SITUATION IN NICARAGUA
Military Situation
eptemberandinista NationalFront guerrilla*eries of attacks in Managua and four other cities. The National Cuard in the capital responded effectively to what were little store than hit-and-run strikes against five police posts. In Masaya, Leon, Esteli, and Chinandega, however, thewere able to gain control of eajor sections of the cities and rally support from local youths.
The Cuard set about restoring control of Masaya the next day. It employed well-trained combat forces from the capital, and cleared out the city systematicallyime. The fighting was heavy for three days, but oneptember Masaya was secured and the bulk of the troops moved northward to Leon.
The latest reports indicate that Cuard troops are making headway in Leon, but they have not concluded the operation. Guerrillas still hold major portions of Chinandega and Esteli, where the existing Guard garrisons are engaged in holding actions only. One Guard officer reported that Esteli would be especially difficult to For this reason, and because of geography, Chinandega will probably be invested following Leon.
In addition to the three towns where the guerrillas still have some continuous control, there are report* of sustained clashes in Diriamba, and sporadic fighting in Rivas, Jinotepe, and Penas Blancaa. These strikes on Wednesday and Thursday were evidently repulsed by the Cuard garrison*.
Managua has been tense, but calm since theeptember.
Tail seaorandua was prepared la the Of Met of Regional and Political Analysis and vas coordinated with tae Directorate ofHR, la the Jepartaeat of State, and vita DIA ia the Department of Defense.
all indicateiajor guerrilla strike will take place oneptember or soon thereafter.
Armedature end Strength
Armed opposition la centered in tbe guerrillaNational Liberation Front (FSLM). Even ln areas such aa Hatagalpa and Masaya where significant numbers of the local populace have taken up arms against thea large Majority of the rebel force has been pro-FSLNtrained Sandinista cadres nave been en instigating element helping to touch off the violence. This FSLN tactic, actingatalyst for violence in urban centers, has been evident since the first general strike against President Somoza in January. Although anti-Soaoza sentiment is atrong at almost all levels of Nicaraguan society, it generally bas not reached the flash point where popular uprisings have been generatedto FSLN action.
The FSLN
With Cuban support, the FSLN was founded in theut of the remnants of several otherorganizations. By the, after two small invasion attempts from Honduras, the group settledattern of predominantly rural operations by scattered bands and occasional acts of urban terrorism. Prior to the eurge of activity that began late last year, theost spectacular success was in4 when itovernment minister's houseumber of hoa-tages,ansom, secured the releaseuerrillas, and gained safe passage to Cuba. 5he government's proclamation of martial law and its more active pursuit of the guerrillas put th* FSLN on the defensive, with most encounters beingby the National Cuard.
Following tbe lifting of martial law inhe FSLN carried out several dramatic strike* against National Cuard unit*. The Increased antl-Somoza sentiment over tha last year, given major impetus by the assassination of opposition leader Chamorro in January, has spurred FSLN recruitment because of the organization's
2
image as the only active opposition to Somoza. ear ago, we estimated that there were onlySLN activists in the country; Nicaraguan intelligence estimated last month that there werewithin the country and an equal numberfigure we findfa^^m% An FSLN leader's public boaituerrillaa are now involved in the struggle against Somoza in Nicaragua could well beover the last fewarge number of FSLN members staged outside the country, principally in Costa Rica, have probably crossed back into Nicaragua. The number of active sympathizers and suppbrters is much larger and growing, but impossible to determine exactly.
FSLN recruitment is, if anything, intensifying.
'new adherents
are Deing taken on board in Costa Rica1so quickly that they are being incorporated directly into FSLN urban and rural units without training. Indicative of theemphasis on ideology by the leading FSLN faction, the new recruits are given little screening other than to determine that they are anti-Somoza.
Traditionally, the FSLN hasarxist, pro-Castro, revolutionary organization that, like other Latin American guerrilla groups, has increasingly shifted its focus to the urban front.
