A COMPARSION OF SOVIET AND US DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 1971-80 (SOV 81-10009)

Created: 10/1/1981

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

A Comparison of Soviet and US Defense

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A Comparison of Soviet and US Defense

AwAssessment

Informal!on mailable atI

has been used in ihe preparation of ihis report.

This assessment was prepared b"

Office of

Strategic Kcicorcn, Il wai coordinated wjih the National Intelligence Officers Tor Strategic Programs. General Porprsscnd USSR/Fastern Fu'Ope. and with the National Inidligcncc Officer atComments and Queries are welcome and may bc dirccied to thc Chief"

Note: This pubtleallonlassified supplement to an unclassified paper tilled Soviet and US Defense. Issued inhe key Judgments are essentially the same as those in the earlier paper.

The reader Is cautioned that the dollar cost estimates used In this comparison of Soviet and US defense activities must be viewed In terms of the limitations and the conceptual framework explained in thepages IS.

A Comparison ofSoiiet end US Dcfcme

Overflew

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Total Defense Program Foreriod, thc estimated cumulative dollar cosl of Soviei defense activities (excludingis. Ihe cost of reproducing them in ihc Unitedcumulative US defense outlays byercent. The trends in defense activities of thc two countries were dissimilar for the first two-thirds of Ihe period, bulvc been more comparable since then.

When expressed in0 US prices, the irend of the annual dollar costs of these Soviet activities was one of continuous growth throughout thc period,ercent per year. Growth was evident in nearly all thc major elements of the Soviet defense establishment.

In contrast. US outlays in cowtanl dollars declined continuously]t an annual average rate ofercent per year. Since then, however, most elements of the US defensehave grown. The average growth rale of total outlays6 hasercent per year.

esult of these trends, thc estimated annual dollar costs of Sovieiactivities exceeded comparable US outlaysidening margin in every year1or the rest of the period, ihe absolutestayed relatively constant.0 the estimated Soviet dollar costs5ercent higher lhan total US outlays.

In sum, ihe USSR has committed substantially more resourcesin terms of dollir costs)over the period than has the United States. This is true for total defense activities and for almost every component of lhat total as well. Further, thc growth rales of Ihcse Soviet activities10 have generally exceeded the cot responding rates for simitar US defense activities. Our estimates of selected individual weapon systems production and manpower, which arc included in the paper, confirm ihii view

Resource Category Comparison* 1

lhe estimated dollar costs of ihc resourceinvest-ment. operating, and research, development, testing, and evaluation-yieldsnit conclusions as examining the estimated total costs. Thc estimated Soviet dollar costs for each of these categories exceeded their US counterparts both foreriod andor inveslm-nl and RDT&E, they werendercent higher, respectively, thanUS outlays for thc period. Estimated Soviet dollar operating costs wereercent more.

Thc Soviet pattern for each resource category is one of continuous growth; the US pattern is one of continuous decline until thend growth slightly greater than thc Soviei rate since then. We project the dollar costs of Soviet resources will continue io grow

omparisons

estimated dollar costs of Soviet and US defense activities can also be compared in terms ofgeneral purpose, and support The estimated dollar costs of Soviet strategic forces were threeuarter times corresponding US outlays over the rstriod; the estimated costs of Soviei general purpose forces wereercent larger. Only for support forces did US outlays exceed estimated Soviet dollar costs over the decade.

Soviet major mission grew throughout the decade, and wc project this growih will continue through the. US outlayi for each of the three mnior mlisloni fell until the, but they have grown since then.

Content*

Pate

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With Previous Estimates

in the Dollar Eslimstes

Li mi tat tons of Dollar Cosl Estimates

Comparisons 8

Defense Costs

Dollar Aggregations

Historical Perspecilve

Defense Activities by Geographic Regions of Concern

Soviet Forces Opposite NATO

Soviet Forces Cvposlte China

Soviet Forces in Afghanistan

Comparisons

Investment Costs

Operating Costs

locmMni. Testing, and Evaluation

Mission Comparisons

Strategic Forces

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Attack Forces

Ballistic Missiles

Missile Submarines for Intercontinental Attack

Bombers

Peripheral Attack Forces

Defease Forces

StrategicBS

A Comparison of Soviet and US Defense

Inliod action

I'n -The goal of this study is to make aggregate comparisons of US and Soviet defense activities. Because Ihe military forces of Ihc two countries arc exposed of such diverseimple comparison based on numbers aloae is not very useful.umerical comparison generally ignores differences in design and performance. For example, comparing US and Soviet tactical air forces using only order-of-battlc data has limitedomplete comparison of thc two forces would requireother activities (training, for instance) which are difficult to measure in physical terms

One way to summarise such diverse activities is to assign to each somevalue that captures its relative worth and then calculate thc weighted sum. For defenseeighted value in common use is the cosl ofevoted to each activity. These costs can be calculated in any currency, but given thc two countries involved tn this comparison, dollars seem thc most logicalollars capture both the quantity and quality dimensions of thc forces we are trying to measure-Therefore, in this paper wc measure Ihe annual flow of resources devoted to defense in terms of dollars. Specifically, this paper presents estimates of what il would cosl. using prevailing US prices and wages.roduce andilitary force of thc same sire and with Ihc same weapons inventory as that of the USSR and to opeiatc lhat force as thc Soviets do. Thceffects of inflation have been removed from all cosls and outlays bythe defense activities of each country in constant dollar terms

In addition, this paper provides infoimotion on US and Soviet order of battle, ryroduction. and manpower to supplement thc dollar estimates. This information, ihc additional detail in thc cost estimates, and more recent daia distinguish it from thc unclassified dollar cost comparisons released in January1

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Thc following US activities and Iheir Soviet counterparts arc included in

thc cost comparisons in this report:

Notional Security programs funded by thc Department of Defense.

Defense-rclaled nuclear program* funded by the Department of Energy.

Selective Service activities.

The defense-rclaled activities of ihc Coast Guard.

Thc following arc ciduded from Ihe comparisons:

Military retirement pay. which reflects the cost ofpasi ralhcr thin current military activities.

Soviet space activities lhal in thc United Stales would bc funded by tHe National Aeronautics and Space Adrninisiralion.

Military assistance (eiccpt for thc pay and allowance of uniformed personnel) and foreign military sales.

Civil defense programs.

Veterans' programs.

Soviet Internal Security Troops, who perform police functions, and Soviet Railroad and Construction Troops, who are not directly involved in national security matters.

Thc physical quantity data for weapon systems contained in this paper are of twoelivery dala. which refer lo the quanlities of selected weapon systems procured by the end of Ihe calendar year, and order-of-battle data, which refer lo the existing inventory of weapon systems in active unitsiven time (ihe middle of ihe calendar year for the Soviet Union andd of the fiscal year for thc United States)-'

Methodologydollar costs of all Soviet defense activities exceptre

developed by identifying and listing Soviet forces and theirpparatuses. Our modelescription ofistinct defenseexample, surface ships, ground force divisions, and airour latest estimates of the order of battle, manning, equipmjnl inventories, and new equipment purchases for those components.

To detailed estimates of physical resources, wc apply ar.tropfiale US prices and wage rales. This procedure is complex, but in general wc do thc

following:

procurement, we estimate what il would cost to build equivalent items in the United Slates at prevailing dollar prices for materials and(including overhead andsing US production technology and

Hit ihe fiteal yearchaated (mmJuIy-JW* tiraespsa toepteraber. Therefore. Ih* *ad of the fVscal yearune foreriod iroeres fir

assuming (he necessary plants and supplies would bc available. Thus, the dollar costs arc based on US manufacturing efficiencies.

For operation and maintenance, we apply dollar prices to estimates of the labor, materials, spare parts, overhead, and utilities required lo operate and maintain equipment the way the Soviets do.

For military personnel, we first estimate thc military rank of the person in the United States who would bc used to perform the functions of each Sovici billet and then apply ihc appropriate US pay and allowance rates to that job.

The results arc then aggregated by military mission and by resource category

Thc costs of duplicating lhc Soviciffort in thc United States are estimated in the aggregate by convening an estimate of the ruble cosis into US dollars.

US dollar cost data arc tn terms of outlays derived from the Five-YearProgram (FYDP) issued by the Department of Defense in1 and thc US budget for fiscalhe US data have beenfrom fiscal to calendar year terms, and defense-related activities of thc Department of Energy, thc Coast Guard, and thc Selective Service have been added lo improve comparison with Soviet programs. Thc outlays for each year hove been converted lo their equivalent0 dollars using detailed price indexes for each type of military expenditure. The US figures in this report, therefore, do nol mclch actual budget authorizations or o[ iiropriations. US ordcr*of-battle data were also derived from the FYDP; US production data were provided directly by lhc Department of Defense.

