Prospects for Closing the Afghan-Pakistaoi Border (u)
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PwiwctS for OcottQi IbcPakistani Bocitt(U|
Soviet have made li:ile headway in bceakJn- ihe tenacious Afghan romance since they invaded Afghanistan innarchy prevails in tbc major cilice, roads continuee interdicted, and ihe awnUyside remainsoutside Sovici and Democratic Republic ofcontrol To icduce uasuigeoey. ihe Soviets have auempiedseal" ihe Afghan-Pakistani border against (he rraot eiv.cn: of men and supplies in the fnaoticr region. Several border clearing operations have been launched and the moat frequented Oath in the border areas mined. Nevertheless, crass-
M asOTw's attempts to dose the border have been thwarted principally byoarucrcrisbcs of the region. Major constraints are ihe grcal length of ibc border, its diverse terrain, and the muiliptialy orUuirsTinkJnj'TTTTT Pakistan with an extensivesystemew. if any. places on tbcic routes can be used as dnkc points io monitor infiltration effectively. The rugged terrain of much of the border nukes many sectors inaccessibleto vehiclesdecided drawback to many Soviet combat units whose mobtliiy is dependent oo vehicles and motarablc routes. Attempts toroutes accesaublc from Ihe ground or vulnerable to air-attack havegc iw rally hademporary effect on cross-border movement. In most eases insiirgent groups have simply used one ofT.be numerous alternate routes to crass the border. Oaetscquently. unless the Soviets are willing to commit themselves mi massive long-term effort of clearing wmiooe along ibc entire border, tbc movcrncnt of insurgent forces to and from Afghanistan will coadtuc.
Coufaftuttial
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Prospects for Closingiiha it-Pakistani Border (tj)
success of insurgent (roups in controlling ibe countryside ia Afghanistan and in tarrying on their hit-and- tun am against the Sonet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) military fortes results io pan from tbeir continuing ability to rnove men aod supplies across the Afehaa-Pakistani header aadAf|haaai_o
Although their sources of supplies aod method of
obtaining them *ary depending on cocdiucais,
gent bonds geeerally folio- ti rise honored practices. Tbey retire across the Pakistani borde: to get aid from their own or friendly tribes or by temporarily moving into refugee camps before they return to fight. Many -insurgents in Afghanistan obtain supplies locally aod supplement them with those procured in Pitman. -Food usually is provided by their homef T. not available there, is purchased from other vjlbgc^or stolen. Supplies of goat aisdarnmunitioa fromian are augmcated by captured Soviet-DRAment andwrapons brought by Afghan ArmySoviet aod DRA mililary operations directed against stemming the flow of men and supplies through the tarder region have onlva temporary effect in hailing the roovemeat
The probability tbal ihe border could be "sealed" restsombi nation of factors: the physical character of the frontier region: the amount aad type of Sovici-DRA military pressure wetted: and the tacticsby boih jidca The problem is addressed here by examining the terrain and related physical conditions of the area, including the cumber, locaiico. and owv ditoo of crcaa^Wder routes and passes, irad byng these factors to Soviet mililary operations and tactics.
