Cuban Policy Toward Latin America
contents
INTERNATIONAL
DOMESTIC CUBAN
FOR REVOLUTIONARY
A. QJkm
t lot liwWil
C
D PiwfuJvt Covtinnwrti* jnd
THE SOVIET
PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN
CENTRAL
A
II
FOR CUSAN POLICY AND RELATIONS
ELSEWHERE IN LATIN
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
A.
foi Eiiww
C CoUIh*
CUBAN POUCY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA SUPPORTING ANALYSIS'
THE INTCDNATlONAL SETTING
U- <jfi*VanIn uihIccuI us liifha-ncrotlui-wli tlirn additioneeploi drtirrhi) iroorul puribRL> ha rbec tin ailh ami drurndrnrt: imOilm'i saoViljin, alirlwdr In-arJ llrIi oa* ol hnatil.lv and fca and hr tert usiMernla ia (St refloat a* Irreconcilabletherefore, heompetlint need loi Infturnre ia oiic lo curb Waahinfton"iof action lo uolale and bring prniure on Havana.
the oaalyean. Ih* Caalro covernmenl hai tharplyih* emphaiii and tactical (xioritln oa* iU regional policy la cartlraai lo moal of ih* period ofivlna much hfa.frr cmphatuevolutionary Iruurtenl).In Central America, and placine Im Importance on cultivation of diplomatic and commercial Ilea wllh moderate andovernmenta
karat'nfof Internationalwere probably on* ley factor that
moved Cuban leaden to revfa* their rcflonal policy.ilcrruliorul Influence and pre* If* had nott been hither lhan at the endlterecade ef luaUinrd and aornctirnes ipectacular nae-iruo Military iatervenlloni In Africa had markedly enhanced Ha>ana'a Interaallonal Uridine,uav ber of toKmmenU there and In other retlora had come to bonow from Cuban ceiantxationa! rnodek, te emulate Cub* a pollciea. and to lolietl Cuban
mHim
Caatroe meet touxhl-aftet foreign poller aoat) *er* achieved: hla campalc" lo htlpWiraj realm* in the hertiliphcredoubly- . t hn teei
'ulfilLd.uhan wftiOBJaaaarir*,vtrtr* rtoia la (Jr-ruda aad rN. tnhr euutmd ihr tjileriliiii of ihr nraia'ianivl nxnrntrMl) wmmtt in Havana Rwoted bi tin* aad athrr itctariA. hr l'a>rlrd lo ihr I'lWird Kalaa* In Octoberirlutao rule hr had rchraniil U* lean, anil nai ahtrwitccredibility In pnar a) isjulnman for ih*unJciprivilrard and opperurd
3 In tin- aivfsi.plitlniH.-fai of Mr lOTOt. tin-romiNk and nairoulinic Impthei riortaaa potiey convertedthe pro-Soviet potlclei that hr had adopted Ineeaua* of hia diplomatic and po/rtieal eft-da. the burden ml Coba't increaaad deprndenee an ih* USSR and wiflintneu lo performid not lubalanilally undeicut hu ma-rwuverabihly TSua, Caalro areminalyble lo perform tlmuliarxouilyoyal Soviet ally, aa eminent Latin American tUtaman.Grid-clan ipolearnan for revolutionary and norulltned caaaea.
6 lioriKaBf. Caalro waa aNe lo rellih theaeforhorl lime, before iheof hb foreljn policy waa upaet by iheof Afihanuian Inomoreec ad*ee ui vocally(oUSSR and the llmlbimpoart on Havana! ability lo purwelinendorsementiand IU lucent In blocainat efforta bymember) looacov have iharplyCaOro'i Inlerrutloetal prmtse. Havanaalmcat Immediate direct damair when Itwithdraw Ra candidacyoveted UNMat after II loti Ihe npportumbercountriea, and IU Questeal waaIn la0 Caflro'i plaaa le eipretliterm ai head of the NAM have alaoilo occupy
AffAanaale* h* probably will have lo be cooieot loelatively defcrulve pcalur* In th* movc-mtnl. te protect Soviet InlereaU.
orcovet, hetthtened Inteinalienal temiont be-caui* ofiriorr recently.
have increased Cuban Inn of the United States. Cuban leaden ar* more concerned than altimeIhrhat Cubal MM rhalrtn.o" uoni'wurd thai Ihr tV>Hdefend Cubai tipecia'I) In lh* abaenceormal dalenae wild ihe Soviets despite hu el forts lo secure one-Cuban leaden realiieounlrv I* vulnerable at ihe mealpused salient of Soviet power and ire alarmedonsensus mar be emerging In In* United Stale* In favor of toucher pofceie* Even before Afghanistan. CaCro apparently had corn* lo belter* lhai US national security officials were attempting lo contrive preteitl lei punitive action* against Cuba0 he became even more concerned about the ptoaprcti for sharperh the United Saleseagan adminIsWaUon
a Developments ir. Latin Americalso helped In alter many of the assumptions and circumsta-iccs on which Cuban foreign polio was based duringvtfl before Alghamilan. Castro had luflcrednumber of setbacks in ihe region (hai undermined the policies rapouied bv such lead.rj pragmaiuti ai Vice Prewdent and Politburo member Carlo* Rafael Rodri-guet Bv the end of the decade, after effort) to negotiate commercial treaties with several majo*Irsea were rebuffed. Cuba't only significant trading partner In the region was Argentina
moderate polk sea that the Cubanduringlao fell short olimportant cbjettive ol cementing ill legitimacyLatin AmericanhHeugS acountries establishedrelations withDraiilumber of others did not (techopes to eapand Its Influence wilh manygovern menu with which it has formalalso been frustrated1.lalli in tbeof hai of Cuban .ubverasoo. Castro haito accept the wnpaoaaant rralrti thatuttivaird relation* cao be transitoryparticularly irritated when the specialhad developedHrtrera Cam pun tui-credrd Caries Andreipresident earh/B
dramatic reaJooal devvlepmeniito Cuban interests reinforced the preaiuirsadvene drveloprnrnt* in prooipttng aol Cuba's regional doctrine, priorities, Tims.he Sandlnista gurmllaito challrnge the Somota regime In Nicaraeua by earlyuba's cornmltmeni ton)ton/luenc began to uwenaif. TV Sandinbuhe triumphoup of radical rcvca^iiooarie* Cinuda. and the eacalating vMafnce io El Salvador and Cualcmala presented Havana with enticing new oppoitunlties for eapandlng Its regional role precisely as the returns from the pragmatic policies olere diminishing
hese revised calculations and Castro* anger aad frustration arising from foretgn aad internalhavegreater militancy us Havana's regional policy, which in turn has stimulated stronger fear of Cuba Conons with the Bahamas.Costa Bka, Ecuador. Peru, and Venezuela intensified already rising concern In the region over Cuba's military might and growing inlluenceharp departure from his relatively conciliator) tactics of. Undent and repealed criticism by Castro and the Cuban media ofozen Latingovern menu or leadenither Hiu.ifd
II. THE DOMESTIC CUBAN SETTING
long with Increasing Inlet national rxeuurcv Cuban leadrrsad to deal with ncalaiingprobiemithe last couple of years.also contributed lo CaHro's (rtnUaUera aad haew policy departures After two decades ofgovernment, the economy Is stagnant andon massive Soviet assistance Masco* pro-vide*tiivalent ofillionabout <me quartet of cfUmated Cubannallnnal product Vet. hviral conditions remain auaterr Most consumer goods. Including food and rlr*.hina are rationed, and pnfula' iierro are frroHtnll)houUng. tranltmrlaticei andrrvice* are seriously cMtcaenlhe fruttraiions of both the population and the govrmmrM IncreitevJ tSe fira because of espoaure to the -ril-bring of visitingerIrani: ihr second because of setbacks to agricultural production from diseases and hurricane damage
Id Warned by theJr'lraders notect Wgnifi. ii" relarl before the ecd'efncreasing numben have become alwnated Wialer productlvtir has declined during lh* but lew years, corruption has sprrad. and crime has increased dra-
Vt bellev*illion Cubaould emigrate to the Untiedhe. badWc estimateew hundred thousand havepr*>clCubalr. they have been air typed ol their jobs and educational pri-'lrsi. and at limea (heir ration card* The*become in effect an outcaal minority, although re-ithe government hai taken Map* to reintegrate them
arge number of the openly discontented belong lo the poat-Caitro generation It waa widelyCuba andthat lh* Ideab of the revolulion had been successfully Inculcated In the youth and that theyulwark of support for the regime. Many, however, after receiving prefer entlal Irealroenl while In school, are disillusionedey enter the Weak Job market and fJlr encoonlrr unpleasant economicheirand other evidence ol popular apathy and disillusionment have angered and embarrassed Cuban leaders, because It discredit) thetclce-sauna that the Revolution hasorivsng sii.ilit society.