The cost data presented here are expressed in constant dollars so lhat (rends in cost estimates will reflect real changes in military forces and activities and not the effects of inflation. Prices used in (his paper represent the purchasing power of the dollar for defense goods and services at0

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Comparisons With Estimates of the dollar cosi of Soviet defense activities are revised each Previous Estimates year to lake into accouni new information and new assessments of lhc sire.

composition, and technical characteristics or the Soviet forces and activities asmnrrvemcnts in costing methodologies. The US data used for comparative purposes are similarly revised each year to take into account changes in the FYDP and the Defense Planning and Programming

Categories (DPPQ' Both the Soviet ond US price bases-are updated annually to reflect the most recent constant price index information available.

This year's estimate of the dollar cost of Soviet defense activities9 is aboutercent higher than the estimate for that year in last year's classified report. Two-thirds of that increase is the result of changing90 price base. About half of the remaining one-third represents thc effects of our improved estimate of construction activities. Although our cost factors for construction remained about Ihc same, we nowetter understanding of the extent of construction work al military facilities built during thc period. The remainder of the increase {about S3 billionesults from higher estimates for procurement (aircraft, ships, and missiles) and operation and maintenance (primarily facility maintenance).

There arc some differences between ihe estimates contained in this paper and those contained in thc unclassified dollar cost comparison released inhe most significant of these changes arc in US outlays. In the January paper we used estimated outlays for fiscal0otal actual outlays0 arc almostillion marc (in currenthe revised estimate1illion more. In addition, lhe unclassified report9 price base. .lis paper, as already noted, is0 dollars.

Confidence Inassessment of how well wc estimate the dollar costs of Soviet defense

Dollarmust necessarily be subjective, but some statistical tcchnicjucs arc

applicable and wc do use them lo analyze this problem. Our estimates could be erroneous if we incorrectly estimated quantities, qualities, or costs or if we included the wrong set of activities in ourne way of measuring lhe magnitude of these errors is lo concentrate on oil', for example) and note how our estimates for lhat year changed over time. (Each year wc make new estimates for every year covered by our data base, using any better information or improved mclhodologicsresumably, our estimates for any one year would improve us time passes because wc should know more aboul the quantities and characteristics of thc weapon systems and facilities pioduccd that year.

' The uk of lite DPPC document it opUined on page V

If our estimates chanp.Td greatly everydifferent analysis, improved data, and new methodologies produce very differentcould have little confidence in our cslimatcs, especially thoseore rccenl year. Thai would be an Indication that, even over lime, wc are not able to discover the "true" values. On lhc other hand. If thefluctuate onlyew years after wc first make them and then bymall decree, wc could feel confident our estimates were substantial-ly correct. Statisticians refer to this desirable property asobust estimate is one thai would not change appreciably even if all input errors were eliminated.

Thc graph shows our total estimate clearly follows the (alter patlcrn. All data have been converted to0 dollars lo eliminate the effects ofWe have performed the same test on all the major resource categories and reached substantially the sameestimates do show this property of robustness.'

Using ihts and other statistical techniques leads us to believe thai thc dollar cost estimate for total defense activities is unlikely to bc in error by more thanercent for each year1' The margin of error can bc much wider for some individual items and categories. Wc arc more confident in our estimates for thc higher levels of aggregation than in those for the lowert (lie lower levels, our confidence varies from catrgory to category. Further, we arc generally more confide: in data lhat represent trends rather lhan absolute levels, especially ifingle year is inrorved.

The table on the next page summarizes the levels of confidence we have in each of the maior resource categories arranged in descending order of confidence.

Construction was the sole ciceptioru Our estimates for construction this vtir are substantially higher lhan every previousai recent research allowed us to correct lonisunding deficiencies indata base.

We are most confident in our estimates for tne middle yean of, because thoseare based on the most data. Our confidence is somewhat lets for thc current year and ihe. Wc are even lest eoofdenl In the projections we make foreriod and ihe histories! data torresented on page 14

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All the following dale, whether displayed in graphics or tables, are presented ai point estimates rather lhan ranges (orange would illustrate thc level of confidence we have in each individuil estimate more clearly, we know that our users find the point estimates more helpful. The reader should remember, however, lhal there is an implicit confidence band around each one of these estimates and lhat lhe bard is generally wider the greater ihe lcvclof detail..

Limitations of Dollar As we have noted, dollar costs can be used io compare theand trends of thc defense activities of Ihc two countries in

lerms of resource inputs. They have an important advantage over many other inputas lhe number and types ofthat they permit aggregative caparisons. Dollar cosl valualions. for example. Ukc into account differences in the technical characteristics of mililary hardware, lhe number and mix of weapons procured, manpower strengths, and thc operating and training levels of the forces

Dul dollar valualions still measure input rather lhan output and should nol be usedeasure of thc relative effectiveness of US and Soviet forces. Assessments of capability must take into accounl military doctrine and battle scenarios; the tactical proficiency, readiness, and morale of forces: thc numbers and effectiveness of weapons; logistic (actors;osl of other considerations. Thus, dohir valualions arc instructive as general indicators of changes in the military emphasisotion's forces over lime. They are nol sufficient to portray thc comparative capabilities of forces. (The ordcr-of-battle data provided wiih lhe dollar estimates will, however, give Ihe reader some additional insight into lhe rclalivcnd composition of the two forces.,

Dollar costs do not measure actual Soviet defense spending, thc Impact of defense on the economy, or thc Soviet perception of defense activities. These Issues are more appropriately analyzed with ruble expenditureollar costs do not measure relative manufacturing; efficiencies in the defense industries. Estimated Soviet dollar costs arc estimates of what it would cost US manufacturers to produce Soviet weapons. Thus, the dollar costs for both countries arc based on US efficiencies.

Finally, cumulative dollar estimates for any single type of weapon do not represent stock value estimates, which would take into accountloss, retirement, and previously existing inventories

Ruble Comparisons ' In addition to our dollar estimates, wc make aggregate comparisons based on rubles. The procedure requires putting ruble prices on all US defense activities. Wc obviously cannot do this directly, but wc doetailed substitute methodology.

Our general procedure ii as follows: Pay and allowances are cosicd directly by dividing each service intoanks from general to private. The manpower in each rank is multiplied by ruble rates of pay. travel, clothing, and so forth. RDTAtE. procurement, constriction, and operations and maintenance arc calculated usingatios. The dollar value of each of abouteparate resource accounts is multiplied by thcruble-dollar ratio. These ruble-dollar ratios themselves arc each value weighted, reflecting Ihe importance of different subcomponents of thatccount. The lUfcrj also lake into account those areas where wc judge jj weapons havesignificant technological or quality advantage.

The rcsulis of all these calculations show thai aggregate Soviet defense costs exceeded estimated US ruble costs byercent0

Tbe Uicit fubk cxpcadliart est Imaies will be presented iaAC laidllfcnce Assessment.pending foe Defease T'mdi1 and P'oipeeti for. which -ill be published In November IM I

BLANK PAGE

Tolal Dtfeose Coals

Foreriod the estimated dollar costs of all Soviet defense activities (less pensions) exceeded comparable US outlays byercent. The major trends In the defense activities of lhe iwo countries were quite different.

Thc estimated dollar costs of Soviei defense activities grewthroughout thc period at an average annual rateercent with gtowth in nearly ail major missions and resource categories of the defense establishment

Annual US outlays fell!ut from then until lhe end of lhe period Ihey grew at an increasing rate. Thc growth wasfast in procurement: on the other hand. US personnel costs continued to fall

onsequence of these trends, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities, which were approximately equal to US outlaysereercent higherhis differential has remaineo relatively constant since the.

The available evidence suggests thai Soviet dollar costs will continue to grow for lhe next five years at approximately lhe same rate as they have In thc past. This projection, although less certain lhan our estimate of current defense costs, is based on information ibout defense programs that are planned or under way.

