EUROPE: IMPACT OF A SOVIET FAILURE TO INVADE POLAND

Created: 5/30/1981

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

EOROPEi Impactoviet Failure To Invade Poland

. *fevents continue in their ourrent direotion and Mocccu holds off on the use of military force, the implications for all of Europe mil be enormous. For tie Soviets, the costs may * bUtehorter term consequences of

The diffusion of power between Communists andorganizations in Poland willixed blessing. It will helpkeptical population is convinced that ittakeenuine voice in the austeritytil aIU On the other hand, it will bring into the decisionmaking process inexperienced individuals who will be anxious to guard their newly acquired power and distrustful of those who relinquished it. MM

Prospectsodest economic recovery withinyears seem reasonably good. Not all of the workers' expectations can be met, however, no matter how the system is transformed. The net result willtrongcurrent of tension and periodic crises as the party, the unions, and the Church try to work out separately and with one another the characteristics of the new "model" ot socialism. BBSJ

In Eastern Europe

A successfully liberalized Poland would be afactor in Eastern Europe. Demands for similar treatment, however, probably would be more sporadic and disorganized, and, for the next year or two, theshould be able to contain them. ssxfj

Over the longer term, Soviet Inaction and theeconomic problems of Eastern Europe would embolden reformers to speak out more persistently. Their message

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would be likely to draw large audiencesounger

recePtive tond ecasitive to the deficiencies of the existing system. MM

In the USSR

Pcobablvost iramuna to the^ infection." ittrong tradition ofllt ou^hority- and dissent is fragmented. Even here, however, there is growing evidence of consumer, labor, and ethnic unrest, if the Polish experiment succeeds, the desire to emulate it might grow. m

1 ,thG Polish liberalization increased throughout the Bloc, the decision not to invade Poland could come back to haunt those who made it. The "who lost Poland" debate would be particularly intense if the Brezhnev succession were in process. MB

The debate would pit those who favored discipline, control, and the use of military force against thoseto allow some reform in Poland as long as it did not undermine Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The outcome of soebate could shake tha foundations of Marxism-leninism andajor impact on the course of East-West relations. MM

Western Europe

While an increasingly liberalized Poland wouldanguish in the Kremlin, it would mean some benefits for Moscow's policy in western Eur-pe. Many East Europeans would cite Soviet restraint as evidence of the value Moscow places on detente, fffffff,

In addition, pressure for arms control progress, expanded trade relations with the OSSR, and the salegn technology items would increase. Differencesthe US and its NATO Allies also could emerge, and Moscow would exploit them. m

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The Warsaw Pact

Signsiberalized" Poland could not be counted on to fulfill its commitment to Warsaw Pact security would prompt the most serious concern in Moscow. Current Pact plans call for the Poles to form andilitary front by themselvesar with NATO. They also are responsible for supporting the movement of Soviet troops and supplies through their territory. Wo other Soviet ally has such vital responsibilities. MM)

Moscow cannot afford to have troopa of questionable loyalty carrying out these key assignments. Invasion, however, would further alienate the Polish armed forces and could disrupt Pact effectivenessengthy period.

Original document.

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