IS II Ml against thlt background that Casuoto adopt harsh civilnd in9 appointed Ramiroaa Ministernterior v'aMra. who previoualy served to tbe post during ihe iw<k. Iiadeputalien aa the regime's most prominent advocate of reprraatvr measures During, he and the Hardline policies associated with him were eclipsed by more pragma IK leaders and programsis returnluse of utcreamai social untestleat Indication that Castro desired Inougher line internally Policies aimed atcrime, vagrancy, occasional acts of sabotage, and oilier eipresatona ofegime aentlment have been imaHuted Valdes's penchaal forvident last year, when block commit (era were mobl-lo ii and physically allaii would-beince then, however, some pragmatic In nova-lions aimed al Increasing productivity and morale ihroagk economic samativr* have also been adopted
lt> Other hardline leaden concerned primarily wllhffairs have proUV. abo beroote more influential during the talt raople of yean Manor! Pineiro is head ol the America Department al lh* Crammiirasl ran*'*alh responat-bllity for coordinating relations with Irftia and rrsotu-toman group* in lh* lir-muplirrr While chief ol (he
r;
Intelligence service during, heCuban aubxrsiv* actlvHIea) sa Latin America and els*wh*rr. Idsof whom aho has* eaoaeiara withccoceotialad In ihe .nieilaenc* and aecsarrti ralabl'shmenl and the Aa Department Several are imbaasadon in Caribbean Basin covMrie*
heir special Interest and eipotuc in Central America and lh* Caribbean data lo ellorti duting Ihr lira month: ol the Castro government to iporuo' ievolutionary movements in that region Theyeen rater* eoeiapaCuoualy repteiented ther* iron >rt other areas ol Cuban foreign policy. Thus, as condi-lloni mote conducive to revolution in Central America hav* (merged. Caatio aaturally has relied on th*ia mote. Hii Iru.ted companions sloe* the guerrillaagainst lh* Batisia regime la the IstSOs, they are closer to him personally than leaden from othet backgrounds. Their loyally to him and lo th* revolu nonary process as berobably are th* major element) of their political creed. Most of (hem also have cksse lie* lo Raul Cauro and the defente eatab-uinlt-.h. and they frequently reflect hi* views on domestic and foreign affairs
e believe that ihe ha/dllnm hold lhal armed struggle Is Ihe only effective way to achievechange and. thus,critically than otherruka on behalf of imurgenu ihev probably are convinced lhal the "coetetatlon of imrr national for era" now I* von Use Communist camp and lhal objective conditions laount ties are more rncoutaglna lr* revo!uiiona'irier hav* been In mans yean Although they probably share with more pragmatic Cubanoncern that th* United Slate* again may adopt punitive pohctetard Cuba, they probably believe that US threat* wtjl arengtheti dorneslic support lor th* Castro regime, and that US action* can b* couoterod effectively Over lh* longer run. ihey probably believe Ihat ihe security of the Cuban reaunr can beat be eaJianred 'h roigfa lh*
lon-uimtathon. of revolutionary regime* elarwhetr m
the
aif io runivr" Kaiupport (orjliorsarirs. In good measuieofustrariort and anger over domestic arid foreign polio irlbacis Nonet heSrn. In* ha* avoided any sweepinglo upart the balance among hi*edvlarn and tricing ira"rreit groupa Official* accused of being "sell" toward crime have been
replaced In ill the lop potilioru in Ihe area* ol interna) security and nuiKC. but pragma'mj main theirand ponliooi in other area* ol the bureaucracy None of tlx: beenH there are no indication* thai Cailro isie or ia lean ii.orInfluence of ihe pragmettiti op loreign policyn at lea it temporary decline
III. SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE A. Cuban Doctrine
ardinal tenet of the Castro rpvernment from Hi Inception hat been that tupport for revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin Americaightuty of ibe Cuban "evolution The levels and types af tuppon have fluctuated through theowever, at revglu-Ikjiarr doctrine haa adjusted lo changing orcum-tlances In Cuba and the region During most of. Cuba backed only groupa that employed rural guerrilla methodi but afler repeatedin Che Guevara'i death in one luch cam-pslgn (in Bolivia Inadopted the more fValb>appcc*chei advocated by Kcdrlgue* aad other pragmallttt and urged on him by Moscow. The prag-matUti' revolutionaries should choose among various metbodt (tncfudi'go reachuntil the end oluring that period, all forms of tuppoil lor IftiurgenU and lerrorltti in the hemisphere were at low levels, and nonviolentprtetlt. bishops andwere praised as true revceuiiortaries
n lite most recent doctrinal dull. Castro once again teemi to have revertedihethat it at tbe duty ol all revolutionaries to "auke revclutioni-through violent ilruggle Thli more milium line waa most riplk-ubuly ISSO tn hn roeecfa on the eonlvcrviry of ihe Revolution In the most forceful tfatei he has made an live mhiect of vioience In overdecade. Castro raid that "the experience* o/ Guatemala. El Salvador. Oille. and Bolivia leach an that there it no other wayamvd itruggle
nlike the Htusiionhe littOv when tlmi-Isrly aarenive policin brought Cob* and lb* USSR Into tharp doctrinal conflict, there Is now atartial convergence on tartlet.both countries endorsing more mllilsnt rraethodi In Central Arneriest. Aulhontativr Soviet ipoknmcn have Questioneddoctrine lhal orthcdoi Communul parties mul play the vanguard rote In Latin Arnertcan revoluttort-ary struggle.ndicated that the moil appn/siwi.tally in Guatemala etvd El Salvador, where the CommunU part let are ecllpted bv more radkslthrough the creation ol brood political mlHtary front*hat refraie from cooperation with other leftist forces have been criticised, and the Sarvsdoraa Crsmmunlsu. who have adopted vice*nt methoda and bread front tacita. have been praiied
ike the Sandinltt. NaiionsI Uberation Front, auch amalgams are seenevolutionary vanguard in the bembphcr* Cub* and the USSR tupport th* Inclusion of "progressive" groupa In such fronts with Communist parties and insurgent groupa Socialaocsahstt, advocates of hberauoo theology and other radical Catholic thought, as well at other quaii-Manisl leftitU who sic critical of the United States and of cspttalitm are orrnstdered tuffieieetly revoVhelp carry outchange, particularly to Central America lato otherhli approach attracts Wen European tupport for Latin American revolutionaries la contrast. Caflio'i antipathy toward CbritOaa Democratic and other center-left reform parlies see mi lo have Intensified during the last year or Iwo
M These and other changes in Cubandoctrine have had diverse reoeioiukxii amongAmerican Cemmur-itt parties. Some haveto conform, whileave either hesitatedtheir Irmgstaadlng policies aga.nithavr divvied over the tttue. The mala
- party thus fsr has refuted to rain in the Caban-apneacaedtails among guerrilla group* or to condone Irxurgeru method* The Honduran and Costa Itican tautlei have tpU over the Usur of1 vtolcrior
b. Support for lntv*flerrf Group!