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iili'fdollar cosl methodology has been crilicized by some because we apply

high US pay rales and allowances lo the large Soviet conscript

hose critics contend that ihis makes lhc total Soviet defense establishment look comparatively larger lhan ii really Is. The application of US pay rates to Soviet forcesogically correct procedure for the comparative siring exercise we arc engagedpart of the cilin.aie must bc calculated according lo the same set ofeven If uniformed military personnel costs arc totally excluded from both sides, thc estimated dollar costs of Sovici defense activities exceeded USyercent over lhc period and byercent i

Aggregate comparisons including military pensions arc not highlighted in this paper because pensions nre consideredc thc cost of pasl ralhcr than current defepsc activities. Ncvertnelcss. we do make detailedof Soviet retirement pay. Our estimate of lhc dollar cost of Sovietis aboutillionS outlays ror retirement were approximately SI3 billion. US costs are higher despite Ihc currently smaller US manpower force for two reasons: (I) many enlisted men in thc US receive retirement benefits; very few do in thc USSR,oviettypically serve longer than their US counterparts before retiring. In fact, because of the demographic history of the Soviet military. Ihcrc were few military retirees before. If wc add thc dollar cost of retirement to both sides, the estimated total dollar costs of Soviet defense activities would be aboul one-third more lhan US outlays over the period andercent more0

' Wait is muni by "reUllveiyhat Soviet soldiers are compared in IheubleIn thc USSR, -hereas US soldiers are paid dollaicloser lo the US average.

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Finally. If RDTAE coat estimates (which arc lew rcliablelhan those for other activities) are excluded from bum sides, thc estimated Soviet dollar cost exceeds the US total byercent for the period and byercent0

Athe comparisons in this paper are focused oneriod.

data base extends bockhis sectionrief look at the

year time.pan

Wc are less confident in our estimates forhan we are in those fornd even less confident in those fc. The production, order of battle, and prices on which our dollar cost estimates depend arc particularly uncertain for. Because Ihc present US accounting system did nol beginc have had to estimate the US costs as well for lhe earlier years. Thc process of converting these data0 constani prices inuoduces further uncertainty into both thc Soviet and the US estimates

Overyear period. US outlays for defense wererillion dollars; the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activitiesrillion dollars. Estimated Soviei dollar costsenerallytrend1his downward trend is caused primarily by falling levels ofelatively expensive resource in ddlar coslolal costs have continually grown. Over lheyear period, the average annual giowih of estimated Soviet dollar costs wasercent per ycai

US outlays for defenseather erratic pattern wilh little or no growth for thcearshole. There were three motor peaks, each driven by procurementfirst wns associated wiih thc Korean war. the second wiih the strategic armsn the, and the third,. with the Vietnam war.

US defense outlays thus seem lo be in response to external inierisaiional(the Korean and Vietnam wan) or perceived (lhe missileithout these crises. US outlays mighl havc been relatively constant over the wholeears. In contrast, thc estimated dollar costs or Soviet defense activities seemave their own growthleast since thc

If tbe estimate* are nude Inaitl coil, are rclalbtly nntlinl dortni lhe 1MO.

Sovlcl Defense Activitiesoitraphic Regions of Concern

Wecurrcnlly estimate lhal1 the total dollar cost of Soviei defense activities was ISO billion dollars and lhat ihe Sovietsillion men tn ihcir armed forces.osts had increased ioillion dollars and manpower stoodillion.

The growth in total costs,ercent per year, was inesponse to what the Soviets perceive as lhe iwo greatest threats lo Iheir national sccuriiy-thc military forces of lhe NATO countries and those of the People's Republic of China.

Sovietforces opposing those of ihe NATO countries consist of lhe

Opposite

Ground and Frontal Aviation units in ihc NATO Guidelines AreaGermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia).

All Soviet ground forces in Hungary and the Leningrad. Baltic, Belorus-sian. Carpathian. Kiev. Odessa. North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Mililary Districts.

All Soviet aircraft assigned io Frontal Aviation units locaied in Hungary and thc eight western mililary districts.

All medium bombers and transports assigned to Ibe Northwest and Southwest Bomber Commands.

All transport aircraft assigned to Mililary Transport Avialion Central units located in thc eight western military districts.

All air defense aircraft. SAM silcs. and radiolcchnicnl units located in the cighl wesicrn mili'ary districts.

All MR/1RBM launchers thai can strike targets in NATO.

All general purpose and peripheral attack naval until assigned io the three European fleets.

All Border Guards unils iocaled in lhe eight western military districts

he estimated dollar cost of these Soviet forcesSIS billion for those in lhe NGA and moreillion for those in Hungary and tire westernhese forces accounted for onc-ihird of lhe total estimated Soviet cost and aboutercent of thc military manpower.hc forces in Ihcse areas hodillion mennnd ihcir dollar cosls hod risen toillion-aboutercent of ihc lolal. The growth in ihcse cosn -mounted loercent per year overyear period.

' Estimates ji.es foraieas do not include ogtlays for RDTrfcfi or for command and lunpoil function; at either ihcor national level Noeen made lo aHocaie these cents gmitephieally

Sovietpposite China

Soviei Forces In Afghanistan

units and weapons targeted against China indudedjn this estimate are:

All ground forces units in thc Siberian, Central Asian, Transbaikal. and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia, less one division ontwo on Sakhalin, and miscellaneous units located In the far northeast

Frontal Aviation aircraft to lhe four eastern military districts and in Mongolia.

All medium bombers and associated transport aircraft stationed at Belaya, Spassk-Dal'niy, Ussuriyik, and Zavitinsk NE airfields.

All transport aircraft assigned lo Military Transport Aviation units located in thc Transbaikal, Siberian, and Central Asian Military Districts.

All Air Defense aircraft, SAM sites, and radiotethnical units in lhe Novosibirsk and Tashkent Air Defense Districts thai are locatedautical miles of Ihe China border.

Allissile launchers located along thc Sino-Soviet border, plusndunchers at Kostroma. Kozel'sk. Perm'. Teykovo. and Yedrovo lhat are oriented toward China.

onversionlass peripheral attack submarines in the Pacific Reel

All border Guard units along the Sino-Soviet border, plus those opposite Mongolia.

We estimate that1 the Soviet dollar cost oforces was SI 3orc'ccnt of the total.osts for forces oppositeamountedillion, or more thanercent of the total. Thc growth rate wasercent per yesr over the period. The number of men associated wilh units along the border increased from slightly1 lo0

We have also calculated lhe costs of the Soviet military operation in Afghanistan. These costs amounted7 billionhey include Ibc cost of pay and allowances for theoviet troops committed to operations in Afghanistan, thc costs of operation and maintenance of equipment, and the costs of military construction.'* They do nol include the value of weapons and supplies for the Afghan military, of Soviei equipment damaged or destroyed, or of ammunition cipended

About SIillion, or iwo-lhirds of the total, ate incremental cosis directly associated with the occupation of Afghanistan. Thc remainder would have been incurred in any case.

Fixers committed to Afghanistan Include all Soviet force* inside Afghaniwellihene In adjacent military districts wiihin ihe USSR which are sopponina cccriivw(he counirj or appear to beigher state of readinessesult of ihe invailo. .

Resource Comparison*

Thc comparison of Soviet ond US defense activities presented in this section separates defense costs into (he following resource categories:Investmentdollar costs of activities to replace, modernize, or

expand forces through the procurement of equipment, including major

spare parts, and thc construction of facilities,

personnel costs and other costs associated with operating and maintaining equipment and facilities. These are directly related lo th^ size of the forces and their level of activity.

costs of expfcving new technology, developing new weapon systems, and improving existing systems.

ItaUir Oils of Sottef Resource Outlaysercent1 of Comparable US OutUra

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Investment Costs

costs can be divided into two subtotals:

estimated cost of procuring weapon systems and support equipment, including major spare parts.

estimated cost of constructing the required defense facilities.

Foreriod, the estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet investment wereercent greater than US investment. Cumulative procurement estimates wereercent greater and cumulativeestimates were three times as great.'

Thc trends in investment costs for the two countries have been dissimilar. Exceptrief plateau in thc. Soviei investment costs have grownteady rale. US investment fell byerccnl16 but had recovered most of the loss by the end of ihe period.

Our estimates of Soviet procurement grew byercent over lhe entireMissile procurement doubled; ship procurement grew byercent; and aircraft procurement increasedercent. Procurement of land armaments showed no significant change. We show two majorcycles for Sovietin lhend another in the. Thc first was caused primarily by the procurement of Strategic weapons; thc second by fourth-generation tactical aircraft.

US procurement had almost regained1 levelactical aircraft and land armaments led the growth lhat took place in US procurement

As noted in the introduction, our estimates for Soviet construction costs have been revised. Our new estimates, in which we havc substantially more confidence, are approximatelyerccnl higher than last year'sor construction

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Operating costs can be divided into two subtotals:

Uniformed personnel costs, which include food, clothing, travel, and

other pay and allowances for active and reserve military manpower.

(Retirement pay is notosts, which include all costs of operating and maintaining

military equipment and facilities.

