Created: 12/1/1981

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Accotriing to official estimates Latin fnerican countries account for wall overercent of the Mrijuana and cocainehe US each year, narcotics leneratorl incerae reportedlyillion to tha illicit caonar/ ot tho US; South Florida's share is aboutillion., the iUcrU rboq trade is worth Millions of dollars to sourer* cocsitry

1he recent bcon in narcotics trafficking Is tha result of an increase in both dcrwBtic ard Corelgn chruind, sourco country inability to enforce na-xotica laiec, anr) the oronaous profitability of drug trafricking, rtoreover, the outlook is not pnwlsing, tiarcotics, rnrticularlyarorkaction will piotat>ly iracrcasc ever tra* next five years. Traditional enforceaent efforto Krl approaches (crop ruaistltutlon arrl eradication) will rrobably not bo itilo Io prevent an irKreane in Latin American narcotics trafficking. As lonrjrs view narcotlea traffic-kirn as tbe only way to raisa their itanrlan' of living, trafflckirrj will prcfcablyajor international problr*-.

Latin taerican: riarcctico tesswnt

Latin Americaavorable operating cliaato for dcuq pro-loctlon and trafficking, fra^lim of all type* of ocrs-ictlitlca fron cattle to ams arrl narcoticB, hasraditionalo nany, an acceptable way of life sincn early colonial tinea. Sevoral othoc regional crwiracterlBtica favor drugcking t

A history ard trarlition of corruptior. ami violence.

Vast,nrl inaccessible arras suitable foe rvarcotics ciUtlvaLion.

Insufficient political organization or onforcorv?nt resources for gcveiTnents to effectively enforce existing weak narcotics itnn.

raditional cultivation ard uso of coca aniorvi large of Ota rofulation.

Porous, irpotrolled boc-lers toittlustoms Insroctlorvi procedures.

Oxgraphlc prcacinlty to majsr coneunera.

f narket Infrastructures capable of supporting crop eradication arrl substitution program.

Ifcoiwraic oVrpefrlenoe upon narcotics generated lrxxrve for valuable foreign exchange.

:lnuM to be th" eajor souro* of earljuana catering the IE According0 estirvitcs, Colombia provide*S ir

Arrwrli* A,iscuss too of proloction eatlna'ea.

Public and rtoverrtaent percept lorn that the drug rsroblen isS conoevn.

3 US cocaineworeurcent higher than

(See Table 2) lb neet thia growing ctemrrf, coca rrcrfuctiro significantly

Increased ln Bolivia, Peru, and Colonbla. (See Table 3) Polivlan coca

harvested8 produced approximatelyetrlc boos of cocaine8 and

aetric tons Peru's coca prcduction also rose rtranatlcally, with

coco cultivation yielding fronetric bona of cocaine8 totetrlc

tons esult of the OawrTraont of Peru's eradication pecqram

rcductlon fall toetric tons of cocaine.

Iieanwhilc,0 Colombia, which in the past served solelyrocessing

country fot^oca panto, hacvestorl sufficient coca loetric tono of ccoiloe. uajaaaaBB

TMUgCocaine Inports (Hftrlc Tons)

llicit Cocaine Sports (Metric tonal





lt> slgnitlcnint

production (MBRj



ftrle of ttorcotlea

Is currently conslrferoi tho second largest atari junna producer ln the region. ltion, the Island is rapidly heccnlm an Inportant transit site for South American coonino. tepoctlntj lnilcates that Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin alno trwsista .lanaica. Tho island's gocqtaphlc position oidvay between the US and South America, its prcalailty to the Yucatan and Wln-Varr) possaoes, its nuaerous Inlets andts rwiy airfields, and Its lax narcotics enforoaowrnc and euatons irw poet loos rarooedures, nako Itdeal location foe interrsatlonal narcotics traf ricking ctpirationa.

