insurgency and instability in central america
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
TTh* following intelligence organizations participated in Ihe preparation of the Estimate:
Tn* Ctfttrol Intelligence Agency, the Defcnfl Intelligence. Aoency. th* Nolionoi Security Agency, ond It* mt exigence orgonizcmcrn ol th* Deportments ol S'crt* ond Treosury.
Also Participating:
Tho Assirlorrf Oiiof of Sroff for IntrftcstWK*.ofy Tho Director of Nerval InleJic/eoct, Depesrhrsont of th* Mcrry The AssJitont Chief of Deportment of the Air Force The Director olicence.Mord* Cor or
KEY JUDGMENTS
Communist exploitation of trends in Central America constitutes the most serious challenge to US interests and freedom of action in the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with theontinuation of the present trends could result in victory for the extreme left in Elandictory would heighten prospects for thein Guatemala. It may be that those Communist and radical Arab forces providing external support and management help to theintend to make Centralattleground over the next few years which would distract, weaken, and undermine the United States in other parts of (he world. The evolution of these scenarios would bring the revolution to Mexico's border, thereby raising the risks of internal destabiligation and infiltration by radical leftists.
We believe that prospects are dim for halting Central America's slide toward increasing instability within the nextoonths. During this period, political extremism and economic deprivation probably will intensify, producing domestic conditions conducive to further revolutionary growth.
eakening of US influence and capability and opportunities to undermine US prestige, Castro8 has increased virtually all types of assistance to revolutionaries in the region, including arms, funding, and training. Under lhe_present circumstances we see little likelihood that Cuba willTfieTTB"present course.
The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has gradually expanded itscomplemented by East European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and theiven the current situation, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.
The principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America are to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and to use Nicaraguaase for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in the region. Indeed by virtue of its location, cooperation with Communist and other radical advisers, and support for Central AmericanNicaragua has become the hub of the revolutionary wheel in Central America.
External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build what is already the region's largest standing army; Nicaragua's armed forces
will overshadow those of its Central American neighbors3 Managua's leaders consider that they must protect the Sandinista revolution by building up Nicaragua's armed strength. At the same time, however, this buildup is intimidating governments in the region and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of revolution.
With Moscow andnow Managua and others-providing material resources, training, and organizing expertise,radical movements in other Central American countries are gaining direction and strength,
InSalvador, the flow of supplies through Nicaragua to the insurgents has been climbing slowly in recent months. As long as the guerrillas continue to receive outside support, we see little prospectarked shift in favor of the armed forces. Hence we expect the war to drag on indecisively for the nextoonths.
We believe that arms shipments will continue to grow in coming months, fueling an insurgent offensive aimed at saLx>taging the economy and disrupting the elections scheduled for next March. Furtherdeteriorationeries of spectacular guerrilla actions could decisively shift momentum against the government'
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Someatin American Males have condemned the recent French-Mexican statement recognizing the legitimacy of the left in El Salvador. Moreover, the Christian Democrats of Europe and Latin America for the most part still support President Duarte. Nonetheless, international political support for Central American revolutionaries, especially by West European socialists and Mexico, it likely to continue. We judge that Mexico's influence will weigh against US interestsas the conflict in El Salvador dragsUnited States will continue to encounter friction in relations with Mexico. France, and other states over Central America policies.
In Nicaragua, meanwhile,ontinuance of presentwe judge that the Sandinistas will be likely to maintain their evolutionotalitarian Marxist state over the nextoonths, giving ground temporarily on individual issues but continuing efforts to isolate and politically emasculate democratic forces The stagnating economy will remain the Sandinistas' major vulnerability', since no foreign government, not even the USSR, seems likely to assume the financial burdens.
Because the US interpretation of events and trends in the region is not shared by many governments, any US effort seen to be stifling revolutionary forces will carry political liabilities Failing to rise to the Communist challenge, however, would have serious costs for the United States. The hemisphere's political landscape could be alteredif the generally weak governments are left to fend for themselves.
Inaction could lead to still more brazen outside radical interference and make the anti-Communist players less amenable to US influence US credibility would suffer accordingly.
Any defensive interdiction effort would have to center onIncreased efforts there could significantly damage the Salvadoran insurgents' lifeline, but whether this would makeontainable threat is uncertain.