l Salvador and Guatemala are the high-prior, ity teraru of Cuban mbversve efforts Virtually all lypet of tnpporl to the Baauagenti have increased during the last year or to.ramatic upsurge in aid Dance tooraa revolutionaries rim0rr Caalro and other evidence Indicate, in addition, that Cuba'i interest In Intuigenl and radical groups eilrnd* to aeveral other couMries Even in Chile and Colombia, where the prutpeicft for
near-term revolutionary lucent lie dight. HavanaIi apparently tommillrd In ihr primacy ol violent mclhoda arid lo tuuJiri*> Inhr prcsrnl ctnrrnnv-nu Cuban Interest In eapaas wLLh ana* Influence over th* cilreme left In Bolivia, the Dominicanand prohablv aother counlrin abo ha* theme ncd
ommllnvnl lo attlri ihrpeoceia In El Salvador haiim pet ed pvb-hclytlr cooi.ocat.oai ti-c*0eaden brieve that ihr potential for soother re*olu-lionaiy I'umi l> greater there lhan anywhereim America, and ihe prospect) of another pioCuhan regime In Centralowerful inducement lo help Cettro haa played an imporiani lolebe liveroupa loritlMaryand lo ckHahoeale withpolitical groupsropaganda uipport foe the eatreme left and Its backing of International initiative* igainil the govern-menl have alto interuifled
ST Cuba. Ihe USSR, and Nicaragua0ajor aupply efluel ihai (raadormed ihe formerly ragtag Sah-idoren irourgniUela-llvelv well-armed and well-equipped force Theoeiginatlrg In Fattern Europe. Ethiopia, andleutomatic and aulomalic rifles,ndi>ropc liedi well at eiplosiveamedKal tupplm. and rommirnicatiorri gear We etti-mate, in addition, thai during the Ua! year or m.alvadanmeceived guerrilla liaininra tn Cuha and from Cuban adUrn in Nicaragua Cuban* alto lain the Imuran In the area* of oomhal pfenning, intelligence, and tactics, cncnliauyrobably through field trtpa to FJ SilvadV* aa well
ommitment to Inaurgcnt groupa Inand effort* to gam greater influence over them havr alro Increased over the leal year Havana haa put peeaaure on leaden ol the four principal guerrilla orgariiiallcuu to enterpopular and demortaltcttvalne* and tacticaltir gunrtlU chieflatra remain il-na however, and em-pede Cuba'i continuing unification effort* Several hundird Cuatemalam havr reeei>ed military tnintng in Cuba,nvatl number of Cuban advUcrt apparently have beenlie field for abort perturb with Cuattmalen guerrillas The growth ofm aupiort of the revolutionary left audareety
through dirAaaalic channrb and ino-runu. lo diacredit and ooialc the LuCat government have Incieared
Armed revolution In Horvdurai haa aboong-term Cuban obie" live.n tharp conlraal lapirtued by Cub* during. when Ibe Caflro regime perrodieaHy roedet* Konduran military leaden wtih the apparent obteetivr of est*blurting commercial and perhapa diplomatic ties. Cube'i change of policy probably helpedan Ihe Konduran partyhen ebnul hall of Ibe memberieparatc gruuit that espiwiw* vtotenl metSodi Cob* provides Konduran revolutionaries wiih guerrilla training and increawd propaganda lupport. Cuban leaden *rc,urglrig Hon-duran Communist* to reunite, and Havana meanwhile maintain! Influence wlih both th*andgroup
In addition. Havana hat helped called re-ohj.n ariahile during th* last year or to. in hope* ofrevolutionary Struggle agalrul the Pin- delTlieof the Movemem ol tbe Revolutionary Left, who fur yean were discouraged bvinlend In do rjdimentart oegsniui tonal wort and io engage ui iporadic terrorlam thai could result in more unified attempti lo undermine ihe military regime Although there are no Insurgent gruupt In Bolivia today, official tUlrmcnti ilronglt wum ihat Havana eould Me toarHae vtpteot opposition lo ihe military
Colombia waa added to the lirtwhere Cuban - r It ihaiprnlng tbe
of revolutionaryavana helped tram. arm. and tianaport MI9pre-vioualy had conrmlra'.ed on urbao (errorttmin their efforta. earl,I, to open rural guerril'a Irontv
C. Revy^uliooory Covwrenenh
i tuppmt for niolmi revolution haihaa aho revvrird lu more demandingof revolutionary prorenea andCenrfab Wlaacoru and Toinioa oftoolrl. populm and reformoftenHavana Caatro eontl-
titled them "revolutionary" because ihey adopted na-iIi.tiiI.uc poii'ivni on such issues as foreign owncnhip in their countries, supported the NAM} inlrrnational laMKiiii ledtkiiJii ofiled Slain. Cuban doctrine becarne even more pragmatic following the erection Ot Martllt Salvador Aflende lo the Chilean presidencyebellion was no tenser the sole means ol winning revolutionary power, assault on (lie class structure was not an immediate priority, and Marittt or socialist ideology was not essential
he Cuban leadership now appears to believe that only leaders who win or consolidate power through violent means, and who eliminate the military ami nlher power centers thai could force them from office, canenuine revolution. In thoview, revolutionary governments should al least be inclined Inward Mariism and should consider Cuba, and by etlcrulon ihe USSR, as their natural allies and be willing to demonstrate this peelcrence publicly by taking strong "anti-impcnaliil" standi By these more stringent standards, only the Sandlnisla. rc*.me in Nkarac.ua and the Bishop government in Grenada qualify ai revolutionary.
ince Ihe coup led by Maurice Bishop inHavana has been the dominant foreignin lliat small East Caribbean nation.ubans are helping in the const nscl looew international airport, and Cubanedical personnel, military, security, and other advisers are at work there. An unknown number of Crcnadiln stu-rfrmi are receiving training in Cuba, and Bishop and other leaden of hi* New Jewel Movement are attracted to Cuban political and social morlrlirrfleiive nip port for Cuban internationalwas Illustrated Inhen il nl ihe only other Wat em Hemisphere government to vote against the UN resolution condemning the Invasion of Afghanistan-OS. It is in Nicaragua,here Cuba hat made the most dramatic progress In Inspiring and helping toibling revolutionary process. Cuban influence is more pervasive there than tl has ever beenatin American country, especially through the pretence ofubans who are active In virtually all area* of public We Numerous high-level Sandinistas, perhaps Including the members of tbeir nine-man Nationalultimate ruling body inassigoed Cuban ad vara
ib-nigh ihe Sandlnisla leadeneen wary of repealing mlitakc* made by Casturing the Initialhan Revolution (open conflict with the UniltJ State* emigration of Ihe middle clasaaL they have moved agtireauvrlt to consolidate their power willsstrategy drawn directly from Cuban opertencc- Cuban military and securityare anlttlng lh* Sandinistas to organitcInternal control mechanisms Mor*ilitary advlacri provide training In leadership, org* citation, tact lev and military soenm All wenregional military eommar*oVn hav* personal Cuban ad'iters,umber of other officendo at -ell Cuban security.nd police ad'isen ate helping te otganiae the Nkaraguan Interior Ministry, the poller andfuroea, and the peopie'i militU Military and intelligence trainlng Is also provided In Cuba
s
We believe the two counirle* are boundecret mutual defenae perl that provide* lor Cuban assistance In the event of foreignal ml the N'icaraguan Government. Roth legimet probably also iolerpret lh* agreementuban pledge for support if tbe Sindtnistu are threatened by InternalCoraWent with thli alliance. Cuba ha* supplied modern arms and equlpmrnl. in cooperallun with the USSR, to uptpad* Nlcaragiia'l military ca paII**.