Over the period, estimated Soviet cost* of operating thc forces wereercent morc.than corresponding US outlays. Personnel costs were two-thirdsosts were slightly less.

The estimated dollar costs of Soviet operating activities grewelativelyercent over theosts grew faster than personnel costs. Thcncrease (over half the total) was in thc support mission: the largest personnel cosl increase was in land forces.

US operating costs fell7 bul haveear since then.osts have grown3articularly rapid rate in the last year. Personnel costs, however, fell8 andarger percentage decrease over the whole period than any other resource category.

The tactical air anC naval missions accounted for most of thelhal occurred aflcr the. Most of the personnel cost decrease was in the support mission

'J estimated dollar costs of operating lhe Soviet forces exceeded US outlays byercent. Estimated personnel costs vereercent higher than USosts were slightly less.

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Research,Testing, and E'lluxllon !

of llic dollar cosis of Soviet RDT&haredcnvctt in trie aggregateess certain methodology and. therefore, shauM he considered less reliable than thc other estimates in ihis assessment. Nevertheless, the available informationC

ndicate that militaryxpenditures were both large and growing duringeriod. Physical evidence on rescjrees devoted to this effort reinforces this asscssmenl.C"

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Sovietontinuedigh levelc have identified some SC new or modified aircraft, missiles, naval ships, and space systems currently in flight-testing or

^3Among these arc new or improved combat and support aircrafi; new or improved ballistic, surface-to-air. antitank, and naval cruise missiles; advanced naval surface combatants and submarines: groundew tank: ond new space systems. .

US outlays foreclined from lhe beginning of the period6 but then grew so that outlays0pproximately equal to1 level. In contrast. Soviet costs foroubled1or ihe periodhole, the estimated dollar cosis of Sovietctivities wereercent larger lhan corresponding US outlays.0 they were twice as large as US outlays.

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Mililary Mission Comparisons

Mission comparisons presented here arc organized in accordance with lhc0 version of thc Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC) of the US Department of Defense. This allows thc presentation of US and Soviet force and spending comparisons in lenm familiar to US defense planners and policymakers. These definitions do net. of course, correspond to thc way the USSR organizes itssions or allocates its defense resources. Further, these dollar costs for mission comparisons do not include anyutlays. Soviciosts cannot bc divided by missions, ond wc are able to estimate only the total (shown in the preceding section)

In thc sections thai follow wc show lhc major missions divided into each of their components (for example, lhc general purpose mission is divided into land, tactical air. naval, and motilityine graphs arc used lo show the movements of dollar costs over lime, and pie charts show ihc distribution of cumulative component costs bciwccn investment, operations and maintenance, and personnel foreriod.rojections for lhc Soviet strategic, general purpose, and support forces ore shown in separate sections following the treatment oferiod.

There were considerable differences in thc trends of the dollar costs for Ihe two countries. The estimated annual dollar cost of Soviet missions grew by aboutercent overeriod.

The dollar costs of Soviet strategic forces grew byercent, allhough there was considerable fluctuation of ICBM. ballistic missile submarine, and strategic air defense activities, largely because of ihc cyclical nature of procurement.

Soviet Defense Missions

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Thc costs of Sovici general purpose forces grew rapidly over lhccreenl) primarily due to increased invcslmcnt for the land, naval, andair components of this mission. This, in turn, was caused by thcof increased numbers of more costly systems.

Thc costs ofSoviel support forces alsoercent1onsequence of ihe need lo train, supply, and maintain personnel and equipmcnl in the growing strategic and general purpose missions.

US mission activities declined byercent16 bui then grew until the end of the period.0 tbe dollar costs had recovered over half their decline.

Outlays for strategic forces fell byercent6 and then grew byercent from ihen until the end of the period. Leading the increase were the procurement costs of the new Trident SSBN program.

Outlays for general purpose forces displayed thc largest growth since-.vcrageercent per year. The causes of this growth were the procurement of new tactical aircraft and land arms and increasedand maintenance costs for thc tactical air and naval components of the general purpose mission.

We project considerable growth for both the strategic and general purpose missions of the USSR in the. This growth will be led by anin investment costs,nd personnelill also increase. Thc peak lhat will occur in theor Soviet general purpose forces will resultrocurement cycle for the fourth generation of Sovietaircraft.

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Strategic forces are defined to include strategic offense Tinlcrcontinenial and peripheraltrategic defense, strategic control and surveillance, and nuclear weapons. {Although the last isPPC category, wc

include nil nuclear weapon costs with strategic forces.;

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Over the period, estimated cumulative do'lar costs of Soviet strategic force activities (exclusive of RDT4E) were threeuarter limes as large as corresponding US outlays. If peripheral attack forces, for which the United States has no counterpart, arc excluded, the level of Soviet activity for strategic force* was slightly less than three times that of the United Slates.

Soviet strategic activities during the period were characteriied by:

Impfosxment of an already large peripheral attack force.

Continued emphasis on forces for strategic defense against bomber attack.

Expansion and improvement of ICBM and SLBM forces, resulting in at least rough parity wiih lhe United States by thc end of thc period

US strategic programs, on ihc other hand, were characteriied by:

opposed toin thc ICBM, SLBM. and heavy bomber forces.

reduction in the number of heavy bombers.

brief deployment of an ABM system lhat was quickly deactivated.

continuing reduction in strategic interceptor and SAM forces

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Intercoatintittat Attack Forces

This mission consists of all land-based intercontinental ballistic missile forces, intercontinental ballistic missile submarines and thc associated missiles, and intercontinental bombers, '

Over the decade the estimated cumulative dollar costs of the Soviet intercomincntaI attack forces exceeded comparable US outlays byercent.stimated Soviet dollar costs exceeded US outlays byercent:

dollar costs of the Soviet intercontinenul attack mission wereester0 than they werehey werelarger in thc, however, primarily because of theofs.stass SSBNs.

spending for intercontinental attack forces fell5 ai both procurement and operating costs, particularly of intercontinentalwere cut. US spending for this mission, however, grewear60 as the US began to invest in the Trident, air-launched cruise missile2 enhancement programs.

As r. result of these trends, the USSR during the -icrjod:

- Overlook the US in number of delivery vehicles but remained behind it in

total online missile reentry vehicles and bomber weapons.Overtook and far surpassed thc United States in tola! missile and bomber

equivalent throw weight, yield, and equivalent megatons.

Because investment costs were over half the total for both countries, iheir trend set ihe pattern-for lotal costs. Soviet invest merit displayed the cyclical pattern already noted, while US spending for intercontinental attack forces fell until procurement costs for the Trident SSBN and ALCM caused them lo rise.

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Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The estimated cumulative costs of Soviet ICBM activities for Ihc period were fivealf limes as large as corresponding US outlays.stimated Soviet dollar costs exceeded US outlaysactor of II.

Thc total number of Soviet ICBM launchers, however, decreased slightly1

In thc. Ihc Soviets completed the deployment ofndorces and started to deactivate the olderndCBM launchers.

In lhehe Soviets began to replace their original force ofnd SS-II ICBMs. The single-RV SS-II was replaced with improved variants (thend Mods well as two new systems, thcndhe single-RVas replacedew ICBM. Ihc SS-iS. Each of the new systems was more accurate, could carry MIR Vs. and was deployedore survivable silo.

Byhe Soviet ICBM force includedndariantsndaunchers. These, however, took.thc place of older launchers, so there wereewer launchers0 lhan there had been1

The US maintained the same number of ICBM launchers, but improved this force by;

Replacing remainingissiles andinutcman II missiles with Ihe more accurate and MIRVcd Minutcman III ICBM.

Retrofitting all Minutcman III ICBMs with an improved guidance system and beginning,oith higher yield MIR Vs.

Hardening thc existing Minutcman silos and improving command andapabilities. Among Ihc specific improvements were belter suspension systems for thc missiles and ground electronics, debris bins on thc launch closures lo protccl Ihc silos from postattack debris, improved protection from electromagnetic pulses, and more advanced retargeting capabilities.

0 US ICBM forces consistedinuieman Ills, each having threeinutcman Usingle RV; andlder liquid-fueled Tilan lisingle RV. Thc Titan II lacks thc accuracy of the Minutcman butarger payload

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Ballisti-Missile Submarines for intercontinental Attack. This category includes all US ballistic missile submarines and the associated missiles and those Soviet ballistic missile submarines and missiles lhal are believed lo have intercontinental, ralher lhan peripheral, attack missions. Alsoon both sides are ihe SSBN lenders.