Throughout most of its existence, the FSLN has been plagued by factionalism. In recent years, thehas split into three primaryProlonged War, and Proletarianvariations of Marxist ideology. The chief reason for this splintering was disagreement over strategy and
The Terciarioa month agoembers--has generally been the largest of the three. It has undertaken most of the urban guerrilla actions,the capture of the National Palace onugust. The Terciarios are the least doctrinaire of theand for the past year have downplayed Marxism ln favor of nationalistic, anti-imperialistic, anti-US, and anti-Somoza themes. The Terciariosave shown the
greatest willingness to cooperate with other, non-Communist opposition groups for the expedient of bringing down the Somoza government as quickly as possible.
The Sandinistas' chief link to other anti-Somozahas been through the Groupollection of prominent professionals formed in Costa Rica last year but now openly campaigning against Somoza in Nicaragua. Members of the group have lobbied for acceptance of the Sandinistasegitimate element in the overallmovement. At least two of the Group ofave been members of the FSLN, and others have sons who are Sandinistas. While in Costa Rica, members of the Terciario faction worked closely with the Group ofn planning guerrilla operations as well as propaganda and fund-raising activities.
The Popular Prolonged War (GPP) faction isilitary organization. The Nicaraguan intelligencecurrent estimateembers is higher thanreporting had indicated. The CPP hopes toeople's war to force Somoza out, but only insocialist revolution" that willore protracted struggle than that envisioned by the Terciarios. Specializing in guerrilla operations against National Guard personnel and installations, the GPP has generally avoided such terrorist tactics as kidnaping and assassination. As the FSLN offensive has gathered strength, there has been increasing cooperation between the GPP and the Terciarios at the upper echelons, but stopping well shortnified command. Each group reportedly maintains its own leadership, and working-level members of the two factions function
The Proletarian Tendencyith onlyembers, is clearly the smallest FSLN faction. It is also the most doctrinaire and insular of the three. Itsactivities are infiltrating worker, peasant, andorganizations and promoting strikes. It carries out some guerrilla actions, but does not work for the immediate overthrow of Somoza. Rather, iteed for hispresence to catalyze mass discontent, paving the wayocialist government to succeed to power. During the most recent guerrilla activity, its only participation appears to have been to actropaganda support mechanism.
Terciario members in general appear to have little respect for this group.
General Resistance
Resistance is spreading in the sense that more towns have been the sites of serious antigovemment attacks and violence, but there Isandom geographic pattern. The worst problems have been in those cities that have been centers of discontent from the outset, such as Katagalpa and Masaya. The FSLN has chosen urban targets ofIn concert with attacks on National Cuard outposts by bands thatcross the borders from Costa Rica and Honduras. The objective is to demonstrate the government's vulnerability and at the same time to stretch the National Cuardso encourage conditions propitiouseneral uprisingajor FSLN attack in the capital onceorces are wearied and depleted.
Thus far, we have evidence of only one otherthat has joined with the FSLN in its militarybut contacts and cooperation, at least on anor individual basis, are clearly wider. One of the factions of the extremist Nicaraguan Socialist Party has engaged In joint planning with the Terciariosajor armed action in the capital that is still expected. of other organizations have probably alsolikely candidates include the other Socialist faction as well as the Revolutionary Studentfor years has been the FSLN's primary source of recruit*. In addition, radicalized businessman Alfonso Robelo, one of the opposition'* principal leaders and head of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, recently indicated that member* of his group had been active in the most recent outbreaks of violence. rominenthas related that the head of the Union for Democratic Liberation, one of the political coalitions within the opposition front, has also been involved in FSLN planning.
Outsideuban Involvement
Since their information in tbe, the Sandinistas have looked to Cuba for ideologicalstrategic guidance, tactical training, materialand sanctuary. In the last few years, however, Cuba
appears to have declined repeated Sandinista appeals for money, anna, and increased training outside Cuba. Havana has apparently concentrated its material support on training in Cuba and related expenses, including transportation and documentation. The bulk of our reliable evidence to date pointsole, but we believe it would stop shortirect -military participation.