Cubao advice and aitulance penetrate many area* of Nkaraguan civilian Mr asThe largest effort Is educationalubao teachen operate in Inalltulioni ihiouahout Nicaraguaicaraa-uan Ircnagcn pa ft Id pat* tn work-Body fTvoT* la Cuba, andt* art ending CobaaJty achook Cuba haa providedsedkal penoonel. an ratirulrd TSO conatJuc-Uoa workrn who are eraeadbuilding and eaher pobbc wo/laad arvnal hundred advaen who are auigned to variou* Nknriguan Co-ernaneat aaeortra Th* Maiiisl eootrni of touch of the Cuban training ha*atter af ooMto-veny with the Nkaraguan Catholic Church, and in other sector*
rctgreitivaond Movement*he MciKsn Ooveinmrnl. trvde Panamanian,pecial category In Cuban rhetoric because thev ate consideredhe two have frequently Joined Nicaragua andin support of Cuban Initiative* In Caitro's view.
'ptogreuive regimes have attained an Intermediate tlagr of "libcralion fiotnn conirasi lu the moderate doctrine* he ht-ld during.jtUi- aiipirenihholdi ikal even "pro grestlve" regime* mini complete thelt development by advancingote radical and violenthich presumably would eliminate conservativeand result in encompaiiing red iitrt but ions of wealth and power.
ince the. Meilco'i Increasingly ka-deperideni and energetic foreignas often paralleled Cuba'slocet Portitlo dramal:-cally dcmonuraled his willingness to bolster Cattro't taggleg prestige when he visited Cuba last August aad called foe an end of ihe US trad* embargo and use ofJ mo Meovernments for years have rupported in principle the need for revolutionary chargeLalin America,meiy lop offklab believe it Is Inevitable In Central America.
il. Meaico over thr pait yrar hai developed close ties with revolutionary groups in El Salvador and haa come close to breaking relations with theroviding economic and political soutane* lo ihe Sandiniitai, Is pieving Guatemalan leaden lo broaden the base of their iuppoci_ and la courting other countries In Central America and the Caribbean with often of political beckini and guaranteed oil supplies Meatco'i rising Intereil in ihe areacuble edge lor Cuba, nevertheless II poses alo long-trim Cuban obrectlvei by using iti energy wealth loolllscslly pluralistic and economically pragmatic alternative lo the beleaguered Cuban lyitrm
lthough Caalro and ihe Cuba* media soeoe-Umes depict ih* Torrtjoa government a*elaiRxo with Panama are motivated by abidingon both aides Cast to no longer baa any tBueora lhalwill becomeCuban suY or thai he wiU Instllute fundamental aortal rcformi Callm aim rcelltea that Tontjoa and other Panama-nian leaders continue to place their lebtiorshJn with Ihe United Stales above all others. Cadre has been disappointed, moreover thaio worked withhe Somoia regime- -ha* played both sides in El Salvador rather than lendingsupport lo thr iiuurgenti Torrijoi rnalntairu contact wiih revolutionaries ihioughoul Central Aran-See and provides tome of them with clandestine tupport Buiess inclined now to collaborate with
Developmenli In Jamaica, where the moderate Labor Party unseated the "progressive" government of Michael Mauley in election! last year,contributed to Castro* renewed emphasis on the primacy of violent method* Under Man ley, Jamaica moved iteadily closer lo Havana and became the centerpiece of Cuba's policy of etpandtng It* influence in the Caribbean Before the elections, tome Cuban leaders probably hoped that Manlev and radical) In his ruling party would abandon ihe Westminster political system, in order to preserve their power Indefinitely. Now Castro ha* resigned hlrnself to the loss of an important friend androad deterioration of relations with Jamaica under the Labor gover nrrvent.
Elsewhere In the Caribbean, Cuba't efforts to increase It! influence aad to promote "progressive" leaden and groups have had mlsedavana employs generally cautious political aad propaganda techniques lo augment its standing with labor and youth gioups and with intellectualt and (electedfigures, especially In the Eoglith-speakingAtsistance program! aimed primarily at those lectori are also designed to advertise Cubanand development models. Cuban leaden tnost likely are disappointed with the result* of their efforts In countries other than Cretiada. however, and appear In have underestimated the resiliency of democratic and conservative traditions tn the area. Castro It probably optimistic, nonet helm, thai long-term trends in the Caribbean favor progressive or revolutionary change and an eiiartsion of Cuban Influcrsce; and he continue* to probe for advantage In tuch openings at the unstable military government In Suriname and the prelndependence government of Beliie
IV. THE SOVIET ROIE'
he Savior Union and Cuba share similarn-warrlir-*America and the Carllibran lo embroil ihr United Slate* <tu! In judcrvut ib iiiHucticV while enhancing their own, ultimately through ibr adwnl of eooperalive revolutionary government) Theto -Inch Meteovr Inlluenceiegional policy,ifficult to asses* Cuba'saclivitiet. and the sutvi.al cf the Castro regime, ultimately depend on massive Soviet economic arid military aid, and iliul on Soviet approval. Castro payi heed both to Soviet interest! and to the IlmiU of Miocow's toleiance on tactical matters.ule,Castro acts essentially on hitinitiative in Latin America, as contrastedgreater Soviet ion-ttols over Cuban activities In Africa and the Middle East
ver Ihe yean Moscow hasower priority on the region and sees tleu immediately important component of its com petition with the United States than does Havana. The viels have more contlilriilly sought to develop diplomatic and commercial lira with cutting governmentseans of eapanding InlWnce Utttil recently. Moscow had not encouraged ihe small orthodox Communist parlies In engage in violence and had not given much direct ttipporl lo the groups thai have turned to insurgency Ai previously tndicaled. Havana's agsjtroive support of insurgents inanted sharp conflict with Moscow. In good measure because ihe Soviet? saw such support as premature and as damaging lo the interests of the ortho-dot CommtmW parties Cattro't cutback: in aid lo InuaraenU duringas largely In response to Soviet pressures
to Castro's vigorous support of Central American revolutionaries,9 pnJiebly tsuban Initiative, but one which the Soviet* have eneourageri at now more consistent with their ownv Miecow apparently cipecti and prefen Havana to tale ihe lead In advancing regional<-ain deference to Castro's greatera of local political dynamics and In shield the Soviet)actlash Iiom Ihe United Slates and Irorn ihe brstcr Latin American countries where theyilateral stake. Thus, other lhan (heir general
iu of live Cuban economy and military
establishment, the Soviet*elatively minor role in promoting Ihe Nlcaraguan Insurgency.
