Prospects for Accelerated Soviet Defense Effort
CIA-HISTORICAL REVIEW PROG RELEASE ASSANITIZED
Prospects, for Accelerated Suvtel Defense (Won
Over clvc past few months. Soviciin both publict minted tu cuiiiiiiuiucaic to Hie USconcern overS military buildup and Soviet determinationto an expanding American defense cffon.t dcpul> cliainnanie Soviet Stale Planningtold"'c Soviets are nut king
tuur changes to then lyai-ay economic plan to accommodate "largen defense activities. He said thai these changes have taken place since Februaryhave required important revisions in plannd arc directed against planned increases in the US defense budget
Any increase in ihc Soviet resource commitmentefense would occur within the contest ol an already large und grossing defense effort. Over the past IS ycnis,Sovici defense expenditures have growneal averagerate ofercent Tins growth has reflected increasing resource commitments to all of ilic militurs services and missions. On the basis of current military aciiviiy. wc expect Soviet defense spending to continue growing5 at about this same laic.
If Ihe Soviets arc adjusting their forthcoming five-year plan to"large increases" in defense activities. thc> could in Ihc near term increase the produciion of .selected militaryreads in or about tn enter production: in thc csiremc. they could retortndustrialOver the longer term, the Soviets could increase investn defense industries to augment their capacity to produce military systems it thend add new development programs to those alrcads planned
Wc believe lhat adjustments to accommodate large increases in Soviet defense activities would bc directed primarilyerceived accelcr ating arms competition wiih the West. Since March thc Soviets have apparently become less Itupcfui aboul lite prospects of achieving arms
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of the need to etc pure fur the possible failureeach new arm. accord* and to consider how to preserve Moscow's, own oitlit.tr-strategic position. With tfan pecspeclive, ths'ubM probablyombination uf near-term pcvductioo increases fortom and . term increase* ia intcatmcBt and doe lorn'scout actmty to bedechat in their view, is an inciea-JncIfnee na in strategic cnnroniiKni
ie Soviets pursuedoptions, defense spending would probably grow at higher rates in the innd beyond In the near term, investment in tunic civilian sectors would suffer. Cutbacks would occur mostly in such areas as consumer durables, services, housing, andand equipment foi lite food and soft goods industries. Such ems would worsen already poor piospccts for improving labot productivity over the next five years and could increase worker discontent Despite thec comcqucnccs.believe the Sovici leadership would be inclined to continue the curvent mis of eounclac concessions.cin fixes, and patriotic appeals and. if ncceuary. ade-st repressive mcasales to easurc both continued growth of the defense effort andontrol
Wc arc confident we would detect large increases in Sovietand production program* well before lhc resultingbecame one rutiih Soviet forces
Prospects Tor Accelerated Soviei Defense Effort i
A derwly clwiriiiiin of Hie Stale Planning Committee (Gupb-J. Ni.toldtliai |BC Sov;cll
are iitakiiuj elevenih-lkwr change*I-KJ economic plan io accommodate "large increases'- in defense auiivitiu. According to Lcbc-cnnskiy. tin* change in allocations favoring the milium- has taken place since February, has required important revisions in plan targets, and is Intended to Counteract planned increases in thc US defense budget..
rtue or his positionseputy chairman ofember of its collegium, and eh.cf of its main computercbcd.nskiv probably would havc access to jccregatc defense spending data and llicrcTure be knowledgeable about thc impaci of increased defense activities on various ceononuc sectors, He did not describe the scoiic and magnitude of the increases, butsvas evidentbedinskiv's intcrhcutctt.
were Swkw
Political
Oi ir Ihc past few months. Soviet officials, in public and private statements have attempted to communicate to the US Covernn.cnl both Moscow'sS military haildup and Soviet de.ermina.ion io keep pace
Cjn '
reases in defense spendingihe United Slates lias embarkedolicy course aimed atcx.sfng strategic balance and a. achieving militaij superiority 5iUess. the USSR no. allmv.tlis connection.
id Junu ,hal !hc Sovicl ^crinip -cannot shui HeJ"h -Pf-opriatc conclusions for itself."
