EGYPT: IMPLICATIONS OF SADAT'S DEATH

Created: 10/7/1981

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

EGYPTi Implication- of Sadat's Death

ratheroup attmpt. Tjft

ounded in the attacktaken the leading tola in its aftermath andsucceed Sadat through elections called for

security officials believe tha seven assas-

Xal ? ?T5undamentalisthat included some military personnel. There is no 2vi-denca linking tha group to outside powers.

Moubarek and the Succession Process

,ptian Constitution specifies that the speaker* poat currently held by Sufi

Uwand organize

a presidential election to be accomplished inays. The speaker cannot run for the office. This procedure was initiated yesterday, and today the Assembly is to select one candidate, whose name will be submittedopular referendum that will be held on Monday. WkW

Sadat had picked Moubarek aa his successor, and the Assembly apparently will comply with this recommendation. Leaders of the National Democratic Party, which is headed by Moubarek and has an overwhelming majority in theyesterday reportedly endorsed his nomination as president. 00

Sadat groomed Moubarek for the presidency. Tomooth transfer of power, Sadat permitted Moubarek to develop his own powerone that did not ehal--enge Sadat's position. ormer commander of the Egyptian Air Force, oversaw military affairs for Sadat and sought to appoint trusted lieutenants to key posts in the military and intelligence services. Jgg

Approved for Release

FEB

succession appears almost certain, but he

t interest groups to

vilws win^heThecritical. Over tha years, some Army offi-

officer in the presidency.

8 candidacy should falter. DefenseAbu Ghazala and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan All

contenders. Abu Ghazala was reportedlyin the *

Policies of tha New Govarnment

The successor regime in Egypt probably will bewith efforts to consolidate its power for several -or,tha. Increased efforts to suppress the Islamicparticularly in the military, are likely. Aatmosphere probably will prevail for somane-year state of emergency was declared yesterday, and other security measure* have been taken. Moubarek is likely to attempt toorceful and determined image in order to avoid an appearance of weakness in the face of any possible opposition.

In foreign affairs, Moubarek and other establishment flgurss are clo-^iy identified with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treatyupport close ties with the US. Moubarek and Abu Ghazala may even move closer to tha US on strategic issues in return for additional military equipment. In the past, they seemed less concerned than Sadat with the donas tic political costs of close identification with tha US, and both ara strongly anti-Soviet.

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7 October1

Moubarek or other Sadat supporters are not likelv to renounce peace with Israel. Strains in ties with Israel

Zitt: nowevtr- if EWt improved its relations with the Arabs. After Israel completes its withdrawal

Sfna* inptlan regime might be more inclined than Sadat to downgrade or even sever diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv to appease Riyadh and end Egypt's isolation in the Arab world. The Egyptians would move carefully to avoid giving Israel any excuse for military action, however, and probablv would scrupulously adhere to the military disengagement aspects of the peace accords, tassa

Israeli Perspectives

Israel's principal" concerns are that Egypt mayeriod of prolonged domestic instability and that Sadat's successor eventually could.yield to Arab pressure to

avldprocess and the peace Tal Av*vanticipates that its efforts

< greements final Sinai withdrawal next April will beextreme rightwing Tehiya (Rebirth) movementof the final Sinai withdrawal,

and Israeli public support for this position probably would grow significantly if the new Egyptian leaderfrom Sadat's peace initiative or appears not to have firm domestic control, mm

will further encourage oppos^tion^in^the^s* Congress to the proposed AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia.

i tTrrtT

71

Th* shooting of President Sadat haahailedajor victory by the Libyan rogue, which has bean calling tgr Sadat's ouster end, when possible* actively working toward that end The day before the assassination, Libyan leader ^adhafi publicly reiterated Libyan support to the "Egyptian people in their efforts to remove Sadat." Thatypical of Qadhafl's rhetoria against the Egyptianbe interpreted by some as evidence of ulbya's foreknowledge and possible complicity in the attack on the Egyptian leadership. This view will be reinforced by pressthat Egyptian exile leader and former Chief of Staff Saad Sharli, who has close ties to Tripoli, was involved in the attack.

Sadat's death will open up both opportunities and dangers for Qadhafi. He aay calculate that turmoil within the Egyptian political and military establishment willprospects for Libyan efforts to subvert PresidentLmeirJ . Qadhafi also can be expected to give financial and moral support to any Egyptian dissidents who are able to seek his help in exploiting problems in Egypt. BB|

ment da

At the same time, 'Qadhafi ia likely to be acutely aware that he may be blamed for the assassination and that refinements on the actual nature of Libyanp if any, will do little to mitigate the heightened

Ztti ZVP?nor>higher state ofblyJ"to the increased readiness josture o. Egyptian units following the attack on Sadat

Sudan

Sudanese President Nimeiri has used his country's close relationship with Egypt to offset threats from Libya and will be concerned that Qadhafi might take advantage of the disarray created by Sadat's death to intensify pressure against the Sudanese Government. He

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1 October1

from th*aid will bo

forthcoming tn the eventibyan move againat him

Arabian Peninsula

njllTliliMllllll'IIIBM III' n -

Moat leaders of the Persian Gulf states will see Sadat's assassination as the result of his separate peace with Israel, his insensltivity to concerns of Islamic fundamentalists, and hia deepening ties to the US. Each leader will reexamine his own vulnerability to these same dangers. The Saudis ln particular will see theas bolstering radical forces in the Middle East and increasing the danger to moderate governments. Gulf leaders will look for opportunities to counsel Sadat's successor, to put Egyptistance from the faltering peace process, and to repair its relations with other moderate Arab governments. Oman, the only Gulf state that has full relations with Egypt, may reemphaaize its earlier requests to the US to postpone next month'sUS-Omanl military exercise. H

Reaction ln Moscow

The Soviets will anticipate long-term benefits from the removal of Sadat from the Middle East scene. He was their bttt noire, who abrogated the Egyptian-Soviettreaty, ended the Soviet presence in Egypt, andopposed theirole in the Middle East peacemaking process. Soviet media coverage of the assas* sination claimed thai- itesult of internal Egyptian discontent with Sadat's signingeace treaty with Israel and hie close military cooperation with the US--pcjUciee that are eapecially bothersome to

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IPlIiilllili

West European Reaction

West European governments reacted withismay to Sadat's death. Host analyata believe that it

he regfon Pro-western t willtLle,? country willing toolicy of peace ni^- ; ll not change the general perception ln Weatern Europe that the most effective

BMtrights of the Palestinian

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Original document.

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