Soviet Military Forces in the Far East
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SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
VolumeJudgments
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The foffowrng inlcBigence orgonJiotions participated in Ihe preparation ol fhe Estimate;
Ihe Control klrfccfence Agency, the Defense trtcXgence Agency.ertonol Seevrity Agency, ond lheor-foVsi of fhe Department of Slate.
Aho PortKipotina,
IKe Aimto'itf Staff far lrrte*geetce. Depo.tment of rhe Aermr Ihe DMr of Naval Iniof-oeeice. Departmen' of fhe Navy Ihe Aisiiionl Chief of Sloff. Inieffcgenee. Deporiment al Ihe Air Force Ihe Director of Intelligence. Headquorleei, Marine Carpi
PREFACE
This Estimate describes the development of Soviet general purpose and theater nuclear forces in the Far East, examines the status of Soviet and Chinese forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and postulate likely Soviet strategy in case ofhe Estimate is being published in two parts: the Key Judgments, which begin onf this documentore detailed supporting analysis (volumehe Estimate generallyeriod of five years in its proiections. It treats the following elements of Soviet military forces in the Far East:
Ground Forces. The ground forces and their organic air defense and tactical nuclear forces.
Air Forces. Tactical aviation. Military Transport Aviation, and medium- and long-range bombers.
Air Defense Forces. The air and ground-based systems of the air defense forces.
Naval Forces. The general purpose submarines, surface ships, aircraft, auxiliaries, and amphibious forces of the Pacific Ocean Fleet.
Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces. Those land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles available for use in the Far Eastern theater.
Support Functions. Those activities and organizations that support and integrate Soviet forces in the area, such as command, control, and communications systems and logistic services.
' Fot thb Eslitnaie, Soviet cenerat ptopo* veni. lit. ind air defease lores lo lt.frre these looted in the USSR's Central Ami, Siberian. Truubukil. and Pit Eat! Miliury Uutiicls and htensetia. Aba co.cirxl hi tbe tjtim.tt tie Soviet getetal pmpow ruvil iorora in the Pacilie Ocean Fleet. IrseJudir* ilie tndiin Ocean Squadron, iml Soviet Ur.iesle lorces ihitctiphetal strike rote araintt largeo, in Ihe Fai East. Moiwillln ruiiooilconceal, consist ol0 men. most ot -horn ire Iniiaiu,ombatre nothb Eslimile.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Determinants of Soviet Policy in the Far East
The Far East is second only Io lhe European theater in importance for Soviet military policy. Its strategic value,ith its remoteness from the heartland of greater Russia, makes regional security an especially difficult problem in Soviet eyes. In contrast with Europe, the USSR directly borders its major potential enemy.Ihe long, slender supply line, thc Trans-Siberian Railroad, is dangerously closeostilevulnerable to attack and interruption.
Allhough the Soviel military position In the Far East is now reasonably secure, the Soviets probably see growing challenges. They observe no basic change in China's hostile posture toward the USSR, and st the same time see intensified US pressure on Japan toreater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sine-Japanese trade and political tics inimical lo Soviet goals, and an evolving US-Chinese military relationship dircclcd specifically against the USSR. They have alsoeaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to maintain sizable forces in South Korea and to strengthen Seoul's political, economic, and military structure.
meet these perceived challenges during the comingSoviets will continue to depend on superior military power asinstrument of foreign policy. Thus, changes to theirwill be aimed at
Ensuring Soviet territorial security by deterring potentialaggression orino-Soviet conflict.
Developing further Soviel offensive miliiary capabilities and options in the region to improve their capability lo inflict damage on China's military-industrial capability and seize all or portions of Manchuria.
Countering US naval and air forces in tlie region
Preventing China Irom taking any advantage ofar willi NATO.
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Limiting American, Chinese, and Japanese influence in Asia.
Frustrating and delaying the emergenceWashington-Bcijing-Tokyo axis" with links to NATO.
Encouraging the evolutionoviet-sponsored Asiansecurity system.
In the last decade, thc Soviets' military policy lias leduch stronger military posture in the Far East. However, their stationingivision on the Japanese-claimed islands, iheir invasion of Afghanistan, and their support for Vietnam have all hampered Soviet regional political
objectives.
he Soviets believe that thc security of the USSR can best be guaranteed through the development of forces capable of decisive offensive operations. Thus, although the Soviets have establishedfortifications in defensive zones along thc border with China, they arc not resigned totatic defense. Tbey haveecisive conventional and nuclear military capability to give them thc capacity for major offensive operations beyond their own borders. Whether the Far East wouldefensive theater for the Soviets or whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on factors such as their political objectives, the degree of iheir superiority over Chinese forces, and the military situation in other theaters.trictly Sino-Soviet war, the Chinese should expect an offensive to seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the frontier.ATO-Warsaw Pact war the United States would be faced with operations designed to deny maritime areas adjacent to thc USSR and prevent the use of Japanese bases,
Force Trends
he buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East has proceeded through two relatively distinct phases. The first,5 through the, was characterized by rapid growth of ground and air conili.it force levels. The second, since the, has been marked by slower growth and emphasis on enhancing existing forces through weapon modernization, improvements in ihc combal supportand lhe development of new command structures to belter control and employ the forces. The Soviet military has emerged fromyear processubstantial portion of its general purpose forces com mil led in the Far East The Soviets have established a
balanced force structure for ttttttctj warfare and arc capable of an
effective defense and strong offensive operations:
i
hreefold IncretM In the number of ground force divisionsivefold increase in fixed-wing aircraft have been accompanied by an expansion of support forces and substantial increases in the numljcrs of tanks, artillery, armed helicopters, and air defensesuarter of the total Soviet ground and tactical air forces are now located in the Far East.
The Pacific Ocean Fleet (thc largest of the four Soviet fleets) has grown modestly and has acquired more capable surface combatants, submarines, amphibious shins, replenishment ships, and aircraft
There has been substantial growth and modernization of tbe theater and strategic nuclear delivery systems available for use against targets in lite icgion. More than half of thcRBM force, for example, can be targeted against China.*
Soviet Strategy and Capabilities
Defense planners in Moscow must consider several potential conflicts in thc Far East, including, forirect confrontation with China; actions againsi US air and naval forces only;imultaneous two-front war with NATO and China.
Conflict With China. Soviet onionstrictly Sino-Sovietwould beand and airrange from large-scale raids with limited objectivesull-scale invasion of western and northeastern China supported by nuclear strikes (seeoviet objectives under any option would be conditioned in part by historical nationalhe international politicalthe military situation in other theaters, and the causes of the conflict. We believe, however, that military as well as politicalprobably would discourage the Soviets from pursuing tbe total defeat and surrender of China or attempting the long-term miliiary occupation of the Chinese heartland
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c credit the Soviets with tlte following capabilities:
couldhinese general groundwe judge as highlycould quicklyunishing counterattack.
They could mount ground incursions, supported by tactical air forces, into northern Chinaood chance of initial success. They would have to consider, however, that anything beyond shallow penetrations could lead to protracted guerrilla warfare.
They could overrun and bold Manchuria (the Shenyang Mill-tary Region and the northernmost portion of the Beijing Military Region) if provided substantia! reinforcements from elsewhere in lhe USSR or with the extensive use of nuclear weapons.
In most circumstances, however, it is unlikely Moscow would draw down its strategic reserves substantially because of its preoccupation with NATO. Moreover, once deep into China. Soviet forces would have toell-entrenched enemy in inhospitable terrain at the end of long and tenuous supply lines.
Thc Sovietsubstantial advantage over China inwarfare capabilities which, in the absenceubstantial Chinese chemical or tactical nuclear retaliatory capability and because of general Chinese vulnerabilities, provides the Sovietsredible option to initiate chemical warfare if the situation requires It
he Sovietsast nuclear superiority and could conduct nuclear strikes throughout China. Nonetheless, we believe thai,oviet countcrforce attack, sufficient Chinese ballistic missiles wouldause of their concealed and dispersed deployment as well as mobility and hardness) tomall but destructive retaliatory strike. We believe thisonstiaint to an unprovoked Soviet nuclear attack.
if) Operations Against US Forces. Moscowirect threat to its security from US naval and .ii( forces in the Fai East, and the modernization of the Pacific Ocean Fleet represents an attempt lo
counter thc US Navy.ATO-Pad war. tlie most pressing tasks of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's general pur pine forces would be to establish
ontrol in waters contiguous to the USSH and in Soviel ballistic
missile submarine patrol areas and to conduct sea denial operations out toautical miles. Soviet air force elements would have missions against US bases in the region.
a war with NATO we would eipect the Soviets toagainst US naval forces in the Pacific and believe thewould not consider such attacks as directly riskingwith China or Japan. We believe neither of thosemuch of an offensive threat and neither is likely to enter awith thc USSR unprovoked. Additionally, the Sovietspressure lite Japanese to deny the United Stales the use ofair facilities. Failing this, however, thc Soviets probablythese facilities.
believe Soviet forces would have the following capabilities:
The Soviets wouldubstantial threat to any surface force that penetrated their sea denial area. On the other hand, we do not believe that Soviet ASW forces can effectively detect US submarines in thc open ocean In the Seas o( Japan and Okhotsk and thc approaches to Petropavlovsk. favorable geography and extensive ASW forces would alleviate some of the impact ofthe limitations of Soviet open-ocean detection capability. Major operations outside these sea control and sea denial areas probably would be deferred as long as the Sovietserious maritime threat to their homeland or ballistic missile submarine force.