Vi"ay 10 ef-
fectively to any challenge. Wc must do so.-Also in June. Defense Minister
M.KSeS'l-. 'dPCfn,il
hrIukV* orees, in ihc sv-orld. He vosved
message to the US admiimtriition of Soviei resolve to compete, if tor all economice limebren able io con firm ilii.
necessary, in an escalated jmi> iuv and1 add- fCr. .njf tacticrodI mo resuming aim. comiol talk*.
ami these politicalcbcdinskiy* remarks tins also Itan
reflected some ofealities of the Soviet defense budgetand ;lic direction of the internal debate over ttiililur* requirements and economic policy duringISS pcrinc-
The shirts in resource allocation that Ins remarks imply ate consistent with our understanding of thcprcparalioit of thei live-Year Plan, which appears to have beenroublesome for Sovietlan-nine difficulties wen- reflected in the plan's drafthich were published in0 and approved ath Party Cons-res* inhese Guidelines contained only half as much statistical data its thc two previous plan directives. The omissions were especial Itin those activities most important but troublesome to themachine buildetallurgy, agriculture, iransportaiion. and consumer gouds. Although the absence of concrete figures for key goals and conventional categoriesonsistent with lite trend since the inu reduce the volume ol published data, ii prababh also rcllccted delay, uncertainty, and possibly conflict in decisionmaking
I tins, the draft guidelines luggcitcd thatth Inc Warrturiitcn besom)mil that diflittili problem, ol* ChuiCC.of us. andl no: bs'sn 'e.ulv'cd b> Ilic Ic-idciship in several critical areas.ucdittskiss renuirks intpls that. a> of
IHruarjhe Soviet hadd,1 ie preliminaryOil
'Jlonding that subsequent mililari lobbsnie disrupts'*.
It large metcases in Sovietcin iiics are sju-anp adiu.imciit.tc-Yc.ir Plan. a>iltiruatut mierprcia. lions arc possible*
*u-.'1 of poor economic prospect, forIK. ths pl.n' imiialls nn-gilt have called for eul*e cill of resultnvalid io defense. In this ease. Lcbcdinskiy's remarks could indicate tltti ihoe eats were subscuttcnll) restored tu the miliiarbudget returning.defense activitiesistoric jl les-cls
- The military might have been Mi.ws-.futor mciea.es in Soviet dcicniCJCIivmoili.iliiIsn. Inst0iic.1l
ill level
.
umber olhalie first alternative. In ihc lirsi place. .ililitHiiili Ihenr ihe Mill live-Year Wail contained fewer Mato-tica!hey dido-ilm.-ing Suvicl co-miuimcm ioielaced ihe prcaloi emphasis on the development ol heavy industrs andiglicci growth lar-eted lor ilioce branches of heavy industrv moo ckrtteh lied lo lhcMoreover, ihevc target* iiidicaicd lhalwm in ihe plan lor continued growth ofijsioceal rales. Although ihc drah directivesuch rlieiorie on ihc need lo boos! li.incnrealistic goals in consumer-re laeas stigecsicd lhal few near-term gain, in coruumpiion would hehatever anxiciv the leadeisliip have fell aboulorsening plight ofot enoughignificant reallocaiion of resources in iheir favor
Moreover, ihe preparation period forve-Ycar torn coincided number of eveni- thai would have crcaledressure* aBainsi reducing prov.efensend indeed probatiK cave added weightilitary areumeitis for additional resources;
Aficr* die pace of work on plan prcpaiauon was incrcaaing. Soviet hope* for SALT IImiahcd and the Sovici view of lhc likely strategic cmirorimcnt inrobablv became more ihrcnlcmnc. During this period. Moscow also became increasingly concerned about lhc prospecis for deployment* of long-range theater naclear forces (LRTNn in Western Europe and aboul lite tmproving US rclanonslup with China.
