National Intelligence Daily
IPAQi President's Position Ma shamed
Mi Ulan/ aatbaoka thin fall in tha unr uith Iron havoSaddau Huuaain undmr nay praeeurm toay tooonfliot. Popular opposition to th* war is gratino atdoubti among oanior Iraqi offioan aboutr-ioue ohalUnae, thevill have todefarmUht uaiting itrataay aoon and either launchor, more likely, due Laraand uitMr***
The defeats Buffered by the Iraqis at Abadanand aware recently atmark ain tbe war. ror the riret ties since theIS -Booths ago, Tehran haa been able to scoreover sUghdad's
The erosion of Iraq's position under Iranianto be accelerating. Iraq's *ost urgentpoor troop morale, caused In part by Saddam'sstrategy.
nevertheless, Iraqi forces are unlikely toremains unable to follow up its successes withto exploit theaa quickly, T
Senior Iraqi offioisls, anxious to preserve their ownhave begun thinking about moving against
An lncreailng nunber of Iraqia eae little chance for an early end to "Saddam's war" ao long aa he clings to tha hope he can outlaat Ay*toh Khomeini lnwar of
waxaaa caused ain eecurlty conditione In northernXurdleh and Coaattunlet guard llae havoof tha reduction ln gorerrdaent forces -
Saddarn'a policy alternatives ara gradually ror tha moment he ls sticking with thestrategy that haa failed to achieve any ofgoals. Despite tha dafeat at sostan, theapparently atlll hopee that continuedloaaaa will causa an uprising or MilitaryTehran agalnat Khoaaainl.
Iraq's chances of moving the battle to thm negotiating table are sllai. larliar international awdlation efforts reamain naoribund. Saddam's efforts to achieve aor initiate peace talka directly with Iran or through
Algeria, hava baan interpreted aa signs of weakness by Tehran, and, coupled with Iran'a military aucceaaaa, have strengthened Tehran'a reaolve.
nd ^lost <
Saddam atlll appear! tothe loyalty of hie powerful eecurlty service, which be dose not hesitate to use.. Reliance oa increased repression at heats ls attopgap Manure, however, as the war be co aaa aooatly ln men, material, and lost economic and foreign policy opportunities for Iraq
President is aware of the mounting discontent at home. He also realties that continued fighting will leave Iraq dependant on the good will of moderate Arab neighbors for vital financial, logistic, and political
eupport, all of which is harder to accept in view of
Iraq'a ambitlona to beoone leader of the Arab world.
Saddam also would like to end tho fighting well before next September, when the nonallgnad rooveaient is scheduled toummit in Baghdad, Heeading role in tne movenent as ths keystone of his foreign policy.
Ths Iraqi leader so far has not shown the flexibility to exploit the wldeepread desire for peaoe in his country, for example, by aelalng on heightenedr asll tension lo break off ths war. The longer he waits to move, hps* ever, the weaker hie position is likely to beOriginal document.