The current ccoromic difficulties facinn Primewanlhim frcn Interfering with therous marijuanaaaaa withtauch reeded foreign exchange. tVen with the rooontW loan, Seaga Is in no position to clasp down on theindustry. The bauxite, tourism, and agricultural Indust-leatoo weak to txnpensate for the loss of auttt juana-generatcd Income, Seaga politically strong enough to challengerocele* traffickers, ill afford to lose tho awpport of significant elenents of thoearn part or all of their livelihood froa the cultivation ant

Seaga Is opposed to naccctlcs trafficking, however, and will probablyarcotics control carapaign onco the ecotxruy shows none positive signs of recovery anrl he Is on firaer political groundarger, hatter tralnnri ard equipped security force to carry out hlo policie*. ihtil thm, jrceeJcs trafficking, especiallypra, will continue to increase.

Colcrabiai COrrupr.lon ard Cocaine

In addition to being the rujor supplier of rutrijuana to the DS, ColeraMa is alsoprimary pcocesaor of Peruvian ard Bolivian cocaine. Recentroreover, irdicatos Colorfoian traffickers are beqlnnirrj to plant umrown coca fields, whichignificant change front, past practice*.

Colcrfcia'a econcrry is sore diverre than Janaica's and not am neperdent upon <lnq generated The real prohlen facing ColcrrMan authoritlas la the growing power arrl influence of the major trafficking groups and the effect that the groat amounts ofenerated by the illicit drugla having cn the government's efforts to ca-ftat inflation and inplcrwot'a tight tscneury policy. Colcrabia'n traffickers hava hnen known to rsurtter judges, pronecutors, ard police officials who interfere in their operations. In

addition Colombian traffickers are organized along family Unas which nafco penetration of thoir networks extremely Alt'L-ult. Plnally, with the adv-nt of (ceond an3 third generation traffickers, nore sophisticated trafflckinr, ant financial operations have emerged. Traffickers no longer devote profits to consumer goals. Ttrtay, many are well educated businessmen who are adopt at laundering their drug profits arrl invostirg in legitimate enterprises, whichncreases tholr Influence and power within rolembian society, sjjsjjsjst

under President Ttirhsy, tho Colombian government has hoen raronBive to LB narcotlcu policy, rut th? .lutloritle* can not concentrate wholly on marijuana and cocaine trafflcki.uof the lrwurgency larohlem. incertain rv-gnents of the electorate, including elncterl officials, nusineewrien,bers o' tho press, favor tho legalisation of narlluana. lorwcvnr. lurbay's successor nay not he as favorably disponed towards lmplo*ntlng US narcotics policies.

Tho ColcraMan marijuana industry, alttoughlight <tepressionincrcosco competition from tS arrl Jamaican producers, will probably bounce back and continue to he the major sourceortol US narljuana. Cbca cultivation is also oxpoctol to irKrease, particularly If recent sightings of Urge enrgene tat loos of coca floids In heretofore uncultivated regions are i ^HHkaW

'Cvor: STufjqlor's Haven

At me time reusdoca aignlfleant amount, of coos, But at nreoent It only accountsmall pjreentage of the region's cocaine output

eoenssing, staging and transltim area for Polivian ani ^ruvlan coca. Contraharrl amuggllrr,ajor activity In ttuartor,

IT'S^ u11 whore narcotics are

handled as Just Another crmcdity.

This active contr**rr! and narcotics traoe has causeil some serious cooccrri among high governmenterception that Sparta from earlier views In vhich Fcuorsorean officials saw norcotlca trafficking mainly5 problon; Presidenturtor^JBH^Kriews tfvt unabated growth of traffickingxentlally 'Wtabilizl-v. Mrce in rcuadoeean society. The ionenne profitability of narcotics trafficking breeds corruption and violence, and Fcuadorwm leadersusihlo -Bolivian scenario-unless the garment acta more forcibly and effectively against narcotics traffickers. overnment novo, however, even withlaortadb's express support, would he unlikely. Hidesnread corruption and military rolux^anco to participate In any mforcurnent campaigns would probablyo any serious govornncntcking of forts.

