc government ol Soulh Africa.
Sovicl (Imon hasewmovements*!hat ihreatcn the stability olto lhe United States or hostile lothc threat olencouragemenl providesv.uh leverage against countries likePakistan On occaimn. actual assistance may be
rendered to separatists by Moscow In order loegime lo conform to Soviel wishes.
ovicl support for the PLO, the mahxgroup receiving Soviet aid. derives from both regional and inter national Interests. Il helps assure Moscow of coniinuing diplomatic entree to the Arab slates in the Middle East and lo Palestinian supporters more broadly throughout North Africa. It provides leverage forampaign (gains: the Camp David accords. It allows lhe USSR to pose as the pairon of the struggle against Israel, in turnlo live dependence of some radical Arab slates on Soviet military aid and political tuppori. It creates the potential for undermining US influence among pto-Westein regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, lhat oppose Isrjeli policies Indirectly, it may enhance Moscow's: ability to pressore eitensive Soviel strategic presence in thc rcgr-in in the form ol purl facilities, base rights, and military advisers And it gives Moscow another dimension inin America Civetsange ofadvantages stemming from lhe Palestinian connection. Soviet leaders appear for the most part lo look the other was wiih respect io Palestinian terrorist activities, even some thai do not profit Soviet interests.
or lhc Uniied Slotei
eneral V$ Inlereili- US policy hasbeen lo encourage csolutionary change andiolent processes of reform, together wiih tlie free international movement of persons, goods,orld markedly different from what lhc Soviets pie let. Revolutionary violence and terror ism threaten to unleash sudden and dangcious crises, which endanger tlvc stability of friendly regimes, preoccupy governments for prolonged peiiods o) time (as did thc Iranian resolution and the subsequent sei-auie ol ihe US Embassy innd can lead toight regional warfare Such violenceii'm':-'! ill US allies and [fiends among 'hem Israel. Great Britain, Turkey, Italy.Spam, hi Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia Sonic ol these governments may be overthrown by violence, and others mav be paralyzed Oi.iolence and terrorism may spread suddenlyii:lintn stable and peaceful* countries, as in Uiuguav in the, or perhaps Coslas
Wertuea to be lhc rxincipal site ol inlecruliooal lr.ro.iun0 more thanercentecorded .rsctdenl. of international terrorism loot place in Western Europe The symbol, ofpower and prosperity are by far lire most frequent target* of inlernational terrorism0 there werettacks on Americans,n cideuls involving TJSlargest number of attacks on diplomats on record The widespread and sustained nature of tlse terrorist threat to US interests is illustrated by lhe lad that0 Americans -ere tlse victims of lerrorisl allacks inounlries. 'moil fre quently in El Salvador. Turkey, the PhiLppmes. West Cermany. and Colombia With lheeption of Pucrlo Rico, the territory of thc United Slates still has been largely spared tin- ravages of international lerrorisl violence "
International terrorists choose American lorgeti for several reasons American peisonnel and* property are highly visible and vulnerable to terroristsmost terrorists seek to undermine thc eiiiling polilical and social order, and the United States is identified as lhe world's leading status quolive hear! of international capitalism, and lhe ally or friend of regimesi. seel tooverthrow American targets have high stmbohc value for "anti-imperialnd atlacki on Americans are particulate embarrassing to hosl gnveinmenli
errorism alsoignificantly detrimental effect on private US inlfrnli Because ol tlie inability of the United Slates or most governments to provide adequate pi ot eel ion. US corporations have been driven to adopting radical eipeda-nis to safeguard Iheir property and personnel" Currently, there are aboulrivate US renter terrorist firms that offer an impressive panoply of Services electronic perimder defenses, information on terrorists, and even paramilitary operations againsi terroiisls US-based
Americantl.rem ire not if* ot.lv tuteu ol inter-
tcrreriim The SovI'llIsm been OTsUon.l
ael.f. beenerofW.state0 <,
CAwMMgWa atfficers ihmuiiIbagsIra. W
Israel -oral emartacli la IVSn av
In one rate, leiaiII tWad <aic-da pn<tt*aid loiimbe. is* Li
rniiilnvecs f'om an turn" nt iun
corporations have reason lo be concerned, as ihey were forced lo pay5 million in ransom alone dur inc.. They also incurred ptopcrty damage and other costs Terrorism, moreover, has an inhibiting effect on the flow of US investment abroad, and its cnsli are calculated ai pari of "overhead" by fj(im making Investment dceisioni
In all cases ol revolutionary terrorism.resources ate drained away to fight the terrorist lineal And. if violence persists,hesocieties may. out ol (lustration, be tempted to seek authoritarian solutions to iheir "terrorist prot> lenv" With the consequent .adical.ulson of raolU.es ihe way may then be open to the capture of power bi ctltemists of either left or right Thus. revoJulionar. violence and terrorism have played important roles in provoking military lalcovers in Turkey and Uruguas and in lhe recent abortive Spanish coup