The estimated cumulative dollar costs of these Soviet activities were almostercent greater than the corresponding US outlays over the period,owever, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities were only 30

percent greater than US outlays for (his mission.

Although the estimated dollar costs of Soviet SLBM forces were onlyercent greater0 lhan ihey had beenhe figure fluctuated during the decade in relation lo procurement cycles for SSBNs.oflass SSBN ended in lhe; lhe procurement oflass SSBN peaked in the.

Annual US SSBN outlays were relatively constant5 because thc procurement programs for Ihe present US SSBN force were completedhe procurement of new types nf SLBMs in theept US outlays from falling. Thc start of lhe Trident SSBN program did cause outlays lo grow by moreear over the last five years of the period. Delays in the Trident program, however, resultedercent drop in outlays

sually the case for strategic rnissioris. investment cosls do-ninated both the totals and the trends over lime for both countries. Estimated procurement costs were especially significant for this Soviei mission

The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force increased byubmarines, from1 to

15 lhe Soviet Union deployed an additionallass submarines.

A total ofl. and Dill submarines were deployed1

n order to comply withimitations on the number of modern SSBNs and SLBM launchers, the USSR began lo retire thcallistic missile submarines as il deployed IMIl submarines.

The first Typhoon-class SSBN was launched0 bul has nol yet been deployed. Procurement costs associated with this system, however, began in the.

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The United Stales did not expand iu fleet of SSBNs during. The force, however, was steadily improved:

- in thcany US ballistic missile submarines were converted toew SLBM, thc.

6 ihe US began constructionew class of SSBN to carry thc new Trident SLBM. whichonger range and more powerful warhead. The first SSBN of that program (the Ohio) is intended .'or delivery by the endnd the second (the Michigan) lias been launched.

Theissile is being backfitted on thclder Benjamin Franklin-class SSBNs

At the end of fiscal0 the US hadSBNs withaunch tubes eachotalubes. Twenty-five cf these submarines were equipped with theLBM or were being converted to the. By the end0 six Benjamin Franklin-class SSBNs had completed conversion and been deployed. The remaining nine SSBNs were armed with the. but these older SSBNs will bc either dismantled or converted to SSNs.

Thean carry up to '4 MIRVs in contrail to its predecessor, the. which carries three MRVs. Thean carry the same payload asver twice thc range

0 there wereSBNs remaining in the Soviet fleet. Some ofs are probably being converted to attack submarines.asaunch tubes equipped with thehere was alsoSBN. which. TheSBNs haveubes carryinghcIj carryaunchers each fornd thc eleven Dills are each equipped.

All Soviet SLBMs except thehich is solid fueled, arc fueled with storablc liquids. Thehe first Soviet SLBModern SSBN.onsiderable improvement in range over earlier Sovici SLBMs. lis range, however, was less than lhat of lhc US. One variant of ihearries two MRVs. Thconger range lhan the Polaris. Poseidon, and Trident. It is also morethan thef the Soviet SLBMs dcplovcd.-hcs MIRVed

Intercontinental Bombers. This component consists of bombers and the related tanker aircraft.

The aircraft included on thc Soviet side arc theear andison (some of the latter are configured as tankers.)"

The principal aircraft included on the US side arehcnd lhcKC-IM.

TV US short-range attack missile (SRAM) and the air-launched cruise uii-^ilc (ALCM) are also included in this mission.

Total US outlays for inter jonlinental bombers over the period were sixhird times as large as the estimated cumulative costs of comparable Soviet activities. The difference reflects tlie much greater emphasis the United Slates attaches to long-range manned bombers.

US outlays for intercontinental bombers were approximately the same at thc end as at the beginning of the period. They were considerably less during most of, reflecting the reduction of2 fleet1owever.ombers were added to the force, and SRAMs were procured for bothnd FB-II Is.

Near the end of thcecision was made lo extend the service life of2 and use itarrier for the ALCM. These programs, along withosts, were the cause of increased US outlays at the end of the period.

Because neither side procured substantial numbers of intercontinental bombers. estimated investment costs did not dominate the trends and totals as they did for ICBMs and SSBNs.osts were most significant on the Soviet side, while for the US lhe distribution was aboul equal.

" The Soviet Backfire bomber* aren the peripheral attack ind navalukcbelieveo* Ihe Soviet! intend lo uie ibem. There is.n*the nste of thn aircraft, to the tniell.fenee eommemi)

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Strategic Peripheral Attack Forces

This category consists of forces assigned strategic targets along the periphery of thc Soviet Union: medium- and inlcrmedislc-rangc ballistic missiles, medium bombers, and some older ballistic missile submarines formerly assigned intercontinental attackhc primary targets of these forces would bc in Western Europe or China.

Thc US has no direct counterpart to these peripheral attack forces in termsPPC mission, although certain US tactical aircraft could perform similar activities.'

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The major aircraft assigned to thc Soviet peripheral attack mission are theadger, thelinder, and theackfire. Land-based missiles included are thcRBM and thendRBMs. Ballistic missile submarines assigned to this mission are primarily dicscl-powered types. Included arclass SSB.l.V SSBs. andISSBN

There were approximately two do^en of these older submarines in the peripheral attack order of battlepproximately two-thirds of the bombers werend. Similarly, two-thirds of the MR/lRBMs were the older, less capablend SS-5s

Thc estimated Jollar costs of ihc Soviet peripheral attack mission rose rapidly over the period. Although there were procurement-causedthe growth rale wasercent over the period. Growth was caused in part by the beginning of Backfire bomberin theut primarily byRBM production beginning4

In aggregate resource terms, investment and personnel were distributed fairly evenly, but investment caused thc growth of this mission over ihe decade

" Although somei mavperipheral aiiack mission, we have included all ol Ihem In (be iniefearitinenul mick mission.

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Strategic Defease Forces

This mission consists of strategicr missile systems, strategic interceptor aircraft, aniiballislic missile (ABM) systems, and defensive control and warning systems.'

Thc estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet strategic defense during the period were aboutimes as great as total US outlays for this mission.0 the Soviet dollar estimate was aboutimes as great. This disparity in strategic defense activities reflected differences in the two countries' strategic doctrines as well as differences in the bomber threats facing the USSR and the United States:

US strategic programs favored offensive forces over defensive forces with damage-limiting missions. The US. having agreed not toationwide ABM system for defense against the Soviet ICBM and SLBM threats, chose not lo commit thc levels of resources necessary to modernize its strategic air defenses against the somewhat limited Soviet bomber threat.

Soviet strategic programs favored more balance between offensive and defensive forces. Although the Soviets also agreed not toationwide ABM system, they continued lo commit substantial resources to bomber defenses. The relatively higher emphasis which the USSR accorded bomber defenses was influenced by the threat posed by US strategicforce much larger and more capable than its Soviet counterpart. In addition, Soviet bomber defense activities wereby the threat from potentially hostile aircraft in lhc European and Pacific thealcrs and in China.

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Duringeriod, chc Soviei Union:

Reduced Ihe number of interceptors assigned lo siralegic defense fromhile modernizing its strategic air defenses wiih thc production oflagon,oxbat. andlogger interceptors.

Continued lhe deployment ofndAMs. resulting0 level oraunch sites andAM launchers. TheAM was nol deployed until laicul procurement costs associated with this system began in ihc.

Maintained Ihe Moscow ABM defenses and brought iwo large battle management radar complexes at Moscow to operational capability.

Completed deployment of lhe Hen House ballistic missile early warning system and initialed constructionarge ABM-related facility near Moscow thai will probably perform battle management as well as interceptor tracking and guidance. Subsequently,heywhat appearsajor upgrading and expansion of thc ABM system.

In contrast, the United States:

Reduced its strategic interceptor order of bailie fromircraft. Mosi of thc remaining aircrafi were lhes.

S completed the deactivation of all strategic defense SAM batteries. The only strategic SAM deployed by lhe US Army during thc period was the Nike Hercules."

Deployednd ihcn deactivatedne ABM facilityaunchers. Costs for the program peaked in lhe.

US outlays for strategic defense declined during most of thc period and0 were only one-fourth as large as they had been1

Investment and personnel costs accounted for roughly equal shares of the estimated dollar cosl of Soviet straiegic defense. Fluctuations in Ihc total resulted primarily from lhe procurement cycle for strategic interceptor aircraft.

" Ihc USAF Bomtre. eliminatedot included in thc accompanrinj otder-of-battle did.