9 probabli both surprised and Impressed theot only did Cuba largely supplant USulountry where Moscow had had no official reixesentatlon It soon enjoyed diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, and even party-lo-partyoviet leaders apparently concluded thai the prospect* foe ihe success offorces in Central America were brighter lhan Ihey had calculated, that the United Slates was unableounter these forces effectively, and that greater Soviet attention to the area was therefore (Unified
SO Under this tevbed perspective, the Sovietloward armed struggle in Central America shifted. Moscow urged the Central Americanparties to form military units and to foia moreinsurgent groups In broad poliiicaloe ihe first lime in many years, local Communist* were provided wiih guerrilla Irairring In the Soviel Union The meat dtamalic indication of Ihii upgrading in Soviet interest was's effotl0 to arrange for broad support to Ihe Salvador an insurgents, especially arms and military cQulpment Irons four East European countries, from Ethiopia and Vietnam, and from the Palestine Liberation Organiza-tior. Moscow alto provided direclly some lottistic support and probably tome fund* to the supply operation
If ihe United Slates were substantially to raise the cost* and risks in the Soviets of their trouble ma line In the rcatOrt. they would be likely once again to reassess the coat* and benefit* of their activities In tupport of uisurgerstj There arc some Indlcatlorit thai Moscowaeet reduced short term prospect) lor new revolutionary successes and greater risk ofto the entire range of Inleiestt at stake in US-Soviet rclaliont. In Latin America, ihe Soviets would wish lo avoid provoking Intense US pressuresicaragua and especially Cuba, and any crisis wiih (he United States lhal would erode the benefit* Mcscow derive* from tiessuch key countries as Argentina and Bratil (fcaadstiitfs and otherexicoandnd Peru, (military sales!
In short, the Soviets'would be likely to adopt more circumspect tactics to esploil opportunities in the region if the United States seemed ready to
i political and military advantages. Whilechange couU provelived. Moscow would, to avoid sharp increase* inimned direct .aafaHnir to irnuege-ii. andrt rlbere-lion in .Hons to stun-Llr'torn Faitm. Furop* and other rtorucflotvil *rur<v* The Vvteta, mo'eovet. -ould be likely to recommend greater tallica! prudence to Havana and to underscore Iheir il.ong drilrc toS-Cuban military- cottlronta-lion, flut loberct to iheae ivutrainlt. Mosco- almoti cctiainlr "ill coMinwe lo mcouraa* and support torse level rJ Cuban assistance In iruursjeols-loegree nl revolutionary momenlum in the region, to keep the United Sulci embroiled there and withllot In Westernr ho* to reipond. and to etitloil an. resurrection ol the Vietnam ivndrome in Ihr Umted States-
ahift in tactics by thewould nothange In Itaraj-lerin eJjrectivestode and supplant US mnoenc* In Latin America, buit* aft it ion of ihe dulaelei lo iheit ambitions under present power realities in the region Not would tactical ivudence oo lite pal of ihe USSR necessarily imp's am rrduetaon in Hi delctmtnation to retain its Make tn Cuba. In lad.ikely to see any US ni-li thrral to the Castro regimeayor cnsil in US-Soviet rrUlWns. The rece.it sharp Increase inillion shlpoirnli to Cubantended to make ihn noii* as well al lo facilitate the supply ol arms In ihe Meats* inn regime and lo regional lanur-geoit In atedatawi to other measures, Moscow .cold be likedetiunterhreat by incteasing its efforts lo effeteressure* throughout Latin America.
V. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA
A. El Sorrooor cand GiKtltrnvcio
S4 The tire ran hem ng nl the muluttonary regime in Nicaragua and promoilun of revolutionaryespecially bs El Salvador andill penbebli cornirme as ihe paramount obrecUve* ofresnonal puLct duringt the neil yeat Ot two Cohan leader, almoal certainly wiH perwit in Irwtr rflort* lo bo-sd'" and bolilet ihe pollt^al-mditary (root* and auemlla groups ihey back tn EJ Salvador and Guatemala, and the> probably will employ similar lactic* in altempliisi lo ttlinulate lh* tl iU-nascent lesvaVrltrnwr* force* in Honduras. Covertand diptomalie Initiative* aimed atsubverting the military dominatedIht three countr>ev and alnents. are almosir-eatnl or highei Itvela
SS We estimate lhal Havana will continue loIruurgenlS In El Salvador will, supplies of small arms, munitions, and other light military equipment as well ai training and planning and miellternve supporlinimum Castro rarobably will under.rite sulfi-citnt eilerral support to sustain ihe insurgents' caps-btlllk* for debdttaiingi and destabiltriog small-unit raidiand economic sabotage He probably hopes lhalUS in.olvemenl will Increase Latin Am-riCan and Furnpean supporl lor theand provide cover for continued Cuban support 0ejers:>ons.
3d. Other types of wpoert are abn Ml to be provided by Hsvana. especially if the rxuapect* uf revolutionary mowirvrtvls improve in El Salvador anil Guatemala Wr believe that Cuban sdvr lirei. temporarily assigned to assess the nerd* ofoth countries and thaiood chance that turn* haveJ Salvador urnr the Jamaary IW| insurgent offensive If fight in* mteiWIjes ht Guatemala and larger amounts nf Cuban malesiel are tent, some Cuban advisers may remainihe guerrillas there aba
W, believe the Cubans hav* also born irrslru-mental in arranging lh* particioaiion in Ire side of the Sal.adoran insurgents of small numbers ol comluums from Nicaragua. Costa Rica, and other Latin Ameti-can countries These Interrvatiorul "volunteers- are Intended lu assist diplomatically as well a* militarily by underscore- lb*of Ihr revolutionary cause Cubaill try to enlarge ihe role of these imeerjtionalIrwicmentaU.
Decisions Involvincndormselalivrly ItKnrtsincuous support at* likely lo be made bv Castro Urgcly or. the bans of ha evaluations of ihe nerds and prospects of Central American rri.Jution-ary moveovests Coeo.derstinriore btatantlinlbotust polio in Ela snme romr-rumoe cf greatly Increased assotanc* In the form of arms, materiel, adviien. Ind inlernatlonalbe bflunweeTby his auesamenl of lilrlv US reactions and olhet eiternal Inter* and rircum-stancei that trod tn constrain him
hange*Ihe regional itid9 raveastro's maneu-vrrjbtlH.redrbilily and haveill.ci.1ihtm lultcct Latinnrncan tupfloit lor violentd leader* hav* been soured bv ihe coursesl revolutionary events In Nicaragua and htvemore suspicious and critical of Cube; andhath Havana or acquiescedlis support ol lh* Sandinistas no- ollen workuban interests in Central America
Caslro ia restrained In particular by theot* other fovernmenls in the region to break relations -ilh ihe Salvadoran and Guatemalan rrglmes or to pro-ide unqualified public supporl lor the insurgents. During ihe Salvadoran guerrilla offensive in January, and on other rwcailons. Meitco -as under popular pressure to re-cognize the revnlotionary from but relations wiih the lunla government continue. Panamanian olfkials abolose ties -Hhkllists and hav* provided them withsupporl while maintaining diplomatic relations with the government.hese or other Latin American governments were publicly to swiich sides in Central America. Cuban objectives and prospect* for eventual victory by rcv-duttntvary forces would be consider aUr enhanced
Paradoxical!astro may realize that his hnpes thai Mnlco eventually will sui-potl revolutionary Irotils in Central America may best be advanced by avoiding more conspicuous or eonftonUlional Cuban involvement Mc.ilcos long border with Guatemala traverses some ol Its mot! backward areas: andand other leblivelv conservative leaders probably are concernedpillover of (evolutionaryand activities. Apt^hcmsions about Cubannioit likely would be aroused in Mesko ff trvotu-li.-uev violence mere to incteaae In Coatemala toenl ItInd If Cuban support for Guatemalan itisurrenU seemed to enhance theirsignificantly In that event, the Meikan pcrspec-llv* ofeed for revolution ki Central Aroerka would probabls be modified lo lake excounl of more practical concerns.