The broader phenomenon ol revolutionary sio-lenceore significant and complei issue for the United States than its terrorist component per se Thc problem of revolutionary vaoience lies near the hearienera] contradiction facing US pobey inhe Thud Wold how besl lo defend US interests and io support peaceful change where the choices are of ten between "friendly" bul ineflettive regimes and other parties that might come to dominate tomorrowscene but arc radical in nature and often hostile to LS interests Thc severe instabilities thai exist in mans settings are chronic, they will not soon be overcome, and in many instance! they would continue to esisi regardless ol the USSR As il Is. however, thesethe resulting contradictions for IS poles -are made mote pioooursced by Sen vet eipacutatioe
he problems lot ihc Untied States are further complicated in those settings where revoluhonin movements with some popular backing resort toacts, asoccutred. for eiample. in the case of lheovement led hy the present Prime Minister nfnd the Mau Man in Kenya Inn lhat icgion. moreover, lhe United States rum Ihe risk of antagoniiing all ol black Africa byto side with South Africa in Hi opposition lo ievs> luliorurr sieletsce. thus inadvertently becomi ng tarredupporter of apartheid
lhe etie ela4 nonir it.il iVr-ned to i* hiri.ni ihtmuc
errorism ate fwma of waif arc lhat fall below (he threshold nf USamj nuclcat ddecrencc Mod governments, including the US. ate unable lo drtet terrorists Tim inabilityignificant challenge lo US crcdibihls ain! prestige, and affects US ability lo catty nut cornniiIntents lo endangered ftiends or allies. The So virli aie natuially i- jrc of these US dilemmas and seek lo esplotl promising revotulionais oppoetiinit-ea as ihey arise, generally lecaidless of whether terrorism isInvolved.
There ts no simple or unfile solution In these problems because of the variels andfleading lo revrdulionary violence andIn every case, lhe indicated measureslalure of three appioaches: reduction or chminilion of external support, notice and/ot tnilitarv action lo combat violence. jikI the opening of channels for peaceful chance
Regional VS Intertill. Decs use of regional variations in the levels of revolutionary violence and lerroiism. differences in ihe sources of such violence, and difference* In llie degree of Soviel support, ihteali lo US interests vary considerably by region
The most significant ihieals arr in lhe Middle East, where lhe Soviets are able lo lake advantage of radical and conservaiive Arab nationalism and strong criticism of US policies with respect lo the Palcslin-ians Terrorists might sr-riously threaten US interests in Ihis region by
Sabotaging petroleum facilities
Undermining eonservatlve Arab government! and destabilizing Egypt.
Weakening Israeli security
America.assisted byin partnership with ihc USSR inactivity in this legion, especiallyAmerica and lhc Caribbean Thc dangerUS point of view is due in pari to lhe proiimityviolence to ihe Uniled States itself and tolike Mexico and Vendue la Revotutiortarvhas been substantially reduced in rccenl yeaislarger countries of Soulh America.Lev threats to US interests in this region include
Overthrowing the government of El Salwdot
I- Cuatemala. Itondurai. and perhapstc*
Endangering the security of the Panama Canal.
rromoting instability in the Caribbean and installing additional radical regimes like lhat In Crenada
Weakening democracy in Colombo and perhaps ix-n'uj.'i Vcnciucla
Creating vubslanlial new pressures on Meslco in lhe even!ignificinl expansion of radical regimes in Central America
urope. The present military regime in Turkey hai reduced lhe incidence of revolutinnaiy violence in lhal counirsince assuming power last September, although TutVish interests outside the country are slill tnaior Urged of Armenian lerrotlim In Wesl Germany, (he Irrroriil ihreal has been small in recent yean, although several recent attacks on US installations ma* signal ils revival, and continuing disturbances In leftists in West Berlin will produce social strains in lhat city Spam may offer Ihc greatest opportunity for lertorivti in the corning; months, largely because democratic instiluliom in thai counlty remain fragile and miliiary flgutes may be tempted once again lo lake matters into iheir own hands ilpersists
frica. Sosict involvement in promotingviolence in Africa is well documented, and terrorism is laltng place, especially in Namibia and South Africa Soviet assistance to tbe African National Congieii (ANC1 and SWAPO continues withoutand Cuba East Ceimany, and Angola aiewiih ih* Sov iel Union in promoting revolution, violence
ast Alia The Sovtcti are assisting Vietnam in ill *ar of conquest againsi Cambodia, and support Vtrtrumrse 'aids mio Thailand Otherwise. Sovietin awivtmg revolutionary violence andast Asia is relatively small. There it good evidence lhat lhe Sovieis do not back lhe Japanese Red Army ot Ihe Moro National Liberation Front in lhc Philippines
upport /or International Efforts ToThe So* ids have adamantly refused logenctjl legal efforts lo combalsiinii or. the claim thai such conventionsat ctippling "national liberation" forces.been willing, however, lo participate inaimed at specific.of Irrrorism.