48

Sotiet Strategicl-8y

The estimated dollar costs of Soviet strategic force activity arc expected to grow, with or without SALTimits. If thc Soviets do not adhere to thc provisions of tbe SALT II treaty, dollar costs for their strategic force activity5 could be as much asercent greater than they weref they do adhere to these provisions, our dollar cost estimates would be slightly lower but still substantial. '

Intercontinental Attack. Estimated Soviet dollar costs for this miss-on are expected to rise fairly rapidly, with or without SALT II limitations. Without SALT Ii limits, the growth rate for this mission could bc as highercent over the period, reflecting:

Continued deployment of improved versions of the.nd the introduction of follow-on systems with improved accuracy.

Introductionedium-size solid-propellanl ICBM with improved throw weight and accuracymallCBM probably for deployment on mobile launchers.

production of Dill SSBNs and deployment of thc Typhoon-class SSBN. each wiihnew long-range SLBMs.

procurcmcn. .jsts associatedew long-range ALCM carrier and new long-range bomber that arc expected to bc deployed

Peripheral Attack Forces. Estimated Soviet dollar costs for irm mission are expected to increase by onlyear15 comparedercent during the previousears. Thc decline in thc rate of growth reflects an expected reduction inroduction as the deployment program nears completion. Thc Soviets will probablyodified version of Ihcith improved accuracy and could increase Backfire production. Neither program, however, is expected loajor impact on Soviet costs5

Strategic Defense. Estimated Soviet dollar costs for this mission also are expected lo tise fairly rapidly over thc period. Wcrowih rate ofercent comparedcreenl during the previousears, re fleeting:

deployment of3 Floggcr, Ihe retrofitting of existingoxbatsetter radar, and the introductionodified Foxbat capable of delecting, tracking, and attacking targets at low altitudes.

- Introduction of two new interceptors belter able lo engage targets at lower altitudes than present aircraft.

Deployment of theAM with its improved largei-handling and low-altitude engagement capability.

Improvements in control and warning and modernization of ABM defenses within the limits imposed by theest;

50

General Purpose Forces General purpose forces are defined lo include Ihc following DPPC

categories:

Land forces.

Tactical air forces.

General purpose naval forces (including ASW. amphibious, and naval support forces).

Mobility forces (including airlift and sealiftdiscussion on

Foreriod thc estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forces wereercent more lhan corresponding US outlays. Estimated Soviet costs were one-fourth more than US outlays1 and over two-lhirds morehey stayed at lhat margin until lhe last year of lhe period, when they were SS percent more

Estimated Soviet costs grew at an average annual raleerccnl over lhe period, while US outlays grew juslercent per year.

Soviei costs increasedesult of ihe modernization of land andir forces, ihc buildup along the Sino-Soviel border and in Warsaw Pact areas, thc increase in naval force levels and operations, and continued deployment of advanced tactical aircraft-

US costs fell until thend then grew al an increasing rate as thc United Stales modernized its land, naval, and taciical air forces

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This minion include* those US Army and Marine elements in Ihc DPPC categories of Land Division Forces and Land Thcalcr Forces. On ihe Soviet side, it includes all of thc Ground Forces and some othersuch as ground attack helicopters and portions of the Borderhave roles similar to those of the US forces in thc two DPPC categories.

Overeriod Ihe estimated cumulative dollar cosU of Soviet land forces were almost three limes as large as corresponding US outlays.he estimated dollar costs of Soviet land forces were jusl over twice as large as the US counterpart. This margin grew until the, bui0 il had decreased somewhat so lhat Soviet costs were aboul twoalf limes as large as corresponding US outlays. fc

The trends in this mission in the two countries have been dissimilar. Estimated Soviet dollar costs have steadily grown. US outlays, on the other hand, fell byercenl1hen gradually increased over the resl of the decade.

Comparisons of the large Sovici conscripl army wiih the US volunteer force are made in detail later in this paper, but ve can note here lhat thc USSR hasore intense effort to develop its ground forces than has Ihe United Stales. It has almosl three limes as many men in land forces as thc United Stales. Il also has over four limes as many main bailie tanks, three times as many armored personnel carriersnd four times as many artillery pieces.

The manpower and weapons inventory of Sovici land forces expanded duringeriod as the USSR increased the size of its divisions and addedombat divisions, bringing the totalccompanying ihis expansionodernization of the country's land arms inventory.ecrease in outlays, the US forces were also able to modernize and expand by procuring new weapons and modernizing old ones. US land forces manpower, however, showed an overall decrease.

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Estimated personnel costs constituted almost half of the total costs for thc USSR and more than half for thc United States. The Soviet costs increased steadily over the period as divisions were expanded. This expansion increased land forces manpower byroops. US personnel costs fell early inue to the reduction in Army rolls after the Vietnam war. These costs gradually rose through the end of the decade as thc number of troops increased, but they stayed below1 level.

Investment costs fo'.Iowed trends similar to ihosc of the total missions. In both countries, tank procurement costsarge part of the totals.

Soviet investment costseneral increase over the period. During thc decade thc USSR procured0 increasingly expensive tanks, including2 andt also0 APCs and infantry combat vehicles and0 BRDM reconnaissance

US procurement costs, like the missionhole,eneral decline through lheul0 had risen higher lhan1 level. Over the period thc US. like thc USSR, increased its tank and APC inventories. The Army and Marines procurederies tanks and0 began production of Ihc Ml, the first new tank to bein lhe United Slates inears. The US alsoumberanks to modern configurations. The United Slates* armored vehicle inventory was also expanded with thc acquisition ofUOO MlPCs andariants used in other roles.

The USSR has considerably more artillery than thc Unilcd States.0 the Soviet ground forces had0 guns and howitzersm in size, for instance, while thc US Army and Marines fieldedomparable artillery pieces.

Thc two countries havc similar numbers of attack hclicopicrs. In0 the USSR had justinds andips fielded withhelicopter regiments. The US Army and Marine inventories includedobras. In addition, thc USSRumber of armed transport helicopters that support ground combat operations, and thc United States has armed utility helicopters that can be used in this role.

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Tactical Air Forcts

This mission consists ol all land- and sea-based fixed-wing aircraft that are usedombat role and. on the US side, multipurpose aircraft carriers. (These carriers are included to accord with DPPCelicopters used for ground attack are not included, nor are those aircraft and aircraft carriers which havc primarily an antisubmarine mission. Finally, no strategic defense interceptors have been included in this mission although in some scenarios they might be available foractical role

Overeriod, US cumulative costs wereercent more than the cumulative dollar costs of comparable Soviet activities. The difference reflects the higher US operations level and thc inclusion of the US aircraft carriers."

US outlays droppedercent14 and then grew so that tbey were approximately the same0 as they had been

Air Force outlays fell4 but had more than reclined1 level by the end of the periodSs,ere added to the force.

US Navy and Marine outlays declined8 but grew over the last two years of the period.onstant one-fourth of their costs were directly attributable to the carriers rather than the associated aircraft.'

Thc estimated dollar costs of thc Soviet tactical air mission grew fairly steadily although there were two major procurement cycles during the period. ,

"If US ina hi purpose aircraft carrirn and Ihe aiaoctated aircraft ate excluded, tbe estimated dollar coaii of Soviet tactical air force* forI-S0 period woreercent more thia ibe corrcipondini US total (that it, USAFoutlayi for U'.iicl air forteaVall ma tedcoils were IS percent more

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Over thc period therelow increase in the Soviet order of battlelow decrease in the US order or battle. Both sides underwent considerable modernization

Although thc principal aircraft in thc US order of battle wasboth at the beginning and end of the period (over one-third of thef thc..s were added lo this mission.as considerably modernized overycar production run. It is the only US fighter ever procured by all three of thethat operate fighter aircraft

1ndonstituted about onc-fourrh of thc Soviet force, but0 these aircraft had been entirely replaced.loggers andishbcds were the most numerous aircraft0 (they each constituted aboul one-fourth of thcut theas well on its way to being retired. Wc predictloggers will befor the tactical air mission alone by the end of this aircraft's production run in the. (Others are being procured ashc Flogger program (all versions) is the largest Soviet weapon procurement program, measured in dollar term*

We do count some of thc Soviei Navy's land-based aircraft in this mission (the most numerous arcut lhe Soviets presently havc no multipurpose aircraft carrier. (They do have one underhcS multipurpose aircraft carriers and their associated aircraft, on lhe other hand, represent aboutercent of total dollar outlays over the perio>*

The dollar costs for investment constituted aboul two-thirds of the total costs for each country's tactical air mission over the period. Eachosts grew at an annual average rateercent, reflecting higher maintenance costs for increasingly sophisticated aircraf

60

General Purpose Natal Forces

Included in the general purpose naval foccej ire:

All majororn) and minor surface combatant!.