- The invasion ofinhich the Sovietsllya "limned- and "lemporaperation, hasajor eommiimc.il of -Soviet political and mil.iary prcstig ituation thai has. no shori-ierm solution. Indeed, all indicators pointoviet military presence Ihcre for lhc foreseeableresence which willontinuing impediment lo improvedrelations.
The political and economic dcioriuranon of Poland0 prosed particularly troublesome for thcls. Ii thrceicncd Wai aw Pact effectnencss und caused new tension* in East-Weil relations.
Exacerbating these factors hate been the announced miliiary policies and increased defense spending goals of lhc new US administration. In proposing lo doublep. opr. at,orishc administration has indicated ,ts micrn to carryroad-Oascd mihiar> buildup directed primarily against the SO'-iet Union.
Any initial hopes ihc Soviet* mas have hurl in februarypeeds resumptionALT dialogue with the new US administration gave war in !atc March to increasingly Slfidcni utluctts on the policies andf (he US Government. Soviet le.idcrs atspcar to have becOniL- increasing Is pessimistic about ihc prospect* for arms control and improved US-Sonet relations, at least in the neat term. In addition. Soviei officials havc apparently come to question uhcther substantial results would be achieved from newon talks with ihe United Slates. Decliningin thc SALT process to constrain US strategic program, probably has contributedoviet belief thai thc USSR must consolei how toand preserve its own military-strategic position.
This perceptioneteriorating international climuic coupled with heightened distrust of US motives .ind sirnicgie designs has almost ceriainly generated pressures within ihc Politburo lo adjusi us own policies and ulans accordingly. It is in this connection, according to Lcbcdinskis. that thc military has been successful in guiniiic additional resource.
DefenseSoviets alreadyarge and growing defense offon Over ihc past
years, Soviet defense spending has increased in real terms at an average
annual rate ofercent, and0 it accounted for sonicoercent ofs Ihe table shows, ihc result has been jnay of major weapons procured by Ihc Soviet military over lhe past decode.
On thc basis of current militarynumber of weapon systems in production, weapons development programs, and trends in capitalion in thc defenseopect thai Soviet defense spending will continue to grow at about the long-lenu talc through attJ Wcili.itew or improved military systems are slated to emerge fiom development andcnler production duringeriod, and that about ihc same number of older programs will be phased oui of prod uc lion
1 The co imi in of So-set defenseftr leonciinKlie*iu-tli rates pre sensed in shu piper are nude ar, leinis0 pi ins. Bccimcof ilie resviimiidthi
nncina if stemi: SSiirli ik. (hai ihw pricesrealroutlhe yeni onmrdiiitlr folk-win^minii pW if Term Tn< last sues "form beganand.we believe iiMly implcmraied by IfllO.Sns.ri
prices In all isi analyse!ore rreeni price bite "ere used,l ol
pcndiiuies -Mid be hlclKi.fin sheivKctiur> cooa.scriiees. W< are uneeruin. heeler, ol the iiripMi olaltrinaiivi pricr bntvs ontint ol
GNP mint lOdclense. Ihi!-sold be Oepeml.nl on lhe illllcr.-nlial brs-evii
innaiion lines 'or defense end fur GNP at a
. rci
1
50 indicates that tlierit_of new weapon* constituted about lialf.if total defense spending ond was llic in-iin facior diivine il upward. Sued increase* could be effected by both short-term and longer itrai option-
Short-Terra Options Opportunities for immediate production increases could well be limited tie chronic bottleneck* in the supply oi components and materials. Wc know! (Of example. Ilia: tlie Soviets are having difficulty making timely deliveries of Critical components IO meet current production levels of strategic missiles. Soviet ato achieve even modest increasesioad fange ofss.tems probably would encounter shortfalls in mpplics of critical coiitponcms and materials
i
for thc iltoit run. therefore. Soviet adjustment* to increase militaij production would likely be limitedwo courses of action:Modesi increases in production rales (or sonic selected systems alrcad* in or aboul to begin production. This option probably would notignificant increase in thc grotvthspending.Implementation or partial iudu.slrinl mobilisation. This is on extreme means of increasing production of criticals and equipment and is normally reserved for emergency situations Prolonged industrial ritobilt-uuon Curries with it severe economic dislocilions.