doubt Iro irflrctldesire nnt le appear loo obUrtactamol and athat the. loo aceror mi of terrorism
he Sovleti a'r unlikely totheir refusal
Is agi re to generalrwim condemning
lerrornoi. Thereumbr* nf rnnm for th*.Titer do not wish to foran ciplotting and netting
The* waiMid Ihc condemnation Inforums of friendly countries tike Libya
They hare aa iatnnl Hi luoporting Third Worldlhal believe lhatefirutioni of Intel national terrorism would riarrtftringMiuiigencieselude the "lerrornr acta ofike theee of Sooth Africa andOnlf
hc USSH haa participated in icveral inlerna-lional cfforl* lo control aircraft li'iiclinf and lhe teV-ing of hm'.aiei it hai sienrd aevrral eonventioaa aimed al combating hiiacking. ai wellK convention concerning lhe protection of diplomat!3 The Sowrti abo voted in9 (or aa interna lional eoovenlmn against liar teiroie of hostages, bat have notratified u
here is no basts (or supposing thai the Sovieu could be peisoaded to join the Wesl in opposing all lormi of inter national terrorism, since that position would conflict with their basic backing of what they call national liberation" movements
omplete withdrawal of Soviet wipcori -ould not put an end In internal mail irrrcwbm Libya and the ealteme Palestinian groups have ample in-dependent rnourrn The weapons needed lor terrorist activities areheap and readily available la the world Moreover, in the eaar of national insuigenciei and separatist movements, at lean, the biiK causeiof ripaoiive lemma would luge's renuia In the impottanl caie of Cuba, however, lhe Sovieu probably have il within iheir power lo lirtut Cuban mpport forthough ihey show no preienl signs o( wanting loeirrrbe such restraint.
Bl The decp-ieaied Soviet policythroughout thii Euimal* is loat the Sonet iliberationy definition seenand anti-USut onebs A* re-ioMtonaties Although at maybe seen by Soviet leaders lo bedo not supoort letromm (or lisake,larare Soviet cemplicilv ia lerroriwn could,instancei cause problems for So-letlhe Important conudrrationi thecontinue lo -eagh in annuo* thru atlitudeisuppori for lerroristthe localhich these I'.-taabdats to mack So-netaolausible denial,elher the actlvilies willproductive, and rout rolled.
St We believe lhal their consider at wra allrctg ice io which the Soviet Union is prepared to in-vol'* iiwlf in upport of let ran vl ictivilms Tbe higher lhe coal in areas otherwise important lo
ere trirociit* are not suhieci lo Soviet isclpiine and control and where the Sonets lack ic-
o craw* the aueeeas of aome oi lhe dubwm lurei involving terrorism, lhe more likely Soviet lets may b* lo eiamine ctotrly lhe advanlaiei of given tertornt lactes In mm -hile raising the cent ia unlikelr to detei Moscow Irom pursuit of ill bailci as it teei them it might in uxne instancesSonet kradees le advise their ehrfits lo ihenr greater rcsiiaint in the uie of Irtrotist methods.
THE REGIONAL RECORD: SOVIET UNKS TO TERRORISTS
Thc Middle Eastaldron of revolulloriaty violence and loleinaliona) lerroruni Terrorbm hua number of face* in thii res ion. including Insurgency activity againsi Mococco. separatism-Irrcdcnilfm in the ca*es of lhe Palestinians aod thethiUim in the occasional foray) of the faro-nne Red Aimy. and stale lerroriim by countries lite Libya. Irao. Iran, and Syria.
Soviel behavioratliculady strong impact on intertutional terroriu activity in the Middle Eut became ol the USSR's close relations wllhotorious backer o( international terrorism; wtth South Yemen, which support* and assists tn thc mining ot members of numerous guerrilla/terroristnd with various Palestinian gtOups. which have beenin some of the most spectacular terroriitof the past decade.
