NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Created: 2/4/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

National Intelligence Daily

Thursday

42

Yra

OR RELEASE

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A government spokesman admitted yeat.erdny thatat the -Jrsus work, near Warsaw have engaged into uxpress dissatisfaction with the recent food price increases, but denied that any strike, had takon place. He also confirmed the magnitude of tha incident in Gdansk, saying police had used tear, flni and water hoses to disperserowd of

The militaiy government, meanwhile, reportedlyin early January to assign selected reserveto fill the post* of party secretaries In various localities. Those chosen would serve as civilians in the party for at least IB months, largely in urban nrcas.

imJlat vein,appointed governor

of Gdansk Province.

Comment; Tho government's tendency to playincidents of worker unrest suggests that thein Uraus may be norc serious than it admit*.

Trie use of officers, though technicallypresumably remair. under military discipline,the military's leading role behind a Such plana by the military Indicate thatnot believe the party will soon be capable ofcontrol of affairs byspecially inspotsas Gdansk.

Possiblfi forced Deliveries of Cram

Warsaw on Monday raised grainercent to encourage sales from privatea government spokesman yesterday refused to rulecompulsory deliveries if farmers fail toamount* to the state.

Comment; The government apparently .till lacompulsory deliveries andhope that such a

--continued t

rr

ers -ho only suffer -hen farmer, withhold food.

i^c? andVvonoc* production.

rrA_Betw*en Warsaw aj!d. Woocgw

l.ruMlrt.y|

Jisagreement between Jjaen over soviet aid

CoPVgnti

The reported differences between Jaruselski restoring party cohesion, and improving the economy.

rliament to

?h. casino of martialong time andhat any Western

nti

action can help the ?oles.

the official's commontsrew-

rhe official's comments illustrate a

J II, M

flicting foTggg-

beruuilsXlcaughthow to proceed.

TASS reports thateeting with theAdvisory Committee onproposed that the USSR and the west reducenumber of medium-range nuclear weaponstargets in Europe" by two-thirds Themaintained for some timealance ofeach currently exists between the

B the lest. [

Onecember the Soviets formally proposed at the INF talks in Geneva that both sides reduce this number

"Tiy the end5 andr ^iy the end ofgovernments are not inprPEseTTwith Moscow'stut have expressed concern that it will attract

considerable public Interest or.ee it is leaked.r

Comment; Brezhnev's reference to systems "aimed at targets in Europe" suggests that the Soviets may beto negotiate onbeyond the Urals but capable of hitting NATO countries. They have hinted

illingness to do so before, however, so there is

nothing substantially new in the proposal.

The Soviet effer will not threaten NATO's enncenrus on INF or give the peaceignificant lift. The Allies, however, will want Washington to discuss in detail the shortcomings of the Soviet approach. Inthe West Europeans will hope that the US willpunlicly some details of its practical approachegotiating agreement on the "zero op Lion, "r-

3

:rolCcseietM tfc

An Insurgent raidhe departmental capital ol' lisulutan on Tuesday followed earlier attacks on several other towns in northern and eastern El Salvador. the guerrillas never penetrated beyond theof the city, they still hold two of several small towns previously seized in the north and east. Military and civilian casualties there reportedly have been

capitalisef- ^Jtwcarjc ihul wuuneircract. Latest reports Indicate only foureight remaining UH-lll helicopters and fourlx Ouragen flqhter-bonbers areUnite the government's ability to respondto scattered guerrilla actions,

Comment: The insurqents apparently plan to continue to harass various towns in the north and east. They also may staiju raids around San Salvador and will continue to sabotage transportation and communications systems.

The guerrillas evidently aro receiving substantial shipments of arms and ammunition that are deliveredto the ccastal area in the southeast and thenLhtouqhauL Lite country. [

Although the government is mill concerned that will attempt to create 'liberated zones"north and east, this does not appear to beobjective. Instead, they probably hopeemall-ucaie attacks willlimateamong tho population and convince much of thecommunity that legitimate elections aro Under current circumstances, their chancesappear good,

RAQ: Military and Political Itaves

fulcra.

These military preparations are ?f

to nuLrouC nonalignedWestern states to use their quod office* to helpettlemen...

Comment: "he peace moves probably will notthT*iranian offensive, which might be launchedFebruary, the anniversary of the Iranianoffonsive rdesigned to trap the IraqiShush and Peaful in the hope of causing aIraqi morale.

Although renewed heavy fighting seems likely, the outlinesettlement that eventually might satisfy moat of Iran's major demands appear to be emerging. Tha two countries, working through the UH Secretary General, ate exploring conditionsease-flte If the Iraqis were to withdraw.

hungary; problems in obtaining credit

olosing coccus;ta

i lintsn bs'.k*" theireist-.jv

rrencn, &wisb, aim: nucwu<ji<iu iwimb iidvu uui. Ein hungary and that austrian banks are reviewing their lending policies. hungarian hankers have expressed concern for several months about budapest's ability to secure medium-term loans from the west in the wake of events in poland. dudapest reportedly haswarsaw that its failure to meet its financial obligations will hurt hungary and other east european countries.

hungarian officials also are said to be concerned that western sanci: one against the ussr and poland will hurt hungary's; trade and financial relations with the west and endanger its reform program. they believe that some soviet officials would be pleased to see hungary forced to rely leas on western trado and credits!^

comment: budapest evidently has been trying for months to insulate itself economically from some of the effects of the crisis in poland, it has approached banks with innovative financial proposals,hift irom its traditional policy of seeking large medium-term syndicated loans. hungary's application for membership in the imf and world hank last november was almostmotivated in part by concern about the possibilityecreasing availability of commorciai credits.]