koroouo
ti2 trim's rhirrminalioo to promote insurgency in Kl Salvador and Cuatemala ts also complkalrd by his even more tnlrnse cVlation lo protect Ihe revolutionary regime in Nkauagua He has teen ihat conspicuous use of Nicaraguaase of support beforevr, n'fv-wive in El Salvador produced slsarp strains inetatlons with lh* United States This could leadf Jespcralely needed Western tcoootnlcand locteased opposi-llon lo the Sandinistas ai fiorne. Castro's hardline advisers probably counsel that confrontation between Managua and Washington ta inevitable under ihe Reagan administration anduch more serious challenge to ihe Sandinista government would result if the Salvadoran insurgency collapsed.
tarting In February, and apparently with Cuban approval, the Sandinistas sharply reduced the flow of war supplies lo El Salvador. In responseS pressures. The flow has recently begun to eapand some-hat over new. mote circuitous routes. Latge war stocks intended lor the Salvadoran insurgents still are slored in Nkatagua and fresh supplies probablyto arrive via Cuba. Bolt. Cuba and Nicaragua remain committed to the success of the Salvadoranwary of UScontinueork lo augment the supply flow.
n any case, Cuban support for Nkaragua will conccittrale during the nest year or so on assisting the Sandinistas to lighten their pelontrol ol the luunOy Military, tecurily. and Intelligence livers and mars organ! tat ion* responsive lo Sardinia:*all patterned closely on Cobanbe strengthened. Cuban supporl, tspectaliv In iheand securitys alreadyJiutkalrd equipment supplied fromnventories and transshipped from the USSR Castro is likely, furihermore, lo urge key Sandinistas to establish more effective and eamtraltaed control over their moveoteni and to isolate or remove suspected" Thus, reported Cubanto avoid coiifrootatlorai witb tbe private sector, ihe Church, and Western foreign aid donors -ill continue lo be ewUn-enl on the Win Mai* aWlrty to control all the enrol (al levers of power In Nicaragua
astroi eommilmcnt to the survival of the Winlatao Brotig that he would probably be willing to tale substantial risks lo defend it andustain major damage In hft foreupi policy generally by doing to If the Sandlntsta government werechallenged bv either Nkaraguan iniurgenis or foreign militarye believe that Castro would
be Homily motivated lo defend il bv supplying Cuban tronu* tie could probably be delerted if het t'S military retaliation were likely, or If he rncounlrred slroosCMWIlon In adJuiufi.IJ be concerned abo-i. inserting Cuban militaryuo'iid In Nicaragua lha' coital 'eauli in large number* ofunities,uban.rolonged urugate He prob-blr hopn lhal n* the Sand'Oislii areiiiryeeu-rity prrumnel already stationed Jn Nicaragua could provide enough help without the need lor rrinfocce-mcoli from Cuba. Withhii obiechves In Elmind, he probably hai alreadyI lime forces over the pait year
VI. PROSPECTS FOR CUBAN POLICY AND RELATIONS EISEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA
oo 'b lileli to receive conflict ing advice on the preferred cowrie of Cuban relations outside of Central Arrveikw lib pragmatic advisers are likely lo LVHirurl Ihat further antagoiilrmg ties* govrrnrrenlaundermine his CeiHral American ohiectivei of fualerinai re mini Inn al low rbk of US munirrortIon. Ilu hardline advisers will have lillle iMIiencr wiih this rrasonlug and mill recommend (oniiinijlion ol recent brlliLi rent regional poliiTes
e think Castro will lend lo view the hensi.pobriird between grouaa of (rvrndli andvrmnenli Denunciations of mahary-dominated reouth Amrnn have become nmee frerjuenl and mordant over the Usl year Attacks on ihe military government! of Chile.iihave iricrcaard. and propagandawrlle it and diplomatic r'forti aimed al itolallnal anJ undermining them couldore important ckmrnl of Cuban pnllcv during the neat lew year* Cuban critic Can of the tuaiiliantm breti muted, braweuee.ot liLety lo increase apprtriabli.
taHhr oulstanxltnal rsrrptMn to liracavrtrvlrat.ubaUi wrl remain aa al Iras! In ihr short lertn Cubatltion Artrnlinr Government credit, rtrgotr MN1 with the Pcorei regimeariety of industrial goods Largrli brrause of the economic brnrflls Iruen the leUlkWiiii (he Iwo countries luxe overt. Acd Iiiialanvnlal poliiical and ideological differences and olhet ptoMrmi sine*hen the Argentine miliUry teturned to power Those lu-nefilt an lataJlrmaln (he prlraiipali.-ol relations over liar steal few ream, slihough moreCuban suppotr lot vSoleet lyolulivin In th* hemuohere would add new straraa
lhard to preserve teed rtUilona with Mrileo. which he ices as fats key regional ally in restraining the United States In Panama, whiledisdainful of Torruos's susccplilvility lo US incisures, he will probably work lo keep relations Irons worsening, because of Cuba's valuable intelligence and trade links Ihere We believe that Castro will lend lo perceive most of the elected civilian governments In the region as allied with Ihe United States ami "rear-Honorsnd that he will adopt more critical, andew cases mote antagonistic, policies toward them evidence of Cuban supporl for9 has recently led ihe CcJom-iais Government to suspend relations with Havana.
between Cuba and th* Socialgovernment In Vrneruela haveover llw past year. In ihe autumn ofwithdrew all of its olltClal rcpretenlativeiRiilng enmity and escalating(h* two governments havr mere usedthai thei will adopt evrn moretoward each other
or hb pert Castro probabls will attempt lo weaken ihe llrttere admicrttratsoa thrown the as* of sharper prnjujjrvdj and ctTttettm In international cauciate* In these cvrcumpsivev the iwotpects*ba wiP seek lo *tp*nd Its ties with the small and divided guenll'a groupt and other lefluti in VertrnarU in the hope of hcloirai h) promote an effective radical opprnitton lore*.