rvjru: Licensed anl Illicit Dxa

Porn is the largest grower of coca in latin America, prolucirvrOO metric tons of coca loaf (Mike Colombia, coca cultivation la irsgal in Peru and is regulated arrl taxed. The graverrnent licenses nro-ers ant buys coca loaves at officially Set prices. Owrrrvwt pcices are often below the going illegal rate, however, which partially accounts for almostetric tons of coca leaf that were diverted to the illicit rvarket in lOHrt. ftowt of lh'9 diverts coca leaf paste was sold to Colombian traffichors.

Peru has an extensive coco control arrl enforcement program which Includes an ambitious crop subritltution program. With USn extensive rural agricultural hevelccrnent program has hecnhat lncltidts tha establishmentarketing Infrastructure necessary ro support the crop cubsti'ution/cracllcatlon elements of tho program. fJHV


Ccr-poral to other South American countries, Peru appears to he in the best position to curtail and control Illegal rvarcneies trafficking. Pom's relative political ant economic stability arrl the gcverrrient's positive attiticlo towards curbing illicit coon praluctlon should help to insure the success of tho new pi nram. Ifff/J^

Bolivia proluoarl0 re trie Cons of illicit coca leaf rest of it was sold to Colombian traf tickers for proeesslng and distribution to 'Vjalors in ths LS, Canada, ani list fiipsany.

hea coup lithe lYjiivians had several narcotics controln effect.h program was rstabllsnod to stivly tho feasibility of cropt included plans foe agricultural dcvolonaent In traditional cultivation areas. This program -las fundedaintenarvos level daring the Carcia rr-za administration when narcotics traffickers flourished, and reports of high level military and civilian Involvement la trafficking seriously danagod nollvla's prestige; the essential elements of tie program, however, ramiore creditable control effort by Polivjan autrnrltlim.

The new government, under General Celeo TOrrelio, is attempting to distanoo Itself from the previous administration's involvement in tho Illicit drug Industry, (few narcotics legislation has been enacted,ew coca census Is expected to bo completed in .moreover, many officials who wore clowly associated with the previous regime have been replaced or reassigned.

ign of good faith, the Thrrelio npverrnent recently turned over two Individuals currently under Indictment in tho IK for trafficking activities. The major trafflckern, howevor, remain at large, and it remains to bo seen how effective or agressive the new (yjvrrnnent will he in implementing Its new narcotics control program.

rriving Prcduction Estlmates

The marijuana and cocaine production estimates cltied in this report nay be off by plus or minusercent. Traditionally, estimates of the amount of illegal drug crop cultivation hove teen based on visual observations on tho ground or from low flying aircraft, for example. In ThailanI traditional setho-lserminal opium cultivation to bo0 hectares

US has recently signed an Sin million aidrl nrant ro he used for the rovolopv?nt of the Cpp-ir fluall^ianajor coca cultivation area.

duringrowing season. Analysis^

revealedectares of Saveral factors account for

cpiun cultivation during that growingaccount tor

this difference. First, people tend to overestimate the extent of cultivation when viewinground vantage point/ Second, differentiation natural vegetation and illicit cultivation is difficult when observing Iron

raveling at relatively high spool, in ono amiliaf;offields" sighted free,actually were wild ferns. Third, an observer often views onlyportionoca, narijuana, or oniui gtrr-ioY-reglon, viiioh navple of the total reigon.

An *Hitional factor required forountry's coca, nariiuana and opium prcduction are yields per hectare of cultivation. Yield factors are often subjectively based on field observations arrl interviews with famers.actors are then njultipled by cultivation hectarage toroduction estimate.

lastly, toountry's or region's illicit drug ox-torts, the follO'irrj should bo taken into account: consumption of coca,and opium in tha tource country and region; stockpiling; crop leas due to

K "anft":ortaClon artJ Pilfrrage; and inefficient ootheds in theard rwrphino/heroin conversion

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