single dominant physical feature is present throughout io clearly delineate the boundary. Theather aresulth-eeo-lury agreement negotiated between the British and thereflects the complex historicaland physical factors of tbcuj
Historically, ibc borderland* have been the homeof fiercely independent and warlikethe Pashtun' and Nurisiairi ethnicwhose outlook oat life has bandyrough ihe centuries. Despite numerous invasions through their lerri torus and attempts by conquerors and govern-ments to control the region, rnost of the tribes havearge measure of autonomy, (vl
Culturally': ihe borocrlandi areaweliei of tribal lei ritoriea where many clans shiO seasonally to graze their animals, to engage in trade and smuggling, to find work, aad to visit kia. This fragmented cuhnrsl -characteristic of theurther cao-rJicniedbyrcgularniigiatiortsoftribalpeopla II larger region. Some groups regularly leave their summer pastures ia the mountainsAfghanistan in late fallpend ibe winter in the warmer valleys and plains of Pakistan,
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Charactemties
Theborder between Afghanistan and Pakistaa stretches from very high aaonntaiiuhe ncnhea.it lo barren desert plains in the southwest No
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(he borderlands an:umble of In iter, and forbidding Mi and mountains. Permanent wttkmenis are confinedalley! andhere Urt oferennialignificant feaure of ihe borderherainage systems io ihe Kabul and Indus Rivera thatnatural routes. These valley route* and numerouspaths and iraU* crisscross the area to such an cucnt lhat the frontier has been termed a
ariety of terrain features typifies ihe borderlands, certain characteristics are common to major border sectors. North of ihe Khyber Pass the border generally follows increasingly higher mountain crests toward theorridor where the snowcapped peaks of the Hindu Ktssh mark the border to China. In this sector areasses that connect routes leading from Pakistan into ihe valleys of Nangarhar. Konarha.and Badakhshan Provinces and ihe Dbtrici of Wakhan inhe longer and physically more diverse border sector south of ihe Khyber contains atorder routes and passes Here hilta and mountain ndges mark parts of the border. In otheriver forms ibe bentrdary and in ihe far south the border with Baluchistanof Straight line segmentscries of points across largely empty desert couniry. (u)
Terrain and climatic cooditiora pose some limitations on use of andty to tordcrtaad trails. Winter snows and ice may block passes aud tn.it ai the higher elevations: in other areas flooding of sireams during spring and early summer restricts or cuts access to croaa-border routes al times. In general, however,alternate routes an be found thai ire open or. in some cases, snow-biceked,trails and pathse forcedetermined group. Probkmi ofare etvoountered most frequently on trails that cross Ihe Safed Koh range (we/ of the Khyber Pass) and in (he area north of Ihe Khyber toward the Chinese border where the terrain become! more of an obstacle and routes fewer TV lower and more open andterrain in theere the border sections cross deseri terrain and ravine-ridden hills, presents
ViUun is ibespcltintd b. ibe Beard of Gam npoic Nine* IV mere fiivWIir Wilton is used. Iio-tver.
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additional control problems because of ihe far greater number of passes and routes, fu)
Soriei Efforts To SlopM
Soviet efforts to block infiltration of Afghan insurgents from Pakbtar. have failed during the first year of (heir occupation In combination, tbe physical and cultural makeup of the border lards tad the natural recald-trance of its tribal groups have proved iosurmoumabk. Insurgents still control ibe countryside, and even the main roads and principal towns held byorces remain vulnciablc. The border is loo long and. in many places, too inaccessible from the roao network for effective pairolling with the number of Sc-riet-DRA forces now in Afgruuasxan. Moreover,thenumerous cross-border trails connect with an catensive trail network In Afghanbun. and everywhere thereumber of atlcmate approaches io village, wwn, valley, or any other objective. Few places on the trail system could be used as eboYe"Wafflo hvatutor-filtraiion cffccuvely. Finally, support by the Afghan Army against the insurgents has otto been ineffective The DRA forces, plagued with easualtks and deter- -lions, have been reduced lo about half their former tUe. Attempts to rebuild through conKriptioo haveiled because moat new recruits desert at ihe firsi eeaponunrty.
Reliance on heavy arrnor wiih air support in fighting the hit-and-run war has confined Soviet ground forces to the roads Tbc roadparse, andew roads extend close to or across the border. The periodic Uunchmg of attacks on suspect rebel ccacxaitraiions ib the border areas, followed by Ibe withdrawal of Sonet forces kaving DRA troops lo hold Ibe area, has proved ineffective. The insurgents disperse and rcturnr
retaking the area and often swelling their ranks and supplies with Afghan Army deserters who bring theircaponsem
Shelling and bombing of villages along the roads,he vicinity of mam towns, have been rrore effective anli-insufgent tactics. Some places in the border area have been partly cleared of people thereby limiiing or
denying support to the insurgents. The villager* filler back in (ime. however, or the deserted houses become way stations for insurgents on the move.