tlcano bornaliaanedhe Caraio gnvrmmenl"ilh Castro In aupporting the Sandlnisla
ul subsequent^ grew alarmed abmrl the estreat of Cuban mHurric* ia Nicaragua and lis Inlets-tetWwnere in tbean roar broke off consular relations withnd bilateral leradons will prtsbably ran he relieved
astro proOahJi has few dhistont about the pruspeeti lui eipunding Cuban influence wiih tlw civilian garvrrtutvents in Ecuador and Peru or lor developing beneficial commercial tie* Havana's
fithina center In Ecado> have been
frmlretrd. and ihr Quito governa no* Inctifwd tol ret at Ions beyond their current minimal level CaV'Vdon no) raped lo be able In rrtllf ihe aliimlv with Peru that dr-eloped -tie* Ceivial Veleteo wat In power, buthai refrained from harth crilkism ol thr Oelaunde government Moreover, rrla-llneo, with both cwMrtes have been alialnrd ovei incident! Involving; Cuban seeking tiylum in ihe Havana embtuies Wr believe that Havana will en. deavoc lo maintain normal uale-lo-ilair rrkliont with both countries, buthance it abo lendmppurl lo ihe ciratlon of bioad "airti-imperialist" front) their duiina the neit year or two
uhan relations -iih ihe Labor Parly ge-etrv. mrnl in Jamaica almost certainly will be Drained and ctuld lafCOaM ronfliclual Caitro ttronglt dctlies lhal Ihr rnuderaleovernmenl not tucceed with Weilern backing ineasure of prosperity andlo the liland. Thii would not only thow ID Manlry't proCuban approarh. but would tWrngthcn ihr hold of niedeiales throughout the FjigVih-jpeaklnt Caribbean. Especially If Jamaican radicals showfor confront Iihe government. Castro will IrmJ rncouragemcnl and assblance.
iuiro will be constrained from aggrcuivelv puih.iic more rend wit at tonalhne and oilier rettUmel countries and fromrg itaie io-ttalr relationi to deteriorate tharplyarieh of Idler rial tonal and domrttlc forcesikell to be rrilrslnrd bicobebV preference lhal he avoidator crlstt with the I'nrird Slainie larger Latin American nalioni In punuil ufpolicies
nfluential gnuof Oman officialslhal lie concentrate hit and the regime iuti Cuba"trather
thannure -trrsalul foreign policy Soviet Iredeet would ahriral certalnli be dismaied If rWrtguei and hithave beenost Irutted trUrrroedtarin wtib other Cubanlo be retiioed b| hardliners Many of ihe laiter probabl> are Will tie-wed critics lit in Moscow because of thethet purrurd during ihe ISr&Qs
astro it abo ltlrli to be generally corutraltiedunger irrm view* of Culuo ivr>niecii in Latin Americawhree leramei and cord notations havealionarr counlrwv Se probably hopes lhal leaders more sympathetic to Cuba and lit policies will replace ihoae currenily In power He may hope,hat more "prcajreiiive" leaden will Irtr 'K^^wvj during the acil few yean in Ven-es-ela. CoaU ft lea. and the (Wniea- HepuhW Cuban ieadrrt have close relaiMna with official! ol opposition parties, luch as Aee (on Democratic* In Venezuela, and with more "progrcsalve" factktna of governing parties Catirobe eaprcied lo trek of these ties and to weigh future policy decitions regarding ihoae count ilea with ae eye on how they might affect the preapecU of grow pi he favon
VII. CONCIUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
n addition to Cuban domestic polities, eventi In Latin America andeletioruhlpi there, andand pressurn from Moscow. US pobcy toward Cuba and the rral of (alio America will have an important impact on Havana'i regional policies First, development! le US-Cuban relations are tkelv to influence ihe Catiro regime'i regional gameits ultimate obiectlvei but matlert of priotilies,and laetits Second. US polk et toward Latin Amenca.esporeaes lo Cubanties, will affect Can rot appraltal of the potential benefits and costs of whatever policies he punuet
A. Relatloni With Iha United Statat
atiro repraledly- year lhal hr deuced talks with Ihe Carter administration on the full range of bilateral ittue* Hit pragmatic adviten have long ed- xated the benefiteductionra lorn and broiled rapcuucherriesH. and toeral actions taken by Cuba laal (all were intended to relieve teiyaorn and to enhance Pmideitl Carter! chanen for-
v central obntiveo win
implicit or cipuot atwrances thai the United Stain will not UMtialc hot! He acHom against Cuba or the icvoluttcawy governrrteros and irraverrtcntt il tup-perts Aa previouslyCubanrowing mHiment in the United Statnouehrr anti-Cuban policy, though thr pragmatlin. at leatt. pcobabHhal tbe neagan admuuslralvori thould be probed to arer if the0 progress toward reduced te>- - be resumed
M Caatra hai itwd nth pinhm ei<li r.dminittratiorivlto interested in winning an
hr trade rmrMrgo aniuirlngmanVri Iniird Sum 'or Cubanyvnllfghlt.t}Mt roc-aa* for ctpuffing ilisgi jwieu Cwiani and. ultimately, an tain-ing US evacuation of ihrNj.jf (lave Hr probably* haa norajnl.alina; Uratny.and maythat he can gain ajmr of hlaihoul making maiOr ranccsMon* tn return From his point nf view, again. even US recognition of Cuba* agenda of bilateral Irritant! would terve to increase the Witlmncy and return. of hit regime.
HI In our view, there It no reason lo believe thatanlagonitm toward Ihe United Males hai diminished or lhal he would make Olntflcsnlrcat ol mamr eoneern. W, believe II highly unlikely that be would agree In reduce or even be wiflin* lo ditcurs ho enmmiinienl loSR. or that there it much fwiJbsIMy in Cuban policies and cJoe-Irine in other erilical areas Wr brieve, moreover, that hrcontinue inigher priority on proosoi-Ina revolutionary changeparticular'i in Centra/mi ImiHuving lelationa with the Unilrd States.
Ki To frotrr wi.HH hllalrralaitro might Umt*Kuril) riduce thr actual level of Cuban tupport tn regional re volutionnd hr would be lest likely to opt for ihe more openly eon frontrtticirS lo Latin Amn>ra prrl-rred by ho hard! iir advlsrn. But even In the event of I'd weedItnisiorn. he1 nut Iruai thr IrWed Stales, and hr would can in or to be attracted lohe rn-ofulrorian Bi-'niv-'. ami irnwrgeocies Ire tees brvtii aa ihe key to lasting arcerily from IS peessiarrsoeans In ruttifi and poaaibli increate Sovsrt aid and tupport fur Cuba
re)irvrreasrd US
ironmililart pei-uurn wnuM give Catiro tome pausetns to be the core In ihr irducrd level of hit aid Inrsurgeiilil. but not force him to back down for long or to forgo pnrhm lot new revolutionary npporiunatart lai invrctlly in iolnrrbla' Castru'i rrac iron to I'i military threat* li rstrar diffkuh io predict Hr would be under pretaure. peobably uvriodiua aoear from Xtrecow lo rnoddi Iwi behavhe until thr Uwral passed Rot hr* natural Inchrulrori would be to Co. defiance in cadet lo mtll and to bring dorrvrtlt.-I'S and iMccmttceud imrtuding Sovvrt) prewurrsear inavor
In tu*n. wr niJgr lhal under nummuchl of feat*Ui mllitsn arilvn thai threeleneelwill pneaiuli continueof cglr.uaIn
tancy and drflance willinn ai ihv toirv for keening the United Slalet at Irai and for creating sufficient rrvnlultonarv lifeline* 'n thr" iinu-lair him overm US prrtuim. The iuurilitary threali aiideombination of dertove trfbacks lo the revolution* rm hrcrewtrd Cuban isolalion In Ihr region, giralrr ttraio* si hnv. aad Sovsrt prrssurn would be Uhrft Inubttanllal changergmnalpbo anvtime tJnn.
oiiro'i Eatrern* Option
r rwimate lhal thrrrmillerceni) that rvrn In thr abwice nf is punitive me*turn. Caalro wifl beenrne to fruitralnl li| nimbi-nation* of evenli andnilng the ml ic-ar or to that hr wuuld hred thr adVtrf of Cuban hardliner* and idnpl confrnnlallunjl polk-irs on an even kinder tcafe than Indicated by our estimates above.rrur he would rnnrludr fylaliilicalli that iiiciraird hrallllty with thr Unitedand Ihut diirnunl the Interrullnnal hrnt-fiU of relative "gnodhile Iw Mill would be waryirect military confrontation, he would innrav effort! lo frustrate and undercut I'S Initiative* Ifuoughoul ihe rrgion There alto it tone dunce that
hr will impi'luvrli conlmra ihr United Vale*, nr
eertaln Latin Anterican cr-irHrvei.calr targe enough lo rrtvJl in irrku damagr lo ho imrrnls.
