USSR: PROSPECT FOR POLICY CHANGE AFTER BREZHNEV

Created: 9/17/1981

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ANALYSES

USSR: Prospect for Policy Change After Brezhnev

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Brezhnev's departure from the political scene will loosen pent-up forces for change. The fragile collective of senior leaders likely to be in charge probably will not agree on how to handle the country's deep-seated problems, and no single leader will initially possess the power to pushistinctive program. This caretaker regime might eoon give wayew group of leaders prepared to oat more forcefully in an attempt tothe system, pjpjjj

The regime faces perhaps the most serious combination of foreign and domestic challenges since World War II. The leadership's failure to tackle these problems head on has resulted in increased tensions in the party elite and Soviet society. The major pressure points are:

economic slowdown, which has been aggravated by three consecutive bad harvests, has led to greater consumer assertiveness and heightened competition for resources between regions and sectors of the economy.

Polish liberalization movement, which has further strained Soviet resources,undamental threat to Soviet domination of East-

. ern Europe and raised questions about theresolve.

ossification of policymaking and the slow rate of promotions, which have probablythe younger generation of party workers.

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these pressures intensify, Brezhnev's heirs are likely to.be" faced with demands for the adoption of morepolicies.

Disputes Probable

In this environment, the potential for conflict over policy will be high. The desire of individual

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members to win allies may override their common interest in maintaining unity and in confining policy debate to the Politburo. As Brezhnev's associates jockey for position and seek support from importantgroups, several fundamental policy questions are likely to be at issue.

Some would-be successors to Brezhnev will favor relying more heavily on coercion to control consumer and labor restiveness. Others may prefer more conciliatory measures, including increased investment in the consumer sector and limited institutional reform, to make themore responsive to the public,

In addition, some leaders may argueess ambitious foreign policy and for reductions in defense spending, in order to concentrate on internal economic 'development while acquiring Western technology and trade. Others may urge the use of military powerorerole abroad to compensate for domestic failings and to secure needed resources.

Arguments also will be made for stronger appeals to Russian nationalism. These will be opposed by those favoring increased attention to the economic, cultural, and political interests of the minority nationalities, who resent Russian domination.

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differences over these issues are debated, new political alignments may emerge, resulting in some policy changes. If Kirilenko succeeds Brezhnev as general secretary, for example, he will probably try to secure ^support for increased investment in heavy industry at "the expense of agriculture, which Brezhnev has championed.

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to the Status Quo

, Radical changes in policy, however, are unlikely in the first few months. There are no quick and,easy solutions to major Soviet problems, and the leadership probably recognizes this.

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decisionmaking process has become more orderly and dependent on balancing entrenched bureaucratic and political interests than was the caseears ago. Policy formulation is more subject to institutional routine, and this may limit an individual leader's room for maneuver and produce compromise measures rather than bold.

replacement will not inherit all of Tho collective leadership probably will put re-

on the new general secretary's authority and

certainly will prevent him from becoming president.

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Neither Kirilenko, Chernenko, nor any other potential successorarge personal following that can be counted on to support his policies. The constraints that exist against the more blatant forms of patronage will make it difficult for the new general secretary toowerful political machine quickly.

Situations Conducive to Rapid Change

If, however, large numbers of high officials were to leave officehortdistinct possibility in view of the advanced age of the Sovietprocess of generational renewal would accelerate and the chances for significant policy change would increase. Younger men possibly more inclined toward change would have more arge turnover also would improve the new general secretary's opportunity to place his supporters in ^important positions, strengthening hi3 ability to secure the adoption of his policies.

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sudden adverse development, suchignificant increase in the level of popular unrest in the USSRorsening of the situation in Poland, also could impel Brezhnev's remaining colleagues toadical reorientation of policy. It seems moreowever, thatrisis would hasten their replacementounger and more vigorous group of leaders better able and mora willing toew course.

Original document.

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