The mosi effective weapon against infiltration hai been the helicopter gunshap used io strafe inssrrrats and to mine border trails Any ja.ra made by the perindic use ofowever, is only temporary, ihe insurgents simply either use alternate roulcs into Afghanistan or move al night. Tocounter nightparticularly, the Soviets have dropped thousands of small antipersonnel mutes on some of the most freryuenied border trails. AUhoogh initially some uniuspecitDg insurgents were maimed by these mines, they have quickly learned lodiiarraor explrade thxm with stonesong stick. Animals stepping on the smallowever, areroblem, for rh'v tend to tiny off ihe path unless roped together.
s.cti.iry by Border See tor
The Soviets do not have easy accessrails and passes in this pan of the border otth Pakistan. They have had difficulty entering and supplying their troops in Badakhshan overland because the combined efforts of ihe insurgents and adverse -eaiher conditions frequently make the one gravel-surfaced road impassable. The road extends through the province into eastern badakhshan. poises in the vicinity of Zibak to Ethsashcm. and continuesirt road of uncertain motorabtliiy along ibeaaj (Amu Darya) into the narrow Wakhaneportedly, the Soviets have moved into the corridor since the sprine0 by Ihe simple expedient of crossing the narrow Abe Panj (river) that formtine boundary between the USSR and Afghanistan, i
The sparse population generally corrals of two groups ofe sedentaryive around Zibak and Esfikashem. and the farmer-herders, who live on the high river plain in Wakhan. The upper pan of Ihe Sang Lech Valley, which parallels the border south of Zibak, is uninhabited. <U) i
The border trails from Pakistan leading into Badakhahaa and Wakhan are iruccesstbie except by men on fool because mosl of the passes are inspracoea-
See MAC RoearcnCSeem SIXktmmffCM, mi
for use by pack animals. Passes are high,eters, and are approached by steep trail*from valley floorseters below. Nearly, every pass bordering tbe Wakhan and Badakhshan areas is covered with glaciers and permancct snow fields which gesserally limit their useew months during ibe summer and early fall. Conditions vary with individual passes, however, and some can be used with difficulty throughout ihe year. <u)
Two trails arc important old irade routesto Badakhshan via the Baioghi! andThe route through Baroghil Pass descendsWakhan Corridor. The presence of SovietsWakhan. however, makes iian unlikely choice of bound for Badakhshan or the interiorThe main trail through ihcjDorahihe Sang Lechthe Soviets have made helicopterup the ta'ley and mined the trail in theike.
A3 of the trails from Pakistan that cross the border between tbe Dorah An and the western end of the
Wakhan feed into the Sang Lech Valky.-The trail
network continues into other valleys to the west and southwest andumber of routes through Badakhshan to ihe interior of Afghanistan from the borderhe Dnrab An trail also connectouthern route to ibe Konar Valley via the Manual Pass and the landySind-Katigal Valleys ia Konar hi Province. Although suitable for pack animals, the route was seldom used in ihe post because of ihe bosliliiy of the Nuristanis who frequently used it when making raid* Imo Badakhshan in search ofanimals and slaves. (U)
KommrU. Some of the heaviealT.ghlinriflATgbXnisla ft has occurred in this sector of the border inhabited by Nurisuni and Pashtun tribes. Tbe fighting generally has been confined to the Konar Valleyravelof Ihe few in Afghanistan close to theSoviet tracked vehicles io move from Jalalabad along the entire length of the valley to Bankowt. Alt nough the Soviets have taanchor! severalon rebel coocer.iratiaas ia the Konar Valley, shelled villages adjacent to the road, and mined cross-
border uaibcanofr. ibe DRA
garrisons at Barikowt, Asmar. and Asndatad irmain vulnerable to attack when Scrrid mobile forcesMininf ihe Konar Valley ifaib ma* have slowed infiltration, or tempecanly halted irafTic on wrne iraib. but ii baa not keptPirating ibe valley fioen who directions;
North of the Koear Volley from Barikowt lo the Corahumber of iniib ctoss (be border from Chiiral and lead directly inio ihe deep, rugged, and heavily forested valleys ofhe irail system in Ihb re-ion ii citcmivc, providing drcuiious access lo lie Konarfrom Ihe -cm and more direct access to ihe Pi no, her Valley aad io Mchur Lam. The orxntioaal limiiaiwes ofbex-*en restrict ihcir use lo ibe tower raLys adjacentheonsideraWe stretch of border, therefore, ato Sovici forces except on foot. Alihough ii has been reported thai the entireBadakhsban to Ihe Khyberbeenorder iraib in Nunsian are still usable.'