Attack submarines.

ASW aircraft and ASW carriers.

Soviet fleet air defense (FAD) aircraft.

Amphibious warfare ships.

Naval forces directly supporting thc fleets (auxiliaries)

Not included in this category arc multipurpose aircraft carriers, which are in the tactical air forces, and strategic missile submarines and their associated lenders, which are assigned io strategic forces. The US Coasl Guard is included with the support mission rather than wiih lhc general purpose naval forces

Over the entire period cumulative Soviet dollar costs Tor general purpose naval forces were slightly more lhan US1 they were about equal to US outlays. Both countries' costs declined al aboul the same rate3 and then grew until the end of the period, but Soviet costs grew at twice ihe US rate. As0 Soviet dollar costsore than US outlay;

For the USSR. Investment accounted for about iwo-thirds of the esiimated wis of this mission. Over the period, investment increasedosts increasedercent, and personnel costs increased aboutercent Roughly half of the US costs went for investment, although investment declined over the period. US personnel costs also declined,osts nearly double/

The largest share aboutercent, of Soviet general purpose naval investment over the decade was for submarines. This reflects ihe USSR's effort to modernire iu submarine force, by far the world's largest and the principal offensive arm of Ihe Soviet Navy. Major surface combalanu accounted for aboul one-fourth of naval investment, although ihe USSR

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built many more minor lhan major combatants. Minor combatants, which accounted for aboutercent of investment, include mine warfare ships, light frigates, patrol combatants, and small missile and torpedo attack boats. Soviet general purpose naval ASW carriers and ASW/FAD aircraft accounted for anotherercent of navalhc USSR also buili large numbers of small amphibious warfare ships and auxiliaries during thc period, and these accounted for anotherercent of naval investment

US major surface combatants accounted for aboutercent ofin general purpose naval forces for the period, while general purpose submarines received slightly less thanercent. The US built only two minor surface combatants during the period. These were an insignificant percentage of total investment. ASW aircraft absorbed nearlyercent of naval investment, and amphibious assault ships,ercci

Over thc decade Sovici general purpose naval forces underwentmodernization through thc procurement of:

Twenty-eight nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, including four of the fast,lass,uclear-powered cruise missileandiesel-powcred submarines. '

TwoTOL aircraft carriers.

Eighteen cruisers, two destroyers, andarge frigates, all equipped with guided missiles.

ea- and land-based fixed- and rotary-wing ASW/ FAD aircraft. One-third of these were thcormone helicopter; thcorger VTOL fighter and theaze helicopter made up another third.

The size of the US fleet declined for most of thc period as the Navy

modernized by retiring many older ships and by procuring:

- Twcniy-cighi nuclear auack submarines, includingos Angclcs-class

SSNs.

Fivelissile cruisers.estroyers.rigates, and six missile frigates. Tlx cruisers' primary mission is antiaircraft warfare, while the smaller:ycrs and frig?ies have an open-ocean cscort/ASW role.

Twenty-two .inphibidus warfare ships, including five Tarawa-classasi-u't ships, were added lo ihe Navy's amphibious inventory.

ixed- and rotary-wing ASW aircraft consisting principally ofC Orion (land based) andiking (sea based).

" Theavy's tactical, mobility, ind support aircraft arc Included tn their respcc'.ivc minions

64

Mobility Forces

The mobility mission presents special definitional problems. According to DPPC definitions it includes airlift, sealift. and Ihe operation of port terminals. We have not been able loeparate Soviet sealift mission, however, so all Soviet sealift is included in the general purposeforces. We believe tbe dollar cos: of this Soviet activity is relatively small.

Another problem relates to US accountingumber of US mobility services are charged to other US defense missions, and the mobility mission, as defined by the DPPC. does noi reflect these costs. When these "hidden" costs are included. US outlays for the mobility mission are substantially more In ihis section, to illustrate the true scope of the US mobility mission, we have arrayed tbe data so as lo show the real total cost of all mobility programs."

For the period. US costs of the mobility mission wereercent more lhan estimated Soviet costs. The trends in the mobility missions of the two countries have been in opposite directions: while the estimated dollar costs of Soviet mobility forces (that is. airlift) grew byercent over ihe period. US costs fell by one-third.S costs wereercent higher

Thus, in contrast wiih many other comparisons in this paper, the costs of thc US mobility mission generally exceeded corresponding Soviet dollarhis occurred because the United States, with its many overseas baseseed to supply them by sea and by air.uchobility mission lhan the USSR. We do noi count any rail transport in thc USSR, however, and that may cause an understatement of USSR mobility activities.

0 there wereircraft in the Soviet airlift mission andhalf that number on the US side. However, the Soviet figure

includes many small propeller-driven aircraft. The USodern heavv .irlift aircraftAssh ihe USSR has lessand)

" Ke*leston. ittc US mobihiriffer* from thain pace 12

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JoviW General Purpose

Wc projcci ihit the estimated dollar coils of Soviei general purpose forces will continue lo grow at an average annual rale of slightly less thanhc growth will be led by investmentosts.

Land Forces. In the neat five years we expect the dollar costs of thc Soviet land forces mission to continue to rise gradually, increasing at an annual rateercent. We expect toontinued increase in the number of Soviet Ground Forces divisions. In addition, the USSR will continue current efforts to eipand iu lank divisions with lhe addition of infantry and artillery.

Thc Ground Forces are projected to beginew tankl. Procurement ol2 in improved versions will continue5 and beyond

Tactical Air Forces. We believe thc dollar costs of Soviet laclical air forces will grtr* at an average annual rale oferccnl until the. This rapid growth rale reflecti our predictionajor procurement cycleew generation of Tighter aircraft. These aircraft, including both air superiority and ground attack versions, generally incorporate moreavionics than their predecessors and thus represent higher dollar costs.

General Pwpose Naval Forces. During thc next five years. Ihc annual growth rate of costs for thc Soviet general purpose navy will beerccnl versusercent wc observed over the last fiveill grow fastest, followed by investment and personnel. The increaseill be largely due to maintenance required on the SSNs procured in the. Investment will continue to grow because of some very expensive follow-on SSNs scheduled Tor production

Major future procurement in thc Soviei general purpose navy will includeuclear-powered attack submarines, two additionalTOL aircraft carriers, approximatelyther major suifnce combatants, andand land-based fixed- ond rolary-wing ASW/FAD aircrafi.

Mobility Forces. The dollar costs of mobility forces will not increase substaniiallyroduction of newa new large transportis expected after that date.

Supportsupport mission includes Ihosc activities which arc required to support

the US and Soviet combat forces. The major elements of this mission arc;

The operation and maintenance of fixed militaryexample, civil engineering activities, base transportation, furnishings, utilities, and communication sysiems.

Logistic activities, including the operation of depots for weapons,and POL and the transportation of supplies.

Intelligence programs, satellite and other centralized (nontactical)systems, and centralized topographic, occanographic. weather, and like services.

Training conducted at other lhan lhe combat unit level, primarily recruit/conscript, officer, and general skills training. Included are lhe costs of operating schools and procuring and maintaining training aircrafi. weapon simulators, and other training supplies.

The administration of the US and Soviet forces, including centrally located cemmand personnel (for example; at field army, air army, or numbered air forcesnd those at the US Department of Defense and Soviet Ministry of Defense levels. The administrative costs of the United States' participation in NATO and the USSR's administration of Ihe Warsaw Pact alliance are found here. Also included arc the two countries' recruitment/conscription activities and personnel management services.

The suppot mission also includes lhe US outlays and Soviet dollar costsumber of other services nol attributablepecific combat mission. For instance, the defense-relatedof thc US Coast Guard. Ihc administration of Ihe Soviet KGB. US and Soviet hospitals and medical clinics, data processing (computer) support of the service? security, investigative and judicial activities, and thc maintenance of cmcrgcr.cy command posts arc part of this category.

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Overeriod Ihe cumulative US outlays for support were slightly more than the estimated dollar costs of Soviet support forces.stimated Soviet dollar costs were almost equal to US outlays.

US support costs fell every year1ecreasing byercent before they began to grow againhe decline paralleled the decreases in mosi of ihc combat forces from the beginning of tbe periodthe. Personnel costs led this trend in the support forces.