the hesitancy of major western banks to lenu lo hungary seems likely to spread. utoff is unlikely in the immediate future, budapest probably will find that borrowing is increasingly difficult and that available funds are short term. I

hungary's balance-of-payment3 position probably will deteriorate this year, but existing banker reluctance seems linked almost entirely to poland, when knowledge at hungary's expected current account deficit this year becomes more widely known. western bankers will be even less willing to lend. i

USSR-CHINA: Border River Navigation Talks

Tho Chinncr have agreedoviet proposalth annual session of the Sino-Suviot Border River Navigation joint Commission next Wednesday in the Chinese town cf lloihe. lks--which arc unrelated to those the Soviets proposed last fall--are one of the few remaining regular bilateral contacts. The iointmet. annually in recent years, exceptiatus in the

Trtn

U FOTrTHTT PA i

NOHKAY: Natural Ca Resources

The new government is Inviting foreign oi1 companies to bid for offshore drilling concessions north of62nd parallel. Horwcgian companies already have discovrillion cubic feet of gas in Arctic waters nearut authorities have decided thatrillion cubic feet of gas reserves must be proven

ilon to justifyipeline through

Sweden todeliver gas to the European continent-|

Comment: Foreign participation and increasedefforts could make additional

elivery to tho continent before the early MOs Oslo! however, probably will be unable todevelopment enough to offer the West ^opeen. an alternative to their currently planned purchases ofgas. Norway's new policy changes could nake itsuture alternative to the proposed the Siberian pipeline tor those countries willing to pay

premium.

& February PJB2

SPECIAL ANAL.YSKS

POLAND: Hole of the Church

Hiewzial lav -'i-isis haa ueu&ened thette wegCne on.;'km

Isa iie wrxfcrrfJ ao "Hc/wsi broker" yaoilCceiinaandthe hitrwvhjvtvr

c sye*ae nscw-r*fforts to

maintain omtxvl.

Since the Imposition of martial law, the Church has retained its moral authority, organizational structure, and popular support. The Church's criticism of martial law restrictions hau enhanced its traditional image as defender of human right* and critic of excesses by the state. Its involvement in aid distribution hasits bonds with the population and has demonstrated_ that it remains the only reliable link with the Wcstj

Despite its unrivaled moral authority, however,lacks the power to guide developments. Somethe Church feor that government and partyenough momentum to threaten its access to thethe freedom to teach catechism.

The leaders also are frustrated at their failure to bring party and Solidarity moderates together and their inability to prevent dangerous outbursts such as the one last week in Gdansk. The Church's influence probably is weakest among younggroup most likely to engage in violent resistance.

Ambivalence Toward Solidarity_

Although the Church is attempting to get the ban on Solidarity lifted and its rights restored, it knows that the regime will never consent. Furthermore, many in the

nued

Church who earlier counseled caution to Solidaritynow partly blame the union--and especially its Intel-lectualthe continuing crisis.

Archbishop Glemp seems frustrated with theof Solidarity leaders, particularly Lech Walesa. Continued Church prossure on Solidarity to scelo down ita demands and to persuade Walesa to talk with the regime could put it directly at odds with union leaders.

Differences Within the Church

There ie basic agreement within the Churchon the need to avoid violence, to ease martialand to renew the union-governmentthe same time, however, there are considerableover tactics.

The tense situation--especially the danger that unrest will lead to moreany course of action risky. The most difficult calculation for Church leaders ishe amount of pressure to put on thn regime, j|

Archbishop Glerap hasiddle-of-the-road position, lie believes that the Church has totrong stand against the regime's repressive measures. He aloo ia afraid to undercut Premier Jaruzelski, whom he viewsoderatc under siege by hardliners. Glemp haa oiton auuonr^tgd Jaruzelski and has opposed US sanctions.

The Archbishop, however, lacks the authority of the late Cardinalnd his tactics have beenby other prelates. The more moderate among them believe that tough statements are counterproductive, while the more conservative believe the regime will move toward accommodation only under increased pressure]

10

Pope John Paulrobably will discuss thosewith Glemp and several high-ranking bishops when they arrive in Rone today. The delegation includes two prelates who represent the contending viewpoints.

i rr:riujrv IV-^

The Pope is likely to endorse continuing Glempperhaps with some modifications. Thebe reluctant to run roughshod over hishowever, and the resultant decision mayenough to allow ror continued differencesat the local

Such differences need not impede seriously the Church's ability to actinifieu fashion ir. Warsaw. LocaL clashes between the Church and regime, however, may become issues ot contention at the national level.[_

Outlook

Despite internal disputes over tactics, concernChurch over violence and tho possibility ofwill prompt its leaders to take positionseffect support the regime's pacification efforts with the populace, however, is not likely toand the church will continue to be in_aencourage any eventual political accommodation.

The Turkish Government continues to cewhat it sees as provocative Greekspite Greek President xaramanlis's propcsal that botn sides tone den the rhetoric. The Greeks,'have been watching closely recent Turkish navalnear some of the Greek-held Aegean Islands andare concerned about Turkish intentions in contested areas

Prospects for Conflict

Neither Greece nor Turkey appears to be planning an attack. The political as well as military costs would be extremely high./-

12

Mutual distrust and military posturing, nonetheless raise the possibilityiscalculation^ an inadvgrt^ t ant, incident that

oy70

Implications for NATO

NATO will continue to be faced with verbal sparring between tho two countries that will complicate Alliance neeLings and the countries' relations with principal Allies. Moreover, the failire to resolve Aegean command and control problems will complicate integration of NATO-committed forces and prevent NATO planners from prearrang-ing areas of responsibility and coordination procedures.

Roll] - verirpr. .it n-lug Ailiai'.ce tears regarding deterioration of Lhe southern flank's military capability to obtain arms aid on the mostterms.

Tnp

Original document.

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