Passes io the Nurtsiani seclor are similaf to those farther north. averaging 4JO0 meters in altitude and covered by glaciers and 'now fields. They generally are open only in simmer to men on foot, bail two af iheBrambulu and Paitasun--traditionally have been used in winier by ih: Ntiristanb. South of Nurisian ihe raises are much lower, averaging less thanmeters, and the number of passes (and iraib converging on them) increasesitle is known about ihe physical coodiiiana of the southern passes,cnaaderabfc arnouni of trade (smuggling) has flowed thiougS ihem between Afghanistan aad the
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States of Dir and Chiiral in Pakistan. In general, they are open in summer and iniolaie fall, or until they, are dosed by heavy snow, (u,
.VaargatraW. This sector of thene of the best known. It contains the area of the Kabul Valley and the Khyber Pass, one of the uad.iaanal .nvasaoo toutes used by cortensaors Thead-Peshawar road through the Khvberrravides ihe Soviets direct access lo tbcew natural surface roads and motors Wc tracks extending south from ibe vicinity of Jalalabad could be used in dry weather, but the Soviets apparently seldom venture from the main road.
Jalalabad, ihe largess town ia eastcrabc sxagiag has* for Sovsn attack* Usui the Koaaralley. Allbough the So-iets maintain daytime control of Jalalabad,ulnerable io attack by the
gents who pcnodiolly disrupt traffic and ambushon the road. Unescorted Afghan trucks makeon occasion by paying tolls lo insurgent
known to what client the Soviets have mined tbc iraib ia this pan of ibe horde Theynude regular helicopter gum hip forayse rebel, in the area and shelled vilUge* befiesco insuppori of ihe
South from the harder ofKonarha Pristine loihe Kabul River, (he border cuts across low. barren, and rdalively open hill country. Il also bisects theof ibe Mohnaand Pashiun tribe, separating the hill dans from their settled brethren in (he Konar Va.ley and in the area north of the Kabul River as far west as Jalalabad. The Mcahmaavds virtually ignore ihe border and rnove freely wit bio their tribal area nailing clan memd carrying out irade. lut
TVdrainage mica* ia both ibc Afghantknomuluplioiy of stream valley and route connection* al ihe border over lo* paiaea averagingeters in clcvatica. A -few caravan route* through fteiiiaB lead toward ihe Konaimi Jalabhad. Moaiof iberou: bow-ever, cross the Kabul1 aad, pasting thraugh Uw area belowend of the river, eater Afghanauan kidciktmetei* north of ibe Khyber where the rKtr turns aorihward andkilometer icction of the border. Thehave been iheeauef tiaftirorten of goods on these caravan route* fating Kabul and Paha war. (ul
From ihe Kabul touth. tbclignedIbc rfver and then through rrvioc-riddento the Safed Koh range that extendi wealKhyber hilb. Three Urge tnbea of Paihtuns li-carea of ihe border: the ShiQwarfhoof labia bid. and. on ibe Pakistani tide ofthe Orakxai and Afridi tnbea, whoas guardians of the poaaea. (o|
Numerous foot and animal traib wind throughhilb crnsaing ihe border through deepalong bill ridges Some of ibc traib areto the Khyberarther soaih ia tbcare routes thai lead from the Bazar andinto AfgMnbun, Here ihe traib turnfollowing seasonal stream beds and eeasvergesouth bank of the Kabul. Along the way ibeyeast-west traib in Afghanistan. These traibpossible to travelrd through the foot hilbSafed Koh at rnwse aastarace south of theroad. In general, ihbNangarbar has relatively milder winter* thanr-xth. Pasaos are ope- nxw of the year,and soring rain* may create occasions:and treacherous cortdiiiem*.