The Soviets provide assistance, including iraining and weapons support, to state* and organization! which they know conduct or support leirorbthe Soviet* themselves do not direct these groups, however, nor do they encourage specific terroriit opc>-ations. tn some cases, they have advised iheir friends and allies against the use ol suchllhough thev have acouiesced in lhcir use.
recent yeari. thc USSR and labya havea relationship based laigely on Libya'swillingness to pay hard currency for theof arms It receive* from tbe USSR.ideologies and long-term objectives o( lhe tworemain Incompatible in manyumber of goals, such as the under miningPresident Sadal and the fostering ofand anti-Western element* In the MiddleAfrica The two nations frequently followpolicies in the region.
ibya, the region's moM active state supporter of in: civilenor's!ad supported lerrorisl-Iks well before the Ugnlltcanl improvement in Mi relationship with lhe USSR in the. The SovieU undoubtedly knew ihb and anew thai some of the weapon* ihey sold to Qadhafi would be diverted For terroriit purposei
6 To our knowledge, thc SovseU have not tried lo present Qadhafi from supporting lerrorisl activities. Qadhafi would probably be unresponsive lo any tt-rtoeat that he no* iraxafei thru emu to iralcirational leirorio giojpi. and ihe Sonet* wiB probably coWtone to accept hb actimies vmlesi aucha*ctrd ler rorism mcoles counterresprmaes that could endanger their investment Or Merest) in Libya and lhe legion
uringhe USSRn in-crcuingly close relationihlp with South Yemen Tbc Iwo count lies, ahhougti fieojuenllv dillerirsgommllmerM lo tuppori leftist and dis-sidenl grouos in the Arabian Penlniula and elsewhere.
9 The Soviets have long provided pobical aodsupport to the Pilcslintaa Liberation Orgaaiu lioa (PLOLUrlli oroaiulaoa which icmescwU malty Palestinianncluding several lhal engage in let rot ia adlvitie* Several ol these groups in turn provide Iraining and aisiKance lo other groups, both ir> lhe Middle Easi and elsewhere, lhat engage in
top west t
IJ Falah the largest .roup In ,he PLO. It headed by YMlr Arafat, whose policyboth within Israel and internav?^* ^ Fatah from
Jilt occupied terrilnrW
he Sonets hive defended the right of thestiniins lo conduct military operations within theoccupied bv brae)nd they have refused to eriliclM such operations publicly or topublicly terrorist actukt-
he aovietsst hulopearu have trained Faleh members and provided the organiialion with arms. Fatah tn return has actedurrogate for lhe Soviels on various occasions, providing Iraining and assistance to other groups at Soviet behest J*
Fatah has been training Central American rcvoluiiorsariea since at
he Popular Front for the Liberation of Pah estine (PFLP) has been the most active Palestinian group in inlernational terrorism. |
Since liters, however, the PFLP hasnterna* ianal terror-
ism Thu probably relsreta the lac* of en effective Iweraiiortal leader ratherolicy shift, as Ltabbashi health has been poor and WadseederFLP splinter group which rofrducledopriaiioni, died in March IvTIS.
- laleHabbesh visaed the USSR le. lhe fust lime in five years; since then the Sen/lets have Pleased (heir material ssapport (or laseturn the Soviets may be using lhe PFLP so maliaisonumber of revolutionary aod sepa-litl groups
Iti. Tlie Democrat* From for ihe Liberation ol Paleslinesed bv lhe USSR la aa inlet-hgence support capacity It is the Mersitl-Lerannl organization oiih the closest polilical and ideoliifical ties to Ihr L'SSR of any Palestinian group The Df LP Haims In oppote international leirorcn, bul tried lo conduct terroriit operations in Israel ai recenily ast
am*alestinian group controlled by Syria.