Disruption of the supporl network funnehng into El ScUodor is central to thwarting further guerrillan success in this matter would not intemtdv the many basic causes of instabi!it> Minimal economic growth in El Salvador and Cuatemala would come only at tremendous financial co$ts
DISCUSSION
The Communis! es.ploitat-.on ol Remit in Central America it (he moil blatant challenge to IS interests in ihe hemisphere unce Cas(ro iranifoimed Cubaadical Mar<is( stale Cuba, (he LSSR. and other entities ate now boldly attempting to undermine the United States in ill own sphere of influence and. in the process to distract it from other strategic concerns The internationalization of the struggle in Central America bv Cuba ind the USSR and the buildup of Cuban, Nscaraguan. and insurgent military strength assure (he Soviets and (he Cubans some net gun- either they trill succeed in the bid (or new client states, ot their ejection will come only at high cost to (he United States The longer they have to consolidate their inroads, the costlier it will be (or the United State* to try to reverse the tiend
entral America's slide toward increasingprobably willthinoonths. The greatly expanded arms shipments from (he USSR to Cuba. Ihe continuing flow of weapons and trailed guerrillas from Nicaragua and Cuba lo PI Salvador and Guatemala, and the Sandinistat' military buildupattern of actions designed to eiploit conditions already receptive to insurgency and revolutionary gro-th.
the period of this Estimate, aof these actions will intensify political eitremitm and economic deprivation throughout the region As violence increasingly Is accepted as the only hope for real change, insurgent groups will continue to eipand. Government efforts to remedy national probleou will be further inhibitedcarcity of resources,violence, and the deep-rooted nature of trie difficulties.
The Cuban and Soviet ffo.es
acting vigorously lo lake advanUge of theses unlikely under present circumstances to moderate its course. The Castro regime saw the Sandinistas* toppling of Nicaragua's Somotaesponal climate receptive to destabiliza-(inneakening of US influence and capability and opportunitiesndermine USCastro in the past three yean has increased virtualli all types of assistanceentral America, including armi, funding, and (raining
3 The Sovitt Union has come to share Castro's optimism for revolutionary prospects in CentralEager to embarrass (hes in its own sphere of influence and intent on discreditingm the eyes of the Third World. Motcow has gradually espanded itsby East European nations, some Communist and radical Arab states, and the PLC Nevertheless. Moscow sees the area as less immediately important than does Cuba. The USSR is also concerned with protecting its diplomatic and commercial lies in Latin America, and recognizes thai its actions (here could furllier strain ill relations with Washington and rally (he US public behind tougher actions. Theseand Cuba's success in Nicaragua underlie Moscow's willingnessei the Cubans take thedvancing regional revolutionaryacknlikely to change. Soviet leaders almost certainly consider that their Central American course confronts the Unlled Staleserious policy dilemma: in their view, if Washington does not respond forcefidiy in Central Amenca, insurgent strength there will grow. and. if the United Slates does respondMcavcow will count on exploiting widespread world criticism of L'S "imperialism" in Centra!and In the process distract attention from Soviet embarrassment In Afghanistan and Poland.
Regional Trends
ithnow Managua andproviding material resources, training, and organizing eipertise. the radical movements have gamedand strength. The psychological boost of having allies lo counter the United States, and (he practical impact of reasonably steadyave signdi-cantly bolstered their potential The imrsottance of external factors varies, however, over lime and from
country to country They are aclement in the Haying power ot the left in El Salvador, foi instance, but not nearly to important vet in Cuatcmala '
evertheless, no country in the region is immune fiom destabilizing trends.
In El Salvador,man armed forces and police are stalematedenerally well armed and trained tnjurgents' We expect the war to drag on indecisively over the nextoonths Despite interdiction efforts, the guerrillas are continuing to receive outside support sufficient torotracted war ofore widespread insurgent offensive is likely late this year or early2 Meanwhile, the government remains vulnerable to the corrosive economic and political effects of the Insurgency, and it is possible that further economic deteriorationeries of spectacular guerrilla actions could decisively shiftagainst the government1
For Cuba and the USSR, the immediate obrectlve in Central America ii consolidating the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua Support of insurgencya complementary and important goal-is eneore elastic time frame.