Thc estimated dollar costs or Soviet support forces increased every year exceptrief leveling-off7he total increase, almostercent, kept pace with the growth of other missions and reflected anin manpower and the cost of supporting increasingly sophisticated military forces

Over iheosts were thc largest resource category for the United States in this mission. Estimated personnel costs were the largest for the USSRosts were almost as large. Thc proportion ofin estimated total costs was relatively small, averaging aroundercent each year for bolh countries

A significant part of OAM cosls in both countries was the pay and benefits of civilian personnel who operate bases andstablishments and serve in administrative capacities. These accountedhird of tbe annual OAM costs for the USSR's suiipori mission. Ulilities aod fuel costs were also significant, as were Ihe operation and maintenance cosis ol* auxiliary support activities, especially space and intelligence programs. In Ihe USSR, preinduction military training programs, conducted al the secondary school level, accounted for aboulercent ofosts. The 'IS Department or Defense does notaige program of this type.

Cumulative Soviet investment cosls for the support mission wereequal to USarge portion of thc construction of airfields, naval bases, and Army and Ground Forces bases are included in ihe support mission, so thai construction makesarge share of the invesiment category relative to olbcr missions.

Estimated Sovietl costs wereercent of corresponding US outlays, bui construction cosis wereercent more. For botharge portion of thc procurement cosls were for expensive space systems. Oihcr large procurement outlays were for aircraft (for training,and logisiicslectronics and communicalions equipment, (raining equipment other lhan aircraft, and base furnishings and supplies. The US category includes procurement associated with the Coast Guard.

Stmet Support

Dunnc (he ncal five years, lhe dollar costs of Ihc Soviei support mission will follow trends similar to those of ihe past decade. These costs will grow slowly throughout thc period. The investmentategories will lead the increase, reflecting the costs of supporting increasinglydefense forces. Mililary personnel costs will remain fairly level.

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73

Estimated Dollar Cosl by US Service

This section compares the US Army, Navy (includingir Force, and defense agencies with their hypothetical Soviet counterparts. We have aggregated alt the Soviei units as if the USSR structured its military as thc United States does. The purpose of this exercise is to give some idc of the comparative size in dollars of Soviet counterpart organizations.

It must be emphasized that this is not the way the Soviets structure their services. Instead of three services, lhe USSR has five: the Strategic Rocket Forceshe National Air Defense Forceshe Ground Forces, the Navy, and lhe Air Forces. The Air Forces include Long-Range Aviationilitary Transport Aviationnd Frontal (tactical)n general, ihcrc is no onc-lo-one correspondence of activities: for example, the activities of thc US Air Force arc performed in lhe USSR by the SRF, the PVO. and lhe Air. some of the PVO'sactivities are carried out by the US Army

The category "defense agencies and other" includes all activities al the Department of Defense or Ministry of Defense level, nuclear weapons procurement and maintenance (most of which is performed in the United Stales by lhe Department ofnd the US Coast Guard. DOSAAF (the premililary training program in the USSR) is also included in this category. The US has no prcmilitary training program of similar scope

Although lhe methodology we use in this exercise has been improved in lhe past year, there are still tome miscellaneous Soviei activities that we could nol assignpecific service. These are included in the "defense agencies and other" category. An example is centralof this is at the service level in lhe United States but al thc Ministry of Defense level in thc USSR. The net effect of these miscellaneous activities, despite our improvements, is io make the Soviet entry for "defense agencies and other" too high relative to the corresponding US category. Conversely, each of lhe Soviei "services" is underestimatedmaller, but unknown, amount

Allosts are excluded from both sides, since we are unable lothese estimated costs among lhe Soviet services. Pensions arc also exclude*Soviet military space activities are assigned to the Soviei "air force.'

" The Soviei Union kit recently restructured its forces,A and changint the name ft duties of PVO. Thb ehanjc was not eompte led until after the period this paper coven

74

We have noi tried io duplicate ihc US Marines. (Thc Sovici Naval Infantry, whichuch smaller organization with limited functions, is included with Ihcc have placed all Soviet assault and attack helicopters in thc "army" although these kinds of helicopters arc also procured by the US Navy for lhc US Marine* This complicaics ihcfor ihc "navies."

The largest difference (ignoring "defense agencies and other" for the reasons noted above) is for thcoviet "army" estimated costs wereercent more than US Army outlays overeriod. The cumulative dollar cosls for thc Sovici "air force" were half again as much as US Atr Force outlays over lhc period. Finally, Ihc size and cosls of thc US Navy (and Marines) exceeded ihc hypothetical Soviet counterpart. Estimated Soviet cumr'nivc dollar cosis were only two-thirds of US Navy and Marine outlays.

The disparities arc greater for investment costs lhan ihey arc for operating cosis. This is particularly true for thche operating cosls for lhc US Navy (and Marines) arc twice as much as Iheir Sovici counterpart over the period; US Navy and Marine investment costs areercent lower. Thus, lhc US Navy is characterized by higher operating costs reflecting its jjrcaicr activity level. Thc Sovicichcr investment costs reflect the continuing buildup of ihc Soviet fleet.

Thc dollar costs grew fastest for lhc Soviet "navy" followed by thc "air force" and the "army" (again ignoring "defense agencies andutlays for thc US Army and Air Force decreased over thc decade while the Navy and Marine lotal was approximately lhc same0 as it had been

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Military Manpower

The manpower comparisons in this section arc designed to cover the same Defense Planning and Programing Categories as the preceding dollar cosl comparisons:

On the Soviei side, this comparison includes men in lhe Ground Forces, Air Forces. Air Defense Forces. Navy. Strategic Rocket Forces, lhe Border Guards of the KGB. and thc national command and support structure.

On the US side, the manpower total includes all members of lhe armed forces and the Coast Guard."

We include only those Soviet personnel who fill whai in thc United Slates are considered to be national security roles. Thus, we do not include Soviet mililary personnel assigned to militarized security forces of thc Ministry of Internal Affairs, mililary construction and railroad troops, or civil defense troops. (These categories total moreen..

Over Ihe pasl nine years, trends for military manpower have paralleled those for total costs in lhe iwo defense establishments:

Estimated Soviet mililary manpower grew by morendrale equalercent per year.

1S mililary manpower was still declining from its Vietnam-era peak. This decline amounieden.S manpower levels haTe been relatively stable.

Viewed on ihe basis of mililary services as defined by ihc Soviets, the largest increase in Soviei manpower through ihe decade occurred in the Ground Forces. This increase amounted to moreannual growth rateercent. .

Despiie dissimilarities in lhe structure of ihe US and Soviet forces which make organizational comparisons misleading, ihc allocation of manpower to military missions can be roughly compared using lhe definitions or the US Defense Planning andategories. Thc (able on the next page presents these comparisons.

cwlulight overstatement for ihc Unite-*line* only ihcnc Coail Guard pertonnrlilitart minion should be counted

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The manpower table highlights several dirfererKes between US and Soviei mililary missions:

- The Sovietsarge peripheral strike force composed of medium- and intci mediate-range ballistic missiles of thc Strategic Rocket Forces, long-and medium-range bombers of thc Air Forccs.and thc older ballistic missile submarines or the Navy. The United Slates has no comparable force.

The Sovietsarge force of men and equipment to defense against air and missile attack. The moreen in this mmion arc assigned lo inierceptor. surface-to-air missile, antiballistic missile, and control and warning forces. Thc Uniicd Stales has only aforce dedicated to this mission.

Soviet general purpose forces arc nearly twice at large as those of thc United Stales. Thc land forces, whtch arc nearly three limes as large as lhe US counterpart, account for this difference

Confidence in Manpower Estimates

Soviet Conscription Practices

are also similarities in the shares of manpower allocated to thc missions shown in the table:

Intercontinental attack forces requireercent of total manpower in each country.

Support forces take about half of US military manpower and slightly less than half of the Soviet total

We calculate our lotal manpower figure by making separate estimatesof the individual Soviet forces. These individual manningproducedariety of methods, including order-of-balllc

statistical sampling techniques. We believe our estimate oi uk.force size is accurate withinercent

A recently completed study of the military service experience

provides the first

independent check on our total manpower estimates. The results of this study support our estimate within theercent range of uncertainty.

Besides checking our estimates of military manpower, the ata show how the Soviets have adjusted their conscription system to oalancc

experience shows that the length of service has varied widelyhen thc average conscript served over six years. Thc average term fellthree years in the, rising again in theo compensate for manpower shortages. Since then, conscripts have typically served only the termby Sovietyearswo years thereafter.

In addition, thc Soviets call on older members of the draft pool when they cannot otherwise meet their requirements. Ordinarily, the Soviets draft the majorityear's conscripts from the youngest members of the draft pool. Forhe youngest eligible ageut the average age of conicripts that year wasuggesting that the Soviets reachedinto the draft pool to obtain sufficient numbers of draftees.

Original document.

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