supplies the group's arms and training and most el us commanders Mr rubers of Sanaa have been Itained in the USSR, presumably "rideraiQa teamrainSoviet fewtsh emigres in aa effort SO rfosc down Ausifian emlgie-processlrtg camps, the terrarsitiapom into Chechoslovakia and boarded the train i"uTi-iindeering the train when it passed inlo Austria, one of thead been trained in the Soviel Union Another Soviet named Sanaa memberai arresred5 Inhere he and nihers allegedly also planned torain Sania has also carried mil attacks agaiast
i inleresU.and most recently may Iiave bren involved In the kidnaping olfordanian diplomat Irii involvement in this kidnaping, lhe groupacting al ifieof the Syrians and notalestinian group promoting Palestinian aims
II. LATIN AMERICA
evolutionary violence has erupted with par-ucula.entral America, mostly Initiated by
movements. Tliev nanvmcnU. as in El Salvador, commonly resortSl ugaifi-cant- haslace recently in South America, withxrlirular titer! nl iiuliteral! who practice leernriim. Several (larilibeati tulinni ate also potential tarfcti Im rt-vnliMimury vinlenee-
The Soviets haw trlinil heavily mi Cuba Intheir common abicctivn in Latin America. Bc-centlr. tne Soviets have Ixvnnteirect Isproviding latth logistic HinjKiel through Nicaragua and propaganda support Inr armed* rcvolti-lino in El Salvador and Guatemala,
Orta's stipport jih! encnuraeemrnlide vjiiety of guerrilla/terror ill yrmita are well tlnru-mented and take tlie fnrm of training, arms, safrlvavcn. and advice. Cuban mppnrt fnr grmiia lhal it knows engage in terrorist niK-ralafios i) clear/'
9 the Sovieis llirmseivrs becamedvocates of armed revolutioneans lot leltisl forces tn gain power In Latin Ansetiea. They were impressed by ilae victors in Nicaragua of the Gibjii-lupoorted Sandinistas, svbnmhrinsetves haddone little to assist, and ihey began In believe thai similar tactics might woil elsewhere. Thevbeean lo ih.lt from their position ibal the moil profitable revolutionary* course lay with the traditional Communist paitie* operating independently, and to assert that lhe best course wai cooperation with poliiical/mihtari' fronts such as lhe Sandinistas This led the Soviets privately In urge various Communitl patties (including those of El Salvador. Cuatemala. Honduras. Cosla Btea. and the Dominican Republic!stablish miliiary apparais. to prepare for armed struggle, and lo loin wiih olher leftist forces lhal were already engaged Inrfare and terrorism
hus. Moscow's attention has been focused on Central America, where il believes lhe greatest op-
il In urging the CommunMI parties" lie unF lied groupa hi bath El "u'ladiie and Guatemala thc Soviets (mdoubtedlire lhal iheie groupa uie leironwnasic lool lot fund raningil mid at ion. and dlteCt elimination of Ihe opposition Tlie moil ugnificanl member groups of Ihe DHL' hate rmploird Hich tactics ai kidnapinot luauitta lions, and holdiie diplomatic (nsta!Ltiom and pet-
" tbgiiniitIf. ILnewounlim nidoiw el Cubaniwivm a> tKc Qylnai Stlt. ilvSlorAenriov and tSetfj
clrarnt euei an Cuban upoon to(roupi inal-i'Sv*
III. WtilERN EUROPE
evolutionary violence In Wovteinssumed lhe (orea of teviinliSUiedrwlorterrorism* Ai ia othet aieaa of
Soviet* aod theli afliei have been prepared lo male
uio ol sepai -'ft dissatisfaction inol impot-
lance lo ihem in order lo provide them greater sewer-agrhose govrrorr-enUcertain of the Palestinians have eoniacts with (be Armenian Secret Army for lhe Liberation of Armenian anti-Turkish and anti American group llulgaria hai appai-enlty smuggled arms Into Turkeyarge scale.
hese have been widespread suspicions lhal its-USSR and other members of lhe East ntoc have aide* nihilistic terrorists in Western Euiope. such as the Res Dtigadns In Italy. And il- thai irame Wes European nibalisls have at time* received induce Soviel aupport ia the (onn of Iranut andastern Europe. However, there is little if any indica lion ol direct Soviet or East European support for nihilistic terrorists.
Iloly (Red tVigodet)
i ined in r.
UurHssacfcnevun) na snedTaul ir is mat knownlhe weapon was acc<sMrrd Cerlata Pal estiiuans appear to have Drovtded the Red Brigades withvariety of weapons, including eiploslvca, liandaieriadea, and heavy nsarhinegiiesa
R members have been among the Inrorut* trained in South Yemen, bul allegations that iheytcrrortsi training al camps ia Ciecboslovakia have not been
noviet assistant army attachearge number of Dee Yc4 cos ten was ageflcd hv Turkish authnritie^*
tt the Turkish Foreign Win ran recently informed theVs Secretary ef State lhal Turkey cannotirect Soviet role InTurknh terrorism.
ii lire Kale smuggling of armainto Turkey, when ihe weapons reachctremist and lerrornl groups Bulgaria'ltun arms company. KINTFX. purehamweapons and delivers ihem Into Turkey
Sov.eu hisiorlcally have iried to stayemigre groups thai represenl their ownThey hive had rontaeU with and havea numberrmenian parties and groupsas well ai in Europe
hr mostf *Bi-" ASA LA hailacked Turkish rf>iilont*ti and inrJalUlHHn abroad and. rinrc lair
it lt-jjo-i- tfj lit
ndnpranm ate allixolovxwl. and fewA Intwtoli hare Inn captured
n llvr mil vctw. llst-re have liren repivrtt lhal Fatah, ihr PFLP. and other Palestinian group* sursnort ASALA JT
Weil Germony (Booder-Meinhol)
hr llaidrrArms groupind ol terroristhat tlir Soviets hive ceitieiied annrli. both poUiehpeivalrfs. Thr-tai hadontactsotheruropean iriixmi gioro* aad .ah Middleips Some (ted At my members were trained in South Yemen tn thr, andoMiblr lhat thci had contactSoviet adiitrii there. Alio.snme members mil hair used Fart Crrmani and Bulgariar*eapr route*
rpubliran Armyburl Soviet propaganda supportCiechmlov *ks may have provided tl with atm*samep Ism iao yeats lain thr group wasbi ihc KCBcriminal triratnl"and ihrir atr cunrntly no ditrcl Soviet
Isssour Fatherland and Ubcrlyoceauonalls rati in out inlrmationalaltarki although it prrlcs lo targetand government olficiab Knowledgeable
nave csainveo tnat CIA Caticmisls mat maintain indued but not directcontacts wtlh the So>ict> Algeria. Smith Yemen, and several Palestinian groups have trained ETA members.