The issue of the Sandinistas' survival raises the stakes for theseso for Havana. Cuban prestigeecret defense pact has been concluded Under rnosl circuci-Haneev Castro would be willing to send Cuban troops to defend the regime in Managuaeriouse believe that only impending US miu-
ran retaliation and (he strongest of Soviet warningsdeter him
avana's determinationelp conyo'.date (he Sandiniita revolution and id desirese Managuaupport base lor insurgents throughout the region are underscored bv the subslannal Cuban presence throughout tbetotalncludingilitaryecurity advisershysical presence Is imall buttoersonnel, includingt its Embassy It has provided military advisers and instructors, and has delivered someaircraft
Eaternalbeen instrumental in allowing the Sandinistas toragmented guerrilla force0en into Central America's largest standing army Nicaragua,opulation ofillion, has an00 men on active duty plus an equal number of organized reservists. (In contrast, Somoia's National Cuard had0 men
Civen present goaU and recruitment patterns, togetherontinuation of current leveb of eiternal supply, we expect thermed forces to0 within the next year, with an0 reservists sufficiently trained to be integrated into (be army Substantial numbers of less trained militia will serve as an irregular territor backup. Managua's leaden consider that thevrotect the Sandinista revolution by building upragua'% armed strength. Al the same lime, however, this buildup is intimidatinghe region and is giving the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of revolution Managua's aimed forces will overshadow those of its Central American neighbots bybuthorlage or trained officers and NCOs. problems with logisticsack of proficiency with newly acquired weapons
The letdQO (eachen -ho rerurned homeui!eplaced b. February IM!
he Sov-.eii are closely collaboratingHa vana on the flow of military supplies to Nicaragua Current (memories reflect major1 tht last two years in almost all categories of ground force light weapons, including undetermined qua.iuiei ot rocsei-propelled grenade launchers-and lubmachineguns. and SovietTh* Sandinista anenal also includes at leastI-mm howitieno4s. and an undetermined but large number ofurface-tt-air missilet In addition, preparations for the introduction of MIC aircraft reportedlyaccelerated, and they could arrive by2 This would enable Nicaragua to offiet Honduras! present air advantage
avana's historical links lo the Sandinistaent. and especially its close relationship with the dominant Sandinista clique, pointurtherof net Cuban training programs ireroad and reinforce Cuban influence on the Nicaraguan Vmv structure, strategy, and philosophy In addition to training provided by Cubans in Nicaragua, several hundred Nicaraguaru are also training oruba at any one time. Recent and planned acquisitions of Soviet weapons will increase dependence on both Cuban and.esser extent. Soviet technicians and advisers. The lurge in Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba this year apparently in pan includes weapons lo be trans-ihipped through Cuba as well as replacements for Cuhan arm, previously shipped loJS'icaragua.
1c
By virtue of Its location, lb cooperationost of Communist and other radical advisers, and ib support for Central American insurgents. Nicaragua has become the hub of the (evolutionary wheel in Central America. The initial emphasis on aid to the Salvadoran insurgency has already eipanded tothe training of Hondutan and Costaleftists, and the assumptionaager role in efforts to unify and supply Guatemalan guerrillas.
Aid Io regional iuurgenb is an integral part of Managua's military aaolitical strategy. The Sandinistas hope to tie down the armed forces of their neighbors while organising an insurgent fifth column. As Nicaragua's military capability grows, its eiport of the revolution is likely to increase because it will be less susceptible to oulildc prewurc The Sandinistas' internal conttol is ahead) csleniive enough lo prolec: sub rosa operations.
Domestic political and economic difficulties will probably not slow etlhet the Sandinistas'military expansion ot the jro*th ol thensupport network If anything, presiurei from the Sicaraguan democratic opposition and from armed counierrevolutionary band) will accelerate themilitary schedulr and stiffen iheir commitment to Central American insurgents The belief that their domestic opponents are linked lo the United States and to conservative regimes in the area strengthens the Sandinistas' willingness to.aid te*olutionanes tn El SaKador. Honduras, and Guatemalaeans of ensuring their own security
Headv buildupiversifiedpoints toward signdicantly increasedflow* to EJ Salvador later this year Theaid earlier this yearasactical reactiondefeat of the guemllai' January offensive and US
, diplomatic pressures We believe the flow of supplies has been climbing slowly in recent months and is now iufficienl to maintain ptesent levels ol rebel activity in El Salvador. Both Nicaragua and the Salvadoranreportedly plan increased ihipmenb during the November-February period because of favorable dry leason conditions and the Salvadoranesire to disrupt the scheduled March election*
supply and support patterns flow inCuba's return to more militant backing ofrevolutionaries, and the strong veccndingpolicy by Moscow. The Soviets haveHavana's Increased activism byformation of an umbrella revohjtJonaryin EJ Salvador and by urging thein Guatemala and Honduras to ioinfronts. The USSR has also played athe supply of arms from both Cuba andiuch as the Vietnamese. With Havanaarmed revolution in Honduras one ofMoscow has undertaken paramilitaryof Hondurans in the USSR for the fustnd will participate in politicalHondurans in Havana.