Longer Term Options In thc loniter lerrn. one way ihc Soviets could augment ihcir capacity to produce mililary systems would be to increase investment in defense industries. This would reduce ihe availability of insesimeni resourcesilier sectors of the economy during the current five-year period, and it would substantially increase production rates Tor systems slated for production during lhe. Increases in production, in turn, svould drive up ilic growth, rate of defense spending in ihe- latter halfk decade and beyond
During the nexl few ycurs. llic Soviets cooid begin construction of new final assembly facilities in addition to ihcse which bad already been included in ihe drafl five-year plun. Simultaneously, expansion ofcapacity ai key eoinpuncnt production facilities could relieve Chronic botilcnceks that currently limit increased production of many military systems. These added new facilities probably would begin producing during Ihe
A second oplion for thc long term would be to undertake new weapons dc-velopmcm programs in addition to those already in train This would
IlKiClxV ibc number of weapon upturn* aiailauliriu Soviet leader* In Ihe to'init It onl> itiinot imuicdiulc imiKtci oil defsiiie apc'iding-IXselopitieni programs do not hcgin to -Ltuiiunx significant rco-arces uaul (nil-scale engineer inr deielopmcni begin*scar.the -program Moil ncu development 'i.imii initiated inI-SJ pciiud would not cnici production until ther early WttlU ,ind would, there Ion. not affect the Currentcar plan
1 -ad iu it merits to accommodate "large increases" in defense spending
could reflect Soviet planning againsi two eventualities- an an'.icipaicd accctoatinc arm. compeuiionthe West and the potential impact of
the. oa Sonet vcOurii>astern tutor*
i
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Recent Soviet eomnicniiry has linked tocctltcr alleged Wettern efforts tu subvert socialu 'i in Poland and broader Western initiatives aimed at weakening ibc USSR's tliaicgic nosiiaon The ssinncciion tie Sosicts make betweenssactheir perception of coordinated Western efforts totitlorieally establishedihc case of Poland, the political-military balance codifird In ihc wartime agreement*letunki aceorfl. in lhc case of Western alma pcoglants (tactl a> the NATO dolo niooVrniie it*hc balance that ha*lxd between Soviet medium-range mm-lcs and US forward-based systems- In any event, in considering future rcouiiements for1 ope. ilie bosicts are likely to -anycraliooal problem, posed by thc niOdcrnir alien ofealerforces as Onl* bong additionally Complicated bs ihc Questionsaised about Poland's fututc role in Warsaw Pact ptar*
l-.sents in Pot anduniniait.saused ih> Sonets toeahcikngoonuy lhal has
lies of cutis .il importance los Pact Inar in Central Europe. Poland is rctponsible for forming and commanding, the northernmost front and alio lor tuppo'ling and tcsuring ihe wartime mot emeni of Soviet troop* and suppliesor. Poland alsoefens; industrial base thai not oril)road range of wcapon> and imlit,iiy couipiiienl foi Polish forces bui also help* tump tin armed forces of other members of the Waist
niav
To hedge against Ihc red be aniicipatinu an expander
and wiiiiId lias, tin
lect on ilie
lur liieir own ioiccs in Poland during*ins connection, may have deededCaSc production uf some hardware for then ground and tactical an forces Sucl. increase* however, would likely be mcrcm, growth of defense spendini;
Il is unclear to si hat cuem. if any. (lie Soviets would factor,ihc impact of military intervention In I'ol.md inive-yenr economic plan. Atilfougli .hi iiucrvcniiun could he, tlie costnvasion would depend on Ihe sirx of ihc liircc. the type of miliiars operations lhal arc conducted, and the intensity and duration ci Polish resistance. CoiiSCyuctltly. ihc Soviets probably have not been able to calculate wilh any degree of ceetainlj the specific co^ls und cun>vtiucncc> of anin military, mucheconomic, terms.