Mmbrfkd be intnlvrd tnfvangr ef maw One important cave houU hr (he drirre to which CmMiv feeb that ihr garni mack* bi Central American rr^olutronarin during ihr lad two years arr lltivulrnrd Olhn Inould hr wnrtrn-Lag domestic problrmi or tninu* diiaariemeajlcacow over, for Inatanre ihe rvl-nt In which both cuunrrln thould tupporl1oward thrm briumn mure hmlile In llio icenario. Caatro would, out of fiuttiatkm and angn. ir*tect the optionI'ui.-'ii In the farertbaclii and trek In recoup imtead through greater aruTrrUrivmrst
nderourse. t'Jttro would be willing, even more blalanlli and; ii.t mm. in
hr-li> Latin American Icflisls orgauitr anil launch sritrrrllla campaigns. In iwiniuV training anil oilier support and In tlisjiuUIt Culiuiin Uraiiire*j cuimlm.in-cluding. (rnta Pica,cnimian Hrnuulie.id thei> be added In tlinvstro already avlivrlv support! aimed revolutionary atruajtiV anilnli-imuciialUl" fronti In effect, he uniilrl lr reverting to theMOi, *henas dedicated In proniHing revolutionary change even Inlinr 'iJijrellvr conditions" were unfa tor able
HH Purr-ly vengeful action* against rival regime leaders wimbl also be more likrlv. as aouM revel tn terrort*lbombings, anil otherat cmUirrasHna; and dcslabill;itig adversary govcrnnieiil* More firiftontallriiial imlt-tie* ainud al placingiilrd Stall*tin-ive in Ititsli-ral rrblirao would also be niorr likely Annllirr lutldrn rvndos of disgruntled Cuban* cmihl Ik*ither by seadirectl) inlo Cuanlanamn Subversive, even violent, iiclivilies lu Pnerln Rico and oilierf harasarnenl ciaild alto rrtuli Iftookourse Castro houhI vutiimioli and publicly seek assurance* from Moscow of Snirte lil|)p" irt
C. Cube* ond the Region
HO. Whatever shllls In bilateral andesiteteS (ail* and the tnltetl Stale* mat adopt over the neilyears.ll almost icrlairJt tontinoelo imrtrst Cult* and the I'mlrd Stales a* rivalof infliii-nre He oill retain llie luppnrl of meal and Inftucttllal irrnupa in theor hi*enli-incnK rairtHularlt ariynrttt students and nncitceluakss urll as rat* its* lists and Wilts* nf varyingIf lories impelling poliiical instability in On'ral 'r-aivJ part* of the teribhean itrrm-lhrn. Cuban prrtligc and influence "id ennlinue to lie aictmjL almost irraidlrs* of what (aiim dors
aslni hay Impressive awettnpWllrnthai sdvartcr III* interests In lh* reason st the ctrpetoc ofilled State* We bcnellt* from massivr Soviet military and rimwinlc support Pukes il.-iiiare luiltly carried out In, ihe Cuban leader-ship, and it lui* the abiliti In adjust tattles readiti In *ult diaittnnR cittsimaaoces and favorableC-astrn has formidable tllplomalic. iiitellWerwe. technical acustance. guerrilla training.
and military resourcesmalt entitles Mvirnner. Havana has rstaWislicd ihitciulable -mlllic-slt a* inroinhr-ul the rrsjioti aidtam lulluenceand oppotitlon frouns even in countries slme stalt-lu-sutr rHalloia an- isirretilly poor.
arados lea. we Judge ihatoreactivities in supDort ul Lalni Arnerkaihe more likelys lo makesustainable gains in Influence in iher tlie eslablisltrd order inAmerica and IheIhe facesocial and rv^nomlcslrenglh of radical forces ctmld producemorej(loii*r> rrstimcs over tlieyears sn wlikh Cuban Influence will beor high. Bv orchtslratlng broad poliiicalsupport fin revolutionary rnovemems.Ntcaranuuba risks tomiirliti'Kicountries for Influence "itli ihrbut II decreases tie prosmsls nfby the lotted State* or actioninterrsti hyiin AmericanOver lime, mot ever,Irs some governmenls (for riample.could iue improved hilalrral rrlntionsgreater suptairl for revolutionary
movements In the region.
n contrast. Cubanolicy* of rreklrisand indiscriininate support of resnliilinnaries -ouhl (rod to Isolate bothstro regime and the retnl'iiuhiry moveoic-nls il supports. Vignrnu* Cuban uipport for revolutionary group* In South America "ould estatiall) stimulate movements by keyountrles to nob (jsiio'ih-A. If ni ihis environment pro-(jtl*an locoes acre to seise power-in FI Salvador, for example, or In one of theight have difficulty in rntiyilidatins their re-rime* in an cnvlrotymeot ofstlllly.
OH Even if. In these drciimjlaneev Castro iharply ahenaled rriode*ate and cnr-ser*athe rntinnalthe I'nlted Statesface difficilti in nraamiinc broad anti-Cuban fronts either in lh* Onia-nirallon of American Slates or through other niultilat-etal forums Even In the more conservative countries nl the region, rationalism and sinpielon of L'S Irsten-llnits run high The increasingly comptet inlrrnstiorul
ion) lit in of nnol Idliu Aiuiiciii rountrH-idunging orientation* of new grlilei hair ihjriJybility
<i I'of
fma nearly all ol ihr moil Important oort-would Liui-rar an> UN efiietl lo nrganiir multilateral action) ue aandlnni agilnii Cube, ric-cpi In the meal ritranr-ilinan* HriiimilaiWrt,
hli It mil to tav lhal government! I'm! adopt jnli ('jloi' pollrloi would not at>ek US encouragemrnl and aifailanrr In holdlna Catiro at liar Whatiilil wohavoid ii direction of ami Cuban amli-mroi toward patttoilariair- US olajretivrt, npnily rr-oUjli-irirm ofS mlh-rftre in (he rr-gluei. effort) Hi itolalr Cola eomplrlrl> in hrmbphrernd frontal ai'ackiuban diplomaticmnvolving ihr lew di-vrlnued and iheuni he*
Go. L'SwnnUI nln be <vni|iliv**lrdirndrncirtat innd economic urr-iaormrmalri donsi-
nani In irioal of ihetoroar will beetinvr Mri-'t-v' in .countrtea in ihr IOTC* In tome, fuitdamental change may lie imi-ncl fruui the lop dnwn by elite* employing new melhodi In order, in effect, lo "aiea!ider" nf (rdhal lefliat movrmenll
iealer US polilieal. er^momic. and trcurltt in ui .ni'i'ii In the region can only dovtly allevui* thr root ciumnd auuage ihr prruurit for change Buticr rated US engagement rnarld wrork In thr Inirnm lo rrducc Cohan ability to gam further advantageb> helping to addrrt* preuurrt through noorevJullonary politicalpIcagiicrrdnd bi railing thr roati and rfokinf Cuban militancy
Original document.
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