Tbe Cu-iti Apporot
llentiniui ruled la Parisnrnsrd his Eurerxert-baard clandestine Apparal which has prmided supportide variety of Thitd World leftist resohitionary organlraltoea. This supportiifabc docuinancial aid. and tafehasrn before and alter operations, as -eft as some illegal training in France in weapons and ri plosives Tlse Apparat grew* out ofvolve me nt in suppotlin* Ihe FLN (National Ubmtien Front)the war in Algeria. Tbe Apparal has seldom, if ever, (unctirmrdrincipal In lerrorisl operalions. ils associationon-Communis! and nonviolent leaders, iucludinc cletgvtnen. has tended lo cloak tbc nature and client of ils operations. The Apparal has been less active once the death of Curiel but itio function.
Ciiriela founder of lhe Eliptian and Sudanese Com nn unit parties inntil his espulsion from Ess.pteookstore winch uas the onls outlet far Soviei literature andin thai country. He alsoml cousin of Ceorge Blase, the British intelligence olfietc who sorted lor tlse KCB. sentenced lor espionage. Elite escaped6 and now lives in Moscow
uring his sears in Paris. Curie! was in contact with the World Peace Cotmed. ihe largrsi and most active ol Ihe Sovicl (root organ!rations. Curiet"*deputy. Jove* Bleu, one ol lhc leaders of the Apparal. slated that sheraining course in (hene source with contacU lo the Apparat claimedhal he had been told bl an Apparal member that the organiialion received estco* live funding from Moscow in Support of revolution*rv movements, and Ernest MandeL head of lhc Trotsky-ilc Fourth Inlernational. staled6 that Curie! worked for lhe Soviet*
here it substantial controversy about whether Ihis inlet roil ion constitutes evidenceoviel link to the Apparal Their could be several reasons for lhe Soviets to maintain links lo lhe Apparal or lo liv lo penetrate it IIechanism (or supporting potentially signilicanl Third Wot Id revolutionary groups without the need lo* direct commitment or possible embarrassment Thr Apparat Is accepted by
i'm. If,.. left, and
oI nCvic: of lefliil aunt tlieir eflctliveneu
and potential Corto*
ew intrtnatnal innaaiieen lha* tab reel of al mucha Ihch Ramurt SaneCarinal educated al Uotcci't Palocr tajmumba Unite, illy tnTO^tta tspUmH. including hb pariaripalion ind mm rig oi ihe OPEC Oil mmbtrti in v'ie-ma inair made him njmtkcimtL Srcarily Srrvartno hii repu-tition lhatnui sighting! oi him in foreign capilalt have linen inn-led IrcQiieiiilt.