any West European socialnts have been so-bered bv repressive Sandlnisla policies and areover the an ti-America msm that their vocal criticism o( the United State* has helped to inspire They will probably ease away from their mediation initiative in El Salvador and eipress revolutionary sympathy with morethe imaE socialist party in EI Salvador, (or instance, rather thanfor the entire left
'most West Europeans remain sSeptical that Washington is willing to accept what they view as inevitable and necessary social iransfor-mat ions
Christian Democrats of Europe and Latin America have for tbe roost part continued to support President Duarte and the SalvadoranDemocrats, while opposing the extreme left as well as the extreme right Meanwhile, if the conflict In El Salvador drags on, the United States will again encounter friction in relations with some Westand othersapid buildup of opposition to USto leftist gains in theremains an ever-present possibility
2Sregional policy has become somewhat moreespeciaJh toward El Salvad
enc=uela will continue as the strongestol US policy in the area, but it is probably approaching the practical limits ol its involvement Increasingly pessimistic overn Centraltt will probably soon movearder public line toward the Sandinislas The Venezuelans will continue to pump financial and political aid into El Salvador, but thev see the country's two greatestdeteriorating economy and the external support of therequiring substanliallv greater US ef-
oiombui has even greater cause forhaving been the recent target ofsubversion. This concernjed the Turbav government to seek increased political and economic ties with neighboring countries and toodest military modernization program Military leaders in Argentina! and Chile ccr.ssdn the crisis in Central AmericaS problem Thev would like to be supportive of governments in El Salvador.jnd Honduit
Implieoiiorvi for ihe United Slates
ealing with ihe challenge in Central Amenta oil) be complicated by the fact thatof tvents and trends In the region is not shared by many governments Not only will the nonahgnec countries continue (or the most part to sympathize with the Central American revolutionaries, but soMesieo and much of Westernparti ot* the IS public as well International leftist propaganda has been enormously successful, and US credibility remains low
n this situation, almost any IS effort seen to be stifling the revolutionary forces will carry political liabilities. Particularly, any action smacking ofintervention will revive the historical nightmare of the Yankee big stick throughout Latin America, even among such countries as Venezuela and Braol which tend to support overall L'S policy.
et. failing to nse to the Communist challenge will almost certainly involve serious costs (or the United Slates The hemisphere's political lanclscape could be significantly altered if the generally weak governments are left to (end for themselves against the^ multinational revolutionary offensive.
and Havana aim to see leftist ideology spread and, over time, to see leftist regimes come to power, as underscored by support networks that lace Central America; Cuba's sponsorshipuerrilla assault on Colombia, showing thai Havana's subversion is not restricted lo righlwing dictatorial governments and ihe Castro regime's continuing assistance lothroughout Latin America.
In this contett, we eipeci that ihe USSR and Cuba would move Quickly to take advantage of anv opportunities that anse in the Caribbean.their attention will remain focused primarily on current objectives in Nicaragua. El Salvador, and Guatemala.
he US response to the insurgency in Elinvolves even greater risks. On the one hand, there is no guarantee that the guerrillas will be decisively defeated even if the United States substantiallyits support to the government. On the other
hind. inaction could lead to Mill mote brazen ouUide radical interference in the region, damage US eredibd-itv, and make the anti-Communist players lessto ITS influence
he challenges involved in slowing thethreat pale beside Central Americasirvequiraet Even assuming that pohbcaJcould be reasonably controlled and thai the attitudes of the elite sectors of those nations directly threatened would change, we estimate that minimal economic growth in El Salvador and Guatemala wouldotal of roughlyillion dollarsfrom fore urn sources over the next three to five yean, and the annual coat for the regionhole could approximate twice that amount
ecause development and stabilisation arelong-range goals, and because dealing with them is inhibited bv continuing outside aid for the Central American insurgeno, the moat criticalfor the near term Is disruption of the guerrilla support network lunneling into El Salvador. Nicaragua andsources ofbe targeted offensively nnl.rwl risk.