The Cubans were cautious in their dealings with the FSLN because they have been skeptical about the group's capabilities and sensitive to international opinion. Havana has insisted that the FSLN first purge Itself of factionalism,nified leadership base, and prove itself under fire.
The Cubans have, however, apparently increasedwith Central American groups. At leastthisigh-level Cuban representativeto meet in Costa Rica with FSLN leaders to helptheir factional differences, but there are nothat he succeeded in bringing all three crroups Late last year, BSjKW
thatit tnat Cuba was- taxing ain
promoting insurgency in Latin America, particularly in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Moreember of the Guatemalan Communist Party related that Havana intends toeeting before the end of the year of all theparties of Central America tooordinated campaign against Soaoza, but details of the campaign were not spelled out.
Some aspects of Cuba's support role have long been documented. Throughout the FSLN's existence, Cuba hasraining site; even two years ago there wereandinistas there in various stages of training. Cuba Is also both safehaven and propaganda bass; one of the guerrillas flown to Cuba after the4 operation remained in Havana until earlier this year to act as FSLN liaison with the Cuban Government, to direct Sandinista propaganda over Radio Havana, and to contactof other radical organizations. Sandinistas in Cuba may also correspond with support groups in the United States and other third countries.
Such Cuban support is clearly continuing. The leader of recent assault on the National Palace appears to be ?ne ofFSLN members who were supplied with Cuban passports in alias by the Cuban Embassy in Panama Lastuban Prensa Latina official in Venezuela was reportedly trying to help collect money for the FSLN. Occasional reports alleging that Cuba is providing the Sandinistas with funds to purchase weapons and is sending selected members to the Near East for training by the however* Llberation Organization cannot be confirmed,
Similarly, there have been two recent reports of a
lif
andinistas in underground sitesowniles)
UmmmmmtmkJ ^bo reported thatplanned to^omb vehicles with" diplomaticchange in FSLN strategy that would seemto FSLN efforts to isolate the Somoza ^fj^mi
in!? pla, dowa} Jh* FSP- eptember, for example, Fidel Castro said that the Sandinistas know how to obtain arms and money and do not need Cuba's help. ember of the Croupwhich serves as the FSLN's political arm-reportedly visited Cuba recently to request that Castro provide arms,
KnJy;fcMiect Bilit*ry intervention. We believe that the Cubans may well increase support to the Nicaraguan guerrillas in the weeks ahead but slip short of sending Cuban personnel into Nicaragua. Both we and the Cubans would reassess if there were some dramatic turn in the Nicaraguanexample, if the FSLN secured an area androvisional government recognized by some Latin American regimes.
Costa Rica's Role
Costa Rica continues to be the FSLN's principal, and critically important, staging area.
The FSLN attack! last October that began theagainat the Soooza government were staged by groups that quickly fled into Costa Rican and Bonduran territory before Nicaraguan National Guard forces could react. In November, there were someell-equipped Sandinistas operating froa Costa Rica. ember of ths FSLN high command has publicly acknowledged that the group uses that neighboring country as its principal training ground and safehaven. The Grouprior to returning to Managua earlier this year, functioned out of San Jose.
The FSLN's continued reliance on Its safehaven wasby the raid launched from Costa Rica oneptember, as well as the fact that the guerrilla* have intensified their recruitment drive there, in addition, the spectacular FSLN August raid on the National Palace was planned and staged from Costa Rica.
The Sandinistas receive material aid froa the Costa Rican Committee of Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People and are provided safehavens and false documents by the Costa Rican Communist Party. Sandinistas have occasional contacts in Costa Rica with Cuban officialsto unconfirmedSoviet Embassy officials as well.
The FSLN has been able to operate froa Costa Rica with virtual impunityariety of reasons. The government is militarily incapable of policing the border and, in any event, aay lack incentive because the Soaoza government is unpopular in Costa Rica. Some government officials aay also fear retaliation from the FSLN. When Sandinistas do fall into government hands, they are deported to Mexico, Venezuela, or Panama.