Wc believe ii mote likely, llterelore. that adjustmentsccommodate large increases in Soviet defense aeiivitiei would be primarily directederceived accelerating arms compel ii ion with ihe West. The Soviets would probably not view increases to improve their mjliurt positis lhe West as rvouirinj; the economic sacrifice lhat industrial mobili/alaso entails Indeed, ihey are prubabJs still unccriaiii about the long-term threat implicit iu ihc US buildup and. in ari> escnl. recognize that the Untied Stales will not be able to cuiekly lum around the imbalancesaving this perspective, the Soviets would probablyombiiiaiioii of near-term production increases for selected weapon systems and longer tcmi increases in investment and developmental activiivedge jgainsi wlral in their view is anuncertain strategic environment
Wc are confidentould deieei large increases in Sovietand production prorjratni well before such weaponsSoviet forco
If Ihc Soviets pursued this course, defend spendinglit would prouabls increase abase historical rato during thend beyond This resolve to increase thc long-term priority of defense, however, would havc an impact on ihe Soviet cconoms in1 -Si period
Economic and Social As economic condition- worsen during, merely maintainingof growth in defense spending will become increasingly
boih economically andihe Soviet leadership. Simulations conductednncrecconomic model of Ihc Soviet economy by the Office of Cconomk Research suggest that, undermpact of labor and energy shortages and wilh annual defense spending increases of abouleiceni5 and tlifjh.ily less aflcr.va.rd. Soviet GNP growih would slow to an average annual rateercent ihtough logs ,llKj u, lew than >
percent rtoiii ilii"2 tomm.ei centi lug tie*5 and could approacheteeniis would drastically reduce the ability of the Sotict leaders to allocate the additional rooorcc. to investment <itsdthat have been mi important in thc rati in easing noli(kaI tensions ihai arlte from the competition (ot resources. Untie' these conditions. i( nuhuiy nuiLits coni.nwcd to grow . t historicalt ooo Idomciou. decmonncrease the prioriiy o( .li li live rclattiv to economic growih and coniuiner svclfatc
lo Hi. cslcot thai any pbn revisions increased investment in defense
induurics. iitvcMrstcaa in >om< civilian mlwi woulc suffer both heats
industry and agrictsluarc have powerful pa iron, in lhe polo teal icanlcrsbip,
;md ihc peiority needs af energy, machine is (or indusiiial modcrni/ulion.
and transportation could make il ditlictili to cut allocations in ihcse ureas.
Consequently, intcsimcnt in such ureas at comumcr durables, scrsiecs.
housing, andnd equipment lot ihc processed food and iofl
goods industries would be likely primary candidaics (or Cutbacks, with
hiCh-piioriiy civilian areas bung scconduiy la rem. Cuts In ihc consumer
sector could have two unpalatableorsening of already
poor prospect* (or improving labor productivity and an increase in workerm
Moscow iinn heavily on large tain,icducliviis ioeoutput goals The plan directives cutrently stipulate thatercent of ihc growih in industry and all of llic growth in agricultureonic through increase, in prorluciiviiy Wilhovl some improvement in consumer welfare, chances of gencraiing the large productivity garni implied inlh ilvc-Ycai I'lin will be much reduced
Labor unrest would be even nnire unpalatable io the leadership lhan lagging nroduciisiti. Food shortages resulted in scattered work stoprstgcs last year, and repuni of strikes has* surfaced again recently. Sonic middle-level pally officiali admitense of isolation from ihc working class, and ansiciy over llto .Soviet workers' mood has grown since the I'oliih crisis began lasl year.
The Sonet leader.tup islo the social inuabilti> ihai could arise from increasing consumer dissatisfaction and io the impact of this dissullsfaciion on labor productivity. Given this possibility, ilicrc will be pressures toreater share of output to conwimpuon inOs at the cinense of cither ir-vesinseni or miliary spending Serious social Iiii could force the Soviets lo reassess their economic prirxitKS inof ihc coastjmci. Short of ilits. we believe llic Soviet leadership will be
Original document.
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