USSR-POLAMD- The View from Moscow
The Soviet leaderehip probably derive* tome eatiefaction from It development* in Poland and tee* more possibilities forevent* by nonmilitary mean* than i did *ix month* ago. onetheless, by oontxnuing to pueh the regime in mareav to take tougherhe Sovists arealculated risk of having to intervene ehould any eneuingut of hand. femsmmV
by the outcome
of Solidarity's recant congress. Although it began.onadical note with an "appeal" to East European 'workers, its second session was sore restrained. The congress also revealed the depth of divisions within the union.
Party leader Kania's replacement by Prime Minister Jaruxelskl. was another development that met Soviet approval, Jaru.elski probably is not Moscow's first choice to lead Poland, but be conveys an image of strength and appealsbroad "Pff^ ty opinion. The Soviets' qualified approval will fade quickly if Jaruselski proves less resolute than they believe necesssry. ffffff^
Efforts To Gain Influence
At the same tine, that the Soviets have been puttlnq pressure on the Polish leadership to restore partyand suppress union militancy, they also have sought to foster moderation on Solidarity's part. Osing broader strategy, Moscow probably sees more possibilities for shaping events in Poland by nonmilitary mans than it did last spring, eaeaam
Since July, Moscow has cultivated contacts withunknown officials elected at the Polish By now the Soviets ere better informednew functionaries end are likely to havewith some. The Central Committee vote toresignation probably helped to reassure thetha^tjej^wie^some Influence in the partyfor ,
The Soviet* elso have continued to use their Vatican contacts to seek the Church's helo in urging moderation on Solidarity. Mote rcconUy, 'hey appear to have sstab-lishsd direct contact with union moderates, perhapa Solidarity chief Walesa. fafaaaemmmBBmBmam
In addition, Moscow is using the threat of economic sanctions to quash anti-Soviet activity. ovietdelegation reportedly indicated In September that the USSR might insist upon balanced bilateral trade, in effect depriving Poland of essential energy and raw material imports. aeBBememeaaaaeaw
The Soviets probably would not actually carrya threat, because it could precipitate massiveand force Moscow to intervene militarily. some Polish officials and members ofbelieve that the economic threat hasIntervention as Moscow's ultimate weapon,
The Soviets probably believe that their besta nonmllitary solution lies in convincing thethat union militants are to blame forconditions and that Poland's well-beingclose relatione with the USSR. For now, Moscow0tavailable to It to encourage
the steady strengthening of party and government authority and the political neutralization of Solidarity. Tha Soviets probably will allow Jaruzelski considerable room to maneuver, so long asrksaassortlon of party control. 4bbbbb.
to Intervene themselves should the regj
Monetheless, the Soviets will press Jeruaelskl to reapood firmly to any challenge from Solidarity. Theyln9risk that the Polish regime will be able to handle any disturbances resulting frome signaling their willingness
lose control.Original document.