SouiA af ihe hill country, the border mm* westward and follow* the cast-west aligned Safed Koh range. Here socne peak* reachmeter* in elevation aad
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theigged Theam border paste* through ihe Safed Koheiers inand are more hazardous. The majority of ihe bcrckr routes are pack traib used primanly by scenefridi clansraoaport salt from Pakistan mio Afghanistan on the back* of imall. sturdy bullocks. Bccaase the south face of the mountain range receives
amount of both rain and snow, passes and traib tbrougfa the Safed Koh often are blocked, usually from January through June, (ul
Pik'ia-Pm+tite-ZMbol-Qartfahar. In (hb sector,highway paiallcb tbc border alofJornetrrs.dahar-Spin Buldak-Caaman road inwhich lead* to fjuetu in Pakistan, acces* fromKabuW^itdahar road to the beederts ewer aofom of
more than motnrable track* winding ihroughl ball of low mountain* aad ending ihert of the border. The Soviets have made littlehb tow-grade road systemjtod Initead havejwpt to ibe.Kabul-Qandahar aad Kabul Cerila-KJaowst roads. These road* are orjr*ti*uaeaa*ly bring cut andhem amb-ahed by the insurgents. Here, as elsewhere In Ihe borderon hdieopter gunship attacks on" the* tomnt of sense of the moat frequently used border-crossing routes in iheop inriliraiioo. Men and caravans nevertheless eonunue to cross tee border and roam the Afghan countryside at will.
Most of the fighting in this sector of the border south of the Safed Koh has been around tbc town* of Gardei and Khowit a* well a*ew border potts where DRA garrison* and tioop* arche town garrison* arc *upt*cd directry fnam lObuload difficult to keep ccen because of several choke points used by the trsniaVfliA
ocated aboutoilometers north of Carder. Several other* are iocs ted in anothericctionrder and Khowit where ihe
flfkuasJHHailaailux.. vun'l iteoi of Uw DBA loreea aad IN* uusrA
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arrow sucam -alley for tomedistance. In additionarfawing ntilicary convoys, (he msur-gcnts haveofigo aueeeeeled in keeping (rucks loaded ssrith much-Deeded firewood from Paktia androvinces from reaching Kabul over ihu road. Vehicles (raveling on other roada and nvotorable iracki io bor-der pom are equally subject to ambush by (he irtsur. gents, and the posts often most be supplied by air!
Soulh ofihi Saftd Koh. the border follows along (he erestseries of low mountains and hill ranges. Unlike most other border sectors. Paktia and parts of Pakitka are faitlHiearily "ceded. Between the Kurram River and Chaman. ihe border cutsangled highland area-ihe WaririsUn hills and the Tobnge-iial consists of basins, ridges, and ravines. High-walledromin width, are intercooneeied loone another and to the basins by narrower gullies created by heavyrains The eroded landscapeaie of passes and trails, many of which are suitable for packmany others arc only wide enoughan on foot. |U|
The trail network follow* tbc eiiertsivedr.inigeof the area, with trails creasing the border over water divides, in sireambeds and ravines.and.-long bill ridges. Although (his section of the border is generally drier than areas farther north, snow melt and spring rains (Mareh-Aprsl) or the occasional viejlent summer norms lorn the sireambeds into destronive walls of water temporarily olocking or limiting acceti in the borderUnds: In winter, snow falls at the higher eteva-lions and beio-freeling lemperaiure* occur from December to March. Briefcan occur as far souih as Chaman until late March. Stronghot in summer or bitterly cold In winicr sweep across the border region most of the
Between tbcSafed Koh range and the village of Kharlachi.ain caravan trail crosses Ihe border in Iheotorabt* track links GirrkilAfghanisUn^wsHharuadlo Parachinarvia ihe Pcywan Kandaw{Pc*an Kotcl. or Peiwap Paul From Kharlachi south lo Waiirisinn,trails lead from ihe Kurram Valley and connect
with an extensive trail maze In the low mountains of Paktia Province. To the south are about an equal number of trails suitable lor animals and for men on foot that can be used to cross tbc border through the. labyrinth of paths in the WazirisUn hills and ihe Tobar Kakar Range.(u) .
Among these trail*ew mi us routes used prunar-iIt bybo annually trek io and from Afghanistan. In practice ihe term nomad includaishepherds, camel men. traders, and laborers who. seasonally move their families and animal* intoun andtile money lending and smuggling on ihe side. Thelso applied lo those laborers, traders, moneylenders, and Ihieves who leave their families ai home and winder into Pakistan alone or in small groups. The latter type, of -nomad" usually moveool and are free to use any of the many paths and trails that cross ihee-large group* of nomads traveling with women, children, and animalsore restricted choice. Tbe Individual
tribal territory occupied in Afghanistan, local security considerations, and the availabiliiy of grazing and waier along ihe rouie^-coodtlions which varyearcarT Security irssditiooally involved periodicrerouting to avoid attackeuding tribe;Ihe nomads have (he added burden of rinding lternate routes lo avoid Soviet-DRA forces. (u|
The major nomad rout en arc the Khyber Pass and adjacenibe valleys of ihe Kurram. Kaitu, Tochl. Gumal. Kundar, and the Pishin Lora Rivers and their tributary valleys, and the border-crossing point at Chaman. The normal period of nomad* move meat into Pakistan is from mid-October through md-December.eturn io Afghanistan during AprilMay. The period of travel varies dcpeoJin, on the weather and the cojoomk aed pwiika! eondHuaM infghanistan and Palustaa. (u)
Nomad, ire calledonbere *nd own Afghanistan and lanu. and Kakat -inAffiant.n Iwtaat Kha- aad Balaam* as rabsua. iWf art
aaowaNoosadi an pnmanl. PatauU.ban
of ihe paaptc -bobi. paniM bo.de. See NPACPaperewbe-v dnWMtlgUlu)
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Qantakat-Htlmani-Nimtiiz. Except for theValley, (his sector of the border is notnearly ihe same frequency as iheus reason, combined -nh the -emctef'esi ofSoviethas been minimal. Thewestward ir-rouih in uninhabitedew old trade routes cross frominto Baluehisian. The alignment of trails isdetermined by the locaiMo of-elli.water wpoty is ephemeral, the routes aredefined and can vary from season ioyearear. iui
Outlo-h
Tne Scwieis have hllle chance cf closing or "seaing"gtan-Pakistani border unless Ihcyuch greater commitment of resources ihan they have thusnd theearly
. Soviet-DRA control in the border region hasto ihe WakBan Corridor, the roads
Jsadakhshaa Provjcec and the Konaf Valley, aad the checiaoinu at the Khyber Pass and io the Spin BaMsk -Chaman area. Along the remainder of the border, eortrol is tenuous or nonexistent .
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To effectively dose the border to insurgent ioflliraiion. Moscow would have to develop long-term operations io systematicallyone of all inhabitants along the entire border. Ii would also Us re io permanentlya tuiTicicm lumber ol troops in the lone io mon-itor croat-border movement. Implementation of these operations wouldassive increase in the number of Soviet iroopa in Afgnanittan. the construe-lion of aunverous roads, the imfjroverneni andof the enure road network to ensure support to ihe border troops, and the building of supply and other facilities rcouired by border pcrsbmtct Unless ihearc willing to makeommitment, the Afghan-Pakisiani border cannot be effectively sealed against the menrensexiof insurgents into andAfghanistan- -. " '
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Original document.
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