ANNEX A
Country Outlooks
Salvador
ver the neatoonths, then El Salvador probably will drag on indecisively. As long as the guerrillas receive effective outside support.dramatic shift in favor of the armed forces is remote (less thant best, Improvements in the government's military position will come slowly. In the meantime, the junta wiJJ be vulnerable to the corrosive economic and political effects of theIn the eventteady economic deteriorationeries of spectacular guerrilla actions,ome20thecould shift decisively against the government' during the period of this Estimate.'
upport funnelcd through Havana and Managua Is critical to Insurgent capabilities, and at present is sufficient to maintain current levels of activityRebel command headquarters in Nicaragua
guerrillas appear to have increasedbeyondman level existing at tbethe January offensive; we estimate thatis now. Whatevercasualty ariddesertioriour suspicions
elativelyor impressrrveot appear sufficient totheminlmgny torotracted
addition, the guerrillas' communications netarms stores are up. and operations continue
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to gain sophistication. While there are significant personality and tactical divisions among the various groups, thereonsensus on the rseed for astruggle irrespective of domestic political cir-cusTistances. This insurgent strategy will result in continuing attacks on economic and infrastructure targets, together with hit-and-run operation) to wear down theat minimal cost to the guerrillas.
ore widespread insurgent offensive is hkel* Late this year or early neil Some planning has been reported and the supplyeing made ready for the November-February dry season Even in the absence of increased popular support the guerrillas will probablyolitical need scene time around the election period for widespread,attacks, which could tnowbalL
nternationalistptobably numberajor factor, although
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further unrest. Nicaragua almost certainly supplies the largest single contingent. Moreover, the appearance In El Salvador (or Guatemala) of Nkaraguan "freedom fighter" Eden Pastora would, at least initially,unsettle government officials. Civettwe cannot rule out sortie spectacular operation paralleling hb takeover of the Nicaraguan National Palace8
he milltary'l counterinsurgerscy effort has made some slow gains; but these have disrupted rather than debilitated insurgent forces. Cuerrilladbplay both the confidence and abilityvoid encirclement in part because of tbe armed forces' limited manpower. There has beeo no significant breakdown In military morale. Interdiction and rapid-reaction capabilities are Inadequate and, to move beyond essentially reactive tactics, tbe army requires
improved traruport. in increased air and navaland belief tactical and national intell-genc*
8 The current balanceovemment troops and policeegular guerrillas and several thousand additionalthe Duarle government far less thanorce advantage generally considered necessary to defeat an insurgencyindeedto expand forces substantially will be aided by the availability of manpower from the Large and unemployed young male popubtion. The government, however. wiD be hindered especially by serious budgetary restraintsritical shortage of officers and NCOl
n addition. Junta efforts lo attract civilianwill be hampered by its inability to control indiscriminate violence by security forces and right-wing death squads This failure will also bluntto gain increased international bar;
f the favored Christian Democrats emergetrengthened position, they could attract labor,and other sectors Failure lotrong showing, however, would greatl* increase the chances that the Christian Democrats will be attacked and perhaps shunted aside by military and private-sector leaders. Any lucb sidelining of the Christianonly credible reform element in thesignificantly boost long-term insurgent prospects.
imilarly, ihe guerrillas would gain from the collapse of the government's agrarian reformack of funds and technical expertise already is hobbling implementation of tbeamong Latin America's rnost sweeping. Moreover, both extremes of ihe political spectrum perceive Itanger and are responding to It with threats and violence.
he economy will probably be the country's most serious problem over Ihe neat year Severely worsening terms of trade, guerrilla damage to tbe infrastructure, and the loss of private-lectorhave produced an economic downturn thai even suable sums of foreign aid alone could not readily reverse. UotJ the violence can be arrested and the private sector has seme assurance of consistent stabiliiation policies, foreignas much aslJJ^
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Original document.
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