at In finl MitfatedJ In wine liiiof two 1'rench nfliiert and an Arab ltdnrmrr in Pa tilrench imnltcattKii of that incident rnulled in- of ta-vrtal Cuban iotruigenc* officeri fcom Fiance, wggrsi.nc thai he may have had tome contacts utth them Their hai been on witnc Ournt indKattoo oi ani Cuban (MvaclMi
lhe Paris Ldhagi, Carlo.bi radical Arab aiatea Hr cooperated-i- inrorial leader lladdad at -ell alVithand Libiani|
Carlns'i connrelloru. with EuropeanEaitetn trrroriiti ate uncontestable, bis-jth Smirt and Easi European arrriees ia
lrica is currently the aileumbei of win Insurgenci movements lhat teioii lo Icirorism. inelud-ine thoic brine -aged in South Allies, Namibia, and Angola It is also lhe scene of lenaratiu violence in Ethiopia
The Soiled have longla AirSce. aad have pro-waVdanaiararral loncaied in irnnrum Oil oeeaBon. thehaw ptiiateli criliriied the eflieact of suchi'J tj innd tbey ha'*n (osier more ermiriitinnal paramilitary otmati.nu Despite time ctiliebmi. ihr Smtets have not wlllalraata their sup-prart Irom line gruuia
SO. Dii.ii* lhe, lhe Smicts. East Duope-aaa. and Cutum greatly Incrrasril their direct jsiiit-aner to Jmhua Ntnmn'i outlaard ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Pniplri I'ninnl Smirt in,ui-i' included training and jjike aias large quanllties ct arms uaualls tL-hieml throughand Zambia ZAPU.eneacieie luunardi in cuerrdla erliiuin. aboun dm ei lermriC attadi within Rhodesia. IncluHing the shootingnf Iwo Vts-cnunl paKcngrr planet withtiiiles
II. Beginning7 tlie Smlrti knight to in-crease iheir ndliaeiier in the Hl-devun iiliialinn bs Iramf-amirv ZAPI'ivnirwiionalcurr Ia*oaiiihai in at lidhi-iil In driiirrieief larre oaon iiliei of convent natalooipmenl lond In training In in uir Thr Soviet! tried wrtl-outersuade ZAPI In target Specific miliiary and rco-lomie otnerliecillhin the Craiiittv. and wrreheir criticism al lhe organlisiioa'i continuing
jroorn.r, lo attaei "soil target* ai Long potitican,
counterpraduciiie and miblanly inrllrcliir. Soulh Afiico
SI Ajiitan Nefionef Concrni tANQ. Tliehave long t'lppoded theostly blacfcovement dedicated to lhe over Ihrow of the Soulh Alncan Coverr.ment Thr ANC bas rrnergrd ai the raost rllective force among thsse fightijn-iii ihe South African regime, andp lucled bi rnovl members of the Or ga naral ion ofUnits (OAome West European countries,umber of public and private otganirations
S3 In Ihe laee of South Adtca'i overwhelming oUhtary suprriorili ihr AtC has been ableouiv ears irJreqvaral hu and runandful of asm ui (ggaj bender oprcaiiotM Thr ANC hai rlaimed eredi; for atnut hall the pararodilary and lerrotist op-
rtatimu intarlr Sr-ilh Africa$ IIcrica id" lironh* al several factaaan trhmtgimn la (he South.ul. OIL anrl Catand it
airn dunne xijrtcmpl In'lFfuu Unk ,0
lir ANC leadership lut tWrwilh African Oimniiiiilil Patty
ui rilerrul umnve ol
mibtari lulttiiwe If llie AKCibn rrevivri (unds (mm Ihr Liltrralinri (avmmitirr nl thr OAl' Siiidenti from Ihr group havehr ISSH aad
AMI rrcrWtU havr'm Irjiuinc io ihr
USSR. Last Germans.,iihl. Labia
SS. Thrtr haw born uimtrnwt iivi'llns" bet noon Oliver Tainbn. thr current ANC Irailrr, jihI SovietT.il aridrcsi-rienl Poritur ny andoUjiihi! pri-nues id ii-vi-jnii mdilart training and -rapnnri. Tambu hai diimod thaiaatiori and thraa rod on lulurr Kiatctt tnaidr Soulhihri mini legm tninlLKC trrronm caolurrd In Soulh UrfBitnld Smith Alrican lecuriti nnllc thathad bren Irainnl in "uiban guerrilla warfare in the I'SSR and lhal lhe luture target) were to be sclioots. clararehrv and public estaUrshmrrati atanriated vrilhAfrikaner nopiiUlam
Jrice PeeptV. OganiialioaS. lhelon hai bren the principal mlhlari lupporlet of SWAM The Soviets, with Angola! active cooper itinn. have itrovirlrd SWAPO with almost all of ill military equipment. SWAPO troops bived in Angola have used thii rrjuip-ramt in then guririlli raidi into northetn Namibia, where cprratiom are aimed al imdnimmng theulht-ii. and its ab.li> to maintain seenWAPO irnorial operations have included lhe kidnaping ai well ai thr titling ol Namibia ni who ro-operale with Irrrilorial authoriltea