Plcan
President Carazo has decided tois policy on FSLN activists apprehended in bitdeporting non-Costa Ricans and giving short Jail sentences to nationals. At best, this islight shift that is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on FSLN tactics.
FSLN raids froa across the border have been athorn in the side of Somora's counter insurgency
effortery important asset to the guerrillas and will likely remain so.
Other Significant External Support
The Somoza government is unpopular in Venezuela, and president Perez isersonal campaign against it. Perez hasnn#.niv with members of the FSLN and Grot
st reporting has conflicted on the question ofroviding money to the anti-Somoza movement in and to the Sandinistas in particular. In the most reports, however,HXm^Bf^
id that Perez is providing money and unsophisticated
the guerrillas, and he is kept apprised ofell as the extent of support they receive from Venezuela alsoommittee of Solidarity With araguan People, which lobbies against Somoza and funds for the Sandinistas.
In mid-August Panamanian Chief of GovernmentAmbassador Young that he was giving some supportFSLN, but not much. This week, *
he
that he was providing
nothing but hotel accommodations for the guerrillas who staged the operation against Nicaragua's National Palace. Earlier this month, however.fj
iTorrijos promised to provide guerrilla training to the FSLN unit that went to Panama following the National Palace operation, but that the Sandinistas departed before any training took place.
In August,
man pro^FSLN cadre Training in Panama's "yestern Chiriqui Provinceid not interfere with the group's_ return to
Nicaragua.
icaraguan President Somoza is evi-
dently aware of The guerrilla commander of the National Palace operation reportedly was seen in
Chinqui on Monday loading what appeared to be munitionslane flownanamanian Air Force pilot. The aircraft supposedly had been making two flights nightly to Costa Rica for the previous four days. In addition, two top FSLN commanders visited Panama in the past few weeks in hopes of meeting with Torrijos,
Ths FSLN operates out of sanctuaries in Honduras, but finds the atmosphere less hospitable than in Costa Rica. As many asuerrillas were staging regular raids from Honduras into Nicaragua late last year, but the Honduran Army swept the border region in May to suppress these Like Costa Rica, Honduras deports captured Sandinistas to third countries.
Honduras alsoommittee of Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, which provides aid to the FSLN. In addition, students and faculty members of the national universityew leftist organization, the Popular Unity Movement, reportedly give added moral and material support.
lieves that the Mexican Government is sympathetic to and probably providesto the Sandinistas, but ffA has no concretebeyond these previous reports.
Inoaquin Cuadra Chamorro, of the Groupaid that he had met with Mexican President Lopez Portillo and Secretary ofReyes. Cuadra said the Mexican Government: was providing important political and propaganda support to the effort to remove Somoza from power. Cuadra said the Mexicans had not yet provided any financial support, and he did not indicate that support to date had specifically included the FSLN.
Ernesto Castillo, also of the Croupn early8 -intimated* that the FSLN had the sympathy ofood relationship with the Mexican Government. Be hoped that the Chamorro assassination would generate concrete assistance.
he FSLN has members In Mexico, including Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo, whose farm near Cuemavaca is used for training and recuperation by Sandinistas Because of Mexico's traditionally toleranthere, many far-left Latin American groups have chosen to set up such exile operations there.
Cohesiveness of the National Guard
Guard'sana loyalty toemain intact. This unityfromears of cultivation throughscreening of enlistees; use ofand balances; and other classic In the current crisis, this cohesion doesstrictly from blind devotion, but from theby guardsxen that without Somoza theirwill be in peril. Moreover, during theSomoza has lifted some of the restraints heon the Guard to reduce human rights abuses,greater latitude initially boosted Guard morale.
the continuing strain of the past live days, however, is beginning to
iF^fw Cuardtested
if the FSLN couldarge number of urbanManagua and involve the urban pooronfrontationmilitary. The Cuard's cohesiveness, especially atmen's level, could be stretched to the
Somo2a's Strategy
The first priority of Somoza's basic military strategy has always been ensuring firm control of the capital. Managua is the political, financial, and strategic heart of the country. Half ofen in the National Guard are stationed in the Managua area, including the best combat units as well as virtually all of the heavy weapons, armor, and Air Force. The rest of the Cuard is widelywith half stationed in each of theepartmental capitals and half occupying small outposts in rural villages.