1'he Soviets probably would expect lo make limited use of bases in Vietnam, but we do not anticipate large-scale erperatiom. because of Vietnam's distance fiom thc USSR- We areabout the degree of support thc Vietnamese would offer.
Thc Soviets could not mount large-scale ground force attacks in the Aleutians or on (he Alaskan mainland, but US facilities in Alaska could be targets for airstrikes or commando teams. Moscow might anticipate that limited airstrikes or nuisance raids on US territory could pin down US forces needed elsewliere.
imultaneous Wars With NATO and China. Simultaneous wars with China and NATO would represent an extreme situation for the Soviets, and Soviet planners have been increasingly occupied with this contingency in (lie last decade. Inontingency, the Soviet priority of efforl would be against NATO, and we judge ihat Moscow
would nvoid operations in the Far East that woulduick victory in Europe.
M. We do not believe the risk of precipitating simultaneous hostilities with China wouldecision by the Soviets to go to war with NATO. Although they would prefer not to fight wars in Europe and Asia at the same time, we believe they could sustain concurrent, large-scale combat in both theatersumber of months.ar in both theaters were prolonged, however. Soviet capabilities to support major offensive operations in Asia would be severely strained by logistic, personnel, and materiel constraints. Thc Soviets also would consider that an attack on China could developong-term, large-scale commitment of manpower and materiel which would compete with and ultimately could weaken their European war effort.
enewal of fighting betweenVietnam would lead to increased Soviet support of anWc would expect thc Soviet reaction to be similar to that afterattackn initial propaganda campaign and aincrease in material aid to Vietnam. If lhe conflict were prolonged
or were going badly for Vietnam, limited Soviet military actions against
China would be possible.
Soviel responseenewal of conflict betweenSoulh Korea would depend heavily on the Chinese reaction andof US involvement. The Soviets wouldapidhostilities to be in their best interest The Soviets probably wouldsome materiel support to the North but probably wouldthe risks attending direct combat support would far outweighbenefits unless the North were in danger of total collapse
Fuluro Prospecls
foresee no dcvelopme.it over the next several yearsappreciably alter the current Soviet military strategy in theor modify the USSR's cfloit lo maintain and improveof its large standing forces in the legion. We expectconcerns over China's rapprochement with the UnitedJapan will prompt lhe Soviets lo continue tosometo maintain their military advantageie region.
ie initiationajor Chinese (one improvement program Incused on introducing advanced weapons technology into Chineseunlikely prospect even if supported by the United
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could spark unanticipated changes in the Soviet posture in the region. The Soviets initially would most likely respond torodcrt level of Sino-US military cooperationombination of diplomatic protest and observible military moves to demonstrate their resolve to counterrogram. Thc longer term response probably would involve some acceleration of improvement programs already planned.
iven current Chinese modernization priorities, wc fudge lhat there is little likelihooduridarncntal shift toward miliiaryorubstantial Western-supported program to import high-leclinology weapon systems in thc next five years. Consequently, we expect lhe Soviets lo continue their program of gradual but steady force growth and modernization in the Far East:
We expect the number of Soviet ground force divisions in the Far East to increase by perhaps one to two new active divisions per year in the next five yean. The number of fixed-wing combat aircraft also will increase slightly.
We believe the Pacific Ocean Fleet will continuetructured primarily to oppose US naval forces, although the Navy also may have to devote more attention and resources to offset the gradual growth in Japanese naval capabilities.
ver the next five years, we expect tbe Soviets' policy in the Far East will continue to focus on the containment of China. They will avoid military or political extremes, and short-term force improvements will be modest. Over the longer term, however, the Soviet effort will provide Moscow with improved defensive capabilities against not only Chinese forces but also against US forces in Asiaarge-scale conflict wiih the Wert. Additionally, it will provide the USSR with increasedfor offensive operations against China.1
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