Cuba and Fait Cermany alio piiivsde valuable tuppori lot SWAPO Aubtcd by Angolan authorities, thc Cubana- aminter riiem lh* EasiSoviet military equipment le guer-nl'a lacihliri and (orces in Angola Cuban advseti provide mbalantial Iraining lo SWAPO radrei andevekipmg guetrilb tactics, and may awivi in planning I. .' jiiaro inlo nonhein Namibia
V. EASI ANO SOUTH ASIA
Vl Thr SovieU weir maiot luppnrien of rr-rohi-lionary virdrncr during lhc Vietnam war OraraMe lhe endhat war. loululionary violence hai cnMinurd Hi plague Ana. largely in ihr lorm nl imutgencv aod irparaliil movement! Alia hai ahoumber nf nil-Inn like lhe memberi ml thr Jaruitnr Red Armv Thr principal fnrut cf Sow* militatyee in ihti region tui hren Indochina, where ihr USSR luppnrtil'orli lo luppieu oppotttion lo the regime installed by Vietnam an Cambnrlia
hr JRAihilistic grouocsporisv Ur (or vniv of thr motl vicioui lei feist inelJeali on record Vhhoocb arigmaii.apan, lhe JRAe aiiociated with ihr PFLP in iK-. Miyit ol Oi meintjeo ate now baitxl in ihr MiddleFLP and JRA mem ben have carried out combined ooeraiioeu in lhe taaat. and penodViHy there are reporit lhat lhegain prrnanng lor rorrrt ot unilateial aciiom The giOu) hai not carried otil an oprranoiut il irtami ceHtneclioni with vmporl groum in lapan Croup leaden have recently ntdvcaled intereu tn rervr-.ng actmlin in lapan
GO In thehr KCB labeled the JRAriminal tetrorm organiialion. f-
Thend Iho Amd
he Moro National Librration Frontuihra ocgamaaliao ircking Independence Ice part of thelippinei While Libya hai given imatl (irru to the group in thr pail, the level ol thii atuttancc hai deelirard over the patt lour yean Libya hai alto named member! ol ihr other Mutlimhearea, lheUraitrd laber-ation Organiialion baiedoulhern Thailand
TRAINING CAMPS IN THE USSR ANO EASTERN EUROPE
I. THE USSR
ubstantial body of evidence from both human
and technical tourers indicate- lhat lhe Soviet Union has beenivest* array of Third Wortd revo-lut lonalan-rly Irom Africa.e* lea. and then lhe USSR since alhe midlWrOv
Z The Soviet Cenefal Sufi, ihraugh Hi Chief Intel* hag net(Cnl'l and Hi lOh Diieclotalr ffe* Ionilitaryhe riecurive body
responsible lor man of Ihe nut-tut and parateiktary
training The Irinrji iooiI Depart ewM of the Central Committee of lhe Crrmnvuniil Party of the Soviet Unionnd. la many caan. an or-saniiing and managementtn lhat activity The KCB abo conducti some puiiiimhtarv training, butelatively limited Hale
he lype of Insliuclmn given lo Third World nationals varies, depending apparerrily on the cil-
I. EASTERN EUROPE
6 Available intelligence reporting on trainingin Eastern Europe has been limited and of ouev tonable reliability Likewise, open press sources ire tot readily serifiable and frequently have beenecondhand information or rumor No reliable re-ort indicates lerrorist training as such in Eastern Uirope."
"t ehemctiar avrw of ihr Dittmn. Dtltmt
Aamtr. lhe (Mmi- al ImitOitma.
ad ihr Awtaal CWfod/.
^fffTkrUti. rut Mien lafetKr- ihr, Icrd
u Mmanrase ht bet*
Ht rraininfal Wni fv-enron ttnariit reup*.
B'-pfrrwiU af tht AU Font. Thta hrfiew iheluerer-eni UMatrtttaaaia tar* ihtn
wotby lhe NolionotAiieiimenl Center. Thi-for ihed im of the recarjaenr end olvrde> hit or hernlo.iWw boiH. AcUitionolo'on moy be oufhoriied bv fhewilhinti
o. Oiiedo* of Intefcoer-ce ond Reteorch, for the Oeporlmenl ol Slote
b. Direclor. Delenie Inlrtgcnc. Agency, for the Office of lhe Secretory of Def.ru*
ond rhe oro^ro-io* of rhelt ol Slaff C. AtUitonl Chief of Stoff foror theof lhe Army
of Novo!fororlnvtnt ol ihe No*y
Chief of Stall, Intelligence, lor ihe Oeporlmenl of the A* force
of Inlelligence, lor Heodqooriert, Marine Cocpt
Aiiittanl Secretory for In let notional Intelligencelor the Deport-
ment o' Energy
Direclor. fit. lo. Ih* Federol fk-*ow oft of NSA. lorAgency
j. Special Attiilonf toecrtlory for Nol-ooolh* Deportm.nl of Ihe Treasury
h. The Deputy Direclor for Nolionol Foreign Aiieiimenl for any olher Deportment or Agency
Thhmoy b* 'ete-ned. ory Iv-ng in ckcc-ootv, mM oppUetto tecs-err) reguloiiont. or relurned to lhe Notionalnler.
When Ihii document itneot. th*oi recipienli moy retain ileriod not in emeu of one year. Al Ihe end of Ihii period, the documenl ihould be destroyed or returned to Ihe forwarding agency, or permiitione retired of th* fo>word-ng ooency lo relom ilco-donc* wirh3
ol Ihr. documenl .hen vnedm rhe leal ihould be clenuUdOriginal document.