Somoza evidently believes he can ultimately control, from the military perspective, anything shortass
civil uprising in the capital. He does not seen toeed for haste in recapturing the provincial cities, and consequently is willing to dispatch only limitedfrom Managua. He nay also believe that such extended operations will cause the guerrillas to expend theirlimited supplies of ammunition.
Nevertheless, thereense of urgency, if not haste, in Somoza's current strategy. The tenacity of the guerrilla offensive has probably surprised him. Declaring martial law gives the Cuard the freer rein it has wanted. The troops are taking harsher measures and uaing weapons such9 grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, andhad not been employed in the past. The Air Force has engaged in hot pursuit of guerrillas into Costa Rica, their chief sanctuary. In short, Somoza is taking the gloves off.
olitical strategy is unchanged. Bisare to retain power until his term officially ends1 and to protect his financial and family interests beyond that time. Clearly he does not envisionall personal power even after his retirement. Atno one in the opposition will negotiate on his terms, and he stands firm.. If he comes to feel that his back is to the wall militarily, be would agree toand make concessionsactical fallback In the hope of buying time, drying up popular support for the guerrillas, and splitting the opposition. Even acquiescence to the demand that he step downinal tactical retreat, with the intent to renege or in hopes of coming back some years hence.
Somoza's diplomatic strategy is to thwartinitiatives by unfriendly countries, such as Costa Rica and Venezuela. If he is unable to restore order in the next two weeks or ao, he would be moreto accept outside mediation, but without Again he would hope to turn the process to hia advantage and buy time. Particularly if the United states were somehow involved in the mediation, Somoza could be expected to appeal to influential friends in* this country to buttress his negotiating position.
Somoza's Prospect, for Success
ubstantial increase in external material support for the TSUI, Somoza's military "get tough" strategy aay well succeed in the short run. The guerrillas are low on ammunition and militarilywhile the Cuard has beenreer rein. Somoza should be able to restore systeaatically some semblance of control.
Circumstances in Nicaragua have changed, however, and, over time, Somoza will probably fail to reverse the tide of active opposition. Be aay aanage to suppressuprisings, but the guerrillas will reappear in other citiesatter of days or weeks. Since hejeopardize Managua's defenses to subdue the rest of the country, only the most draconian measures and aIncrease in the size of the Cuard would permanently eliminate the Sandinistas and their growing reserve of young followers. Even if by these measures he managed to stay in power untilthe odds seem hedged against it--the dynasty could continue onlyolice state.
Presumably, Somoza's political strategy--accepting some form of outside mediation--would enter the picture before the military situation slipped froa his grasp. The opposition would agree to such mediation expecting that the United States wouldand in assuring Somoza's retirement from power. Somoza's strategy would be to marshal all his political savvy and influence to resist his ouster as well as any ban on political participation by his relatives. Even if ultimately compelled to yield his offices and dismantle his power structure, he would probably never quit maneuveringeturn to power.
Government Shortages
Major "Tachito" Somoza acknowledgedhe Cuard was rapidly exhausting its ammunitionit had found sources of additional supplies inAmerican countries. Be indicated that hisforces, however, were in nrqent need ofconcern
in the Guard over the adequacy of munitions reserves and other aateriel. Inability to replenish stocks of small-arms ammunition and field supplies could weaken the
regime's military position, but Somoza probably has the sources and connections tohortage.
Of more serious, if not immediate, concern is thefinancial crisis compounded by the national strike and wave of violence. erious liquidity crisis and capital flight, the government requested advance tax payments and imposed currency controls. Most foreign firms are expected to comply with the tax request, which will ease but not eliminate the economic squeeze. The government has already had problems meeting public teachers' salaries, and if the business strike and nonpaynent-of-taxes movement continue, the government's position could be undermined.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: