USSR-POLAND: MOSCOW'S NEXT MOVES

Created: 7/28/1981

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-POLAKDi Moscow's Next Moves

The Soviets have grave miogivinge about the results of the Polish party eongreee, and probably doubt that the party as wm constituted will be able to lUrlt and eventually reverse the course of reform. For at least several weeks, however, they will be asBeBeing the new party leaders and seeking to build influence atong them. Barring aajor strikes or publto disorders, the USSR is likely to eschew major military movee in favor of continued political pressure.

Moscow will have even fewer assets in Poland to influence events thereesult of the congress, while expecting extensive personnel changes, the Soviets probably did not anticipate the near-total turnover that took place in the Central Committee and Politburo. 4eV

The departure of several of the Politburo's more conservative members must have comeude shock in view of party leader Kania's earlier efforts to secure their election as delegates. The preponderance of new faces on the Politburo, including two Intellectualsolidarity member, has to be disquieting. Wmf

The inability of Kania to dominate and the diffusion of authority away from the central leadership belied Kania's assurances that he wdld remain in control. onversation on the eve of the congress,oviet Central Committee official said that the most critical >roblem in Poland was the lack of effective leadership.

Moscow also is alarmed by the precedent of free elections within the party. The Kremlin gerontocracy almost certainly is disturbed by the prohibition against mora than two terms in office for senior party leaders ami the ban on most of them holding government positions.

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Too congress, however, did not meet Moscow's worst fears. At least one leading conservative, Olszewski, retained his seat on the Politburo, while Solidarity's leading patron within the party leadership, Piszbach, and other liberals lost their positions. The Soviets also may hope that the more unified party may be better able to tackle Poland's economic and social problems.

The Massage to the Poles

The absence of strong negative media comment since the congress suggests Moscow does not want toorking relationship with the newly elected officials. Nevertheless, the absence so far of the Pravda editorial that normally follows an East Buropean congress suggests that the Politburo may not yet haveonsensus on how to treat Poland. MMW

An admonitory tone has pervaded what Soviet officials have previously said. For example. President Brezhnev's curt message to Kania on his reelection indicatedlack of confidence in the first secretary.

A 'subsequent joint message from Brezhnev and Premier Tikhonov, though more cordial, lectured the Poles on the need to follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism and rebuff "anarchy and counterrevolution." The Soviets seem to be saying that the price for their acceptance of the party reforms must be tougher and more decisive actions.

Outlook

For at least the next several weeks, Moscow will assess the new leaders' effectiveness andto Soviet concerns and attempt to build influence among them. Brezhnev presumably will stress Sovietduring the traditional summer meeting with the PoliBh party leader in the Crimea. Moscow will encourage Polish conservatives to push their views inside the party and to remain available as potential new leaders. UW

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Over the short term, the USSR is unlikely topressure unless widespread strikes ordevelops. Moscow recognizee that suoh aantagonize the now Polish leaders, inflameand complicate other Soviet foreign e 1

Over the longer terra, Kremlin concern is likely to focus on the Polish leaders' ability to keep Poland in the Soviet security orbit. Recent comments by Soviet officials suggest that this factor is even moreto Soviet calculations than the emergencepolitical pluralism and sociopolitical reformism, which can bo tolerated so long as Poland's adherence to the Warsaw Pact is not undermined.

The officials also indicated, however, that soviet leaders have been unable as yet to define criteria to determine when that point would be reached, it is on those criteria that future consideration of military intervention will hinge.

Original document.

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